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REPORT. 
STATE OF IowA, f 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL's OFFICE, 
DEs MoiNES. 
To the Honorable Albert B. Cttmmins, Governor of Iowa: 
In compliance with the requirements of law, I hereby submit 
to you a report of the business transacted by this office during 
the years Igoo and rgor. 
Schedule "A" is a complete list of all criminal appeals sub· 
mitted to the supreme court of which disposition has been made. 
Schedule "B" is a list of all of the civil cases tried in the 
different courts of the state and of the United States, with the 
results of such trials. 
Schedule "C" is a statement of all criminal and civil cases 
pending on the fir st day of January, Igo2. 
Schedule "D" is the official written opinions delivered by this 
office during the years Igoo and Igo i. 
CR IMINAL APPEALS. 
Th P. policy of thi s office, that a ll appeals in criminal cases 
shall be submitted to th e supreme court at as early a day as can 
be reasonably done, has been fol lowe,d as stri ctl y as is practi-
cable, and th e res ults have been satisfactory. It is now ge ner-
ally understood by th e members of the bar throug hout the state 
tha t unn ecessary delays in th e de termin ation of a ppeal s in crim-
inal cases cannot be obtain ed, and the cases are as a rule 
promptly prepared and submit ted for determination by the 
supreme court. 
Com parative ly few of th e judgments of th e district courts in 
criminal cases are reversed by the supreme court, and thi s fact is 
evide nce of the ab ility and care with which this class of cases is 
tried in the d istrict courts of the state. The crim in al laws of the 
sta te are as a rule wise ly and fai th fully administered , and gener-
ally well enforced throughout th e sta te . 
D urin g th e past year th ere has bee n an unu sual number of 
murd er cases tried in th e d istrict and suprem e courts. I am 
unable to suggest any reaso n why thi s cond ition exists. Not-
(3) 
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withstanding this fact, the criminal statistics of the state com-
pare favorably with those of other states, and our people are, as 
a rule, law abiding citizens . 
CIVIL CASES. 
Schedules "B" and "C" furnish information as to the status of 
the civil cases in which the state is a party, and it is not deemed 
necessary to refe r to all of such cases here in detail. . . . 
The most important of this cl ass of cases now pendmg In the 
courts are what is known as 
TH E LAKE BED CASES. 
When th e original government survey of the lands within the 
state of Iowa was made, many lakes were meand ered and 
excluded from the public lands claimed by th e government, 
which have since becom e d ry, eith P. r by natural or artificial 
means. The d ry in g up of these la l{es has left large trac ts of 
land which were not included in the governm e nt survey, and the 
q ues tion as to the ownenhip of such lands is now invo lved in 
several suits pending in the district courts. 
It is th e clai m of the state that it hold s the absolute title to 
all lakes and lake beds within th e sta te und er its right of sov-
ereignty , while it is urged on the other hand, by those opposed 
to the claim made by the state, that such lake beds we re, and are, 
a part of the swamp lands of the state, which pas sed from t~e 
government to th e state, and from the state t~ the ~ou?t.y In 
which the same are situated , and from the counties to mdi vidual 
purchasers. 
The case of Rood v. Wallace is now pending in the supreme 
court of the United States upon a writ of error to the supreme 
court of th e state, the state of Iowa, as intervenor therein, 
being the plaintiff in error. The case has been arg ued full y in 
print, and will be submitted for de termination a t th e October 
term of the supreme court of the United States . 
Another case of like chart!.cter is pending in the district court 
of Greene county, and it is hoped that a decision of these cases 
will determine the rights of the state in the lake bed lands. 
COLLATERAL INHERITAN CE TAX. 
The law imposing a tax upon collateral inheritance has been 
before the supreme court in several cases for construction, and 
many questions involved have been determined by that court. 
Questions are, however, continually arising as to the interpreta-
., 
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. t ion and intent of this law which have not been ·settled by the 
courts, and which are frequently difficult of determination. The 
solution of these questions has imposed a large amount of labor 
upon thi s office. 
The law has in some respects been criticised as imposing a 
hardship upon persons who succeed to property subject to the 
c0llateral inheritance tax. One case where such criticism was 
made came to this office for determination. 
The decedent was a re sident of Pennsylvania and owned real 
estate in Iowa. By the terms ot his will he directed that all of 
his real estate be sold and converted into personalty, and then 
divided among certain collateral heirs. 
Under the laws of Pennsylvania, a will which provides that 
real estate shall be con verted into personalty, draws to the juris-
diction of that state such real estate as personal property of the 
deceased, although it may be situated in another state ; and 
under the decision s of the courts of that state such real estate 
becomes liable to pay the collateral inheritance tax imposed by 
the laws of Pennsylvania. 
Under our statute there is no doubt that real estate situated 
within thi s state is liable for the collateral inh eritance tax 
imposed by the laws of this state, and the di ve rse holding of the 
separate jurisdictions thus makes such property subjec t to double 
taxation. This is undoubtedly a hardshi p upon the persons who 
succeed to the inheritance of such real estate, but I see no way 
out of the difficulty, except for the supreme court of Pennsyl-
vania to reverse its decision as to ' the liability of real estate 
located elsewhere than within its jurisdiction to pay a collateral 
inheritance tax within that state. The holding of that court has, 
by the courts of several states, been criticised as being clearly 
illogical, and not in harmony with the taxing powers of the sev-
eral states. 
On the whole, however, I believe the collateral inheritance tax 
law is salutary in its effect, beneficial to the state, and produces 
a revenue with as little hardship as any system of taxation which 
has been devised. 
CORPORATIONS. 
The law requires the attorney-general to examine and approve 
the articles of incorporation of certain classes of insurance com-
panies, and the amendments thereto, before the same can be 
approved by the auditor of state and a certificate issued to such 
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company giving it the right to transact business within the state. 
This provision of the statute necessarily also brings to the 
attorney-general for examination the policies and contracts pro-
posed to be issued by such insl:lrance companies, as well as their 
by-laws which fix the method of transacting their business. 
Such examination imposes upon the attorney-general a large 
amount of labor and responsibility, and there should, in my 
judgment, be a provision of law requiring insurance companies to 
pay a reasonable compensation for such labor. 
In my opinion all articles of incorporation required by law to 
be filed with either of the state de!Jartments, should be submitted 
to th e attorney-gen eral and to the executive council for approval, 
and that no grant of corporate rights or of corpnrate franchise 
should be made by the state except upon such approval. 
Corporations seeking corporate franchises and powers from the 
state should submit to the attorney-general and to the executive 
council not only their articles of incorporation, stating in general 
terms the character of the business of the corporation, but a com-
plete plan of the business sought to be transacted by such cor-
poration, stated in detail, that such officers may determine before 
a corporate franchise is granted by the state and a certificate 
issued to such corporation authorizing it to transact business 
within the state, whether the business which it proposes to trans-
act is a legitimate business, and. not opposed to the public policy 
of the state. 
A large portion of the entire business transacted within the 
state is done by incorporated companies, and many corporations 
are asking that their articles of incorporation be filed by the sec-
retary of state and a certificate issued permitting them to transact 
business, which, to say the least, is of doubtful legitimacy. Bond 
and investment companies, co-operative and home building 
associ a tions and other companies and as~ociations of like char-
acter, have multiplied rapidll throughout the state, and are claim-
ing the right to transact ousiness within the state, practically 
without the supervision of any of its officers. · 
While the power to determine whether the business proposed 
to be transacted by a corporation is legitimate, must necessarily, 
in some degree at least, be lodged with the secretary of state or 
other officer to whom the articles of incorporation are presented 
for filing, the right to reject and refuse to file articles of incor-
poration of companies seeking to transact a business which is 
against public policy, should be clearly defined by law and, in my 
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judgment, lodged with the attorney-general and the executive 
council. 
No corporation desiring to transact a legitimate business within 
the state can object to its articles of incorporation being examined 
and passed upon by the attorney-general and the executive coun-
cil, and such a law would have the effect of preventing the organi-
zation of companies for the purpose of transacting a business of 
doubtful legitimacy. 
INSURANCE LAWS. 
The insurance laws of the state are inadequate for the govern-
ment and control of insurance companies doing business therein. 
They are incongruous, inharmonious and conflicting, and I believe 
it would be wise for the legislature to repeal every line of the 
present insurance laws and enact a complete, harmonious and 
adequate insurance law by which the various kinds of insurance 
would be classified and the rights and duties of insurance com-
panies clearly defined. 
Iowa has been a fruitful field for the organization of insurance 
companies . Many companies have been organized within the 
state apparently for the sole benefit of the managers thereof, and 
without regard to the interests of the members or policy holders. 
Under the present law it is practically impossible to prevent the 
organization of such companies. 
An insurance depar~ment should, in my judgment, be created 
by the legislature, which should have the supervision and general 
control of all classes of insurance, including fraternal benefit 
societies. 
BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS. 
The creatiOn of a state board of law examiners by the twe-nty-
eighth general assembly has imposed upon the attorney-general a 
considerable amount of additional labor. The preliminary work 
required for the examination of the applicants by the board, neces-
sarilf falls upon him as chairman thereof. The operation of the 
law to the present time has been very satisfactory, and I have no 
doubt that the ultimate result will be very beneficial to the bar of 
the state. 
In this connection I desire to bear witness to the fidelity and 
ability of the other members of the board in the work of carry-
ing out the provisions of the law relating to the examination of 
applicants to the bar. The members were happily selected by 
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the supreme court, and the work of the board has been most 
harmonious. 
MONEY RECEIVED. 
The only money received by me to the present time is the sum 
of $37.90, which was unexpended balance of the amount required 
to be deposited with the clerk of the United States supreme 
court for costs in Campbell v. Waite, which was taken to that 
court upon a writ of error by the state. The amount was received 
by me April 17, Igor, and on the same day paid to the state 
trea!urer, whose receipt I hold therefor. 
NEEDS OF THE OFFICE. 
There is now allowed by law an assistant attorney-general who 
receives an annual salary of $1,200. In my judgment this sum is 
insufficient compensation for the labor of a lawyer who is fitted 
by education and training to do the work of an assistant in th~is 
office. -
I call attention to w!1at was said by my predecessor in his last 
biennial report upon the subject, and the comparisons which he 
makes between the compensation paid the assistant in the attor-
ney-general's office of this state and other states having substan-
tially the same population. The office of assistant attorney-gen-
eral must be filled by one who has received a liberal education 
and thorough training in law, and has had experience in the prac-
tice, and yet the salary which is ·fixed by the legislature as com-
pensation for the time and services of a person so equipped, is 
$12oo-less than is paid the clerks in other departments of the 
state. 
A bill was introduced in the senate at the last session of the 
general assembly raising the salary of the assistant attorney-gen-
eral to $2,000. The committee on compensation of public officers 
reported it back for passage amended so as to make the compen-
sation $1,500. In this form it passed the senate, but did not pass 
the house. The same sessioR of the legislature raised a number 
of the salaries of the clerks and bookkeepers in the different 
departments, and many of them are now receiving a salary m 
excess of that paid the assistant attorney-general. 
I find no fault with the legislature for raising the salaries of 
clerks and bookkeepers in the state departments, as I believe the 
state should pay its employes liberally; but I think the legisla-
ture has fallen into a serious error when it expects to obtain a 
trained lawyer, competent to perforr_n the work required of an 
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assi stant in the office of the attorney-general, for $1,200 a year, 
I hopP. the next legislature will see the necessity of fixing an 
adequate compensation for this office. 
A set of the reports of the supreme court of the United States 
is greatly needed in this office. Aside from the reports of our 
own court, the reports of no other court are so frequently con-
sulted, and it is a great drawback and hindrance to the prosecu-
tion of the work of the office to be compelled to go or send to the 
library whenever it is necessary to examine a decision contained 
in one of these reports. 
The idea appears to have grown up in the minds of the people, 
and p!lrticularly of the legi:;lators of the state, that the work of 
the office of the attorney-general can be successfully performed 
without a well equipped office. Nearly a hundred briefs and argu -
ments in cases are written in a year, nearly as many opinions pre-
pared upon important questions during the same length of time; a 
large number of briefs in the courts of the state in civil cases 
must be prepared and the general routine work of the office trans-
acted. All this is expected of the office with a meager equip-
ment and an insufficient and underpaid office force. 
It is a great draft upon the time of the attorney-general and 
his assistants to be compelled to go to the state library every 
time it is necessary to examine a case contained in a report of 
the supreme court of the United States. The cost of a set of 
these reports is small, and they should be made a part of the 
equipment of the office. 
In conclusion, permit me to express , my appreciation of the 
courtesy extended to me by you and the other officers of the 
state with whom my official duties have brought me in contact, 
and to say that our relations have been most pleasant during my 
term of office. I also acknowledge th ,faithful and valuable ser-
vices of my assistant, Mr. Chas. A. Van Vleck, and the other 
members of my office force. If the work of the department is 
deserving of any commendation, it is largely due to the efficient 
manner in which they have discharged their duties. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHAS. w. MULLAN, 
Attorney- General. 
SCHEDULE "A." 
The following is a list of criminal cases submitted to the supreme court, and also rehearings asked during 
the years 1900 and 1901, and the final disposition of the cases: 
I I I 
TITLE OF CASE. COUNTY, DECISION. OFFENSE. 
State v. Wru. M. Bair, appellee .................. Audubon ........ .. .. Reversed December 20, 1900 Practicing medicine as an itinerant 
State v. Wm. J. Baughman, appellant... ... Cass ....... .. ........ . physician. Affirmed April 13, 1900 .. ...... Incest. State v. Jane Stinson B~be, appellant... ... Linn ................. . 
State y. Theodore Burdock, appellant.. ...... Clinton .. .... .... .. .. 
State v . J esse Bige, appellant .. .... .. .................. Hamilton ........ . 
Affirmed Decembt r 18, 1901 Keeping house of ill-fame. 
R eversed October 16, 1900 Murder. 
State v. Cbas. Bishop, appellant .................... Mitchell .......... .. 
State v. Wm. Boone, appellant ...... ............... J ohn8on ... .. .... .. .. . 
Reversed December 19, 1900 Seduction. 
Affirmed October 20, 1900 .... Burglary. 
State v. John W. Booth, appellant ................ Howard .... .. .... .. 
State v. L. R. Bone, appellant........ ................ Cerro Gordo .. .. 
Affirmed May 23, 1900...... .. .. Assault with intent to commit murder. 
Affirmed December 20, 1901 Perjury. 
State v. Joseph Burns, appellant.. ............... Dubuque ........... . Reversed October 9, 1901.. .. Murder. Reversed on reheariag April 
State v. Max Bysong, appellant......... ............ F ayette ........... . 10, 1900 .. ................. .. ......... .. Reversed December 19, 1900 
Seduction. 
Assault with intent to inflict great 
State v. Chas. Carnagy, appellant... ............ . 
State v. S . B. Cuter, appellant .... ............ .. 
State v. James Chapman, appellant.. ........ . 
State v. Irvin Ubanvet, appellant.. ....... ........ . 
State v. Simon Clipper and Fred Klocke, 
appellants ........... .. ...................... ................... .. . 
State v. S.D. Clough, appellant... .............. . 
State v. John Coontz, appellant ................... . 
State v. Joe Cordray, appellant.. .. .......... ...... .. 
State v. James Cunningham, appellant... .. .. 
State v. Thomas Daily, Jr., appellant... .... . 
Linn ........ .......... . 
'\\7 arran .......... .. 
Jones ........ ....... . 
Sao ................. .. 
Allamakee ...... . 
Warren .. .. .. .... .. 
Wayne ........... .. . . 
Polk ................. . 
Audubon ........ .. . . 
Iowa ................ .. .. 
Affirmed May 24, 1900 ...... .. 
Reversed October 4, 1900 .. .. 
Affirmed February 6, 1900 .. . 
Affirmed October 2, 1900 ... . 
bodily injury. 
Rape. 
Obtaining property by false pretense. 
Burglary. 
Keeping house of ill-fame. 
Dismissed January 27, 1900 Arson. 
Affirmed October 3, 1900 .. .. P erjury. 
Affirmed October 24, 1901.. .. Assault with intent to commit murder. 
Affirmed October 24, 1900 .... Robbery. 
Affirmed May 8, 1900 ............ Murder. 
Reversed April 10, 1901.. ...... Seduction. 
'State v. A . I. Dexter, appellaut ..... .... ...... ... .. Hancock ...... .. .. .. Affirmed October 3, 1901 .... Obtaining property under false pre-
tense. 
Slate v. R. C. Dionell, Jr . . appellant.. ........ Polk .................... Affirmed October 24, 1900 ... . Burglary. 
State v. D. W. Doss, appellant.. .................... Clark .......... ........ Petition for rehearing over- Keeping a gambling house. 
ruled May 17, 1900 ......... .. 
State v. James H. Easton, appellant... ......... l<'ayette .... .. . .... Affirmed April 12, 1901.. ... 1\ Fraudulent banking. 
State v. S. G. Edmonds, appellant .... .. .......... C11lhoun .. .. ........ Dismissed October, 1900 ... Injury and destruction to grain grow-
State v. J . H . Engle, appellant... .... ....... ..... .. 
State v. Terl Evan.!, appellee ............... . .. ...... .. 
State v. Jacob Geier, appellant ......... ........... . 
State v. Wm. Glover and Frank Ward, 
appellants .................... ...... .. ............ .. ........ .. ...... .. 
State v. Jobn Gray, appellant ........... .. ... ........ . 
State v. F. W Gregory, appellant... .. .......... . 
State v. Gus Grimmell, appellant ........ ........ . 
State v. Gustave Hamann, appellant .. .. .. ..... . 
State v. Chas. Hart and Sol Davie, appel-
lants .. ..................... : ........ .. ....... ....... .. .. .... .. .. .. .... . 
State v. John Hopper, appellant.. .............. .. . 
State v. B. H. Hough , appellant 
State v. John Hudson, appellant 
State v . J esse Hunt, appellant ............ .. ......... . 
~tate v. Iowa Cent. R'y Co., appel ant ....... . 
State v. Mrs. H. M. Jameson, appellant . .. 
State v. ·G. C. Jamison and W. C. Crone, 
appellants .. .... .. ................. .... .. ........................ . 
State v. John Johnson, appellee ................... . 
State v. Cbas. Jones, appellant.. ...... .. ......... .. 
State v. Earl K~tuffman, appellant.. ...... .. .... .. 
State v. C. S. Keenan, appellant .................. . 
State v. Thomas King, appellant.. ................. . 
State v. William Kiseock, appellant ......... .. 
~late v. Albert ltu ba, Appellant 
Clay ...... .. ........... ! Reversed May 8, 1900 .. .. .... ... . 
Mahaska ........... Dismissed April 13, 1900 ... . 
Keokuk .. .. .... .... Affirmed October 2, 1900· ... . 
Des Moines .... .. 
Marshall ........... . 
Harding .... .. ..... . 
Greene ............... . 
Lyon ................... . 
Appanoose ...... . 
Polk ................ .. 
Fayette .. ........ . 
Clinton ............. . 
Decatur .. .. .... .. .. 
Franklin ........... . 
Cass ............ ....... . 
Affirmed February 5, 1900 .... 
Revereed October 4, 1901.. .. 
Reversed April 10, 1900 .... . . 
Reversed December 19, 1901 
Affirmed April 10, 1901... .. .. 
Affirmed April 10, 1900 .. .... . 
Affirmed October 24, 1900 .. .. 
Dismissed October 11, 1900 
Peti tio n for rebearing over-
rnlsd May 11, 1900 .. .... .... . 
Affirmed December 21,1901 
Affi r med May term, 1901 ... . 
Affirmed Uctober 20, 1900 ... . 
Reversed January 25, 1900 
Reversed October, 1901.. ..... 
Affirmed December 18, 1901 
Reverijed OctobH 4, 1900 .. . 
Affirmed May 9, 1900 .. .. .. ..... . 
Reversed October 1, 1901 .. .. 
Reversed Uctober 2, 1900 .. .. 
Affirmed October 11, 1901.. .. 
State v. Geo, Lee, appellant .............. .............. ! Ringgold .......... .. ! Reversed April 10, 1901... .... . 
ing on land. 
Embezzlement. 
Maintaining a liquor nuisance. 
Murder. 
Robbery. 
Murder. 
Maintaining a liquor nuisance. 
Abortion. 
Seduction. 
Burglary. 
Breaking and entering a building. 
Gambling for money. 
Murder. 
Burglary. 
Maintaining a nuisance. 
Larceny. (Two cases of like nature.) 
Using false weights. 
Aasault with intent to commit rape. 
Larceny from a person. 
Seduction. 
Libel. 
Breaking from penitentiary. 
Seduction. 
Depositing dynamite bomb on door-
etep of dwelling house . 
Abortion. 
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SCHEDULE "A "-CONTINUED. 
TITLE OF CASE. COUNTY. DECISION. OFF ENSE , 
State v. Mrs. Harry Lugar. appellant ...... .. 
State v. Chester McCullough, appellant .. .. Wright ..... -.. ..... Reversed December 21, 1901 Prostitution. MitchelL. .... ....... Reversed October 9, 1901 .. .. Larceny. State v. John McGarry, appellant ............. .. 
State v. Norml\o McPhenon, appellant.. .. .. Dubuque ..... ..... .. Reversed October 3, 1900 .... Murder . Louisa ................ Affirmed October 7, 1901 .. .. Murder. State v. C. H. Macy and E . D. Turner, ap· 
pellants .. ............................ ...................... .. ... .. . 
State v. L. R . Maxwell, appellee .................. .. Lee .............. .. ...... Affirmed October 2, 1901 .. .. Breaking and entering a building. P olk ........ .. .......... Reversed April10, 1901.. ...... Emb~zzlement. State v. Antoine Miller, a(tpellant.. ..... .. ...... .. 
State v. Clarence Mills, appellant .. ........ .. ... .. Lion .... ............. Reversed October 1, 1901 .. .. Maintaining a liquor nuisance. Davis .. ... .... .. ... ... Affirmed February 1, 1900 Murder. State v. D. Moran, appellant ........................ .. 
State v. Chas. More, appellant .. ........ ......... . Decatur ... .' ........ Reversed December 21, 19()0 Maintaining a liquor nuisance. Taylor .......... ...... AffirmAd December 20, 1901 Adultery. State v . Tho.s Mulholland, appellant ......... .. 
State v. Chas. H. Newhouse, appellant.. .... .. Ciioton .. .... .. .. ... ... Affirmed D ecember 20, 1901 Seduction. Monroe .............. Affirmed December 20, 1901 Larceny. State v. W. O' Day, appellant .. .... .......... .. .... .. 
State v. Harve Owens, appellant .. ...... ...... .. Howard ..... ... .. .. Affirmed May 23, 1900........... V iolating pharmacy law. Davis ..... ............. / Petition for rehearing over-
State v. Will Owens and J. L. Perry, ap- ruled January 25, 1900 ... Larceny. 
pellants .. .................... .. ...... .. ..... - ..... ...... , .... ...... . 
State v. Will Owens and M. E vans, appel- Hardin .............. .. Affirmed December 19, 1900 Keeping a gambling house . 
lants ................................. ...... .. .......... ...... ...... .. .. 
State v . John Penny ........... .. ..... ..... .. .... ............. . 
Ha.rdin ............ .. .. Affirmed December 21, 1900 K eeping a gambling house. 
Affirmed December 19, 1900 Murder. Emmet ............... . State v. J. L. Perry, appellan' ...................... .. 
State v. Frank Peterson, appellant .. ........ .. 
State v. E. A. Pinckney, appellant ............. . 
Hardin .......... .... .. 
Clinton ............... . 
Winnebago ...... . 
Affirmed .May 21, 1900 ....... Maintaining a liquor nuisance. 
Affirmed April 11, 11100....... Rape. 
Affirmed April 12, 1900 ........ Maintaining a liquor nuisa.nce. 
Reversed January 22, 1901.. Forgery . State v. Henry J. Prins, appellant.. .... ...... . State v. John Ryan and Jos. Griffith, ap-
Sioux 
pellants .......... ..... .......... .... ..................... .. 
State v. C. F. Santee, appellee ................... .. 
State v. G. T. Schlenker, appellee .............. .. 
Benton ...... .. ........ , Affirmed April 12, 1901... ..... 1 Burglary. 
Polk ................ ... Reversed April 12, 1900 ........ Using gasoline for illuminating b'ld'g. 
Polk ............... ..... Reversed December 22,1900 Selling adulterated milk. 
State v. Rober t Schwab, a ppellant ........... .. . 
State v. F red Sears, appellan t.. .. .... .... ........ .. 
State v. Bruce Shefler , David Rinar d and 
C. C. Hayes, appellants ....... ....... .... ......... .. 
State v. Jack Shields, appellee .. ........... ..... .. 
State v . Frank Sigler, appellant ...... .. .... .. .. 
State v. A. F. Smith, appellant ....... .. ... .... .. . 
State v. M. Snyder, appellant ....... .. ...... ... .. . 
State v. J. M. Spayde, appellant ........ ........ .. 
State:v. Chas. Spiegel, appellant .... ....... .... .. 
State v. Frederick Stahley , appellant.. .. .. .. 
State v. Alexander D. Storms, appellant.. 
State v. Geo. Sutton, appellant .... ..... .. .. ... . 
State v. R. R. Swallum, a ppell an t .......... .. 
State v. August Swanson, ap pellant . ...... .. 
State v. Clark Todd, appellan t.. 
State v. R. Tripp, appellant.. .. .................... .. 
State v. Frank Utter soo, appell ant ............ .. 
State v. Marvin Walters, appellant.. ............. . 
State v. E. A. Westbrook, appellant.. .. ... .. . 
State v. Hiram Westbrook, appeUaot.. ....... .. 
State v . Alice Williams, appell ant... ..... ...... . 
State v. G. A . Willimas, appellant .............. .. 
S tate v. Orris Wolf, Leavitt Wood and 
Chas . Allum, appellants .. 
S'ate v. A. L. Wood, appellan t... ........ .. ....... .. 
State v. Archibald, appellant .. ..................... .. 
State v. Owen Worthen , a ppell ant .............. .. 
State v. David R. Wright, appellant.. .. ...... .. 
State v. David R. Wrigh t, appellant .. .. ...... .. 
State v. Leonard Wycoff, appella11L .. .. .. .. . 
Sac .. ... ........ ..... .. [ Affi rmed January 15, 1900 .. \ Aseault with inten t to commit murder. 
Sllc......... .... ..... ... Affi rmed October 22, 1901.. .. Catching fish with a seine. 
Linn 
Pottawattamie 
Fremont ........... . 
Chickasaw .. .. .. .. 
Poweshiek ....... .. 
Webster ......... .. 
Polk 
Louisa ........ .... .. 
Louisa ...... ......... . 
Shelby .. .... ....... .. 
Hardin ........ ...... .. 
Winnebago ..... . 
Benton ...... ........ . 
Dallas ............. .. 
Polk ............ ...... .. 
Clayton ....... .... .. . 
Mahaska ......... .. . 
Mitchell 
Scott .......... ... .. .. . 
Union 
Poweshiek 
Madison ..... ...... .. . 
Harrison .... .. ... .. 
Benton .. ........ .. 
Appaooose ..... .. 
Appanoose ..... .. . 
Shelby .. .. .......... .. 
Affirmed December 22, 1900 
Reversed October 5, 1900 .... 
Affi rmed October 1, 1901... 
Affit·med May 29, 1901... ... .. . 
Affirmed May 23,1900 .......... . 
Pe tition for reheari ng over· 
ruled May 18, 1900 ........... . 
Affi rmed October 2, HlOO ... .. 
Affi rmed February 6. lllOO .. .. 
Affi rmed April 11, 1901.. ... .. 
Affi rmed December 22, 1900 
Reversed April 12, 1900 ....... 
Dismi~sed January 22, 1900 
Affi rmed ·April 11, 1900 ........ 
Affi rmed December 19, 1900 
Affir med October 24, 1900 .. .. 
Affirm ed May 21, 1900 ........ .. .. 
Affi rmed December 18. 190J 
Affi rmed May 23, 1900 ..... : .. 
Affi rmed October 23, 1900 .. 
Affi rmed December 18, 1901 
Reversed December 22, 1900 
Affi rm ed December 20. 1900 
A ffirme d December 19,1900 
Affi rmed May 8, 1900 ... ....... .. 
Reversed May 23, 1900 .. ... .. .. . 
Reversed D ecember 20, 1900 
Affirmed October 4, 1900 .. .... 
Assault with intent to inflict great 
bodily injury. 
Forgery. 
Murder. 
Larceny. 
Maintaining a liquor nuisance. 
F orgery. 
Arson . 
Incest 
Murder. 
Perjury. 
Maintaining a liquor nuisance 
Maintaining a liquor nuisance. 
Committing a felony. 
Obtaining a signature to a written in· 
strumeot by false pretense. 
Burglary. 
Seduction. 
L3r ceny. 
Rape . 
Larce ny from the person. 
Murder. 
Rape. 
P erjury . 
Murder. 
Burgl ary. 
M11rdar. 
Murder. 
Seduction. 
State v. Joe Zimmerman and Amos House, 
appellants ............ ............ .. .... .. ....................... ILion Reversed October 3, 1900 .... 1 Keeping a gambling resort. 
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SCHEDULE "B." 
The following is a list of criminal cases pending in the supreme 
court of Iowa on January 1, 1902: 
TITLE OF CASE. APPEALED FROM. 
Stat e v. American Express Co .... .. .. .. .. .. Tama .. ... .... .. 
State v. Bedison, C. H. , et al. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Page .... .... .. .. 
Stat e v. Ber~er Ellsworth and Wm. Phillips Mahaska ... .. . . 
State v. Boo er, Elza . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . Monr oe 
Statev. Boyd, A . J ., Jr. ............. ... . J efferso,;:: : :::: 
Stat e v. Comer~,..Frank .. ... . ................ Cass 
State v. Dunn, .l:'at. .. .. . .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. . Marshall .' :: :: : · 
State v. F ost er, Lucy...... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . K ossuth ....... .. 
State v. Gar ety , J ohn . . . . . ..... , .. .. . . ...... Audubon . . . . 
State v. Gathrilan, Alber t. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P ottawattamie. 
State v. Gr ay, J ohn .... .. ...... ..... ..... .. . Marshall. 
State v. Gr egor y, J. A .. .......... ..... .... P ottawattamie 
Stat e v. Hammer, M. & .. ................... Jasper .... .... .. 
~~a~e v. :an~ph~tat. .... .. .. .. . .... .. ... J effer son .. ... . 
a ev. eig1t, ·ed .... ...... .. .. .... ...... Linn ........... . 
State v. H oganj- J ohn .. .. .... .. .... .......... Winneshiek ... . 
S tate v. H oot, er ome W .. .......... ...... .. BlackHawk .. .. 
Sta te v. H ossack , Mar gar et . .. .. .. .... ...... W arren . . . ... .. 
Statev. Irvin, H . C .... .. .. .... . .. .. ...... .. . Madison .... .. 
State v. J ay, Mar t in .. ................ .... .. . 
Statev. J amison, G. C., and W. 0. Cron e. 
State v. Kuhn, Snrah ...... ...... .... ...... .. 
State v. L ock e, J ohn ... .. ....... . .. .... .. .. 
State v. Maxwell, J am es .... .. ......... . . 
Stnte v. Mtmgoven, H enry .. .... ..... .... .. 
Boon e ...... .. .. 
F ranklin ..... .. 
K eokuk .. .... .. 
Madison ...... . 
K eoknk . . . .. . 
Wapello . .... .. 
State v. Osborne, C. E. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. 
State v . Phillips, J ack. .. . . ... . . ...... .... .. 
Stnte v. Poulsen , Maggie ........ .. ...... .. .. 
Stnte v. Sheadler , William ........... ...... . 
State v. Shunkn, Joseph , J r . .. .. .. ..... ... . 
P olk . .. .. .... .. 
W apello .. .. .. 
Audubon ..... .. 
Johnson ...... . 
Ben ton . ...... .. 
State v. Snyd er , Geo. W . .. ....... .... .... . J efferson ... .. .. 
State v. Soper , Hubbell 0 . ..... , ... . • . . . 
State v. Steffens, Geo . .. .. .... .... .... ..... .. 
State v. Wheeler , I saac . .. . . , .... .. .... .. 
State v. W r i ght , J. L .. .. .. .... .. .. ...... .. .. 
W ashington ... 
Scott . ........ .. 
Boone .. .. . . .. . 
J asper .. ...... .. 
State v. Wrigh t , Geor ge .. .... ... ... .... . 
State v. Zenas, J ohn W. .. ....... ... . 
Muscatin e .... .. 
Muscatin e .... .. 
OFFENSE. 
K eeping intoxicating liquors 
with int ent to sell. 
Having intoxicating liquors 
in p ossession with intent 
t o sell. 
Robber y. 
Rape. 
Liquor nuisance. 
Rape. 
Mtuder . 
Assault w ith intent to 
murder . 
Larceny. 
Sedu ction . 
Mtuder . 
L ar ceny. 
Assault with intent t o com· 
mit murder . 
Selling intoxicating liquor s. 
Rnpe. 
Burglary. 
Assault wi th int ent t o com· 
mi t m urder . 
Murder. 
P urpose of prostitution and 
lewdn ess. 
Larceny. 
Using false w eight s. 
Murder by poisoning. 
Btu· glary. 
Seduction. 
Assault with int ent to 
m urder . 
R.obbery . 
Mtucler . 
K eeping a h ouse of ill-fame. 
Adultery. 
Assault with intent to com· 
mit m1uder . 
Assau lt with inten t to com · 
mit r ape. 
Con piracy. 
Rape. 
Ra)?e· 
Soliciting order s for intoxi· 
cat.in g liquors. 
Murder. 
Perjury, 
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SCHEDULE "C." 
The following is a list of civil cases in which the state was 
interested, for the years rgoo and rgor, pending in the supreme 
court of the United States: 
Manchester Jiire Insurance Company, et at., v. Herriott, Treasurer of State, 
et at. 
A suit in equity, in the United States circuit court for the Southern dis· 
trict of Iowa, Central division, praying for a preliminary injunction to 
restrain the enforcement of the provisions of section 1333 of the code of 
Iowa and to test the constitutionality thereof. To the bill filed the defend-
ants interposed a demurrer. Demurrer sustained and bill dismissed, from 
which decision plaintiffs have taken a writ of error to the supreme court of 
the United States, where the case is still pending. 
Edwin 0. Rood, et M . , v. George A. Wallace, et at ., State of Iowa Inter· 
venor, and four other like cases. 
In November , 1895, the state in.tervened in the above entitled actions 
pending in the district court of Humboldt county , claiming the title to a 
tract of land which' was form erly known as Owl lake, the sa me h aving been 
meandered by the surveyors of the general government. The plaintiffs 
claimed under the swamp land grants. '!'he sta te intervened to recover pos· 
session of the land and to h ave the title of the jake beds of Iowa settled by 
the courts . The cases were tried in November, 1896 . Judgment was ren· 
dered February 11, 1897, dismissing the intervenor' s p etition, from which 
judgment the state a ppealed. Upon appeal , the judgm ent of the lower 
court was affi rm ed May 26 , 1899, from which decision the sta te ha s taken a 
writ of error to the suprem e court of the U nited States , where the case is 
still pending. 
Scottish Union and N atio1:al Insurance Company, of Edinburg , Scotland, 
·and London, E11g land, v . H erriott, S tate Treasurer. et at. 
An action at law , brou ght in the district court of Polk cou n ty , Iowa, to 
recover taxes p a id defendant as treasurer of the state . Defendant, in hts 
individua l ca pacity , filed a m otion to be dismissed from the case , which 
m otion was sustained. In his capacity as treasurer , he fi led a demurrer to 
the petition, which was also sustained. From the decision of the court on 
the motion and demurrer, the plaintiff appealed to the supreme court, 
where the judgment of the dist r ict court was affi rmed October 27, 1899 , 
from which decision plaintiffs have taken a writ of error to the supreme 
comt of the United States, where the case is still pending. 
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Edward F. Waite v . A. C. Campbell, S'heriff 
Action before the United States circuit court , Northern district of Iowa. 
Waite was convicted by the district court of Howard county of violating the 
state statute . He claimed to be acting as special examiner of the pension 
department. He appealed to the supreme court of Iowa, and the judgment 
of the lower court was affirmed. He then sued out a writ of habeas corpus 
before Judge Shiras, judge of the district court of the Northern district of 
Iowa, and the petition was heard at Fort Dodge. William Wilbraham, Hon. 
C. C Upton and Hon. Thomas D Healey appeared for the sheriff. The court 
discharged the p~titioner. Because of the important question involved and 
appeal has been taken by the state to the United States circuit court of 
appeals, where the judgment was affirmed. The state sued out a writ of 
error to the supreme court of the United States; the cause was dismissed by 
that court for want of jurisdiction because no federal question was involved . 
The follow ing is a list of civil cases in which the state was 
interested, for th e years 1900 and 1901, pending in the supreme 
court of the state of Iowa : 
Johtt Herriott, Treasurer of the State, v . L. F. Potter, Admittistrator of 
the Estate of John Lawso1z, Deceased, et at. 
On September 7, 1896, John Lawson, a resident of this state, died, leav-
ing an estate consisting of several tracts of land and considerable p ersonalty , 
all in this state. On November 11, 1896, there being no heirs at law present 
and able to take charge of said real estate, L. F'. Potter was duly appointed 
and qualified as administrator of said estate. All of said la nds were listed 
in the office of the clerk of the district court of said county, as subject to 
the collateral inheritance tax, said real' estate being appraised at $11,900, 
and the personal property at $768.95 . On June 4, 190Q, appellant herein 
filed in the office of the clerk of said district court a petition praying an 
order direc ting said Potter to pay in to the office of the treasurer of the state 
of Iowa the amount of tax due on said estate as provided by law. On June 
29, 1900 , said Potter filed an answer to said petition , averring, a mong other 
things , that said property was not subject to said collateral inheritance tax. 
On June 29 ,1900, the cause was fully tried and submitted to the court , who 
found and determined that said Lawson departed this life after the enactment 
of the original collateral inheritance law of this state and before the enactment 
of the first amendment thereto, and that said appraisement by the collateral 
inheritance tax appra isers was made since the enactment of the first amet;td-
ment to the collateral inheritance tax law, and thereu pon dismissed appel-
lant's petition and denied his ap'!:Jlication for an order upon said adminis-
trator to pay the tax into the office of the treasurer of state . From said 
order and judgment of the court, appellant appealed to the supreme court of 
this state, where the case is now pend in~. 
State of Iowa v. W. M. McFarland , et al. 
This action was brought in the district court of Polk county, at the Sep-
tember term of court, 1897, upon the official bond of the defendant, to 
recover damages for the violation of his official duties as secretary of state. 
The case was tried to a jury at the March term, 1899, and a verdict for 
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$1,219, money misappropriated, and $362.25 as costs on said action was ren-
dered in favor of the state. On this verdict judgment was rendered, from 
which the state appealed to the supreme court. Defendants served notice 
of cross-appeal. The case is now being prepared for hearing in the supreme 
court. 
State of Iowa on the Relation of Miltott Remley, Attorney-General, v. Byron 
F. Meek, et at. 
An action in equity to abate a nuisance caused by using a dam across the 
Des Moines river at Bonaparte, Iowa, without providing a suitable fish-way 
as required by law. To the petition an answer was filed, averring the 
unconstitutionality of the law in que::;tion, and also the fact that there had 
been a former adjudication of the case . The prayer of the petition was 
denied, and pla intiff appealed to the supreme court . The judgment of the 
lower court was affi rmed October 24, 1900. A petition on rehearing was 
filed January 16, 1901, and overruled. 
State of Iowa v. S . F . Prouty, Judge. 
This is a certiorari proceeding, brought in the supreme court of Iowa to 
test the validity of an order made by defendant discharging one Mark Chiesa 
from the charge of conteml>t in violating an injunction restraining him from 
selling intoxicatin g liqu ors . The proceedings in the lower court were 
annulled, D ecember 20, l 9GO, and the tria l court was directed to take such 
further action in the contempt proceedings as were in harmony with the 
opinion of the supreme court. 
The following is a list of civil cases in which the state was 
interested, for the years 1900 and 190 1, pending in the district 
courts of the state of Iowa: 
P. Farrington v. State of Iowa . 
An action at law begun in the district court of Cedar county Iowa by the 
filing of a petition September 4, 1899, asking damages in' the ~urn of 
$175,000 for false and illegal imprisonment of plaintiff. No service of the 
notice has been m ade on either the attorney-general or the state of Iowa. 
It is probable that nothing will come of this action. It is still pending in 
the district court. 
John Y. Ferry v. C. S. Campbell, E:reet~tor, et at. 
An action in the district ·court of Pottawattamie county to enjoin defend-
ants from collec ting an inheritance tax upon the property of the estate of Frank 
C . Stewart, on the ground that chapter 28 of the acts of the Twenty-sixth 
General Assembly and the re-enactment thereof in the code of 1897 , are in 
contravention of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United 
States , and of section 9, a rticle 1 of the constitution of this state. Defend-
ants demurred to the petition, but their demurrer was overruled and a decree 
was entered for plaintiff as prayed. Defendants appealed to the supreme 
court, where the judgment of the lower court was reversed January 22, 
1900. Under the holding of the supreme court, the case was sent back for 
the purpose of hearing evidence as to whether the personal property had 
been distributed. The supreme court left the question open as to whether 
2 
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the real estate could be subjected to a tax after the adoption of chapter 27 
of the acts of the Twenty-seventh General Assembly. On November 29, 
1900, the district judge filed his opinion, wherein he held, 
First-That the personal property inventoried and appraised was by the 
executor sold and the proceeds derived from such sales were by him applied 
on the payment o f claims and expenses of a dministration, and the same is, 
therefore, not subject to colla teral inheritance tax. 
Secottd-That the devisees took possession of their respective parcels of 
real estate more than one year prior to the taking effect of chapter 3i of the 
acts of the Twenty-seventh General Assembly , and that the title to the said 
real estate vested in said devisees at the time of the taking possession of the 
sa me , and that the said real estate is not subject to payment of said collat-
era l inheritance tax . 
Tltird-lt is held that the money legacies provided for in the will are 
subject to and liable for the payment of said colla teral inheritance tax . 
Jolm Herriott, 7 reasurer of State, v. Jennie E. Day. 
Decedent, John M . Day , died in Iowa intestate in September, 1896, seised 
of certain personal and real property located in Polk county , Iowa. A cer-
tain pa rt of his property was bequeathed to collateral heirs . Settlement has 
been made wi th the treasurer of state for colla tera l inheritance tax, in so far 
as it effects personal property . The appra isers fixed the amount of real 
property subject to taxa tion a t $22 ,942.30 . On the 24th day of April, 1900, the 
t reasurer of sta te fi led a motion praying the court to fix a tax upon appraise-
ment, to be paid by said estat~:. a s collateral inheritance tax . This defend-
ant became owner of sa id real esta~e between the 6th day of March , 1899, 
a nd the 13th day of June , 1899 , and on the 26tb day of April, 1900, fi led a 
resistance to said motion. The district court held that the amendatory act 
of the T wenty-seve nth Genera l Ass~m b ly provided a mea ns for the enforce-
ment o f the tax , tha t it becam e a lien upo n this real esta te. The defendant 
became the owner o f th is land after th e ·amenda tory act ha d been passed, 
and she was, therefore , ch arged with no tice to the effect tha t this s ta tute 
created a lien upon this property , and was fu rther charged with the fact tha t 
the legisla ture had p rovided a remedy fo r its enforcement. 
William L. Og den v. L eslie JJ!l. Shaw, Governor of tlze Stale of I owa . 
An act ion in the d istric t court of Polk coun ty , Iowa, asking that a n order 
of m a n damus issue from said court , d irected to the governor o f the state 
of Iowa , com mand ing him to report the selection of lan d in Woodbury 
county , commonly known as ~· Sand hill lake bed, ' ' a s swamp and over-
flo w la nd to the com m issioner of the genera l land office at Washington , 
commanding tha t the said governor take such steps as he m ay deem 
expedient to secure to the state of Iowa t he title to said la nd as swamp land , 
and that he cause to be issued and delivered to Woodbury county, Io wa, a 
state swamp land pa tent to said la nd . The case has been fu lly su bmitted 
and is in the hands of the court for its decis ion. 
Walter Sltalte~zberger v . The Iowa S tate B oard of Medical E x aminers, et at. 
An application to the district cou r t of the sta te of Iowa, in and for Polk 
county for a writ of certiorari, requiring defendant s to certify to said court 
the record s of their proceedings, wherein plaintiff had made an app lication 
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for exam ination to practice medicine in the state of Iowa and had been ~~~~sed;uch examination. Said writ was ahowed on the i s t day of May 
b d h he secretary of said board made a retu rn to said writ tha t said 
oar_ ~d no record of any kind or character in its office rela~ive to the 
aophca twn for examina tion by plaintiff other tha n the ' · f · 
exhibit · tt h d ' cop ies o certam 
. d ~ba ac. e . to pla intiff ' s petition . The application was thereafter dis-
mtsse y plamtJff at his costs . 
State of Iowa v. Eqt~itable Loan Company of Ottumwa Iowa. 
': petdition in equity was filed in the dis tri ct cour~ in Wapello county 
agamst efendant company · th · 
th t h ' praymg e appomtment of a receiver and 
a e proceed to recover the assets of said compa ny a nd dispose ~f the 
s~m_e under th~ order of the court , and finally liquidate and wind up the 
:bea~:::~do~d::Isn~::r~~tai~~~mc~::Y w~~ ~~~s~n:erest of. the_ members and 
arrangement for voluntary liquidation . q ently dtsmtssed under an 
State 0~. Iowa on Rel~tion of Miltmt Remley , Attorney-General, v . the 
E qttu able Mtttttal Lzfe A ssociatiou of fVaterloo. 
A suit in equity in the distr ict court of the sta te of Iowa in d f 
Black Hawk count · • an or 
th y, ~raytng that a receiver be appointed to ta ke charge of 
. e f~o~e~ty and a~atr of the defendant. Also a restra inin g order prevent-!: ef : b endant, Its o fficers, agents a nd employes from removing from the 
0 
ce ~ e company any boo ks , papers or property of said com an or 
from dtsposmg of any of its asse ts , and tha t the com an b p y ' 
the corporation be dissolved. The prayer of the pe~iti: e wound u~ a nd 
the company is now in the ha nds of a receiver . n was grante and 
State of Iowa ~n Relation of ll!'iltmz R emley, A ttorney-General, 
Mutttal Buzldwgand L oan Assoct'ation , et al . v. the Iowa 
A suit in equity brough t in the dist rict court o f the state of Iowa in d 
f~; ~ub~lque county· praying th a t a receiver be ,appoin ted to take charg:~f 
a d oo s , assets ' and p roperty of the associat ion' a nd that a restra in •ng 
~r ~r be h g ra n ted ' p roh ibiting a ny of said parties herein named or a nyone 
avm g t e ass_ets of the co mpany in their hands , from tran~ferri n the 
~ame or re~ovmg the same out of the jurisd iction of the cou rt , or ~ak-
mg any asstgnment or d istribu tion o f the sam e nd that the H S · d T • orne av iD gs 
an . rust company ~e res_trained from fi ling of recor d a ny deed or deeds 
which they may_ have In their possession , or f rom transferr ing a n of the 
property for which they have unrecorded deeds Upo f II y 
hearing of the case the p rayer of th t' t' . n u argument a nd fi na l 
• e pe I IO n was g ra nted T he a bo e 
associa tion is now in the hands of a receiver . · v 
State of Iowa v. Christoplzer T. Junes, et at . 
This is a n ac tion brough t in the distri ct cou rt of Polk county to reco 
moneys alleged to have been collected as fees by defendant as ~Jerk of :: : 
supr~me court' an d not accounted fo r or p a id to the treasurer of s tate as 
:;i{lu~~:d~:gl~:~he~~s~r~~~~:uhr~~ been fi led by defendant , a nd the cas~ is 
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Stale of Iowa on the Relation of Milton Remley, Attornev-Gmeral, v. The 
Muscatine North and South Railroad Company. 
On July 11, 1900 . the board of railroad commissioners of this state 
made an order requiring the company to put in an undergrade crossing 
within ninety days from date of its order. The company did not comply 
with this order, and upon a request from the board this action was brought, 
as provided by law, to compel obedience to its order. A petition was filed 
in the Muscatine district court in October, 1899, to compel the company to 
comply with this order. After the issues were made up and the case sub-
mitted to the court, and after full deliberation thereon, the judge ordered 
that the company should construct an undergrade crossing, as ordered by 
the board of railroad commissioners of this state, and in the manner and at 
the point as ordered by the board, on or before the first day of July, 1901. 
State of Iowa v . Sioux Coutzty. 
An action at law to recover a balance due the state from said county, for 
board of patients at the hospital for the insane, a t Independence, Iowa, A 
change of venue was taken from defendant county t o the county of Plymouth, 
where the case is s till pending, and will be tried ~s soon as the same can be 
reached for trial. 
State of Iowa on Relation of Milton Remley, Attorney-General, v. W. A· 
Smith. 
A petition in equi ty was filed in the district court for the state of Iowa, in 
and for Pottawattamie county, praying an injunction to restrain defendant 
from draining Noble la ke in said county. Noble lake is a permanent body of 
water and belongs to the state, and constitutes one of the principal waters 
of the state . An injunction was granted as prayed, and the case is st ill 
pending in the district court. 
State of Iowa v. Suet J. Spaztldi11g , et al. 
This action was brought at the September term of the Polk county dis-
trict court, on the official bond of Spaulding as treasurer of the pharmacy 
commiso;ion, to recover for the embezzlement of fun ds of the state. This 
.action is still pending, and will be tried at an early date. 
The following is a list of the criminal cases in which the state 
i s interested, for the years rgoo and rgor, pending in the supreme 
.court of the United States: 
State of Iowa v. James H . East;.,z, 
Defendant was indicted by the grand jury of Winneshiek county, under 
section 1885 of the code, for fraudulent banking. 
He was tried upon the indictment, and a verdict of guilty was returned 
by the jury. Upon this verdict the judge imposed a sentence of imprison-
ment for five years in the penitentiary . The defendant appealed from the 
judgment of the district court to the supreme court of Iowa, and the judg-
ment of the court below was affirmed on the 12th day of April, 1901. 
On the 16th day of April, 1901, the defendant sued out a writ of error 
from the supreme court of the United States to the supreme court of Iowa, 
DO the ground that a federal question was involved in the case, viz : 
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That the defendant, at the time of the receiving of the deposit charged 
in the indictment, was president of a national bank authorized to do busi-
ness at Decorah, Iowa , under the laws of the Uni ed States ; that the pro-
visions of sections 1884 and 1885 of the code of Iowa are not applicable to 
national banks, and that an officer of such bank cannot be convicted there-
under for receiving a deposit in an insolvent bank; that the state court has 
no jurisdiction to inquire into, hear, try or determine the question of the 
authority of the defendant to receive a deposit of money in such bank . 
The case is now pending in the supreme court of the United States. 
The following is a list of the civil cases in which the state is 
interested, for the years rgoo and rgor, pending in the district 
court of the United States in and for the Southern district of the 
state of Iowa: 
Charles Spiegel, alias Charles Cohtz, v. N. N. Jotzes, Warden of the State 
Penitentiary at Fort llfadison, Iowa. 
This was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, on the ground that the 
information upon which tht-: petitioner was extradited from Canada, charged 
the common law crime of ar~on, while the indictment, under which the 
petitioner was convicted and sentenced to serve a term in the peniten-
tiary, charged the burning of a store building, which is made an indictable 
offense by the statutes of this state, but which is not included in the crime 
of arson as known to the common law. The court holds that the offen~e 
charged in the informa tion is the same as charged in the indictment, and 
thereupon refuse to grant the writ. 
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SCHEDULE "D." 
The followin g a re official opinions of public int erest g •ve n 
to state offic ers and county a ttorneys : 
OLEOMARGAR INE-The law prohibits anyone having in hi s posses-
sion a substitute for butte r colored ye llow, alth ough it may be 
intended for the use of hims elf and hi s fa mil y . 
DES MOINES, I OWA, J anua ry 9 , 1900. 
H o1t . B. P. Nor/ott, Dairy Commissioner, Des JJfoines: 
DEAR SIR- You rs of the 6th iust. at h and, asking my opinion upon 
wheth er ' 'the d airy laws for bidding a nyone to have in p ossession oleomar-
garine contrary to the provisions of chapter 13, title 12 of the Code, will be 
viola ted by a private individual having in h is possession for the use of h is 
own family oleom a rg arine of a yellow color . ' ' 
In reply to this I will say that the last clause of section 2516 is as fo llows: 
' 'No one sha ll manufacture, have in his possession , offer to sell or sell , 
solicit or take orders for delivery, ship, * * * a ny imitat ion butter or 
cheese , e:o.cept in the manner and su bject to the reg ulations in this chapter 
provided. 11 
The next sect ion permits the manufacture, having i~ possession , selling 
a n d ·offering fo r sale, e tc . , a subst itute for bu tter and cheese not having a 
yellow color, or colored in imi tation of butter or cheese, if each t ub , firkin , 
etc. , sha ll have branded, sta m ped or m arked on the side or top thereof in 
the E ng lish la ng uage in a dura ble m a n ner the words , ''su bsti tute fo r bu t-
ter. 11 It also permits such substitute for b ut te r to be kep t , used or served 
as foo d, or for cooking in hotels , restaurants, etc. , p rovided the p roprietor or 
person in cha rg e o f such place sha ll p ost a card opp osite each table where 
t he guests are served , on which shall be · printed : ''Subst itute for butter 
used here . '' 
Section 2518 p rohi bi ts the coloring of a ny substitute for bu tter so as to 
cause it to resemble true da iry products. Sect ion 2519 p rohibits anyone 
having in his possession a ny subititute for butter unless the same is duly 
m arked or b randed as required in this chapter , ''except fo r the actual con-
sumption of him self a nd family. The prohibition contained in section 2516 
above quoted is general. l'ilo one "shall have in his p ossession, except in the 
m anner and subject to the regulations in this chapter provided . 11 
I h ave called attention to the remaining clauses of the law to show that 
there is no exception in favor of having in possession any yellow substitu te 
for butter. Any substitute for butter which m ay be manu factured m ay be 
kept by one for actual consumption for h imself a nd family without being 
branded or marked as req uired, but th is exception does not apply to yellow 
oleomargarine or substitute for butter. 
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It is evident that the entire provision with reference to the sale of oleo-
margarine or a substitute for butter is intended to prevent fraud and deceit 
being practiced upon the public, or any part thereof. It may be said tha t 
one knowingly having in h is possession fo r the u se of himself and fa mily a 
yellow substitute for butter, is not deceived thereby , and tha t a construction 
of law which would prohibit a nyone having in his possession for his own use 
a yellow substitute for bu tter , unnecessarily interferes with p r ivate rights . 
Such an a rgument , however, shoul d be addressed to the general a ssembly . 
It is competent fo r the general assembly to prohibit anyone from having in 
his possession a ny yellow substitu te fo r butter , even for h is own u se, if, in 
the j udg ment of the legisla ture, such a p rohibition is necessary , or a proper 
provision to p revent the evasion of a law, or its violation, wh ich law is 
w isely m ade to prevent fra ud an d dece it being practiced upon the p ublic. 
I a m of the opinion tha t the law prohi bits anyone having in his possessio n 
a su bstitu te for butter colored yellow, although it m ay be intended for the 
u se of h imself a nd h is fa m ily . Yours t ru ly, 
MILTON R EMLEY 1 
Attorney-General. 
WITHHOLDING PROPERTY FROM AsSESSMENT-Penal ty- In con-
struing sec ti on 1374 of t he code, it is he ld to mean t hat if th e 
deli nq uent taxpayer pays the amount o f tax whi ch would have 
been assesse d agai nst h im had he listed hi s· property , tog-e ther 
with 6 pe r ce nt. inte res t th ereon, he is d isch arged fro m fur ther 
li ability . Th e t reasurer is not authori zed to conclude in his 
own mind, with o r withou t evid ence, th a t th ere had been a 
fraudul ent withholding of · property from assess ment, and 
dem and a pe nalty . 
DES MoiNES, IowA , January 9 , 1900 . 
D . ~V. Hamilton, Esq., Sigourney , I owa: 
DEAR SIR-Yours of the 5th inst . came to h a nd yesterday . In rep ly I 
will say that a carefu l examination of section 1874 requires ' ' that the t reas- . 
urer should dema nd the amount the property hould have been taxed in each 
year the sa m e was withheld , etc., together with 6 per cent. interest thereon 
from the t ime the tax wou ld have become due a nd p ayable h ad such property 
been listed and assessed . 11 
In other words, when property is discovered which has not been listed, 
it is the duty of the treasurer to dema nd the amount which wou ld have been 
paid as t axes had the p roperty been lis ted, together with 6 per cent . interest 
thereon. There is nothing up to this point in the section which implies that 
there is any penalty beyond the interast, an d suppose the delinquent tax -
p ayer pay s the amount that is dema nded within thirty days , could an a ction 
be mainta ined against him ? I think not. There is nothing which suggests 
to my mind that the treasurer may h ave a hearing to deter mine whether the 
tax has been fraudulently withheld or not; nor would it be in accord with the 
spirit of our la w to permit him to determine it in any star chamber proceed-
24 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
ings of which the other party had no notice or an opportunity to be heard. 
I think the statute fairly means that if the delinquent taxpayer pays the 
amount of tax which would have been assessed against him had he listed his 
property, together with 6 per cent. interest thereon, he is discharged from 
further liability. 
Referring•to the latter part of s9.id section, a failure to pay within thirty 
days, with all accrued interest (no penalty stated), gives a right of action to 
the treasurer. Until such failure has been made, no right of action exists. 
We come now to the last clause: ''And when such property has been 
fraudulently withheld from assessment, there shall be :ldded to the sum 
sound to be due a penalty of 50 per cent. upon the amount , which shall be 
included in the judgment." This evidently refers to the trial of the cause 
and the entry of the judgment. If the evidence on the trial shows the court 
that the property has been fraudulently withheld, then it is authorized to add 
a penalty of 50 per cent. which shall be included in the judgment. I do 
not think a fair construction of this section would authorize the tre asurer to 
conclude in his own mind, with evidence or without evidence, that there had 
been a fraudulent withholding of property from assessment, and demand a 
penalty. 
There are cases where a penalty is imposed on account of failing to pay 
a fixed sum, or an ascertained ~urn, at a given time. For instance, delin-
quent taxes bear a usurious rate of interest as a penalty. But I know of no 
case where any officer of the state or county may assess up a penalty for a 
fraudulent or an illegal act. It is one of the fundamental doctrines of our 
system of government that there must be a notice before a hearing, and 
nothing can be determined except upon a hearing after due notice. I am 
'\!ery clear that the legislature never intended to give to the treasurer such 
extraordinary powers without providing for a notice and a hearing to the 
person against whom the penalty is assessed. 
Yours truly, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney General-. 
GAME WARDEN--His duties as such do not require him to prose-
cute for the killing of deer, when owned by a private person. 
The wrong is a private one and not a public one. 
DRS MOINES, IOWA, January 26, 1900. 
Hon. Geo. E. Delavan, Estherville, Iowa: 
DEAR SIR-Your favor of the 24th inst., enclosing a letter from J . 0 . 
Walton, duly at hand. You ask whether you have jurisdiction of the matter. 
The matt~::r referred to is concerning two deer which escaped from their 
owner and strayed away a nd were shot and killed by a man in violation of 
chapter 65, acts of the Twenty-seventh general assembly. 
There was unquestionably, under the facts stated, a violation of the law. 
It is not made your especial duty to prosecute where private rights have been 
trespassed and injury done to private persons, although the act constitutes 
a violation of the criminal law . You as a citizen of the state have the right 
to file an information, and to begin prosecutiOn for the violation of any law 
of the state. The owner of the deer in question is the one especially 
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 25 
interested. He can file an information, and the county attorney of the 
proper county can take charge of the prosecution of such a case, but I do 
not think you would be justified as fish and game warden to spend your 
time and incur expenses in instituting a criminal prosecution when the sole 
party injured does not take enough interest in it to begin the prosecution 
himself. 
The public at large had no interest in the deer killed. Game which 
the state is interested in preserving was not diminished by the killing of 
these deer. The owner is the only one who suffers loss directly, and while 
the peace officers and officials of the county could properly take cognizance 
of the violation of the criminal law, yet I would not advise you that it is 
your duty to do so in a case of this kind. 
I return you Mr. Walton's letter. 
Yours truly, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
AttonteJ··General. 
REFORMATORY FOR WoMEN AND GrRLs-The legislature may 
properly provide for the transfer of girls at Mitchellville to the 
reformatory proposed to be established at Anamosa, but they 
cannot be legally imprisoned in the penal division of such 
reformatory. 
DES MOINES, IOWA, January 29, 1900. 
Hon. Clzas. W . Stewart, House of Represmtatives: 
DEAR SIR-Yours of the 28th inst., submitting to me a draft of a bill for the 
establishment of a reformatory for women and girls, duly received. You 
request my opinion concerning the bill, and especially with reference to the 
powers therein given to the board of control to transfer the inmates of the 
Industrial School for Girls, at Mitchellville, to such reformatory. 
With reference to the bill itself, I will say that it seems to be drawn with 
care, and contains no provisions of doubtful rheaniog. I have noted in 
pencil a few suggestions. It occurs to me that section 6 might well have 
another provision added thereto, in about this form : ''But if any woma n 
or girl over sixteen year~ of age shall be committed to the reformatory 
department of said institution under a sentence pf a court after being duly 
convicted of crime, and shall thereafter prove intractable or detrimental to 
the best interest of said reformatory department, then the board of control 
may order her removal and confinement in the penal department of said 
reformatory.' ' 
The Industrial School for Gi rls, as now constituted ; is educational and 
reformatory in its nature, and is not a penal institution. The reformatory 
division of the reformatory proposed to be established at Anamosa by this 
bill is of the same general character. On the other hand, the penal division 
of said reformatory is imprisonment in the sense in which the term is used 
in section 11, article 1 of the constitution. The provisions of the existing 
law for the commitment of girls to the industrial school at Mitchellville, is 
the method adopted by law to designate th<;>se girls who shall be subject to 
the educational and reformatory training adopted in the industrial school at 
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Mitchellville. Comparatively few, I apprehend, have ever been indicted or 
found guilty of any crime. That being true, I do not think it is competent 
for the legislature to order the imprisonment in the penal division of such 
reformatory of anyone who has not been indtcted and convicted, and if such 
imprisonment is desirable, it would be necessary to comply with the pro-
visions of section 2710 of the code. 
In regard to the transfer from the industrial school at Mitchellville of 
such girls as are confined therein to the reformatory division of the reforma-
atory proposed to be established, I think there are no constitutional 
obstacles in the way. It was said in re Hartwell, 1 L owell, 536: 
''Another of the incidental powers conferred on the keeper of jail, 
and implied in the sentence, is that if the jail be lawfu lly removed he 
shall remove the prisoners with it. The sentence need not recite that the 
keeper is to hold the prisoner in the jail at Lenox unless and until there shall 
be some lawful occasion or necessity to remove him therefrom. All this is 
implied. The court expressly holds the state has a right to regnlate the 
custody of prisoners within the state, including their removal from one jail 
to another when necessary, a nd of this necessity, the state, acting by its 
legislature, is the sole judge . " 
This is with reference to prisoners sentenced to a penal institution within 
the state. If the legislature has such power in regard to prisoners convicted 
a nd sen tenced for their crimes, by so much more has the legislature the 
power to direct in what educational or reformatory insti tutions these children 
or youths shall be placed, whom , for their own no less than the protection 
of society, it is necessary to p rovide enforced attendance upon instruction for 
their education and reformation. It is wi thin the power of the state, unless 
prohibited by the constitution. to take full a nd absolute control of the care 
and edncation of all the children of the state. This includes the power to 
take custody, care and control of children of a class whose environments and 
tendencies are such that they would become criminals and a charge upon 
society. 
I have no question that it is in the power of the legislature to say where 
the education or reformation of such children shall be conducted, and in 
what place they shall be kept, or to remove them from one institution to 
another, according as the legislature may determine to be for the best inter-
est of such children, and of the state at large. I think the legislature may 
properly provide for the transfer of the girls a t Mitchellville to the reforma-
tory proposed to be established a t Anamosa, but they cannot be legally 
imprisoned in the penal division of such reformatory. 
Yours respectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
A ttorney- Cmeral. 
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LIFE INSURAN CE AssociATIONs-Such associations, having depos-
ited fund s with the auditor of state, under section 1791 of the 
code, have no authority to withdraw such securities for the 
purpose of placing them as collateral security to indemnify a 
surety company which becomes liable upon an appeal bond of 
such associ ations. 
DES MOINES, IOWA, February 5, 1900. 
Hon. F. F . 111erriam, At~ditor of State: 
D HAR SIR - In reply to your request of January 9th, for my opinion, I 
will say that a life insnrance association doing business und ~r cha pters 7 and 
8 of title 9 of the code, which has deposited funds with the auditor of state 
under section 1791 of the code , would, in my j udgment, have no authority to 
withdraw such securities for the purpose of placing them as collateral 
security to indemnify a snrety company wh ich becomes liable upon an 
appeal bond of suc h life association . Section 1791 provides: ' 'An asso-
ciation accum ulating any money to be held in t rust for the purpose of 
the fulfillm e nt of its policy or certificate, contract or o therwise, shall invest 
such accumulations in secu n ties provided in section 1806, and deposit the 
same with the auditor of s tate, a s therein provided.'' 
It will be conclusively presumed that secu rities deposited with the 
a uditor, under the provisions of said section, have some trust a ttached 
thereto, and such securities can only be wi thdrawn fo r the pur ose of bei ng 
u sed in accordance with the articles of in corporation or the contract made 
between the company an d its policy holders. The u se of such secu rities as 
collatera l security to indemnify those signing an appeal bond, is not such a 
use as is a u th orized by the articles of incorporation or the law. Hence, I do 
not think suc n securi ties can be withdrawn for the purpose stated. 
Your favor also enclosed a requisition, which seems to be in due form, 
and shows that the fu nd s to be withdrawn are to be used for the p urpose for 
which they were originally deposited. The withdrawal of funds deposited 
with the auditor is :;.uthor ized by sec tion 1792, upon satisfac tory proof in 
writin g that they are to be used for the purpose for which they were origi-
nally deposited, and if the affidavits of the officers of the co mpany are uncon-
tradicted and unimpeached , this requisition n ot being for the purpose of 
securing collateral security, but being regular in form , I see no reason why 
it should not be honored. Yours respectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney-General . 
INSURANCE CoMPANIES - PHYSICIANS GuARANTEE CoMPANY, FT. 
WAYNE, IND.- It h as no elements of an insurance company. 
It should not be admitted to do business in this state as an 
insurance company. 
February 6, 1900. 
Hon. Fratzk F. llferriam, Des Moines, Iowa: 
DEAR SIR-Your favor of the 2nd inst. at hand enclosing copies of the 
contract, application, etc., of the Physician's Guarantee company of Fort 
Wayne, Indiana, duly at hand, upon whic:h you ask my opinion as to whether 
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or not said company is an insurance company and should be compelled to 
comply with the laws of the state. There can be no manner of doubt about 
it. It has not the first element of an insurance company. The character of 
the business is not one of insurance. The statute of Iowa provides for no 
insurance of that kind, or anything like it. I have no hesitation in saying 
that the company should not be admitted to do business in this state as an 
insurance company . 
If jt is admitted to do business in th is state as a corporation, it can only 
do so by complying with the law relating to foreign incorporations. 
I do not wish, however, to be understood as saying that a company 
engaged in the business that that company is engaged in, as shown by its 
advertisements and literature, can properly do business in the state of Iowa 
by filing its articles of incorporation with the secretary of state, and paying 
the fee r c quired by statute of foreign incorporations. I have grave doubts 
in regard to the business proposed to be done by said corporation, being a 
legitimate business . It strikes me at first blush that the contracts and busi-
ness proposed to be done by the corporation is against public policy. The 
law wisely holds physicians and professional men to an accountability for 
the manner in which they discharge their duties. Statutes are made so as 
to provide that none but men skilled in the profession, may practice medi-
cine in the state. The fact that for malpractice, liability in a civil a ction is 
enforced, fastens upon the practitioner a responsibility which is both wise 
and salutary. I suggest that any organization which seeks to · relieve the 
physicians from the consequences of his insufficiency or carelessness, and 
secures to him immunity from damages, is contrary to public policy as ex-
pressed by the statutes of Iowa and by recognize:l. public policy independent 
of statute. 
I do not give this as a definite opinion, but would prefer leaving the 
question until it is presented, if it shall be at the proper time, upon the 
secretary of state. Yours truly, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
A ttorney-General. 
GAME-A person having live quail in his possession, 
shipped into this state from another state for the pur-
pose of propagation, is not liable criminally because of 
such possession. 
February 7, 1900. 
Hon . Ceo. E. Delevan, Estherville, Iowa : 
DEAR Sm-Your favor of ~he 6th inst. at hand , asking my op inion in 
r egard to whether it is unlawful for a man to have Jive qu .. il which he has 
shipped into the state from Kansas for th e purpose of propagation, in his 
possession, while wailing for proper weather to turn them loose, ' 'during 
the period wh en the killing of such birds is prohibittd." The letter which 
you enclose intimates that parties who have been proRecuted for violating 
the game law are likely to take advantage of the circumstances to cause 
the arrest of the person who has shipped in live quail from Kansas. 
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In my opinion, section 2554, which prohibits any person "?aving in P?S-
session any of the birds or animals named i~ this c~a.pter, dunng the.penod 
when the killing of such birds or animals 1! proh~btted, except dunng the 
first fiv 11 days of prohibited period,'' was never mte~ded, and cannot be 
fairly construed to cover such a case as that to which you refer. T~e 
game law was inten'ded to protect the game of tho ~tate, and ?Y no fatr 
construction of the statute can it be used or tortured 10~0 ~endenng an act 
for the increase and propagation of game in the state cnm!Dal. . 
If the construction of said section would permit the prosecut10~ of the 
person in question, then the nwner of every park in which the bn·ds an_d 
animals named in the statute were kept, or every pe~son who ~ept on hts 
premises for the purpose of propagation, any. of t~e ammals or birds named 
in said section, would likewise be guilty of VIOlatlDg th~ game law . . Su~h a 
construction is an absurdity upon the face of it. l th!Dk you are JUSLlf:ed 
in saying to your correspondent to go ahead with his laudable ente~p.nse 
and trust to the good sense of any court or jury to thwart the mahc10us 
designs of a ll persons whomsoever . Yours truly, 
MiLTON HEMLEY, 
A ttor11ey- General . 
REPORT OF STATE GEOLOGIST-It was not the intention 
of the lerrislature that such report should be included 
• I"> 
and bound in the Iowa Documents. 
OEs MOINES, IowA, F ebruary 12, 1900. 
Hon . A. H . Davison, Secretary Extczttive Cou1tcil: 
DEAR sn~-Yuurs of the lO th inst. at hand, in which yo u say: 
"The executive council r equest your opinion in writing as to wheth~r 
the annual report of th e s tate geo logist, including the surv~y r eports , ts, 
under the sratute3 of I owa, one of the reports to be bound tn the set of 
documents provided for in paragraph 2, of s,ectio n :26 of .:?e code.'_' 
In rercard to this I will say that section 126 provtdes: The semetary of 
stale shall make distribution of the various public documen ts tur~ed over 
to him ·as follows. Paragraph 2 providing: ·One thousand copies shall 
be stitc,hed and bound in half-sheep, containing a copy of each r eport, to 
be arranged under the direction of the sect·etary of state.'" These reports 
thus bound are commonly called the Iowa D .)cum2nts. 
It is evident that tbe secretary of state is not required to have bound 
in the I owa Documents any r epor ts except those which have been, ~r un_der 
the law are r equired to be, turned over to him. If we turn to se_ct10n 2a01, 
providinrc for the publication of the annuot.l repor_t~ of the ~e?logtCal survey 
(section 250l and other sections), we find no provtswn requtnng any of such 
reports to be turned over to the secretary of state, but section 2501 has 
something of the idea that the board of geological survey shall have con· 
'trol of the copies not required for distribution. Bat take_ another vJew: 
the general impression derived from reading the statutes with r~fereu ce to 
the reports is, that the reports referred to in para~raph 2 of sect10n 126 are 
only those specially named in the preceding sectwns. The reports of the 
state geologist relate to matters other and distinct entirely from those 
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referred to in the reports of state ffi . 
the adoption of the cocle it was ~ cer~ and state mstltutions. Prior to 
report of the state geologist in ~; Iusua Dor customary to incorporate the 
T e owa ocuments Chapte 82 f h 
wenty-second General Assembly s . fi 11 · r o t e be embraced therein, aud the repor~e:; t~: ~ ntamed ;th~ reports that s hould 
among the number. The report of th I a ? gel o ogist ':as not included 
entific d d · e geo ogiCa survey Is more of a sci-
. an e ucati?n a l report along a speCific line, and 
IS never classed Wi th the reports showin th so far as I know, 
affairs and of the sta te institutions. g e management of the state 
the II:~an~to!~~!n!:;e ~~~i:~~~:~~: i::;~:tn~ si~c~h:eforts to be incl~ded in 
which expressly requires it y anguage of sectiOn 126 
· ours truly, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney-General. 
B UILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS AND I COM l NSURANCE 
. ~ ANIES. . -When articles of incorporation of a 
bmldm_g and loan association are once approved by the 
executive coun cil, the law makes no provision forth 
recall of such approval. Remedies are sugo·ested be 
way of amendments to the law. 5 • y 
2.-- Articles of in?orporation of insurance companies 
~hould be su bmitted to the attorney-general for his 
approval, ~efore a certificat e to do business is issued 
by th: auditor of state .. Ther should be required to 
submit the form of thmr policies to the auditor fo 
approval. Remedies by way of amendments to th r 
law suo·gested. e 
3. -Addi tional powers should be o·iven to the atto. -
aeneral t' b . . 5 I ney ~ respec mg mldmg- and loan associations and 
msurance companies doing business illegally. 
1 o the Senate of the State of Iowa: DEs MOINES, Io wa, Feb. 17, 1900. 
GENTLEMEN-The resolution adopt<>d b tl 
req t d . . ., Y 1e enate on the 7th inst 
ues e my opm!On upon four questions, as fo llows: • 
1. " Is th ~ present law sufficiently comprehensive that the executiv 
count~ ll or the officers charged with the approval of art icles of incor~ 
por~ !On can . p r:vent the incorporation of, or the transac tion of bus~ness by_ bmldmg and loan associations or insurance companies in 
con ravent10n of law or pu blip policy. " 
2. ".Are t~ere b~ il din~ and loan associations or insurance com an ies ~fo~ _do.mg busmess_rn Iowa in contravention of la w or public ppolicy·~ 
IS rs answered m the affi rmative in what . 
panies violate the law ?" ' manner do such com-
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3. "Has the attorney-general exercised the powers given such officer 
respecting illegal corporations; is it nece!ilary to give further and 
additional powers to the attorney-general, and if so, what powers, to 
enable such officer to prevent the conduct of a.n illegal business by 
the said associations?" 
4. "What amendments, if any, a re necessary in our laws to insure a 
conservative and prudent control of such corporationiil?" 
Two classes of incorporations are involved . To avoid repetition and 
undue prolixity I will present my views, first, in regard to building and 
loan associat •ons, and. second, in regard to insurance compan·es, endeav-
oring to present the same under the three heads involved in the first, 
second, and fourth questions: 
First.-As to the present law. 
Second.-The evils, if any, existing. 
Tllird.-The rem •dy therefor. 
This will be done without repetition of the que~tions propounded. 
The questions concerning both kinds of corporations in vo lve the inquiry, 
what is public policy? I t is difficult to give a comprehensive and exact 
defini tion of public policy which can be applied to a ll cases. I shall not 
attempt it. Howevet· much courts and lawyers may differ as to what is 
public policy, I thiu k a ll will agree to the following propositioas: 
First.-Whatever is contrary to the spirit of the law, and defeats the 
end and purp ose for which the law was enacted, is contrary to public policy 
Second.-vVhatever is morally wrong in its tendency, deceptive and 
fraudul ent in its practi ces, and produces r esul ts injurious to the welfare of 
any con siderable number of the general public, is contrary to public policy . 
Tltird.-That it ie the policy of th e state of I owa, as shown by its laws 
and t he history of legislation for more than ha lf a century, to encour age 
the citizen to !lequire a home, to care f6r t he family while li vi ng, and make 
provisions as far as possible for his dependent ones after he is dead. 
Pozwtlt.-That the purpose of the law with reference to building an'd 
loan and insurance companies (both artificial', intangible bein gs born of the 
legislative wil l), was in furth erance of t he general policy above stated, and 
to afford r easanable safeguards against fraud an d deception, imposition 
upon, and the despoiling of, the very classes of persons whom it is the 
policy of the law to encourage and protect . 
Such, I underst»nd, to be the pol icy of this state, and the sense in which 
the term "public policy" was used in the inquiries of your hon orable body. 
I. 
IN R EGARD TO BUILDI NG AND LO AN ASSOCIA TIONS. 
The present law, section 1894 of the code, requires th e executi ve council 
to exam ine the articles of incorpo ration and by-laws of building an d loan 
associations, and to determ ine whet her they are iu conformity to the law, 
and are based upon a plan eq uitable in al l respects to their metJJbers. If 
so, such ar ticles shall be approved by the executive council. The clause of 
said secti on authorizing the executive council to pass upon the plan of build-
ing and loan associationll, and to determine whether they are equitable in 
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all respects to their members, is quite broad and comprehensive and 
ordinarily would be sufficient to prevent the approval of any articles ~hich 
would do an injustice to any of their members. The general power is how-
ever, limited by other p-rovisions of law recognizing the right of butlding 
and loan associations to issue certain kinds of sto<•k, or to assess fines 
charge usurious interest, etc. It is not in the power of the executiv~ 
council to say that a class of business which the legislature seems to recog-
nize as legitimate and equitable, is inequitable. 
To illustrate: Section 1898 seems to recognize guarantee stock. In my 
judgment there is no place for guarantee stock in a building and loan cor-
poration. In this the executive council have concurred, but have felt 
themselves, because of the statutory recognition, powerless to prevent the 
issue of such stock. 
The law makes no provision, when the articles of incorporation of a 
building and loan association are once approved by the council, for the 
recall of such approval in case it be foun.d to be transacting a business which 
may be strictly in accord with the articles of incorporation, yet may be a 
practical fraud upon the public, or all who invest money in such corpora-
ti on. It is true section 19 17 authorizes the revocation of the certificates by 
the auditor in case the association shall violate any of the provisions of 
law, but if the executi ve council approves the articles of incorporation, and 
acts are done wh ich are not inconsistent with such articles, and no provision 
of law can be found expressly prohibiting such ac ts, it is questionable 
whether the auditor's authority reaches the evil. 
The present law was enacted at a time when the building and loan fever 
wa~ at the highest, when compar~tively few men in the state had oppor-
tumty to know of the practical workings of building and loan associations. 
It was an excellent law under the circumstances: probably the best that 
could have been enacted. But experien9e has taught the people as if 
"with thorns of the wilderness and briers." At the present time 1 do not 
think the law is sufficiently comprehensive to prevent transactions which 
are contrary to the spirit of the law and public policy; specific defeats will 
be referred to hereafter. 
AS TO THE EVILS . 
The evils are many and grievous . The many complaints received at 
this office from all parts of the state of the wrongs, the disappointments, 
the sorrows occasioned by delusory confidence in the promises of building 
and loan associations, is a strong argument at least that there is something 
radically wrong with the system. The complaints come from borrowers 
largely, and from non-borrowing members who wish to withdraw their 
stock. It is no uncommon thing to find a party paying a given sum 
monthly for four or five years on his stock who wishes to withdraw from 
the _association in order to use his accumulated earnings, but is unable to 
realize from the association as much money as he has paid thereto and 
this, too, in spite of the assurance that the association has been decl~ring 
dividends of 10 per cent, 12 per cent, or 14 per cent. 1n numerous cases, 
borrowers make monthly payments of interest and premium at the rate of 12 
per cent or 14 per cent, and payments also upon the stock, which may be 
continued for four or five years, at the end of which time, if they wish to 
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pay up their loan , they are informed that the ~urn requir~<;i to pay off t~e 
mortgage is actually more than the money borrowed. Wit~ some assoc~a­
tions a system of fines and forfeitures has been adopted which bearsheavtl_y 
upon the unfortunates who are unable to continue the payments upon t~etr 
stock. I have yet to find a case where the promises and representatiOns 
made at the time the stock was taken have ever been fulfilled; nor have I 
found a borrower who felt that he obtained money to build a home at a 
cheap rate of interest, and that his connection with a building and loan 
association had been otherwise than disastrous I do not say that there 
a re no such cases I am well satisfied that many dome~ti_c local associa-
tions, where the expenaes have been kept down to the minimum, ha~e 
produced good results , and many such associations have been benefimal 
to the community in which they do business . 1 have heard very few com-
plaints of the domestic local associations . 
The theory upon which building and loan associations a re justified is, 
first, it encourages the man of small means to make a saving from a lim-
ited income; second, by furnishing money at reasonable rates to th_ose who 
wish to build homes they are enabled to pay for their homt~s m small 
monthly payments fr~m year to year. The primitive idea of buil~ing and 
lo~~on associations was that each member who made monthly depostts would 
in time become a borrower. If all became borrowers, and ultimately paid 
substantially the same rate of interest, it mattered little what that rate of 
interest might be for all shared substantially eq ually in the benefits and 
in the burdens of 'such a system. It was a means of accumulating capital 
from small savings to build homes for the members as fast as the accumu-
lations would permit. A very different condition arises, however. w~en 
Rtock is purchased in large amounts by capitalists-paid up stock-:-which, 
many times receives dividends more than double the legal rate of mterest. 
I am satisfi~d that not over 40 per cent of the stock of building and loan 
associations of the state is borrowed upon. Suppose it were 50 per cent . 
Taking up a report of an association at random, gne of the strongest 
associations in Iowa, which has been in operation ten years, in reply to 
the question: ·• What has been the average annual dividend declared by 
your association since its date of organization, including the term covered 
b~ this report ?" I find this answer: "Thirteen and one -fifth per cent." 
' The only source of income of a building and loan association is the 
premiums and interest paid by the borrowers, and the lapses, fines or for-
feitures from the unfortunate members who fall by the way. Assuming 
that one-half of the stock belonged to the borrowers and the other half to 
the investors, many of whom bad fully paid up stock, In order to m&ke a 
dividend of thirteen and one-fifth per cent on the entire stock, the half of 
the stockholders who borrowed must have paid enough as interest and 
premiums to have amounted to twenty-six and two-fifths per cent on the 
money which they had borro\ved, less. however. what was gained by the 
association by forfeitures and fines . It requires no words from me to show 
that such a ruinous rate of interest is crushing the very men the law was 
Intended to benefit and protect. 
It will be said that the dividends on the stock will offset the high rate 
of interest paid. From the nature of the case this cannot be true . " A" 
subscribes for Sl,OOO of stock in a building and loan association . and bor 
s 
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rows $1 ,000 thereon. "B" subscribes for $1,000 of stock and pays therefor 
$1,000 in cash. "A " pays say 6 per cent premiums and 8 per cent interest. 
payable monthly. Such interest amounts to more than 14 per ce nt payable 
annually . At the end of the year "A " has paid into the association $140 
as interest and premiums. To offset this he gets a dividend on his monthly 
payments which go to the loan fund for the average time On the usual 
plan of payment he has paid in during the first year $72 $60 of which goes 
to the loan fund. He obta ins then dividends on $60 for one·half of the 
year which, a t the rate of thirteen and one-fifth per cent, amounts to $3 . 96, 
which is in no sense an offset for the amount of interest that he has paid. 
"B ". on the other hand, receives in cash his dividend of $132 . That $132 
passes forever beyond the control of "A", and there is never any redistribu-
tion of it . The same d isparity, it is true, would not exist between the 
payments of interest and premiums and the di vidends on stock in each 
succeed ing yea r, but at the end of the time when " A's" stock is matured 
and his mortgage is canceled. which is seldom less than n ine years, be has 
paid the enormous sum of $1 ,260 interest, which is in no ways offset by the 
dividends on the small payments made yearly on his stock; but "B '', the 
investor, has received his $132 regularly every year. 
This illustration leaves out one element. As the business is now con-
ducted, there is a profit to the association from the fin es and forfeitures of 
those par ties who are unable to continue their payments, but such fi nes 
an d forfeitures are tak en from the class of people who can poorly afford to 
lose the money they have paid to the association. It is a patent fact, and 
cannot be disputed, that under the plans of building and Joan associations 
as now operated under the law, capitalis ts have taken advantage of the 
law to secure exorbitant in terest on their in vestmen ts, anc\ that, too, at the 
expense of the very persons the law is intended to benefit and protect. 
The sys tems of fin es and forfeitures are oppressive upon persons whose 
only crime is their inabil ity to pay as much each month as they hoped to . 
Some associa tions have issuect stock providing for the fo rfeiture of the en-
tire amount that has bee n pai1 in case of failure for a givt'n tim e to co n-
tinue th e pay ments . Others have a pl a n of imposing fines and selling the 
stock for the pu1·pose of paying ar rearageP, which meth od would be 
tolerated in no en lightened community in r egard to any other subject for a 
mom ent. 
Som e associations have stock wh ich is, to all in ten ts and purposes, pre-
ferred st ock, receiving an unequal dis tr ibution of the profit s at th e expense 
of the common installment stock. The supreme court of Kentucky, in a 
recent case, held tha t prefer red stock in a mutual building and loan as-
sociation, was against public poli cl Whiie there are associations wh ich 
are undoubtedly carrying on their business within the legitimate li nes of 
building and loan association laws, and have produced results high ly satis . 
fac tory to the investor, a nd not very objectio nable to the borrower who 
persists until the maturity of his stock, yet I will venture the assertion that 
90 per cent of the borrowers from bnilcling and Joan associations in the 
state, and an equal percentage of the instal lment stock holdsrs who with-
draw thei r stock before maturity, feel that they have been deceived by 
fals e promises , and unjustly dealt with. 
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY- GENERAL. 35 
There are some domestic building and loan associations whose expense 
account is far in excess of that permitted by law. The auditor's r aport of 
the building and loan associations furnishes an in terest ing study . It shows 
some domestic local associations conducting t heir business at almost a nominal 
expense- some as low as one-half of one per cent of the receipts. Many of 
the domestic building and loan associations, however, show the expenses to 
be far in excess of the amount r eceived for the expense fun d, which is, in 
my judgment, violation of the law. O ther associations have mad e invest -
ment~ of fund s in a manner not authorized by law, which jeopardi zes not 
only the earning capacity of th e· home bu ilder 's fund, but also th e principal 
which he has paid in from his savings. Other association s fail to sho w the 
amount of salaries of th eir officers, but repo r t thousands of dollars of 
traveling expeosP.s, office help, etc., which aggr egate the fnll amount of the 
expense dues. Oo e association masks together und er th e title of " Sun-
dries," over $40,000 of un class ifi ed d isbursements. O ne associat ion , with 
to tal assets of less thau $2,000, shows ex penses for sal aries of nearly $900, 
and general expense of $400 . Some associations pay large salaries far in 
excess of the service rend ered, it seeming to be t he pro blem how best to 
' 'pluck the goose wit hout making it squawlr." Other associations show a 
praisworthy moderation in this respect. T he Auditor' s repor t furnishes 
food for refl ection . I t can no t, however, di sclose the tears of t he widow 
who has paid for years what was r rcoguized as an exor bitant interest on a 
loan, and made payments on stock which s he und erstood were payments on 
the principal, to find af ter yea rs of privation that she owes as much as she 
did in the first place. It cannot tell of the blasted hopes and bi t te r disap· 
pointmen ts of the young man, and maiden , the hired gir l, and the la borer , 
who have, through years of pri vat ion, paid of the ir hard earnings iuto an 
association which promises so much and fulfi lls so lit tl e. 
What are the remedies? 
This is a di fficult problem . I can only m ake tentative sugges tions. 
First.-The law shou ld forbi d any part of t he principal paid in by the 
stockholder to be used for expenses . Most associations ded uct from 11 
to 13 per cent of the amount pa id in on i'nstallment stock . and a pply 
the same to the expense fund . The expenses should , in my j udgment, be 
paid out of the profits . A proposition made by one business m an to 
another: '' L et m l'l take your money and invest it f or you ; I will secure 
you remunerative returns, but I will take, to Pi1Y fo r manag ing the affair, 
13 per cent of the monev you place in my hands," wo uld be m et with 
derision. Yet that is what nearly every bu ilding and loan association in 
the state does. 
Second - There should, in my judgment, be a limit upon the expenses 
of the associat ions . Most of the domestic local associations are now very 
moderate in their expenses ; but not so with m any of t he others . 
Third.- All guarantee stock or preferred stock under any and all names 
which receives a fixed dividend. whether profits have been earned or not, 
shou ld be entirely eliminated. If the associations are mutual in name and 
liability, there sho uld be a mutuality of the profi ts. It is desirable that 
associations have the power, when there is a temporary demand for loans, 
to secure the money with which to supply th e demand. This can be done 
by i>suing paid up stock, with a. limit placed upon the dividend it shall 
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receive, which amount shall in no case exceed the dividend earned by the 
other stock . Such stock should be ca lled in when the funds of the asso-
ciation will permit, and it should not have a vote on amending the articles 
of incorporation. 
Fourth .-The power to impose tines and forfeitures upon persons who 
fail to pay the insta llments on their s tock ought to be removtd. There 
can be no good reason why a person making savings deposits f rom year to 
year should lose what he bas <>lready deposited in case misfortun e should 
prevent h im from depositing furth er; or that the amount depo~ited should 
be cha rged wi th tines and penalties because of his inability to deposit 
more. 
i'z ft!t. -How it will benefit the poor man or wage earner to permit him 
to enter into a contract to pay an interest which under the general law 
would be usurious, is something that s urpasses comprehension . The 
exemption of building and loan associations from the law of usury, works 
a hardship which I a m convinced was not foreseen by the former general 
assem blies. 
Sixth.-T he executive council ought, in m y judgment, to be given more 
plenary powers, includinJ.r the power to revoke the certifica te authorizing 
the association to do business 
Se-vmt/t.-Provision should be made by which money paid on stock by 
the party who has borrowed thereon, in case of foreclosure, should be 
treated as an absolute payment on the money borrowed , together with the 
profits, if any, credited on such stock. 
Eight/e.-Sume provision should be wade to enable asoociations to go 
into vuluutary li<~~-tida.ti u u, with sui taule provision for the protection of the 
borrowin g member. ln thi3 co nnection it might be well al~o to authorize. 
Lhe assignment of the loans made by the liquidtHiug association to sume 
1iS3ociatiou of similar character, subject to .the rights of the borrowing mem-
ber to have the amount paid on his stock credited on such loan. lt might 
be well to permit two or more associations to consolidate by a three-founhs 
vote of the stock of the respective associations, on ttn·ms which th., execu-
tive council or some officer of the state should approve as tquitable to all 
concerned. 
N inth.-The effect of chapter 48, laws of the Twenty-seventh General 
Assembly, was to make new and different contrt~cts for th ose affected 
t hereby, which has worked a. hardship in very many instance.i . In my 
·Opinion justice demands the repeal of said chapter, leaving all parties in 
,their original contractual relations. 
The am endm ent of t he l &w along t.l.le lines above sngll(ested would relieve 
'the system of many of its inequitable features. It will be urged against 
.some of the suggestio ns that no new association could ue starteu depending 
upon the pro tits to pay the expenses, ami th a t there would be no inducement 
for capitalists to put money into the s tock of an a~sociation in case some o1· 
all of these suggestions should be incorporated in the Jaw. lf i~ is rt>mem-
bered that the building aud loan association law was not J;llade for the 
beuetit of capi talists, but for another class of persons altogether·, the sug-
~e~stion loses much of its force. It is true, unquestionably, that such a law 
as above outlined would deprive associations of a source of protit; but at 
the same time it would strip them of the speculative features which have in 
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the p'i.st ena bled tha men of means to secure exorbitant r eturns for t he use 
of th eir mon ey a t the expe ~ se of the ve ry men and women whom it is the 
policy of th e law to enco ur 11 ge and help . The pl ea in favo r of li he t·al laws, 
so call ed, fo r such associ>ttious was nJIIde on the grounn of thei r beneficial 
r es ults to th e wa~~;e earn er an d man of moderate means . They ar e chtimed 
to be quasi be nevole nt a>s<~ciat i o rts . If tb ev have ceased to be such A. nd 
beco me ins t rum ll nLH of oppression, th e_y have fai led to de monstrate 
1
their 
right to live . If s~teh R~soc i at io ns ca nn ot li ve u nder restri ctions that will 
prevent the abuse which I apprehend is r ecognized as a cryiD g ev il , t hen 
they ought not to li ve; bu t I do not apprehend th at t he suggestions above 
made, if e nll( raft ':ld in th e law, would Re riousl.v in tHfAre wit h do mPstic local 
and worthy nom est ic ~tsso ciati o 11s . All unworth y on es s houl d not be fo stered 
by the state a t the expense of the welfare of i ts citi ze ns . 
H. 
AS TO I NSURAN CE COMPANIES . 
The present law appeara to give su ffic ient authority to the auditor with 
reference to companies organized to do the kind of insurance referred to in 
chapter 4, title 9 of the code, inasmuch as the articles of incorporation must 
be approved by the auditor after the same shall have been submitted to 
the attorney-genera l, and the forms of all policies issued a re required to 
be submitted to the auditor for his approval. In rega rd, however to com-
panies referred to in chapter 5, title !i of the code, formerly known as far-
mers ' mutuals, there are few restraints upon their manner of doing busi-
ness . The articles of incorporation and the form of policy are subject to 
the approva l of the auditor, and if an examination of the a uditor shows 
t hat the associati on is in an unsound condit ion, or doing an unsafe busi-
ness, he may revoke the certifi cate of authority to do business If such 
associations were I mited to the county of their principal place of business, 
or counties contiguous t hereto, the a bsence of legal restra in t upon their 
a cts would not be so objectionable . Such associations, when their busi-
ness is con ti ned to a neighborhood, are usu a ll y subject to t he scruti ny of 
thei r mem bers, and I think experience shows th a t the business is conducted 
honorably, cheaply. and to th e ent ire satisfaction of the members. 
But state associations a re very different. There is no reason why what 
a re called s tate associations under sa id chapt r 5 sho uld not be required to 
comply with chapter 4 of said tit le. There is just as much necessity for a 
state association organized under chapter 5, to have $2\000 of available 
assets, and be su bject to t he same inspection a nd restrictions as other 
mutual companies doing business under the provisions of chapter 4. The 
bmliness which they actuall y do is the same. I t is actuall y done in the 
same manner by prem ium notes, etc. The liability of the public to be 
defrauded is just as great. There are more complaints coming to this 
office in regard to t he wrong doing and fraud perpetrated by the state asso-
ciations than in regard to the mutual associat ions doing business under the 
provisions of chapter 4. 
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AS TO LIFE INSURANCE. 
The laws of Iowa with reference to life insurance are in an anomalous 
condition. We have level premium companies, natural premium com-
panies, stipulated premium associations, assessment associations, beaev· 
olent associations, fraternal associations; in fact, insurance companies of 
all descriptions, and some nondescripts . Life insurance of all shades and 
complexions can be written under the laws of this state as they now stand. 
There is not, in my judgment, sufficient authority given to those who 
approve the articles of incorporation of the different insurance companies 
to prevent them doing a business not contemplated by the laws, or contrary 
to public policy. Only stipulated premium and assessment associations 
are required to submit their articles to either th e auditor or attorney-gen-
eral for approval, and the authority given such officers by the law appears 
to be very limited. The insufficiency of the law will appear when we con-
sider the evils which are done under the law as it now stands. 
AS TO THE EVILS. 
The state control over some classes of associations is sufficient to induce 
the public to believe they are under state control, but that control touches 
so lightly that the associations do practically as they please. In such cases 
the state control is a delusion and a snare. An i nquiry was received at 
this oltice from a man in Texas enclosing an advertisement by some agent 
of an Iowa company, in which it was stated that the state of Iowa guaran-
teed the payment of the policies. 
Companies and associations are organized, and policies are issued, which 
should be accompanied by the company's private glossary or key to ·enable 
the members to understand the meaning of the terms employed. A policy 
was issued by an association, now happily deceased, which" accepted the 
policy holder as a general partner and member in said association to the 
extent of --shares in its combination ten-year indemnity and accumuJa. 
tive cash surrender value securities limited to the aggregate benefit value 
of $100 per share," which may mean one thing to the company, another to 
the policy holders, and to the average citizen is gibi.Jerish. 
Companies doing business on what is called by the statute, ·• level prem-
ium," or "natural premium plan,'' more commonly called old line com-
panies, are not required to submit their articles of incorporation to any 
person whomsoever for approval; nor are such companies required to sub-
mit their policies to the auditor or any officer of the state for approval. 
l>ractically the only control over such.companies organized in this state is 
that of the auditor, who is made the depositary of the capital stock of 
$25,000 and the net cash value of the policies in force, otherwise the 
reserve, but his authority is very limited. 
The auditor can examine whether such companies are insolvent, and ''if 
found to be insolvent, or the condition such as to render their further con-
tinuancA in business hazardous to the public, or to the holders of its 
policies," to turn the matter over to the lender mercies of the attorney-
general. 
There is no provision of law authorizing the auditor, or any other 
officer, to call a halt upon the kind of business that such companies may 
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do, or to require the contracts which they may make with the public to be 
submitted to any officer of stat!) for in ~pection and approval. 
So-called old line insurance companies have been incorporated, and 
mnre are endeavoring to be incorporated, which have few or none of the 
characteristics of life insurance, and which are not conducted on life in-
surance principles, but whose principal business smacks loudly of the 
features of bond companies, which have been condemned everywhere as 
against public policy. They are insurance companies in name, and not in 
fact. A man of sixty is insr~red at the same rate as a child of five. No 
medical examination is required. The amount agreed to be paid in case of 
death is entirely incommensurate with the so-called premium paid. The 
so-called policy or bond is to mature in ten years, and 10 pPr cent of the 
face thereof is required to be paid by the holder every year. At the ead of 
ten years, the promise is to rep:ty the holder the amount that has been 
paid in by him to the company, and a share of the speculative accumula-
tions arising from the lapses and forfeitures enforced against those who 
are unable to pay longer. 
To state the proposition concretely : The company enters into a contract 
with the so-called policy holder to pay $1,000 at the end of ten years, in ·con-
sideration of the policy holder paying for each of the ten years to the 
company the sum of $100. If the so-called policy holder fails to pay any 
year, even if he has already paid $700, or $800 or $900, he loses and forfeits 
all that he has paid to said company. The company promises, in case the 
so-call~d policy is not forfeited or lapsed, that the holder shall receive a 
benefit from these lapses . I have seen stat!'ments made by the agents of 
such companies that the investor or policy holder will receive, at the end of 
ten years, double the money he has paid, and if be dies before the expira-
tion of the ten years, h~ receives a small sum as life insurance. Statements 
are published showing a large percentage of lapses, and enormous profits 
are predicted because of the many lapses which will inure to the benefit of 
those who are the persistent mem hers. Such companies take for their own 
use all of the first payment of $100. They set p.side about 91 per cent of all 
the subsequent payments, which is invested, and from such sum they expect 
to realize enough to pay the amount which is absolutely promised. 
Thus it wi·ll be seen that more than 18 per cent of all the payments made 
by the policy holders inures directly to the benefit of the corporation. One 
such company, during the year 1898, shows a total premium income of 
$148,000, and a death loss of $1,200. It shows commissions, bonuses to 
agents of over $66,000; salaries to officers and home office employes, over 
$4,000; total expenses over $83,000. The receipts from the new business 
were nearly $107,000. If we deduct the total disbursements of the company 
for expenses and death lo ~ses from the amount of the firs~ year's premium, 
over $22,000 remains, which is a very handsome profit on a paid up capital 
of only $25,000. Whether such companies will be able, after deducting over 
18 per cent of the total amount paid by the members, to fulfill their abso-
lute promises of repayment of the total amount paid in, is very doubtful; 
but in no possible contingency will the company be able to pay the amount 
which the agents and officers represent t.o the policy holders they will 
receive. The average amount of insurance for the whole ten years does not 
exceed three-fourths of the amount which will be paid by the policy holder 
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during the te n years . The cost of term insurance would not exceed $12 per 
thousand. To divide the coutru.ct and the premium paid on a $1,000 con-
tract, the member pays $90 for in s urRn ce. He pays $910 for the bond, or 
endowmenr., if please so to call it. The endowmen t., the n, costs $91 a year. 
To illustrate: S uppose a contt·act were mad e by a bank; in conRidera-
tion of a man depositing with a bank $91 a year, th e bank would, at the 
end of ten years. pay $1,000. bu t if the de pos ito r failed to deposit iu any 
year, be would forfei t to tl•e bank all thu.t hfl had paid . I think everyone 
would say it W AS not l e~~;ilim a te buoiness ~tnd s hould not be tolerated iu any 
community; and certainly cor poration:~ whi ch are created by the state, and 
empowered to contract by law, should not be permitted to thus prey upon 
the inexperienced and gullible. 'l'ne contract between MUCh so-called 
insnr11nce c-.mpanies and so·called policy holders· is at letAst 90 per cent of 
the same kind named in the illustration. lu m.v judgment, such tl. business 
is against public policy, if not against the l~tw of the sta te as now existing. 
Not a few stipulated premium and H.sses;ment tl.Ssoci~ttioue doiug husi· 
ness under chapter 7, title 9, of the code, I am inf<>rmed, ara issuing term 
policies, quasi endowment policies, paid up policie;, 11.nd in fact, nearly 
every kind of policies which level prem-ium companies are issuing. Many 
of such policies are a palpable fraud upon every one who accepts them. A 
paid up policy with the right of the association to require further pay-
ments, is a contrH.diction of terms, aud a fraud on the face of it. It is no 
less a fraud because hidden away in some dark coruer of the p olicy, iu fine 
print couched in laBguage which few but tile officers of the associatiou can 
understand, the right to require further p'\yments is rtJserved. 
It is the refinement of cruelty for an associaLion to take a man'" money, 
year after year, he paying it uu"er the belief that at a ~iven time be wilt 
have a paid up policy, or au endowment, for hi:~ good wife after he is gone, 
or for himself in his old age, and after be has been to lled along until he is 
past the insurable age , aud his ability to ·earn a liveli hood is no more, to 
be told that his policy was not a paid up policy, and the SUJ.IPOsed endow-
m ent was a myth; that his equitable sha re in the grand combioation, ac· 
cumulative, emet·gency, savings, cash surrend er value securiti es, bas been 
dissipated to pav for excos ive mortality losses. or has di sa ppeared through 
a system of division . and ~ i lence. lt is no solace fur such a mau to learn 
that u nd er the law the perpetrato rs uf such a fra ud cauuo t be seo t to the 
pe ni t ent iary. 
One old lady wrote me that she had work ed, s cintetl and saved to mak e 
payme n ts to an associati ou of malodorous mem ory, on a ten -year e ndow-
ment policy for $1,000; lhat s he had made nin e paym en ts a nd t!Je $1,000 
she ex pected was her o n ly r e lia nce fo'l: f u tu re s up por t ; the associ a tian bad 
failed . "Will I ge t my $1,000? What ba ll I do ?'' be ask ed. I did n't have 
th e hear t to tell ~ er to go to th e poor-house . 
The stories of wrong perpe tr ated up on hoo est, simple-minded, confiding 
people which cont inua lly come to this office, at time:~ make me wish 1 l.J ad 
bee n born 1vitbout sympa thies, or had not bee n houoreJ by being chose n 
attorney-general. 
E ven while I wri te th is, a vic tim no w pas t tne ins ura ble age en da hi s 
s tory by say ing: "Had I not believed the state controll ed insurance com-
panies and prevented worthless companies from doing business, I would 
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not have been deceived. The state has no right to pretend to control sueb 
eompanies aud not control them ." 
I endorile this sentiment with all the emphasi~ possibl e. Common 
houesty delllands that the st:lle should eontrol l 1fe io suraoce compauie~ 
doing business in this s tate in fact, or cease to pretend tu do su. 
There is no sta•,ute r eq uiring any life iosurance company or association 
to submit the form of its policies for th e approval of the auditor. lu the 
year:~ past every attempt of the auditor, so far as my knowl ed f(cl g ••es, to 
prevent the i~suance of certain kinds of policies, was met with a challenge 
of his authority. Io fact, to prevent any elas:~ of insurance policies being 
issued, h9wever obnoxious t o hi s sense of ju:~tice , he bas been eompelled to 
arrogate to himself authority not expressly given by statute Any success 
in this respect in the p1st bas been through fear that he may arbitrarily 
withbolrl his t'ertificate authoriz\og the compaoies to do business in thiR 
state. Policie~ can be, and have been, issued which the starutes do not 
authorize, of which the auditor cau have uo knowledge and hai no power 
to prevent, which policies contaio promises which the as~ociation3 have 
neither the present ability, nor any reasonable hope of ever being ZLble to 
fulfill. 
The authority given to thu auditor to turn over to the attorney-general 
insolvent companies, and those not C!l.rrying out their contmcts, does not 
relieve the situation a grflat deal. It is practically no mort~ than the hold-
ing of an inquest on a companv found dead, and brrrytog the r e mRins . Tbe 
injury was done to the public before the CQmpany's insolvency became 
known. 
There are Ol)any Iowa companies and associations d oing a safe and 
honorable business. Such oeed not, ~tnrl do not, fear strict l eg i :~b ive cn n· 
trol. The evils to which I have refBt'red , which are causiog Iowa c0 mpani es 
to fall into disrepute, are chargeable mostly to th ose associations which 
are organized by promoters for the mouey there is iu it to th em, and are 
cond ncted on un sound principle > fur a f ew year3, whe n th e.v go to the wall, 
leaving to their co nfiding victims r eseotm uut aod l oss iu stead of prov ision 
for their dependent ones. 
These tl'Uths must be self evid ent . 
Any sc hem e whic h enab les one to obtain th e m oney or property of 
another wi thou t r etuming a fair equ iva lent, i :~ bad iu eth ics. 
An y business whir.h de pends for its s uccess upo n enforcing uncoosdon-
a ble contracts, in to the siguiog of which in e pe 1·i e ne~u and unw a ry 10eu 
an d women are beguiled by false bop.:s and illusory !Jrospec t~ , presPuted 
by smooth and pl e usii.Jle , over-paid and u nder-scr upulous agents, is uoL a 
legitim>tte business, and is contrary to public poli cy. 
No state has a dgllt by law to a uthor ize a bJd.V of me n to s hel ter th eir 
private consciences aod private fortun es uoderoeath a co r~c~ora t e na me and 
en tity, wh i le th ey carry on a bus ioess whi ch thri ves alon e u po u th e mis-
fortunes, improvidence, or pover ty of those , many of the w God '• poor , who 
are d raw o into their mes hes. 
In this r espec t Iowa has not measured up to her respon;ibilities . 
R EMEDIES. 
I can only suggest the lines along which, in my opinion, additional legis-
lation may well be directed. 
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First.-All articles of incorporation of companies and associations 
incorporated under the laws of this state, as well as companies incorporated 
under the laws of other states, should be submitted to the auditor and 
attorney-general for their approval, and those officers should be authorized 
to disapprove all articles, the plans or the nature of the proposed business 
of which do not provide proper safeguards for the protection of the policy 
holders . 
Second.-All companies and associations which make assessments on the 
members, or by a so-called safety clause reserve the right to make assess-
ments, should , by statute, be prohibited from issuing so·called paid up 
policies, limited payment policies, and from accumulating a fund to be paid 
back to the members as dividen<is, distribution of surplus, or endowments 
in any form. 
Third .-All forms of policies should be submitted to the auditor for his 
approval, and he should be required to disapprove of any form which does 
not state on the face of the policy, in plain and ordinary language, within 
the comprehension of persons of ordinary understanding, all the terms, 
conditions, or warranties by the breach of which the policy is avoided, and 
to revoke his certificate authorizing the company to do buoiness in the state 
of any company or associatioJl w~icll' Issues policies in a form not approved 
by the auditor. · ' · 
Fourth .-All policies which require the payment of a fixed premium 
should be made non:forfeitable after two annual payments. 
Fifth.-Any company or association wbich publishes in its literature 
false and misleading statements as to the nature of the business it trans-
acts, or in regard to the ability ·of the corporation to fulfill its contracts, 
shall forfeit its right to do bu3iness in thii state, and its certificate therefor 
shall be r evoked by the auditor. 
Sixth.-Section 1830 of the code, requiring a medical examination of all 
members of associations, should be extended so as to include level premium 
companies also. 
Seventh.- No mutual company or association shonld be permitted, by an 
amendment of the articles of incorporation, to increase the premium or 
rate of assessments upon existing policy holders. 
E ighth.-N o stipulated premium or assessment association incorporated 
under the laws of another state, should be permitted to do business in this 
state if it uses a greater per cent of the premiums or assessments for ex-
penses or soliciting new business than is allowed to similar associations 
organized under the laws of this staLe. The per cent to be used for ex-
penses might properly be limited IJy ssatute. 
Ninth.-All associatio.ns which have attempted to absorb any other 
association, either by reinsuring or consolidation in any way, (which I con-
tend cannot -oe legally done under our laws) and have made as~:~essments on the 
members thus received, should be required to treat such members as their 
own original members, and pay the same atnount, in case of death, as their 
own original members receive. 
It will be urged that if these suggestions are carried into the statutes, 
they will cripple some of the companies and associations now doing business 
in the state, and will make it difficult to organize new companies and 
associations in the future. My answer to this is: Such laws will not injure 
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good, safe companies, honestly managed; all others, by the grace of state, 
have no right to live; and by the grace of God, should be buried out of 
sight; that organizing insurance companies is not the chief end of m s.n; that 
it is better far to have a few good, trustworthy companies, than to turn 
lo~se a thou~and worthless ones to prey upon a long suffering public. 
III. 
In regard to your third inquiry, l will say that the statutes do not 
plainly give to the attorney-general any powers r especting illegal building 
and loan associations and insurance corporations until the matter is placed 
in his hands by the auditor. 
Actions to test official and corporate rights may be brought by the county 
attorneys. (Code, eection 4315 .) The general power given the attorney-
general by section 1640 of the code, to institute an action in equity to dis-
~:~olve a corporation for good eause, seem! to be limited by other sections 
requiring the auditor to take the initiative with reference to building and 
loan and insurance corporations. In view of the equivocal lan~;uage of 
section 208, it is by some considered doubtful whether he can bring any 
action in the name of the state except when "req nested to do sa by the 
governor, executive council, or general assembly," unless specially author-
ized by some other statute. 
I have not felt warranted in bringing any action to close up any building 
and loan, insurance, or banking corporation, until my attention was ca.lled 
thereto by the auditor in the manner dit·ected by statute. I have, however, 
used to the extreme verge, the limited powers giv!'>n to the to.ttorney-general 
to prevent the conduct of illegal business by such corporations. 
I am satisfied that I have made some mistH.kes by inadvisedly approving 
a few articles of incorpo ration of insurance associations, the press of other 
duties preventing the careful scrutiny that ought to have been given them. 
But since I discovered those mistake~, no articles of incorporation have 
pa!sed this office without the closest examina~ion. I think there are a few 
certificates of approval of articles of incorporation signed by me which 
should be recalled or canceled, and I shall assum11 the responsibility of so 
doing unless the present general assembly makes changes in the law which 
rander such recall unnecessary. 
I think the attorne_y-general should be giveu. a larger discretion in regard 
to the approval of articles of incorporation which are submitted to him fur 
approval. I t is claimed under the presen t law that his only authority is to 
see that the articles are in legal form . In this view I have not concurred, 
but have insisted that the articles must provide alone for that class of busi-
ness which the law authorizes that kind of a corporation to do. But I have 
not felt warranted in refusing to approve such articles solely because I 
was convinced the plan of business was such that the a~sociation must, in 
the nature of things, be short lived, and disappoint every policy holder 
who might not die early. 
1 do not think it would be wise or practical to give to the attorney-
general anything like a general supervisory power of the corporations 
referred to. It would be impossible for him, with the insufficient force in 
his office, to give such matters the attention they demand. 
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It might be well, however, to enlarge his powers so as to require him to 
bring actions to wiod up the affa irs of all corporations, includiog those 
named in your iuquiri es , wheu they are d oiu~r a busi ness not tHttborized by 
law, or not authorized by their articles of iuco q.JO ration; or are conducting 
the bu3iuess in a mann er by which tb e publi c are decei ved or defrauded. 
I am not, however , asking for myself addttional powPrs aud respon si-
bilities, anct would not be so ungener onq aq to ask t hem for my successor; 
hut [will ende11vor, to tb e b ~s t of my >1bility, tu perform every duty which 
the IHg islature in its wi:!dow imposes upou tbi~ offiee, to the end that the 
fair fame of tbis noble commonwealth shall no t be taroished by the acts and 
practices of oorporations which it has created. 
r have the honor to be, your o bedient servant, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
A tto1·ney-Generat. 
BOARD Ol<' SUPERVISORS-It has no power, given it by 
law, to interfere with the discretion of the clerk of the 
courts in having bar dockets printed where and when 
and by whom his good judgment may dictate. 
DKS MOINES. IOWA. Februa ry 21, 1900. 
W. 0. Clemans, Esq., County Attorney, CedarRapids, Iowa: 
DEAn SIR-Yours of the 20th inst. at haod, in which you ask my opinion 
as to whether ' 'the board of supervisors, by resolution, can direct wheo and 
by whom th e bat· c!ockets sh all be printed, or whether the same s hall, nuder 
section 366l of tbe cod e, be printed by direction of the clerk of the court, 
aud th e prin ting R:iven to whom he m ay Slje lit." 
Iu r eply thereto I would say th1t t s ection 3661 nq nires th e c lerk to 
furni sh th e cour t a od bar a suffi cient number of printi'Cl cop ies of the cal-
end ar. The rul e of l11.w is of uoiversal acce ptat ion that w he1e a d uty is en -
j0i ned upon a pu blic o lli cer, au d uo direction is give o by s ta tu te as to th e 
m anner i n which he s hall perform that duty, a d iscretion is le ft with him t!l 
perfnn n th e duty in such manuer as be may rl e te rmin e best. 
Apply the r ule to the Quest ion yon ask. The clerk is d irected to fnrni sh 
prin ted cal endars. Unl ess some statute directs bow these c~t l e otlars are to 
ba procured by the cl erk , or who is to priot t he S>1 me, he bas a u absol u te 
discr·et inn in t he m atter which cannot be contro ll ed by anyo ne . I lind 
nothing in the statu te which a utb or i&es th e board of su per viso rs, by any 
r esolution , or by ao y vote, or in a ny ma n oer w hatsoever, to io te rfe re with 
the exer cise of this u ndoubted d iscr eti on give u to the cle rk . I t is tru e the 
board of supervisor s m ust orde r tb e paym ent fo rth m, a nd i t bits the right 
to in sist that the cost of t he print ing shall be r easouable, bu • io ru .v jt~dg­
ru en t, has no power given iL by law to inte rfe re wi th the discre tion of th e 
cle rk in baving s uch ca lend ttrs priuted , wh ere, whe n, and by wh om, hi s 
good ju dgme n t may dic tate. 
Y ours truly, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney-Getter at. 
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LIFE Ass ociATIONS - Where securities are deposited in 
the office of the auditor of state, he is not authorized 
to make any disposition thereof without a statement of 
the funds to which they respectively .belong, furnished 
to him by said association. 
D RS MOINES, loW A, February 27, l!lOO. 
Hon. Frank F. Merriam, A ttdi/01' of State: 
DEA R SIR-Your favor of th e 5th in st. duly a t hand. You enclose t he 
articles of incorporatiao of the F ederal Life nssociatiou, of Davenpo rt, 
togethe r with a statement of the securities now on deposit in your office; 
also a requisit ion made by the said association for the withdrawal of certain 
securities, a nd also a sample of certain policies which purport to be 
guaranteed by securities deposi ted in your office. You state that some of 
the securities in your office have nothing upon them to designate to what 
fund they belo ng. The requisition is ruade under section 1792, which pro-
vides: ·• The auditor shall permit a withdrawal of th e su me upou sa tisfac-
tory proof io writing fi led with him that they are to be used for the pu r poses 
for which the.v were originally deposited." 
The articles of in corpoutiou of the Federal Life associati on provide that 
certain fundi! shall btl accuwulated, aoJ sha.ll be devoted to certain specific 
purposes. Certain c lasses of policy holders are requ ired t o pay more t han 
certain o ther po li lly holde rs for the purpose of accumulating a fund , and 
the p olicy, as well as th e articles of incorporation, r eq uires th a t the fund 
thus acc umulated shall ia ure to the benefi t of the policy holders belonging 
to that class. There is a trust, uoder the article~ of iocorporation, attach-
ing to every fund depos ited wich the auditor of state by this association. 
The law requires that satisfs.ctory proofs shall be furnished the auditor 
that the funds to be withdmwn are 10 be need for the purposes for which 
they were originally deposited, i .e., that tbe association so witbdr>1wing the 
fuuds inteuds to use them in execution of the trns t which attached to the 
funds thus deposited. Where an associatiou has accumulated several funds 
of oifferent names, and securities are deposited wi t h the auditor of state, 
the nature of the trust attaching to each fund should be stated so that the 
auditor may know the purpose for which it is deposited, and holu the same 
as security for the beneficiaries who are entitled to said fund . 
The requisitiou contains a preamble, as follows: •·Whereas, the pre-
miums received by this association under the life and savings fuud plan, 
after deducting the amount r equired for the surety and expense funds, are 
and shall be liable fot· the payment of mortuary claims; that there is now 
due and payable from the savings fund to the mortuary fund for mortuary 
purposes, four thous<iod one hundred dollars ." 
This is a peculiar s tatement for a preamble. If it is intended as a reso-
lution of the board of directors, which it purports to be, that the savings 
.fund shall be liable for the payment of mortu11ry claims, then such resolu-
tion is wholly void as applied to this fund . Under article 14 of the articles 
of incorporation, all the premiums received by the association under \he 
life and savings plan are subjected to the amount required for the surety 
and expense funds, and for the payment of death claims, and the balance 
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of the premiums thus received, after meeting the drafts upon it, constitutes 
the savings fund . This savings fund is req uired to be invested in subs~an­
tially the manner required by section 179 1 of the code. After it is invested 
it, together with the profits thereon, is apportioned to the policies from 
which it was created, and no other class of policies is entitled to participate 
therein. Certain options are given to the policy holders . A.mong thAm is 
a continu'l.tion of their insur~tnce beyond the time for which it was written 
by the application of the accumulations of this fund to the payment of the 
premiums year by year. Such fund caunot again be drawn upon to pay 
mortuary losses. 
The requisition in question calls for no funds other than the savings 
fund, and it shows affirmatively that the withdrawal of such fund is not for 
the purpose for which it was originally deposited, but shows that there is 
to be a violation 0f th~J trust at taching to the said fund by using it for 
mortuary purposes. Hence, you could not legally surrender the securities, 
upon that requisition . 
You ask, if you cannot surren,der such securities on that requisition, 
bow you can legally surrender the same. I will say that you can only 
legally su rrender them upon proper evidence being furnished you that they 
are needed to execute the trust attaching to the securities on deposit in 
your office. 
It ap pears in the papers submitted to me that certain of the makers of 
the mortgages on deposit in your office have paid to the Federal Life asso-
ciation the amount of their mortgages, and they are needed to be turned 
over to the makers. You can legally permit the :Federal Life association 
to substitute other mortgages for those which have been paid. but no 
maker of any mortgage on deposit with the auditor of state has any right 
to pay the sam~ to the payee without the payee having in possession the 
mortgage. If the association may receive pay for mortgages. which a re 
on deposit with the auditor of state charged witn a special trust or secu rity 
for the fulfillment of certain kinds of policy contracts, at pleasure, and i-f 
they may withdraw such securities and apply them to any purpose for 
which said association may see fit, then it is useless and worse than use-
less to have such securities deposited with the auditor of state at a ll . The 
law requiring the deposit of such securities means something, and if, whi le 
they are deposited with the auditor of state, they are subject to the control 
of the association the same as if they were in the vault of the association , 
the law becomes meaningless . 
With reference to those secu rities on deposit in your office, without hav-
ing the fund to which they belong properly designated, you a re justified in 
requiring the association to· furnish yt>u with a statement of t he funds to 
which they respectively belong, and until this is done. you would not be 
authorized to make any disposition thereof, but reta in them until you can 
ascertain from some source the trust attached thereto. 
Yours respectfully, 
MILTON RE)!LEY, 
Attorney-General . 
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MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANIES-Mutual companies 
can issue no stock. A certain company shows by its 
articles of incorporation that it partakes both of the 
nature of a stock and a mutual company. This it can-
not do. It must be either one or the other, it cannot 
be both. 
DEs MoiNES, IowA, March 1, 1900. 
Han. Frank F . Merriam, Auditor of State: 
DEAR Sm-ln re ~~:ard to your inquiry as to whether tl;ie guarantee fund 
(so-called) pro vided for in articles of incorporation and by-laws of mutual 
fire insurance companies, such as the Anchor Mutual Fire Insurance 
company, whose articles of incorporation and by-laws yon submit to me, 
shall be considered as a liability, or whether, in making the statements to 
your department., such companies are authorized to list the so-called 
guarantee fund in a manner similar to that in which stock companies list 
their capital stock, I will say that the articles of incorporation of the 
Anchor Mutual Fire Insurance com pany are very peculiar indeed, and 
certain features therein have received the condemnation of the supreme 
court in the case of Berry v. the Anchor Mutual Fire Insurance company, 
62 N. W. R , 681. 
The supreme court holds in that case that there was no authority of law 
whatsoever for having the holders of the so-called guarantee funds direc -
tors of the company, and that such provision was illegal and void. That 
case was decided April 4, 1895, and yet that provision has been continued, 
although there have been some amendments attempted by the said corpora-
tion since the decision of the supreme court. 
I am willing to accept as legal and proper certain members guarantee· 
inD" the contracts of a mutual fire insurance association, and i t may be 
co':npetent for the corporation to provide that such notes given to the com-
pany for the purpose of fulfilling its policy contracts may be assessed in a 
catain manner; but it is a mi snomer to call the notes given by guarantors 
t o the company a guarantee fund. Section 15 of the articles of incorpora-
tion provides that the moneys advanced by the guarantors and applied ~o 
the payment of losses shall be regarded as advances to be thereafter pard 
by an asEessment made upon t he pledges of members to the association for 
their own insuran ce. There is in fact, then, no lia bility of the associatio n 
to the makers of th e guarantee notes unless there has been money advanced 
thereon by the makers of such notes. If paylJlents have been made on such 
notes to the full amount th ereof, then such notes undoubtedly constitute a 
liabilit.y to the company. E very amendment to the articles of incorpora-
tion since the organization of said compa ny in 1889 has been made, or pur-
ported to be made, by the contributors to the guaran tee fund alone, 
except the amendment acknowledged October 1, 1895, which amendment 
purports to be adopted at a meeting of the policy holders and guarantors. 
A serious question arises whether any of such amendments have been 
legally adopted and are now a part of the articles of incorporation. 
The plan of business seems to be to permit those persons who have given 
guarantee notes to the company, and have received a certificate showing 
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1 he amount which each has guaranteed, to have iull and absolute control of 
the affairs of the association, and to treat the notes which they have ~iven 
respectively as stock of the company. It requires too great a stretch of the 
imagination to call one who is conditionally liable RS guarantor for con· 
tracts ot a corporation, a stockh older. The claim that it is a mutual com-
pany under its present organization is onl.Y a pretense. Mutual companies 
can issue no stock. No provision is made for the policy holders sharing in 
any election of officers, or having any voice whatsoever in the affairs of the 
compttny. This fiction is carried along until we come to section 5, article 
8 of the by-laws, wherein it is provided: ' 'In case any stockholder trans-
fers his stock," etc., referring by stock holders to the person who has 
given a guarantee note to the company. 
There seems to be an attempt to impose upon the policy holders the 
liability of the members of a mutual company, and at the same time permit 
the management to reap the benefits of a ;, tock company. I do not think 
this can be done, and you would be justified in nquiring the company to 
amend its articles of incorporation so as to put it squarely upon a stock 
company basis, or else upon a purely mutual basis . CertRin it is that the 
so-called guarantee fund is nothing, an d is entitled to no consideration un-
less the makers of the ~uarantee notes have actually paid something to the 
company on such notes . The n the amount which they have paid is a 
liability against the company, and sbould be so reported as a liability. lf 
nothing has been paid by the makers of the guarantee notes, then the 
amount of the notes is neither an asset nor a liability; but under no circum-
stances, according to the articles of incorporation, can the so .. called guaran-
tee notes be con~idered as an asset. If the company desires to report that 
responsibl'l parties guarantee their policies to the ~>xtent of $25,000, I know 
of no reason why objection should be made thereto; but the fact that a man 
may have credit to the extent of $25,000, if he has no property whatsoeve::-, 
does not make him worth $25,000. by any inannl'r of means. · 
Yourii re~pectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
· Attor11ey-Gmeral. 
MUTUAL ASSESSMENT ASSOCIATIONS- The directors, 
president, vice-president, and secretary of such asso-
ciations must be members thereof. 
Jh:s MOINES, IOWA, Mareh 3, 1900. 
Hon. Frattk F M erriam, Aztditor of State: 
DEAR Sm-You have r equester! ruy otlici '\ l opinion ns to "whether or not 
the dir \lctors and officers, such as president, vice-president, secretary and 
treasurPr, of mutual assessment associations organized to do bnsiness undor 
the provisions of chapter 5, tit.le 9 of th e code, should be selected from the 
memberR of such associations; and whether or not such officers can legally 
act as officers of such mutual assessment associations if they are not actually 
members of the associatinn@." 
In regard to this I will say that there is no direct provision of the statute 
which explicitly prohibits one not a member of such mutual association 
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from being an officer therein if so elected, as there is with reference to com-
paniPs doing a business autho1·ized by chapter 4 of said title 9 (see section 
1695 of the code). But I am very clear tha.t the legislature in no way con-
templated that an association should be organized and practically owned 
and controlled by one or more persons who have no property to insure, and 
who do not belong to said association. The history of legislation, and the 
policy of the law as stated in section 1625, as well as by analogy in other 
matters, I think make it as reasonably certain that the law did not intend 
ansone should be an active officer in associations ot·ganized to do business 
specified "in chapter 5, of said title 9, who was not a member. The original 
eection 1160 of the code of 1873, which is the basis of all subsequent legisla-
tion in regard to farmers' mutuals, did not in fact contemplate a corpora-
tion. The association was bound together by mutual pledges. It was a 
voluntary association; no provision was made with reference to how it 
should be managed or by whom. The custom of farmers' mntuals at the 
time the law was passed, was to elect the officers from their own number, 
and recognizing that custom, and for the purpose of enabling persons who 
gave their mutual pledges to conduct their business inexpensively, the 
present statute was enacted; but I do not think ·it was their intent that the 
law should be so construed that persons in cjties and towns, with no 
property to insure, without making any pledges themselves, should form a 
corporation, issue policies or certificate of membership which would make 
insured members, and carry on a general insurance business with practi-
cally no restraints which a local company would exercise over the officers 
chosen from their own members. 
I am of the opinion, therefore, that the officer~. meaning thereby the 
directors, president, secretary, and such officers as have executive control 
of the affairs of the company, should be members. I do not mean to say 
that a person may not be chosen treasurer to simply receive and pav out 
funds belonging to the association, but having no voice in its management 
otherwise; nor that all the agents must necessarily be members of the asso-
ciation; but the active, executive officers of the affairs of the association 
must be members of the association. Your~ truly, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attortuy-General. 
GAME L Aw-Where there has been a conviction on two 
counts of an information for violating the game law, 
the prosecuting attorney and the informant who :files 
the information, each is entitled to have $10.00 taxed 
in his favor as a part of the costs of the case. 
March 6, 1900. • 
Hon. Ceo. E. Delavan, Fish atta Game Warden, Estherville, Iowa: 
DEAR Sm-Yours of the 5th inst. at hand asking my opinion as to 
''whether upon a prosecution and conviction of several counts of an 
information for violating the game law, the informant is entitled to a fee 
of 15.00 for each count, or whether he is entitled to no more than $5.00 for 
4 
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each case upon which there has been a conviction although the defendant 
was convicted upon several counts?" 
In regard to this I will say t hat the language of the statute is very 
explicit. It says : "There shall be taxed as a part of the costs in the case, 
a fee of $5.00 to the informant and a like f~e of $5.00 to the attorney 
prosecuting the case, u pon each count upon which there is a plea or verdict 
of guilty and judgment of conviction." It is not $5.00 for the case ~ut 
the costs in the case shall inr.lude a fee of $5,00 for each count upon wh1ch 
there is a judgment or conviction . If there have been co.nviction~ on two 
counts the prosecuting attorney and the inform ant who fil es the mforma· 
tion a;e each entitled to have $10.00 taxed in his favor as a part of the 
costs of the case, five dollars on each count, and so on. I do not see how 
the statute is susceptible of any other meaning. 
Yours very truly, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
A ttornev-General . 
MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY-When the assets of 
such company, organized under chapter 4 of the code, 
including therein the fair present worth, or value of 
all notes , together with the other assets of t_he. ~o_m­
pany, fall below $20,000.00, in excess of _th~ h~bihti~S 
of the company, the auditor of state IS JUStified m 
finding that its assets are insufficient to ent~tle it to 
continue in business. 
DES MOINES, IOWA, March 9, HJOO. 
Hon. Frank F . lJferriam , Auditor of State: .. 
D KAR Sm-Yours of the 8th inst. at hand, in which you ask my opm10n 
upon the following question: 
"Under what circumstances can a mutual fire insurance company, 
operating under the provisions of chapter 4, title 1J of the code, 
become impaired, and what is the construction of sectio~s 1731, 17i:!2 
and 1733 of the code, in reference to the duties of the aud1tor of state 
when a mutual lire insurance compan y doing business under chapter 
4, title 9 of the code, is found to be im p!dred ?" 
In order to rightly construe the sections referred to, it will be neccessary 
to look at ot her provisions of said chapter 4. Section 1691 r equires a stock 
company to have paid up in cash a!J. actual capital of not less than $2.5,000. 
In regard to a mutual company, section 1692 r equires notes of the. mcor-
pc>rators aud insurers to the amount of not le.ss t? an. $25,~00, to be g1ven ~y 
so lvent parties, foun ded upon an actual appliCatiOn for msurance made m 
• good faith of which $5,000 shall be paid in cash. These notes are made the 
basis of security for the pay ment of losses and expenses in r egard to the 
transact ion of the bueiness of the company. They stand in the place of 
the capital stock requir>Jd of stock companies, and are upon a different pl~ne, 
and the makers incur a different liabili ty from the makers of premmm 
notes given for insurance after the organizat ion of the com pany· 
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It will thus be seen that the legislature intended, before a company 
either stock or mutual, could be authoriled to transact a fi re in s uranc~ 
business, that there must be at least $25.000 of cash in hand or notes against 
solvent parties which should be lia ble for the payment of losses by fire and 
the expenses of the com pany. The premium notes taken from insurers 
after the organizati on stand upon a diffe rent bas is. They can only be col-
lected in accordance with the terms of the notes, and are given to pay the 
maker's pro rrata share of the cost of insurance covering the period d uring 
which the policy is in force. Such notes cannot be considered assets of 
the company to the full amount of the face thereof . Every member has a 
statutory right t o have his policy canceled by paying short rates, and 
hence it cannot be cla imed that the company could in any event collect 
more than the short rates, less the amount theretofore paid by the insured. 
But it does not follow tha t the notes are worth no more than the remainder 
of the short rates collectible thereon, for procuring the business has cost 
the company something, and upon the theory tha t only the short rate can 
be collected on such notes, there is so far as the company is concerned a 
real value in the balance of said notes which should not be disregarded. I 
know of no rule which can be infallibly applied to all cases. 
The question is what is the real value of such notes taking everythin~.t 
into consideration-including the probability of the members continuing 
their policies until the expirations thereof, and the fact, if such it is. that 
the entire commissions have been paid to the agents for procuring the 
insurance represented by said notes . 
Section 1731 provides, in reference to a stock company, that when its 
capital stock, which shall not be less than $25,000, has become impaired 
more than 20 per cent below the paid up capital stock required, unless the 
deficiency is made good, the attorney-general shall proceed to wind up the 
affairil of the company. This indicates clearly the standard by which fire 
insurance companies shall be measured . Where the assets, then, of a 
mutual company fall below the standard, the auditor is justified in con-
cluding that the assets of the company are in~ufficient to justify the com-
pany continuing in business, and section 1733 provides he shall proceed in 
reference to such company in the same manner as herein required in 
regard to stock companies. 
I think, t herefore, when the assets of a mutual fire insurance company, 
organized u nder the provisions of said chapte; 4. including therein the fair 
present worth or value of all notes, together with the otiler assets of th e 
company, fall below $20 000 in excess of the lia bilities of the company, the 
auditor is justifi ed in findi ng that its assets are insuffi cient t o conti11ue in 
business. Yours respectfully, 
M I L T ON R EMLE Y, 
A ttorney- Ge11eral . 
52 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY- GENERAL. 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE- The act of the legis-
lature, creating such department, and providing for 
the filling of the office otherwise than by an election 
by the people, or appointment by the governor or 
some other officer of the state, is held constitutional. 
Ds:s MoiNI!:s, IowA, March 14, 1900. 
Senator W. F. H arriman , Des Moines; 
DEAR SIR-You ask my opinion in regard to the constitutionality of 
Senate tile No. 165, being a bill for an act to create a department of agri· 
culture, etc., especially upon two points : 
First.-Whether it is competent for the general assembly to create an 
office and provide for the filling of that office otherwise than by an elec-
tion by the people, or appointment by the governor or some other officer 
of the state; and, 
Secvnd.-Whether the bill is obnoxious to section 1, article 8 of the con-
stitution, !Jroviding that no corporation shall be created by special laws. 
In regard to this I will say that all legislative authority in this state is, 
by the constitution, vested in the general assembly . The general assembly 
has the power, then, to enact any law unless there be some constitutional 
inhibition. Certain officers of the state are required by the constitution to 
be elected by the people . The constitution, however, recognizes that other 
officers may be appointed, and there is no provision whatsoever which 
requires all officers of the state to be elected by the people. 
The bill in question creates a department of agriculture. We may 
assume, for the sake of the argpment, that those persons who shall admin-
ister the affairs of the department of agriculture are state officers. Such 
officers, however are not constitutional officers. There is a distinction to be 
made between election and appointment to an office. There is no consti-
tional provision providing who shall make the appointment to the offices 
which the general assembly may create. Throughout the entire history of 
the legislation of the state, offices have been created by the general assembly, 
and provision is made for the filling of such offices sometimes by appoint-
ment of the governor; sometimes by appointment of other officers; either 
state or county; sometimes the offices are filled by designating the 
incumbents of certain other offices or positions to fill the offices created, 
and no question has ever been raised. to my knowledge, of the constitution-
ality of the appointment made in •accordance with the provisions of law. 
The legislature may either confer upon some designated oflicer the power 
to make such appointment, or it may confer the power to make such 
appointment upon some other body or class of persons. Almost the iden-
tical question was determined in the case of Sturges v. Spofford, 45 N . Y ., 
446, in which it was held that the act creating a board of commissioners of 
pilots to have charge of the licensing and regulations of pilots for the port 
of .New York, etc., three of whom were to be appointed by the Chamber of 
Commerce of the City of New York, and two by the presidents and vice-
presidents of the marine insurance companies of the city represented in the 
board of underwriters, was not unconstitutional. 
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~en ate file No. 165 proposes that certain officers in the department of 
agnculture shall b~ selected by a convent ion composed of r epresentatives 
from the different agricultural societiee of the state, thus conferring upon 
the r epresentatives of persons supposed to be most in terested in agriculture 
the power to make an appointment . In the N ew York case the power to 
make ~he appoin tment. of the commissioners was delegated to the repre-
sen~at1ves of commerc1al and private associations or corporations. The 
ag~·JCultural societies whose representatives in convention a11serubled ap-
pOint the officers created by Senate file No. 165, are qt~asi pu blic organiza-
tions, supported in part by the state, incorporated under the laws of the 
state, in furtherance of the poliey of the state, to promote agriculture the 
most important industry of the state. ' 
The case of State ex ret. Childs v . Griffin, 72 N . W. R., 117, is referred 
to as holding to the contrary. I do not understand the case to so decide. 
The constitution of the state of Minnesota is different from that of the 
s~ate of I owa., a?d a di~erent question was involved, but the court recog-
mzed the prmmple wh1ch I have stat ed above in the foll owing language: 
"It will be understood that we do not intimate that the legislature 
cannot create an office, and itself appoint the officer thus provided 
for, or lodge the power of appointment elsewhere than with the chief 
executive ." 
Secon_d.-,In rega~·d to the second objection referred to, I will say that I 
s~e nothmg m the b11l that creates a corporation. It is simply a designa. 
twn of t~e department of agriculture as an arm of the state. The prop-
erty rece1ved by the department of agriculture, as referred to in section 9, 
does not become the property of the officers of the department of agricul-
ture. Whatever is received becomes the property of the state, to be man-
ag6d and co?trolled by the department of agriculture so long as the state 
shall aut.honze the same to ~e done. There are to be no dividends or gains 
of any kmd to tho&e managmg the department of agriculture other than 
the salary fixed or proYided for them in the manner specified i~ the bill. I 
see n~thing in the. act which can justly be construed into creating a cor-
~orahon of ~ny kmd or nature. I am well satisfied that the bill in question 
IS not obnox1ous to .the two constitutional objections referred to above, and 
from a careful read10g of the same, I have discovered no constitutional ob-jection thereto. 
Yours r espectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney- Gmeral. 
ELECT~ON-BALLOT-The use of a voting machine pre-
servmg the secrecy and carrying out the intention of 
the constitution does no violation to the provisions of 
the constitution. 
D~:s .MOINES, Iowa, March 21, 1900. 
H on . Wm . W. H awk, Hottse of Representatives: 
~EAR Sn~-You have req uested my opioiou upon the question whether 
votmg machmes may be constitutionally used at elections in this state. 
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In regard thereto I will say that section 5, article 2, of the constitution , 
is in these words: "All elections by the people shall be by ballo t ." The 
true answe r to your inquiry depends entirely upon what is meant by 
"ballo t." Various defini tions have been given of the word. The word 
"ballot" is derived from t he word ''ball.'' The second definition in Webster's 
Internat ionnl Dictionary is : ''The act of voting bv balls, or by written or 
printed ballots or tickets ; the system of voting secretly by ballots or 
tickets." Among the definitions in the Imperial Dictionary, is : "The 
sy~tem of votin!t in such a way that the voter cannot be identified ." In 
th e Century Dictionary is this definition: "The method of secret voting by 
means of small balls or by printed or written ballots wh ich are deposited 
in an urn or box called a ballot box." The Standard Dictionary, among 
other defin itions, contains this : "The method of election by choice by 
voting with t ickets or colored balls which are placed in a box or urn in 
such a manner that the voter can conceal his choice if he so desires." 
In short, if we consider th e original meaning of the word ' 'ballot" as "a 
ball," and limit the manner of election to that used originally when the ball 
was in use, it will be seen that since the constitution was adopted there has 
never been a constitutional election, for never have balls been used in the 
state of Iowa. The Greeks use shells, ostrakon, for their method of con-
ducting a secret ballot, hence the word ''ostracial .'' Jn this growth of 
language, ballot has come to mean, and did so mean, in my judgment, at 
the time our constit ution was adopted, a method of conducting a secret 
ballot. 
The constitutional provision above quoted, therefore, means that all 
elections by the people 11ha ll be by that system which enables the voter to 
express his choice without it being known for whom or what he has voted. 
It is used in contradistinction to a viva voce vote, as had been fo rmerly used 
in England. Any system, then, which preserves that secrecy of the ballot 
or vote of the elector, in my judgment rulfills the constitutional require-
ment . 
We are not without authority to sustain this position. Under a constitu-
tion more restricted than ours, the Rhode Island court held that an election 
by the use of voting machines was constitutional. (1!) R I., 729 .) The use 
of a paper ballot is an acknowledgment of a departure from the primitive 
use of the word. I think, without doubt, that at the time our constitution 
was adopted the word "ballot" was understood as meaning a system of 
secret voting in contradistinction to viva voce voting, an d the use of a vot-
ing machine preservin '! the secrecy and carrying out the intention of the 
constitution is, in my judgment, not.obnoxious to the constitution. 
Yours respectfully, 
MILTON RBMLEY, 
A ttorney-General. 
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CoRPORATIONs-They bave no power in this state to in-
cur an indebtedness to exceed two-thirds of their 
capital stock. Any foreign corporation seeking to do 
business in tbis state must conform to the policy of 
this state, both in regard to the nature of the business 
transacted and the security which the law of this state 
is intended to give to those having dealings with such 
corporations. 
DES MOINES, IOWA, March 30, 1900. 
H01t. G. L. Dobson, Secretary of State: 
DEAR Sn~-You have submitted to me copies of the articles of incor-
poration of the Marfield Elevator Company, and the Interstate Elevator 
Company . which corporations are incorporated under the l11.ws of the state 
of Minnesota, and seek to obtain permits to do business in the state of Iowa 
by complying with section 1637 of the code, and you ask my opinion whether, 
under the circumstances, such permits sho uld be gra.nted. 
The nature of the business of each company is stated in the following 
words: "The general nature of the corporate business shall be the erection, 
purchasing, leasing, own\ng and operating and sale of elevaton and ware-
houses; nd the doing of s general busi ness for itself or on commission in 
buying, selling, cleaning and storing grain, seeds of all kinds, flour, feed , 
fuel, lumber and building materials." The capital stock of the Interstate 
Elevator Company was origina lly $ 100,000, "of which not less t ban $40,000 
shall be subscribed for and paid in on or before April 1, 1896, and the 
balance uf said stock may be subscribed for and issued or not, and at such 
times as the board of directors may at any time determine." Under article 
4, the limit of the indebtedness was plsced at $250,000. By amendments 
made June 2, 1899, stock was authorized to be issued to the extent of 
$200,000 "and all of ~aid increase of stock to, be subscribed and issued at 
such Limes and in such amounts as the board of directors may from time to 
time determine." The article in r egard to indebtedness was amended so 
as "to increase the l::ighest amount of indebtedness or liability to which 
such corporat ion shall at any time be liable to the sum of $500,000. 
It will be noticed that these amendments required, so far as the public 
may know, only $40,000 of stock to be subscribed aod paid in, and the cor-
poration is authorized to become indebted in the sum of $500,000. The 
Marfield Elevator company can al~o become indebted far in excess of the 
capital stoek paid in . 
Under section 1611 of the code, such corporations, if organized under 
the laws of this state, shall fix the highest amount of their indebtedness or 
liab!li.ty in a sum that shall not exceed ~wo-thirds of the capital stock. The 
purpose of this evidently is to protect the pub lic who have dealin,:ts with 
such corporations. This provision of our statute is of old standing, it 
appearing in the code of 1851. 
It may be said, then, to be the settled policy of the state that no cor-
poration organized in this state shall have the power to incur an indebted-
ness to exceed two-thirds of their capital stock. While section 1637, relating 
56 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
to granting permits to foreign corporations to do business in this state, 
does not, in express terms, require a foreign corporation to comply in all 
res pects with the Jaws of this state relating to the organization of incorpo· 
rations, yet I think it must be understood without doubt that the legisla-
ture intended that only such foreign corporations as conform generally 
to the policy of this state as expressed in its laws for the organization of 
corpor11tions under the Jaws of the state, should be permitted to do business 
within the state. 
I cannot conceive that the legislature ever intended that corporations 
organized under the laws of this sta te should be placed at a disadvantage 
as compared with foreign corporations doing business in the state. There 
is no rule of comity vrhich vrould require a state to give permission to a 
foreig,n corporation to do either a class of business prohibited to copora-
tions organized under the laws of t his statA, or to ~ive to foreign corpora-
tions the right to do business on terms and conditions more favorable than 
those given to our state corporations . All foreign corporations, in my 
judgment, must afford to the people of the state who deal with them secu-
rity and protection at least equal to that required of corporations organized 
under the laws of the state. It would be an anomalous condition to pro-
hibit a corporation organized under the laws of this state, with a capital of 
$40,000 to incur liability in any greater sum than two-thirds of its capital, 
and to permit a Minnesota corporation with the same amount of capital to 
incur a liability of half a million of dollars. In my judgment, any foreign 
corporation seeking to do business in this state must conform to the policy 
of this state, both in regard to the nature of the business transacted and 
the security which the law of this state is intended to give to those having 
dealings with such corporation . Hence, I do not think it your duty to give 
permits to said corporations authorizing them to do business in this state. 
Yours respectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
A ttortti!Y· General. 
PENITENTIARIES-The powers vested in the governor by 
section 5710 of the code are abrogated as to him and 
vested in the board of control by chapter 118, acts of 
the Twenty-seventh General Assembly. 
March 31, 1900. 
Board of Control of Stat/! Inslitution.f, Des Moines, Iowa: 
DEAR SIRs-Yours at hand, requesting my opinion upon the following 
question: 
''A convict confined in one of the penitentiaries became insane, 
and was transferred to the insane department at Anamosa, where he 
is now confined. His term is about to expire, and the warden pro- · 
poses to cause an examination to be made as provided in section 5710 
of the code. Are the duties which tha t section d evolved upon the 
governor now to be discharged by the board of control, or is the gov· 
ernor still required to act according to the provisions of that sec-
tion?" 
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Section 8, chapter 118, of the laws of the Twenty-seventh General 
Assembly, gives to the board of control ''full power to manage. control and 
govern, subject only to the limitations contained in this act, * ·* ·* the 
state hospi tal for the insane * * * and the state peni tentiaries." 
Section 55 of said chapter repeals all ac ts and par ts of acts in conflict 
with, or inconsistent with this ac t. Section 5710 of the code as well as 
5709, conferred upon the governor certain powers and duties in r elation to 
the management, control and government of the penitentiaries, with power 
to order a convict to be tra nsferred from one penitentiary to the insane 
department of the other or from one penitentiary to one of the hospitals 
for the insane, or to order that convicts should be retained in the hospital 
department for the criminal insane. If such powers are still to be exer-
cised by the governor, it is the duty of the board of control to respect and 
carry out the orders of the governor which may be made in the exercise of 
that power. It becomes evident, therefore, that the exercise of such power 
is an encroachment upon, and inconsistent with, the full power given to 
the board of control to manage, control and govern said institutions. 
Many cases may arise where the exercise of such power by the governor 
would produce a conflict of authority. Suppose, ffilr instance, the governor 
should direct a convict to be se.lt to a state hospital who had no settlement 
in the state, and the place of his settlement was unknown. He would have 
to be received as a state patient. The last sent.,nce of section 38 of said 
chapter 118, provides "that no patient to be maintained at state expflnse 
shall be received at the state hospital without the formal order of the board 
of control." In the case supposed, then, the governor may, if such a power 
still exists, order a state patient to be sent to one of the hospitals, and the 
board of control refuse to make an erder to receive him at the state 
hospital. 
I think, without question, so much of section 5710 of the code as imposes 
any duty upon the governor with reference to the matters therein con-
tained, is in conflict and inconsistent with said chapter 118 of the laws of 
the Twenty-seventh General Assembly and, has been repealed, and the 
board of control, under the ·provisions of said chapter 118 has full power 
to discharge the duties devolved by said section upon the governor. 
Yours truly, 
MILTON REMLEY. 
A ttor,uy- Gweral. 
PENSION MoNEY-The board of control, or the command-
ant of the Soldiers' Home, has power to require a 
deposit with the commandant of a part of pension 
money of an inmate which extends to two classes only; 
first, those who have been convicted twice of violating 
the criminal statutes of the state, or who shall have 
twice been found guilty by the commandant or court 
martial of intoxication or other misdemeanor; second, 
those pensioners who have a wife or minor children. 
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D ~!:S MOINES, IOWA, April 23, 1900. 
Board of Cont•ol of State Insti fttt ions: 
DEAR Srns-Yours of the 23d inst. at hand, enclosing two letters from 
pensioners at the Iowa Soldiers' Home with reference to the disposition to 
be made of thei r pension money, and asking my opinion in regard to your 
authority to eomply with the requests made in t hese letters. 
The act of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly, approved March 29th, 
being an act defining the power of the board of control in relation t ) the 
pension money of members of the Iowa Soldiers' Home, prohibits the board 
of control adopting or enforcing any rule making any disposition of the 
money received from pensions by members of the Soldiers' Home, except 
as provided in t he act. Section 2 of the act provides for the disposition of 
the money of pensioners in cases where the member of the home shall have 
been "convictad twice by any court of justice of violating the criminal 
statutes of the state, or who shall twice be found guilty by the command-
ant or a court martial. if the members so elect, of intoxication or other 
misdemeanor." 
Said section 2 does not authorize any interference with the pension 
money received by any member of the home unless he shall have been con-
victed of violation of la w or of a misdemeanor as above stated . Section 3 
of the act is as follows: "All members of the home who are pensioners 
and having wife or minor children, shall be required to deposit with the 
commandant at once upon receipt of his pension check, one-half of his 
pension money, which shall he sent at once to sa id wife or minor children, 
unless said wife is proven to be a woman of immoral character ... 
It will be thus seen that t he power of the board or the commandant of the 
.home to require any deposit with the commandan t of any part of the pen-
sion money extends to two classes of pensioners; first, those who have been 
convicted twice of violating the criminal statutes of the state, or who shall 
twice be found gui lty by the commandant or court martial of intoxication 
or other misdemeanor . The second class is all pensioners who have a wife 
or minor children. The power of the board to adopt or enforce any rule 
with reference to any other class is entirely prohibited by section 1 of 
the act . 
The letter of Mr. Chas. P. Swaim, his statement of facts being endorsed 
as correct by the commandant, and assuming that he has not been twice 
convicted of violation of any criminal law, or intoxication, or other misde-
meanor, by the commandant or court martial, brings him within neither 
of the classes referred to above, and hence he is authorized, in my judg-
ment, to do exactly as he sees fit with\he money received from the pension, 
and if he desires to send one-fourth of it to his mother, it is his privilege. 
If his mother were dependent upon him, which does not appear from the 
statement of facts to be the case, the board could take no steps to enforce 
the sending of money to her unless he should be convicted in the manner 
referred to in section 2 of the act, of some violation of law, misdemeanor. 
or intoxication . · 
Hence, J. think he is at liberty to use or dispose of his pension money as 
he wishes, without let or hindrance from the commandant or the board of 
control. 
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Second.-In regard to the case of Mr. Augustus Morrison : It appears 
from his letter that he recei res a pens ion of $8.00 per montb, and under 
the r ule heretofore enforced. has been sending all above $G.OO per month 
to his two children who are twelve and fourteen years of age respectively, 
and are at the Soldiers' Orphans' Home at Davenport. He wishes to discon· 
tinue the sending of money to his children and to apply all in excess of 
$6.00 per month to the payment of certain debts. 
His case comes clearly within the provisions of the third section which 
I have quoted abo ve . Having minor children, under section 3, he is 
required to deposi t with the commandant one-half his pension, or $4.00 per 
month , which amount section il requ ires to be sent at once to his children. 
The other hal f, or $4.00 per month, Mr. Morrison is at liberty to dispose of 
as he deems best. In his letter he states that the children are not in need 
of any of the necessities of life. By section 3, the need of the children is 
not an element to be taken into consideration. The statute says plainly 
that the members of the home who are pensioners, and have a wife or 
minor children, shall be required to depo~ it with the commandant at onoe 
upon receipt of their pension checks, one· half of the pension money. 
A series of inquiries might arise as to how this money shall be expended 
for the minor children; whether the home at Davenport could use the 
same for the support of the children there; whether it shall be used by the 
children themselves as pin money; wheth er a guardian might be required 
to receive it for them . But these inquiries relate more to the wisdom or 
unwisdom of the act with whieh your present inquiry has nothing to do. 
I think it plain that section 3 requires a greater deposit to be made by Mr. 
.Morrison and those similarl.v si tuated with reference to having a wife or 
minor ch ildren than was required und~r the rule heretofore in for ce. The 
act in question, while it has limited the power of the board and of the 
commandant . has increased the bu rd•n upon the class of members in the 
home described in sec tion 3 t hereof. 
Yours respectfully, 
MILTON R~<.MLEY, 
A ttorne)!-General. 
MUTUAL ASSESSMENT I NSURANCE ASSOCIATION- -There 
is nothing to prevent a corporation from insuring 
against loss or damage from all the causes named in 
section 1759 of the code. Under proper provision, an 
association organized under chapter 5, may divide its 
members in to classes. 
DES MOINES, IOWA, April 27, 1900. 
Hon. Frattk F . Merriam, Attditor of State: 
DEAR SIR-Your request!or my official opinion upon the following ques-
tion has been duly considered, viz: 
" An association is about to incorporate for the purpose of doing 
fire, lightning, and tornado business, under the provisions of chapter 
5, title JX ?f the code . The incorpo ators desire to provide in the arti-
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cles for a division into two classes,-one division to consist of fire 
and lightning business, and the other class to consist of tornado and 
wind-storm business . They desire, further, to provide that in case of 
loss from fire and lightning that only those holding fire and lightning 
policies are to be assessed to pay the loss; and that when losses 
occur by tornado and wind·storm·that only those holding tornado and 
wind-storm policies are to be assessed ; the query being, catl. an asso-
ciation containing these provisions in its articles of incorporation 
be lega lly authorized to do business under the provisions of the code 
already cited, provided b01za fide applications for insurance to the 
amount of $100,000 is first obtained in each class." 
Section 1759 of the code provides: "Any number of persons may, without 
regard to the provisions of the preceding chapter, enter into contracts to and 
with each other for their insurance from loss or damage from fire, tornado. 
lightning, hail-storms, cyclones, or wind-storms." The following sections 
of said chapter 5 imply at least that the persona entering into the contracts 
referred to in section 1759 may incorporate, and the contracts entered into 
and with each other are entered into by means of the corporation . The 
kind of insurance which may be done is specified in said section 1759. The 
corporation is a mutual association. 
I do not think there is anything to prevent a corporation from insuring 
against Joss or damage from all the causes named in said section 1759; nor 
would one be justified in saying that a company could only insure against 
one of the contingencies or causes specified in said section. In fac t, it 
would be hard to distinguish between loss or damage from tornadoes, 
cyclones or wind-storms. 
The only question about which there can be any reasonable doubt in my 
mind is whether such association may divide its members into two classes, 
depending upon the contingencies insured against. If a proper provision 
is made for the equitable apportionment of the expense of managing the 
company, each class contributing to the payment of the losses occurring in 
that particular class, and each class having insurance in the sum named in 
your inquiry and in the statute, I see no legal objection thereto. The 
mutuality required to be preserved by mutual companies does not necessarily 
mean that each one shall pay the exact amount which every other member 
pays. In fact, in all mutual insurance companies, the basisjfor contribution 
to losses is fixed by tile premium paid, or the premium note given. Where 
one class, for instance, the class which is insured against tornadoes, hail-
storms, cyclones, or wind-storms, agrees to pay the losses of the memberli 
of that class by an assessmen& upon. the members of that class, the mutu-
ality is preserved between the members of that class and the class insured 
against fire and lightning is not required to contribute to the losses of the 
other class. If each class contributes its equitable proportion to the 
expenses of operating the company, I cannot say that the mutuality is not 
maintained. 
It is somewhat difficult to gather a clear idea of what the legislature 
intended by some of the provisions of said chapter 5. It is a little difficult 
to consider a contract made between a corporation and a member as 
"entering into contracts to and with each other." In one sense undoubtedly 
this is true, but in a very material sense it is not true. Still, construing the 
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different sections as best we may, I am inclin ed to think that you would be 
justified in authorizing a company organized under said chapter 5 to do 
business upon the plan above suggested, if due care is taken th a t each cla ss 
shall contribute equitably its proportionate share to the expenses of m ain-
taining the corporation and transacting the business. 
Yours respectfully, 
MILTON H E MLEY, 
.LJttor?zey-General . 
WARRANTS --AUTHORITY OF AUDITOR OF STAT E TO DRAW 
- He has no authority to draw warrants against the 
fund appropriated under chapter 131, acts of the 
Twenty-seventh General Assembly, after the first day 
of April 1900. 
DES MOINES, IOWA, April 27, 1900. 
H OIL Frank F. M erriam, A uditor of State : 
DEAR Srn-Yours of the 16 th iust. came duly to hand, in which you ask 
my official opinion upon the following question : 
"Can the Auditor of State draw \Varrauts against the fund appro-
priatt d under chapter 131, acts of the Twenty-seventh Genera l A ssem-
bly, after the first day of April, 1900 !" 
Section 2 of the said act is as follows: ''There is furth er appropriated 
from the state treasury for the term of two years ending March 31, 1900, 
the following sums, or so mnch thereof as may be necessary, to wit : • * * 
provided that on the first day of April succeeding the meeting of the r egular 
st>ssion of the General Assembly, all moneys appropriated under this act 
and remaining unexpended shall be and are hereby covered into the state 
treasury." 
The correct answer to your inquiry depends upon the meaning of the 
word" unexpended ." For a number of years substantially the same language 
bas been used in the general appropriation act. The word "expended" is 
derived from the Latin " expendere," meaning ''to weigh out; to pay out; 
to lay out;" used with reference to the paying out of money, because of the 
fact that before money was coined, the precious metal was weighed out in 
scales or balances. The English word "expend," when applied to money, 
means to pay out or disburse money. This is the definition given by most 
or all of the lexicographers, and common usage sanctions the use of the 
word in this sense. 
The first clause of the section above quoted makes the appropriation for 
the term of two years, ending March 31st. The second clause expressly 
requires all moneys appropriated in this act, "and remaining not paid out 
on the first of April, to be covered into the state treasury." Money cannot, 
in any true sense, bA said to be expended until it is paid out . The last 
clause of said section is equivalent to saying that all moneys remaining not 
paid out on the first of April shall be and are hereby covered into the state 
treasury. 
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The purpose of this provision is in harmony with the construction above 
given. In m aking appropriations and prov iding for the expe nse of the p:ov-
ernment of the slate, un d the state institution s. it is necessary th at the 
legislature should know the amount of money subject to be drawn under 
previous appropriation bills. If it were proper to pay for bills or debts 
contrac ted, relying upon the appropriation after the first day of April , the 
general assembly would have no means of knowing the amoun t of suc h 
bills or debts outs ta d ing, and hence could not !mo w defini te ly th e amo unt 
of money in the treas ury s ubject to be drawn . The appropriations from 
one general assembly to another are not cumu lative. T he provision a bove 
quoted cl oses the account, so far as the money not drawn from the tr easury 
is concern ed, promptly on thll thirty· first day of March succeedin g tlle meet-
ing of the ngul:ll' session of th11 gene ral assembly. If bills or debts co n-
trac ted by any state offi cer on account of the n ppropriation con tained in said 
act, cannot be settled und adjusted Hnd paid prior to the first day of April, 
then the legislature can provide therefor by an additional appropriation in 
the omnibus appropri tllion act, and no one will be prej udiced by the con-
struction thus placed upon it. 
I am of the opinion that your inqniry mnst be an swered in the neg~tive. 
Yours respectfully, 
.MILTON REMLEY. 
A ttonzey- General. 
I NMATE OF HOSPITAL FOR INSANE-RESIDENCE OF-Such 
person cannot change his residence or place of settle-
ment. He has not the mental capacity to form such an 
intention as is required by law. 
May 4, 11•00. 
B oard of Control of State Institutions, Des Moines, I owa: 
DEAR SIRs-Your favor of the 2d inst . at hand in which you ask my 
opinion upon the state of facts therein narrated . nam ly; that a patient at 
Clarinda hospital was paroled for sixty days, but was not discharged as 
cured He bad been a state patient. During the time that he was out on 
parole he resided in Woodbury county . Under a new commitment be was 
returned to Clarinda April 21 , 1900 The warrant and findings of the com-
missioners of Insanity of Woodbury county state his legal residence to be 
in Woodbury county. You ask wheth~r. upon such facts, said patient could 
obtain a legal settlement so as to be chargea ble to Woodbury co unty; or, 
stated otherwise, can an insane man, who is an adult, acquire a settlement 
in such a case. 
I am very clear that if the patient's residence b ~fore he was sent to the 
hospital in the first place, was not in Woodbury county . he could not acquire 
a settlement in Woodbury county between the date of his parole, on Janu-
ary 15, 1900, and the da te of his return, April 21, 1900. 'J he length of time 
required to obtain a settlement in a given place is one year. Even had he 
been a sane man, he could not, in seventy days' time, acquire a settlement 
where be had not one. 
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I do not think an insane person can change his residence or the place of 
his settlement. Settlement follows from a continued residence in a given 
place for the period of twelve months . Settlement once acquired continues 
until it has been legally changed. To change the place of residence, two 
things must combine . First . an intention to make such change; second, an 
actual change, An intention to change a residence cannot be imputed to 
an insane person. Henoe, in my judgment, an insane adult cannot acquire 
a new settlement by simply wandering into another com:Jty or jurisdiction. 
If Woodbury county insane commissioners find that his settlement is in 
that county. it is possible that they have kn owledge of facts which your 
honora ble board may not know. While the patient in question had been 
committed as a state patient to the hospital , the former finding may have 
been incorrect and the latter one be correct. The board might well m ake a 
thorough investigation of the facts before doing anything to set aside the 
order of the commissioners of insanity of Woodbury county. 
.Respectfully yours, 
.MILTON REMLEY, 
Attor1zey-General. 
GAME L AWS-VIOLATION OF BY INDIANS ON RESERVATION 
- The above laws are general in their operation, and 
affect Indians the same as all other persons. 
May 8, 1900. 
Hon. Ceo . E. Delavan, Estherville, Iowa: 
DEAR SIR-Yours of the 9th inst. at hand asking my opinion upon the 
question whether th tJ Indians of Tama county are amenable for the vialation 
of the I owa game law. 
In 1·eply to this I wi ll say, that there is no Axception made in favor of the 
Indians in the stat ute. The statu te is general in its operation and effect. 
All persons, wh eth er citizens or a liens, resident or non-resident are li able 
for any violation of the statute. The Indians• can claim no exemption from 
the operation and effect of the crimi nal laws of the state. 
Yours truly, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
A ttor1tey-G ene1'al. 
-::::--- But sco In •·e. Blackbird, 109 F ed. , 139, 
]'ENCES-RIGHT T O ERECT ALONG MEANDERED L AKES-
No adjacent land owner has a right to enclose the 
shores of a lake below hig h water mark, or any part 
of the lake with a fence so as to interfere with the rights 
of the public. 
DEs M OINES, I owA , :May 17, 1900. 
F. M. Bat~gltma1t, E sq. , Detmty Fish and Game Warden, Breda, Iowa: 
DEAR Bm-Yours of the 16th inst . at hand, in which you ask my opinion 
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as to whether parties owning land adjacent to Wall Lake, in Sac county, 
have th e right to build a fence in the waters of the lake, thereby obstructing 
the passage of any wanting to fish in sa id lake from the shore, a nd whether 
they can prohibit anyone from climbing over or through such fence for the 
purpose of fishing . 
In regard to this I will say that in all meandered lakes the state of Iowa 
owns all the land under the lake and on its s hores up to high water mark . 
It holds the title for the use of the public. The public, and any part thereof, 
has the right to go to any part of the l!>ke, or along its shores below high 
water mark, without let or hindrance. Persons owning land adjacent to 
the lake can prevent people trespassing on their land in going to the lake, 
but the right of the adjacent land owners does not extend below high 
water mark. Such land owners may erect wharves or docks, a nd use the 
shores for purposes connected with the legitimate use of the lake, but can-
not prevent th e public from going thereon, or passing along the shores ol' the 
lake freely. In using the lake, the adjacent land owners must use it so as 
not to interfere with the rights of the public. 
lt follows from this statement of t he rules of law that no adjacent 
land owner has a right to enclose t he shores of a lake below high water 
mark, or any pa rt of the lake, with a fence, so as to interfere with the rights 
of the public. Yours truly, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
A ttonzey- General. 
TRUSTEES OF IOWA STATE COLLEGE-POWERS OF-1-
They have no authority to use any part of the interest 
from the endowment fund to pay off expenses of the 
college experiment station. 
2.-They cannot legally divert the funds appropriated 
by section 2674 of the code to the payment of the cur-
rent expenses of said experiment station. 
May 23, 1900, 
Hon . J. B. Hzmgerford , Chairman Board Trustees Iowa State College, 
Carroll, I owa: 
DEA.R SIR-Yours of the 16th inst. duly at hand in which you ask my 
opinion upon the fo llowing questions: 
First-' ' Can the trustees of> the college lawfullv appropriate any 
part of the interest from the endowment fund, for the payment of the 
current expenses of the college ex periment station?" 
The act of July 2, 1862, donating lands to the several states provided, 
among other things, that the money derived from the sale of the lands 
aforesaid, shall be invested in a certain manner, a nd" the interest of which 
shall be inviolably appropriated by each state , which may take and claim 
the benefi t of this act, to the endowment, support, and maintenance, of at 
least one college, where the leading object shall be, without excluding other 
scientific and classical studies, and including military tactics, to teach such 
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branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts, 
in such manner as the legislature of the states may respectively prescribe." 
The act further provides that th e state shall erect the necessary buildings 
and keep the capital of the fund derived from the sale of lands forever 
undiminished . The state bas acce pted the grant upon the terms nl\med in the 
act. The act of March 2, 1887, providing for au agricultural experiment 
station to be established under the direction of the college or colleges or 
agricultural department of colleges, made an appropriation for the expense 
of 8aid experimental sta tion . While the experiment station is under the 
control and direction of the college, yet it is something separate and distinct 
from the college so far as the expenses are concerned, and the sources from 
which the funds necessary to maintain the experiment station are derived. 
There is nothing in the statute of the state which autbonzes or justifies the 
mingling of the funds provided for the support of the college proper and for 
the support of the agricultural experiment station. In view of the acts of 
conl{ress, it is doubtful whether the l e ~~:islature could authorize the diversion 
of the income fund of the college to the support of an experiment station, 
but whether the legislature bas such power or not need not be discussed, 
for the legislature has not attempted so to do. The two are treated as 
separate institutions so far as the expense of supp,ortin~~: the same is con-
cerned. Hence, I do not think the board of trustees of the college would 
be authorized in using any part of the interest from the endowment fund, 
for payment of the expenses of the college experime'nt station . 
Second, you ask: "Can the trustees lawfully appropriate any part of 
the annual appropriation provided under seetion 2674 of the code, for pay-
ment of current expenses of the college experiment station?" 
Section 2674 ilil as followe : "For the repairs, general improvements and 
current expenses of the state college of agriculture and mechanic arts, in 
its sever~.L l departments and chairs, and in aid of the income fund, the sum 
·of eighteen thousand five hundred dollars is annually appropriated out of 
any money in the state treasury not otherwise appropriated." This section 
specifies the purposes for which the appropriation is made. Bearing in 
miud that all appropriations of the national gonrnment, and all laws en-
acted by the legislature make a distinction between the college and the ex· 
periment station, it is evident that the appropril\Lion made by section 2674 
is intended for the support, repairs, general improvement and current ex-
penses of the college and not for the current expenses of the experiment 
station. I do not think the trustees can legally divert the funds appropriated 
by said section to the )Jayment of the cUI-rent expenses of the experiment 
station. 
Yours respectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney-General. 
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GAME LAws--Fish in ponds or lakes owned by private 
individuals are private .property. Under the facts. 
stated, no opinion can be formed as to whether the 
parties are in fact the owners of the lakes in question. 
June 8, 1900. 
Hon. Geo. E . Delavan, Estherville, Iowa: 
DEAR SlR-Your favor of the 28Lh ult. at hand, in which you enclose ~ 
letter of Mr. J . H . Scott, and r equest me to give you an opinion upon the 
rights of the parties from the facts stated in Mr. Scott's lett.er. Mr. Scott 
says: "We have in this towh an association organized for the purpose of 
fishing and have leased, on the bottom lands of the Miss i!Jsippi, a couple of 
ponds, or sm&ll lakes, that are surveyed, and taxes paid on the same, as if 
in a state of cultivation, and are cut off from the main channel or stream 
by the government levee. The association wish to know if they have the 
right, under the state law, to fish in these ponds with nets, or only with 
hook and line? In other words, they wish to know what their rights are 
now, as provided by the etatute?' ' 
The an!wer to this question depends altogether upon the ownership of 
the ponds or small lakes. If the ponds, or small lakes, are private prop-
erty, then I am of the Qpinion that the oo;vners, under section 2M5, are the 
owners of the fish therein, and may take them as they see fit., or permit the 
~~ame to be done. Under .the facts stated, 1 can form no opinion as to 
whether the parties are in fact the owners of the lakes. Mr. Scott's letter 
s~ys they are surveyed and the taxes paid the same as if in a state of culti-
vation . I infer also that the lakes were formerly connected with the stream 
by a natural out let. The fact that some party has had a meandered lake 
surveyed, and voluntarily pays taxes, does not necessarily make him the 
owner of the lake, notwithstanding the outlet may be cut off by a levee 
built by the government. 
The language of section 3545 is: "Persons who own premises on which 
there are waters having no natural inlet or outlet through which such 
waters may be stocked or repl enished with fish, are the owners of the · fish 
therein, etc.'' It may be contended that there was a natural inlet or out. 
let to these lakes which has now been closed by the g overnment levee, and 
hence t he lakes, al though owned by private parties, do not com e within the 
description of lak es referred to in said section. Such a construction would 
be very tech nical indeed, and I think contrary to the spirit and intention 
of the en tir e section. T he g overnment levee d estroys the outlet o1· inlet 
a nd there is none there no w, so that•if t he ponds or lakes belon~ to private 
par ties, the public is not damaged by the taking of the fish therefrom by 
the owners of the lakes . 
If private parties do not own the lakes, then I do not think they would 
be authorized to seine in them. 
Yours truly, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
A ttorney-General. 
REP01IT OF THE ATTORNEY- GENERAL. 67 
COMMISSIONER OF L ABOR STATISTICS-Under the powers 
g iven him by law, t o inspect factories, he may make a 
written request to enter said buildings for such pur-
pose, and if refused permission, he may proceed to 
enter said buildings without the consent of the owner. 
June 11,1900. 
Hon. C. F. Wennerstrum , Commissioner of Labor Stati stics, Des Moines, 
Iowa: 
DEAR Sm-Yours of the 8th in:st. duly at hand in which you refer to 
section 2472 of the code, and ask : 
''Must the commissioner first obtain or secure the complaint of 
two or more persons before be can enter such factory, or does the 
law mean that he must make an examination of a factory on receiv-
ing such complaint, and does the law quoted, authorize him to make 
an examination on his own initiative after having first asked per-
mission in writing to inspect such factory, as the law prescribes?'' 
The language of the statute is: "The commissioner of the bureau of 
labor statistics shall have the power upon the complaint of two 01' more 
persons, or upon his failure to otherwise obtain information in accordance 
with the provisions of this act., to enter any factory, mill, etc., when the 
same is open or in operation, upon a request being made in writing, for the 
purpose of gathering facts and statistics such as are contemplated by this 
act." Section 2474 of the code provides in general terms. the kind of infor-
mation that may be required to be furnished by the owner or manager of 
such fac tory, mill, workshop, mine, etc. The information given may not 
prove satisfactory. Some matters about which information is to be asked 
such as, what means are provided for the escape of the employes in ca~e of' 
fire ; what measures are t r.keu to prevent accidents to employes from 
machinery; how are t he buildings ven tilated, etc. , could be obtained better 
by a personal in spection tha n by any description whi ch could be given. 
The purpose of the law, among other things, is unquestionably to secure 
th e bes t possible protection for the life and th e health of the em ployes. A 
power given of ten implies a duty. Where complaint is made by employes 
or others , as to t he insufficiency of the applia nces to sec ure t he life. he alth 
and comfort of th e employes, I t hink it is th ll du ty of the commissioner to 
make a perso nal inspection , exer cising thereby, t he power to en ter t he 
build ing wh e n it is open or i n opera ti on, af ter m aking a request th erefor i n 
writing. B ut if, for any cause, he deems the information which he bas 
obtained, not sa tisfacto r,y, I d o not t hink he is limited in his action u n til 
after compl aint is til ed . He may make a req ues t in wri ting and if gran te d 
enter the building, a nd if refused per mission he may proceed to enter th e 
building without t he consen t of t he owner. 
Yours respectfully, 
MILTON R E MLEY. 
At/orne; -General . 
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BOARD OF CONTROL-The abstract of title of the east 
half of lot sixteen (16) in Sage's subdivision of the 
southwest quarter of section twelve (12), township 
seventy-nine (79), range twenty-two (22), west of the 
5th P. M., shows the title in the present owner to be 
good. 
June 11, 1900. 
Board of Control of State btstitzttions, Des Moines, Iowa: 
DEA.R SIRs-£ enclose you the abstract of title of the east half of lot 
sixteen (16) in Sage's subdivision .of the southwest quarter of section twelve 
{12), township seventy-nine (79), range twenty-two (22), west of the 5th P. 
M . The objections thereto pointed out in my communication of .May 4th 
have been removed except in regard to taxes up to and including the year 
1876, as stated in item number 10 of the abstract. 
In regard to this I will say, that while taxes are made a perpetual lien 
upon real estate, the long time that has elapsed since there was any effort to 
enforce the taxes , makes the defect in title more apparent than re&l The 
action of the board of supervisor~ in passing a resolution relinquishing 
taxes prior to and Including 1876, although in my judgment without 
authority of law, has been acquiesced in for so long that there is not one 
chance in five hundred of the act ever being questioned hereafter . Every-
thing considered, r am of the opinion you would be justified in purchasing 
the said land and considering the title thereof good, as I think it is for all 
practical purposes. 
1 enclose you herewith also the unrecorded deeds and tax receipts . 
Yours respectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
A ttonzey- General. 
INSURANCE CoMPANIES--1.-'rhe securities of such com-
panies deposited with the auditor of state for the pur-
pose of securing policy holders cannot be withdrawn 
under any circumstances, either by the company 
depositing the same or any assignee or reinsuring 
company, except upon the substitution therefor 
other securities in a• sum of equal value to those 
withdrawn. 
2.- Payment of interest could be endorsed on such 
security at the request of the company, in case it has 
been paid and ~here is no interest coupon to be 
severed from the mortgage or bond. No company 
has any authority of law whatsoever to receive 
payment in full for said securities. 
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3.- The maker of such securities, making payments 
thereon, to any one other than the auditor of state, 
while such securities are in his possession, does so 
at his peril. 
June 12, 1900. 
Hon. Pranle F. Merriam, Auditor of State, Des Moines, Iowa: 
DEA.R Sm-Yours came duly to hand in which you ask my opinion upon 
the following subjects: 
First-''lu the transfer or consolidation of the assets and business 
of a legal reserve company organized in this state with a similar com-
pany organized in another state, on what basis, if at all, can the 
purchasing or surviving company if organized outside of this state, 
withdraw the securitiee deposited with this department?" 
In regard to this I will say, that life insurance companies organized 
under chapter 6, title 9 of the code, if a stock company, under section 1769 
of the code is required to deposit with the auditor of state, securities repre-
senting $25,000 of paid up capital. And under section 1774 they are required 
to deposit from year to year, enough in addition thereto, to make the total 
deposit equal the net cash value of all policies in force. A mutual company 
under section 1774 is r~q uired to deposit in section 1770 of the code, three-
fifths of the whole annual premium of policies, averaging $1,000 each, issued 
on the life of two hundred and fifty persons, and from year to year, enough in 
addition thereto to make the total securities deposited with the auditor 
equal the net cash valuation of all policies in force by such company. The 
state becomes the trustee of the funds thus deposited, holding the securities, 
which as far as they go, are a guaranty of the fulfillment of the contract 
made between the company and the policy holder. The auditor is the 
custodian of the securities thus deposited, with the state as the trustee. 
No company organized in the state is permitted to do business without 
complying with the requirements of the provisions of the law above referred 
to. Section 1779 authorizes the companies having such deposits to change 
the securities, that is, they can substitute other securities in lieu of those 
theretofore deposited with the auditor. Section 1780 authorizes the com-
panies having deposited with the auditor, bonds or other securities, to col-
lect the dividends or interest thereon. forwarding to their authorized 
agents the coupons or other evidence of inter88t as the same become due. 
But there is no provision of law authorizing the withdrawal from the 
auditor's hands the bonds or mortgages or other securitie3 once deposited 
there except upon the company first having placed in the auditor's hands, 
an equal amount of securities to be approved by the audi tor . Section 1774 
requires that the full net valuation of all policies in force shall be ascer-
tained by the auditor, and securities in an amount equal thereto, shall be 
deposited with the auditor. Tbe provision authorizing a substitution of 
securities and a collection of interests thereon, gives to the companies 
sufficient lati tude in the loaning of tbeir money and the collection of the 
interest thereon, but does not authorize them to withdraw securities 
deposited · so as to recluce the amount deposiLed, below the net valuation of 
the policies of such compR.ny in force. Nor does the law authori~e a stock 
company to withdraw securities so as to repuce the amount on deposit with 
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the auditor below the sum of $25,000 the amount of cash capital required 
of such stock companies. 
The inquiry arises: For what purpose is this deposit with the state as 
trustee? Section 1778 clearly defines the trust imposed upon the state. If 
a company defaults or becomes insolvent or proceedings are instituted 
against a company, the securities on deposit shall vest in the t1tate for the 
benefit of the policies on which such deposits were made, and the proceed• 
of tbe same, shall, upon order of the court upon final hearing, be divided 
among the holders thereof in proportion to the last valuation of the sum, 
or at any time be applied to the purchase of reinsurance for their benefit. 
It is thus seen, that the state is the tru!tee of securities which are pledged 
for the fulfillment of a contract of insurance made between the company 
depositing such securHies, and its policy holders. No private arrangement 
between the company making such deposit, such as procuring reinsurance 
on some other company organized under the laws of this state, or any 
other state, or a consolidation of business by which the business is after-
wards continued in the name of another company, will justify thfl trustee 
or the auditor of state acting for such trustee, in releasing the securities or 
permitting them to be withdrawn from the hands of the trustee. To illus-
trate: A enters into a contract with Band as an inducement forB to enter 
into the contract, deposits with C as trustee, certain securities as a pledge 
or guarantee that A will fulfill his contract with B. Afterward A makes 
another contract with D, to which B is not a party, by which D assumes all 
the obligations entered into by A and agrees to carry them out; what right 
in su!:h a case would D have to the securities which were pledged and 
placed in A's hands for the fulfillment of the contract made with B. B has 
a right to insist that C, the trustee, shall hold the securities originally 
pledged for the fulfillment of the contract, and for C to deliver the securities 
without B's consent to any person whomsoever, would be a gross violation 
of his trust and contrary to every principle of law and equity. 
The provisions of the statute to which I have called attention are wise 
and one of the most excellent features of the Iowa insurance law. They 
have been advertised and many policy holdtrs llave been induced to take 
policies in various companies becanse of the provision of law referred to, 
and the securities deposited with the auditor of state To permit a com-
pany which has received money as premiums from the policy holders on pol-
icies procured because of securities deposited with the auditor of state, to 
reinsure its risks in a company org!lnized under the laws of another state. 
which latter company is not required to deposit the net valuation of all 
policies in force with the auditor of this state, and because of such rein-
surance, for the auditor to surrender the securities pledged for the fulfill-
ment of the contracts of insurance without the policy holder's consent, 
would be a gross violation of law and of his duty as an officer of the state. 
It would practically abrogate the wise provisioa which the law has made 
for the protection of policy holders. It would be a rank injustic <: to such 
policy holders, and, in addition thereto, I am inclined to the view it would 
render the auditor liable . on his bond to every.policyholcler injured thereby. 
My conclusion is, that such securities caanot be withdrawn under any cir· 
cumstances, either by the company depositing the same, or any assignee 
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or reinsuring company~ except upon the substitution therefor of other 
securities in a sum of equal value with those withdrawn. 
Suond-Y ou ask further : "In case you find such securities 
should still be retained on deposit here. what arrangements, if any, 
sbould this department enter into to permit the temporary with-
drawal of securities for the proper endorsement of payments made 
thereon; or in case said securities have been paid in full?" 
In regard to this. from what I have said before, it will appear that the 
auditor has no authority to permit the withdrawal of any securities until 
an equal amount has been deposited with him. lf securities equal to the 
net valuation of all policies in force have been deposited by the company, 
the auditor is authorized to surrender the coupons attached to bonds or 
notes , to the company as such coupons mature . But the bonds or mort-
gages should in no case be permitted to go out of the hands of the auditor 
until other securities are substituted in place thereof. The payment of 
interest could be endorsed thereon at the request of the company in case it 
has been paid and there is no interest coupon to be severed from the mort-
iage or bond. 
You ask: "What shall be done in case said securities have been 
paid in full?'' 
No company has any authority of law whatsoever to receive pay-
ment for securities which are deposited with the auditor of state. The 
maker of any mortgage or note, or any bond given to an insurance com-
pany, is presumed to know the law, and is not justified in making a pay-
ment to an insurance company unless such company has actual possession 
of the bond or mortgage . If he does so, he does it at his peril. It is my 
opinion that the auditor should permit no withdrawal of securities for the 
endorsement of payment made thereon, unless the company has placed an 
equal value in lieu thereof. Such companies being authorized to receive the 
payment of interest except as hereinafter stated, a company giving a receipt 
for the interest is entitled to have a receipt for the interest paid, attached to 
the note or mortgage, but if such note or mortgage has interest coupons 
attached, . the auditor is justified in cutting off the same and forwarding it 
to the company_ A company having no authol'ity to collect the principal 
of any securities on deposit with the auditor, if it unlawfully does so, the 
auditor is justified in refusing to recognize such payment and still holding 
the bond or mortgage for the purpose of carrying out the trust imposed on 
the auditor when such security was deposited with him. 
Tlzird.-You ask further: "What action should this department take, 
if any, to prevent the companies accepting payment in part or in full 
amount of securities deposited here without the withdrawal of said 
securities?" 
The latter part of section 1380 provides: '' H :tny comp~ny fails to 
deposit additional security when and as called for by the auditor, or pend-
in~ any proceedings to close up or enjoin it, the auditor shall collect such 
dividends or interest and add the same to such securities." ln as much as 
under the law, companies not in default are authorized to collect the 
interest, I think the auditor should, in case a company fails to deposit 
additional securities when and as called for by tlle auditor, notify the 
72 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
• maker of every bond, note or mortgage on deposit with him, to pay no 
more interest to the company, but to pay the same to the auditor; this as a 
matter of precaution and as courtesy to the makers of the bonds and notes. 
If it comes to your knowledge that any company illegally collects the 
amount of a note, mortgage or other security deposited with the auditor 
for the purpose of protecting the persons liable on such security from a 
fraud and double liability, I suggest that you notify the person liable on 
every security deposited by such company, in no case to pay any sum what-
soever to such company. It is a familiar principle of law, that the maker 
of a negotiable note or bond who pays the same to any person other than 
the actual holder thereof, does so at his peril. While I think the state 
could collect any security deposited with the auditor notwithstanding the 
payment to the insurance company which deposited with the auditor, yet 
as a matter of precaution and to protect such makers from being required 
to pay their obligation' a second time, the notice above suggested might 
well be given, although not required by law. Courtesy to the makers of 
the bonds and notes, if not absolutely requiring it would justify it. 
Let me say, generally, that every security required by law to be deposited 
with the auditor of state, either by a level premium insurance company 
organized unrler the laws of the state, or by any association, has attached 
to it some trust. The state is made the trustee for the fulfillment of the 
trust attaching to the securities deposited, and in no case is the auditor 
justified in surrendering the securities or permitting .them to go out of his 
possession, except in the manner prescribed by law, or upon an order of 
the court, which executes in behalf of the state, the trust attaching to the 
securities deposited with the auditor. 
Yours truly, 
MILTON REMLEY,, 
Attorney-General. 
CITY MILK DEALERS-WHO ARE SUCH-Wholesale dealers 
in milk and cream are included within the definition. 
June 13, 1900. 
Ho~e . B. P . Norto?t, Dairy Commissioner, Des Moines Iowa: 
DEAR SIR-Yours at hand in which you desire my opinion upon the 
question : 
"Whether the statute definition of a city milk dealer will apply to 
tbGStl persons who sell their mnk at wboles&le, and deliver the same 
bv wagon to retailers of milk in De~ Moines and the other citie3 of 
the state in which the in spection of milk is carried on by this office.' ' 
The definition of city milk dealer in section 2525 of the code is as follows : 
"Any person or corporation who shall Aell milk or cream from a wagon, 
depot or store, or sell or d eliver milk or cream to a hotel or restaura nt or 
boarding bouse, or any public place in any such citv, shall be considered as 
cit.y milk dealer." The language is very general Rnd comprehensive 
and seems to include all persons who use a wagon or have a 
store or d epot, from or at which milk is sold. I see nothing in the 
language to justify the idea that it referred only to retailers of milk. A 
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wholesale dealer of milk who either keeps a store or depot or delivers the 
milk sold, from a wa~on, is no less a dealer of milk than one who sells by 
retail alone. The milk of such a one is no less subj~ct to inspection. The 
evil resulting from the sale of impure or unwholesome milk b.v a wholesale 
dealer is no less, but on the other band, much greater than the sale of such 
milk by a retailer. I think without question, a wholesale dealer of milk or 
cream of the kind you name, in a city having 10,000 population or over, 
comes clearly within the definition of city milk dealer and should obtain a 
permit and pay the fee therefor, as in said section provided. 
Yours respectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney General. 
STATE BOARD OF HEALTH-Construction· of section 2573. 
June 14, ~900. 
Dr. J. P. Kennedy, Secretary Stat1 Board of Heallh, Des Moi11es, Iowa: 
DEAR SIR-Your favor at band in which you enclose a letter from Mr. 
C. A . Meredith, county attorney of Ca~s county, and my opinion is asked 
as to the proper construction of section 21'i73. 
In reply I will say, that in the . first part of said section it is provided 
that certain acts and omissions or failures and neglect therein named, sub-
jects the parties so offending to a civil action in the name of the clerk of 
the board, to a penalty of $20.00 per day for each day be so offends. The 
last clause is in the following words: "And in addition thereto, anyone so 
offending or knowingly exposing another to infection from. contagious 
disease, or knowingly subjecting another to the danger of contracting such 
disP.ase from a child or other irresponsible person, shall be liable for all 
damages resulting therefrom, and be guilty of a misdemeanor." This laet 
clause which I have quoted, ~ives an additiqnal remedy for violations or 
neglects enumerated in the Jirst part of the section. One knowingly expos-
ing another to infection from a contagious disease, or · knowingly subject-
ing another to the danger of contracting disease from a child or other 
irresponsible person, under this last clause is made liable for Rll damages 
occasioned thereby, und also is ~uilty of a wisdemeanor. The penalty of 
$20 00 per day does not apply to the two cases named in this last clause, but 
anyone guilty of any of the allts of commission or omission referred to in 
the first part of said section, is liable to three different actions. First, one 
in the name of the clerk of the board or tb6 statutory penalty of $20.00 per 
day; second, he is liable to any person who has been injured by his act of 
omission; third, he is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
I do not think the language sus t:~eptible of any other mAauing . The 
phrasP, "and in addition thereto," refers to the p enalty affixed in the part 
of the section before said phrase. The use of language will not permit one 
to say that in addition to the acts before enumerated, or any of them, one 
must knowingly expose another to infection from a contagious disease in 
order to be held guilty of a misdemea nor. Such a co nstruclion would lose 
sight of the phrase ''anyone so offend in~." If we bring the subject and 
predicate of the clause which I have quoted above, close together, it would 
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read t his way, "anll in addition th ereto (that is, the penalties above 
descri bed) anyone so offending * * * shall be liable for all damages 
resulLing th erefrom and btl ~rnilty of a misdemeanor." This makes the 
sense more perspicuous. Yours respectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney· Ge1~eral. 
E XPRESS COMPANIES-ASSESSMENT OF- The rjghts of 
the state will not be prejudiced by the acceptance of 
taxes t endered by said companies under the law exist-
ing prjor to the enactment of chapter 45 of the laws of 
the Twenty-eighth General Assembly. 
DE& MOINES, IOWA , June 14,1900. 
Hon. Frank F. Merriam, Auditor of State: 
DEAR SIR-Yours of th e 4th inst duly at hand, in which you say: 
'' .:- everal express companies have tendered to this depart· 
ment their report as provided under the law in existence prior to the 
passage of the new law for the assessm t>nt of express companies by 
the Twenty eighth General Assembly, together with certiti d check 
for the amount of tax provided under the old law. This matter was 
brought to the attention of the executive council and they request 
an opinion from you as to whether it would be proper to accept the 
tax as tendered." 
In regard to this I will say that from an examination of the prior law, it 
may fairly be con~idered th at the tax the~;eby imposed was intended to be 
in the nature of a franchise tax . While the law of 1896 did not specify 
whether the first payment made under such law should be a tax for the 
year 1896, or the year 1897, the first payment was made under the law in 
May 1897, and was required to be so made. In view of the fact that the 
general policy of the law is to require the payment of the tax for a given 
year after the thirty .first of December of such year, it may be fairly inferred 
that the first payment of the tax required by chapter 83 of the Twenty-sixth 
General Assembly was intended to be a tax for the year 1896. Likewise 
the payment of the tax made during the year 1898 would be considered the 
tax for the year 1897. Also the tax paid in the year 1899 would be for the 
year 1898, and the tax tendered to yeu at the present time may fairly be 
considered the tax for the year 1899. 
Chapter 45 of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly provides 
another method of taxing the express companies. and clearly implies that 
the assessment made thereunder for the year 1900, and certified to the 
county auditors of the several counties of the state, shall be subject to tax-
ation in the local taxing districts, and shall be in full of all taxes from such 
eompanies during the year 1900. In other wordil, said chapter 45 provides 
a method for assessing the express companies, and it shall be in force fully 
for the year 1900, and taxes thereunder will not be required to be paid until 
after the first of January next. 
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I see no injustice in accepting the tax tendered by the express companies, 
nor any harm that can result to any interests in putting the new law into 
operation. Yours respectfully, 
MILTON REMLE Y, 
Attorney-General. 
REPORT AND ACCOUNTING FOR FEES BY PUBLIC OFFICER 
-1.-The monthly report of the clerk of the supreme 
court to the treasurer of state should include an accu-
rate and particular account of all fees received or 
collected by him during the preceding month. 
2.-He is personally responsible for uncollected fees 
which the law makes it his duty to collect before docket-
mg cases. 
3.-If he makes default in payment at the proper time, or 
appropriates any fees to his own use, he will be liable 
for the interest thereon. 
4. --If such clerk fails to make his report to the treasurer 
at the proper time, and fails to account for fees col-
lected, it would be the duty of the treasurer to call 
the attention of the governor or the executive council 
to such delinquency. 
DES MOINES, IoWA, June 23, 1900. 
Hon. John Herriott , Treasurer of State: 
DEAR SIR-Your favor of the 31st ult. duly at hand, in which you call 
my attention to certain provision!! of law with reference to the report and 
the accounting for fees by the clerk of the supreme court to the treasurer of 
state, and say : 
"In view of the fact that the clerk of the supreme court is by law 
required each month to account in detail to the treasurer of state for 
all fees that are due the state, and pay all fees collected into the state 
treasury, I respectfully request your opinion upon the following mat-
ters so that I may act as circumstances may make appropriate: 
"1. As a salaried officer is the clerk of th e supreme court per-
mitted, nuder section 1289 of the code, to appropriate for his own use 
any fees or moneys received by him for performing any duties or 
rendering any of the services required of him by law, or should his 
monthly reports to the treasurer of state include "an accurate and 
particular account" of all such fees reeeived as sections 191 and 205 
direct., the same to be accompanied by payment into the treasury of 
the entire amount therein reported as collected?" 
Section 205 of the code fixes the salary of the clerk of the supreme court. 
It provides: "The clerk shall collect the following fees and account for them 
as provided in section 191 of the code, and shall also keep an account of and 
report in like manner all uncollected fees." 
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Section 191 provides with reference to the secretary of state and auditor that 
"they shall keep an accurate ancl particular account of all fees received by 
them which shall be verified by affidavit and rendered monthly to the 
treasurer of state, and they shall p!ly the amounts thus received to such 
treasurer at the end of each month. 
Section 205 makes it the duty of the clerk to collect the fees therein spec-
ified upon the rendition of the services therein described. 
Section 4638 of the code is as follows: "Every officer having the custody 
of a public record or writing shall furnish any person upon demand and 
payment of the legal fees therefor, a certified copy thereof." 
1t is a well established principle of Jaw that a public officer, by accept-
in!!' the office, agrees to accept the compensation, whether salary or fees, 
provided by law as full compensation for any service within the line of his 
official duty. It is stated in Throop on Public Officers, section 478, "that 
where a compensation is given by statute, whether by salary or by fees or 
by commissions or otherwise, it is in full of all his official services, and he 
is not entitled to demand or receive any additional compensation from the 
public, or from any individual for any service within the line of his official 
duty." There are hundreds of cases which sustain this doctrine. 
Section 1289 is as follows: ''The salaries of all officers authorized by this 
code shall be paid in equal monthly installments at the end of each month, 
and shall be in full compensation for all services except as otherwise 
expressly provided." The last clause is but a restatement of the law 
E-xisting prior to the statute. 
My conclusion is that the monthly report of the clerk to the treasurer of 
state should include an accurate and particular account of all fees received 
or collected by him during the month for any and all services rendered, for 
which the law requires a fee to Le charged and collected, as well as an 
account of all uncollected fees, and that the money received for any 
service rendered for which the law authorizes a fee to .be charged, should 
be paid into the treasury at the end of each month. 
"2. In case the clerk has not charged and collected the fu)J 
amount of fees for performing his duties or rendering serTices to 
private parties, for which he is directed to charge and collect certain 
specified fees, is there due from him to the state treasury the differ-
ence between what he actually collected and what the law directs 
that he shall collect?" 
Certain fees which the clerk shall charge are a specified sum for a spec-
ified service, which mu~>t be paid in ad'll6nce. For instance, under sections 
205 and 4121, no case shall be docketed in the supreme court until a docket 
fee of three dollars has been paid. If the clerk dockets a case without tbe 
payment of the fee in full, it must be considered that be personally extends 
a credit on his own account to the appellant or his attorney, and so far as 
the state is concerned, the fee should be considered as paid in full to the 
clerk, and it should be so reported and paid to the state treasurer at the 
end of the month during which the case was docketed. In this class of 
cases I think without question that the full amount of fe~s which the Jaw 
directs him to collect is due the state treasury. 
·. 
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Certain other fees are definitely fixed by the statute, for a specified 
service, and are inelastic; that is, no computation is necessary to determine 
the amount, but the clerk has a discretion whether or not he will demand 
the payment thereof in advance. In regard to such fees a different rule 
would obtain. Not that the clerk is authorized to charge a cent less than 
the law directs, -he has no discretion in regard to that,-but where fees 
have not been paid in advance, cases may arise where collection cannot be 
enforced by execution, and the clerk might be justified in accepting a less 
sum in settlement of the costs than the law directs . ln such cases, the 
clerk acting in good faith, I do not think the difference or the discoun,t thE' 
clerk makes can be said to be due the state treasury; nor would he be-liable 
therefor to the state in an action on his bond. 
But if the clerk wilfully, or in bad faith, for personal gains, or for any 
other reason , does not charge the amount of fees which the law directs, or 
charges the legal fee and makes no effor t to collect, a very different ques-
tion is presented, and the Jaw which is as stated below with reference to 
another class of fees, would, in such cases in my judgment, apply. 
.Another class of fees are those which the amount thereof is determined 
by ascertaining the quantity of work done and computing the fee there-
from at the rate fixed by statute,-such as copies of opinions of the court, 
transcripts of judgments or records, or papers on file in the clerk's office, 
for which he shall charge ten cents for every hundred words . 
The words are never actually counted. They are generally estimated,-
possibly an average page or two may be counted and the whole number of 
words approximated by multiplying the nuruber of words found or esti-
mated on one page by the number of pages. In case there be an error in 
computation, or in the estimate of the number of words, by reason of 
which the clerk charges and collects less than the lawful fee , I do not think· 
the difference can be said to be due the state treasury . . Nor would he, in 
the absence of mala fides, be liable therefore on his bond. 
In case the clerk wilfully, or for considerations personal to himself, fails 
to charge and collect the fees required by law, but charges and receives a 
less amount, or having charged the correct amount, fails to collect the same 
when it is in his power to do so, whereby the state suffers loss, then be is 
unquestionably liable to the state for all loss sustained. He is doing the 
state's business, for which the state pays him a fixed salary. It is contem-
plated by law that litigante shall pay what is in effect a tax to help pay the 
expense of the court in which they have business . The clerk is made th£1 
agent of the state to collect this tax (fees). It authorizes him, except in a 
few instances-those named in section 1298, and possibly a few others-to 
collect the fee in advance . In some cases it is contemplated he shall col-
lect the fee in advance of rendering the service. (Sections 4121,1295,4638.) 
He must faithfully discharge his duties fully in regard to collecting the full 
amount which the law directs. If he were negligent, or wilfully and 
wrongfully fails to discharge his duty in this respect, I think without 
question he would be liable to the state for the damages . 
But unliquidated damages cannot be said to be due until they are liqui-
dated, either by agreement of the parties, or by a proper tribunal. A per-
son may be indebted to the state in an uncertain sum ae damages, and yet 
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it cannot be predicated thereof that it is "due the state treasury" in the 
sense in which the terms are used in the inquiry. 
The law required the clerk to repo1·t the amount of fees he hr1s collected 
I think this should include the amounts which are to be conclusively pre-
sumed to have been collected, as above stated. He is required to pay to 
the treasurer at the end of the month the amounts collected. If he does not 
' do so, the balance is properly-due the state treasury. He is not required 
to report any unliquidated damae:~>s which the state may claim of him for 
a violation of his official duty. This must be determined in the proper 
tribuual 
"3. Is interest due the state on the amount of any fees improperly 
retained by the clerk for the time the treasury has been deprived of 
the money?" 
Fees collected by the clerk are rPquired . as stated above, to be paid at 
the end of each month Section 3038 of the code says the rate of interest 
shall be six cents on the hundred by the year on money after the same 
becomes due . 
Mechem on Public Officers, section 911, says: "A public officer who duly 
accounts for public funds at the proper time would not, unless by E~xpress 
statute or special agreement, be chargeable with interest thereon But if 
he makes default in payment at the proper time, or omits to include a por-
tion of his account, or appropriates it to his own use. or retains it for an 
unreasonable time, he will be liable for interest upon the amount retained 
from the time it should have been paid " This, I think, is a fair statement 
of the law. 
"4. What Is the duty of the treasurer of state with refereO:ce to 
the 'uncollected fees' reported by the clerk as due the state, now 
approximating the sum of $10.000?" 
The sections of the code above referred to make it the duty of the clerk 
"to keep an accurate and particular account of all fees received by him, 
and to make report thereof, verified by affidavit. Also. in like manner, to 
keep and report all uncollected fees ." 
The purpose of this requirement is that there shall be a check upon the 
accounts of the clerk. This provision is not altogether a form al one. Such 
reports would be of no service-altogether uselPss - if the treasurer of 
state should file the monthly reports away in a pigeonhole and th ey were 
never examined or inspected The f&ct that reports are required to be 
made to the treasurer for the purpose of keeping a check upon those who 
receive public funds implies a corr~sponding duty on the part of the 
treasurer . lt goes without saying that it is the duty of the treasurer to 
require the payment of all moneys collected by the clerk as shown by the 
report, and if such report shows among the uncollected fees, items which, 
1:nder the law, must have been paid in advance- for instance, ttle dock et 
fees-it must be evident that the treasurer is authorized to demand the 
payment of the same by the clerk, and that his report be made so as to 
show the same were actually collected 
As stated above, as an agent of the sta• e. it is the duty of the clerk to 
collect all fees required by statute to be collected. He must use all reasonable 
effort so to do. lf, however, it appears that he abuses his discretion in not 
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demanding fees in advance when he is authorized so to do, and if he negli-
gently fails or refuses to collect the uncollected fees when th e same might 
be done with reasonable effort, then the treasurer of state would be 
authorized to call his attention to the matter, and if he persists in disre-
garding hi s official duty. whereby the state suffered loss, it would be the 
duty of the treasurer to call the attention of the governor or the executive 
council to such disregard of duty, to the end that action might be brought 
in behalf of the state upon the official bond of the clerk to recover damages 
sustained by the state. Yours respectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY 1 
Attorney-General. 
BUILDING AND LOAN AND SAVINGS AND LOAN A SSOCIA-
TIONs-Such associations under the laws of this state 
have no power whatsoever to incur an indebtedness by 
borrowing money for the purpose of making loans and 
pledge sufficient security of the association for such 
debt. 
DES MontEs, IowA, June 30, 1900. 
Hon. A . H . Davidson, Secretarl' Executive Council: 
DEAR Sm-Yours at hand, in which you say the executive council 
requests my opinion 
"As to the legality of permitting building and loan and savings 
and loan associations, in the amended artides which they are pre-
senting to the council for approval, to provide for an indebtedness 
other than the stock authorized by law to be issued. Many of the 
associations provide an article, as they claim, in compliance with the 
requirements of sec tion 1611 of the code, limiting the indebtedness 
to a per cent of the assets. These limits r ange from ten to seventy-
five per cent of the asset.s. Others have, among the powers enumer-
ated, the power to borrow money for the purpose of making loans, 
with authority to pledge sufficient security of the association there-
for." 
I will call your attention to an opinion pul:fl'ished in the first reoort of the 
attorney-general, page 140, given August 7, 1896, to the Hon · Wm. M. 
McFarland, secretary of state. I have no reason to change the views 
expressed on page 142 thereof. 
1 am aware that it is claimed by some writers on building and loan that 
there is an implied authority to borrow money iu a limi ted amount to be 
used in th.e legitimate purposes of the corporation. This is ad d need from 
decisions of courts relating to corporations gllln erally, and not to building 
and loan associations, or in cases in which the rules with reference to 
estoppel and innocent. purchasers seem to be the controlling principle which 
influenced the decisions. 1 am firmly couvin.ctld that the object and pur· 
pose of building and loan associations, from the fir~t organizaLion of such 
associations to the present time, is opposed to any such theory. Some 
cases that I have examined where it is claimed that the power to borrow 
80 RE PORT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
money or give a note exist@, base th e right so to do upon the fact that suuh 
associations were organized under the general incorporation laws of the 
state, and nothing in such law prohibi ted such associations from exercisi ng 
all the powers given to corporations organized for commercial or manu-
facturing purposes. 
The powers possessed by corporations of a particular kind must be 
largely-not wholly-determined from the statutes of the state under the 
law11 of which they are incorporated. If a statute gives powers to a build-
ing and loan association by that name, it will he presumed that the legis· 
lature had a knowledge of t he general plan and purposes of such association, 
and such plans and purposes, and the usual method of doing business of 
such association will be deemed tu be engrafted, to some extent at least, by 
the use of the uame which represents a given idea, iuto the statute itself. 
Where the statute, however, specifically stale!$ the plan and purposes, and 
enumerates the powers which can be exercised' by an incorpora tion of a 
parti cular kjnd,l take it to be universally acce pted as true that such statute 
is a limitation u pon the power of such cor poration . The act of 1896, now 
codified as chapter 13, title JX of the code, deals with the entire subject of 
building and loan associati ons. Sect ion l l:l91 provides that ' •any number of 
persons not Jess th an five. residents of the state of Iowa, may become incor-
pGrated as a building and loan association under the general incorporation 
la ws of the state, exce pt as otherwise herein provided, upon complying 
with the provisions of this chapter." 
The phrase, "under the general incorporation laws of the state," relates 
to the manner of incorporation,-the formality attached to the execution 
of the articles of incorporation, recording, etc.,--but cannot be construed 
as giving to building and loan associations any powers at variance with 
the specific enactments made in said chapter with reference to building 
and loan associations. · 
It appears from sections 1611, 1612 and 1613 that certain things must be 
stated in the articles of incorporation of those corporations organized 
under chapter 1. Section 1893 relates to building and loan associations; 
specifies what must be contained in the articles of incorporation of the 
building and loan associations. Jt will not be contended for one moment 
that section 1893 of the code was intended to supplement the provisions of 
sections 1611 to section 1613, inclusive. 
On the other hand, with reference to building and loan associations, 
section 1893 becomes, and must be considered, the only law with reference 
to the matter treated of in said section. The enumeration of powers given 
to such associations in section 1898 aud the sections following must be con· 
sidered as excluding other powers not enumerated therein; i.e., so far as 
the nature of the business to be transacted is concerned. Chapter 13, and 
the laws amendatory thereto, are to be considered a limitation upon the 
power of building and loan associations, although in a certain sense they 
are said to be organized under the general incorporation laws of the state . 
To illustrate this point: Authority is given to make loans to members 
on such terms and conditions and securities as the articles of incorporation 
and by-laws may prGvide , I do not think any one would contend for a 
moment that a building and loan association, in view of this provision, 
_ ) 
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would have authority to loan to one wbo was not a member . Yet a corpo-
ration with all the powers given in ch'l.pter 1, ti tle lX of the code would be 
permitted to do so, and the provision above quoted does not, in express 
terms, prohibit loans to other than mem bers. 
Again, in section 1892 , we find the following : "The capital stock named 
in the at·ticles of incorporation shall be taken to wean the authorized stock 
, and the association may commence business when one hundred shares thereof 
have been sub cribed." etc. The authorized stock is generally placed at 
millions of doll ars. Under the law, stockholders may withdraw their stock 
from buildi ng and loan associations at any time, and have the r ight to 
withdraw it in accordance with he articles of incorporation . T he stock, 
then, is a variable quan tity from time to time. If it be said that such asso· 
ciations have the r ight, under section 16l1, to become indebted to two-
thirds of the amount of their capital stock, would it be said that the indebt· 
ed~ess may be two-thirds of the stock authorized, or the stock actuall.Y sub-
scrtbed, a lthough not paid, nor any part; or shall the limit of Lhe indebtedness 
fluctuate from day to day, just as stock may be subscribed or withd r awn? 
The absurdity of the proposition appears to me so plain, in view of the tact 
that fixing the limit of indebtedness is for th e purpose of the protectiou of 
creditors, and shows very plain ly, to my mind at least, that the legislature 
never intended that a building and loan assoctation shou ld have power to 
borrow money, or become indebted in any sum whatsoever. 
I do not mean by this that such associations may not purchase supplies 
or make contracts from whieh liability arises for the payment of salar ies to 
their secretari es or otfic~rs. Soch expenses 1ll'e met by the current reven ues 
and a.re in no sense indebledness, such as ie contemplated in section 1611 of 
the code. The right to order supplies, or contract for the services of a sec -
retar.y or employes, is one of the incidental powers, and is not dependent 
upon the power to incur indebtedness. It was never contemplated that 
building and loan associations, which were intended to provide a means of 
profitably investing monthly savings of home builders in the erection of 
homes for their members, should jeopardize the' rights of the members by 
becoming indebted to cred itors, who way sweep out of existence in times of 
panic or stringency of t he money market, the savings of all ite members. 
ln my judgment, building and loan associations, under the laws of this 
state, have no power whatsoever to incur an indebtedness as above 
explained, and no articles should be approved by the council which provide 
for an indebtedness. Yours respectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney-General . 
lOW A COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE AND :M ECHANIC ARTS-
A certain contract relative to the purchase of land 
construed. 
DES MOINES, IOWA, July 12, 1900. 
E. W. Stanton, Esq., Secretary Board of Trustees, Iowa College of Agri-
culture and Mechanic Arts: 
DEAR Sm...: Yours of the 11th inst. at hau._d, in which you enclose a blank 
form of a contract executed for the leasing of the southeast quarter of sec-
6 
-----------~--------------------~--------------------------------: 
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tion 4, township 93, range 27, and say that the lessee now furnishes a certi-
fied copy of a survey, made by the county surveyor. showing the tract con-
tains only 152 acres instead of 160 acres, and upon this fact bases a cla im 
for a refund of the rental paid upon the shortage of eight atJres, and asks 
that a patent bt~ issued upon the payment of the original appraisement per 
acre of the 152 acres. You ask my opinion as to the legal obligation of the 
board in the matter. 
It appears that the description of the land in the lease was as above 
stated. and after such description is the following clause : "being a part of 
the Al ricultural college land grant and containing 160 acres. " 1 t appears 
also from the lease that the lessee agreed to pay a gross sum for the land 
as rental , but in case he exercises an option to purchase, he sh·•uld have 
the right to purchase such land at the said sum of .... .. dolla rs and ... .. . 
cents per acrt~ 
Upon this state of facts, my opinion is that the description of the land by 
government subdivision as aforesaid is not limited or changed by reason of· 
the clause, "containing 160 acres " The description refers to a specific 
tract of l!md surveylld and marked by the government surveyors . known as 
the southea,t quarter of section 4, township 93, ra nge 27 The statement 
of the quantity of land therefore. under the ruling in Ufford v Wilkins, 33 
Iowa, 110, must yield to the description. The rent agreed to be paid is a 
gross sum . A statement of the manner of arriving at the amount of rent 
to be paid does not change the fact that the payment is for a gross sum . 
We have, then. this proposition: A party rents a q uarter section of land 
and agrees to pay a sum of money named in the contract therefor as rental. 
Doeil the fact tha t it has fallen short a few acres fro m what the parties 
thought was in the tract rented entitle the lessee to a red uction of the 
rent? I think not . If the quarter section had overrun eight acres . as is. 
sometimes the case, wou ld the lessee !rave been liable for the rent thereof? 
Evidently not, for the land which be rented was all within the description, 
or what is said to be "within the call of the lease." The same rul e which 
he would apply to the college in case the land had overrun will apply 
equally to him if it had fallen short. 
If there had been fa lse representations, wh ich the lessor knew to be 
fa lse, a diff,..rent rule might apply. (Hallam v . Todhunter, 24 Iowa, 166) 
There is no warranty in t he contrac t that the land contains 160 acres Them 
is no breach of the contract on the part of the college. There is no agree-
ment in the contract to return a part of the rental paid in case the land 
upon being surveyed, does not contain 160 acres. I do not think, under th~ 
facts stated, that the lessee is entitfed to any repayment of the rent. 
I do not wish to be understood, however, as saying that where there is a 
mutual mistake which is material to the agreement, that the contract may 
not be reformed in eq uity, or that either party might not treat it as a nullity 
because there was no agreement of mind; but so far as the facts appear in 
this case, as I gather them from the let ter and the contract, the ,·ules 
governi ng a mutual mistake, or the right to rescind a contract because of 
a mutual mistake, would hardly apply. 
In case the lessee exercises the option to purchase, no gross sum as the 
purchase price for the quarter section being named, but a price per acre 
being named, a different question is presented. There is not the same 
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reason for holding that he should pay tor a number of acres not actually 
contained in the contract. The language of the contract seems to justify 
the conclusion that wh<:Ltever land is embraced within the description shall 
be paid for at a fixed price per acre. and if the tract contained more than 
160 acres, the lessee would be required, upon purchasing, to pay for the 
number of acres actually contained in the tract, and I see no reason why 
the same rule should not be applied if it actually contains less than 160 
acres. 
In view of the different rules adopted by different county surveyors in 
ascertaining the amount of land in a given government tract and the 
repeated conflicts between the surveys of different surveyo_rs. I suggest ~o 
the board that they satisfy themselves as to whether there IS a shortage m 
this particular tract before they consent to accept less than the price of 160 
acres. · Yours respectfully, 
MILTON REntLEY, 
Attorney· General. 
GAME LAw-Lakes owned by private parties are private 
waters and the fi£h thereon belong t o the owner of the 
lake. He may seine therein without violating the . law. 
DES M OI Ni:S 1 low A1 Au~ust 3, 1900. 
Hon . Geo. E . Delevan, Estherville, lowt~: : 
DEAR Sru-Yours of the 80th ult . at hand, asking my opinion upon the 
following question : 
' 'Has the fish and game wardeu e.uthority to grant permission to 
any person to sei.ne a lake or bayou for th e ~urpose of taki ng ~ut 
certain kinds of fish and return ing thep1 to a r1 ver? R presentat ive 
L~tts, of Wapello, has a lake on his farm that be desires to take t he 
buffalo and carp ou t of and prolll ises to pu t t hem in the Iowa r iver. 
He desires to have nothing but game !ish in t he lake." 
In r egard thereto I will say that the statement that Represe ntative 
L etts has a lake on his far m implies that he is the owner of the lake or 
bayou. Desiring to take the buffalo aud carp out, leavi ng nothing but game 
fish in the lake, implies t hat there is no outlet or inl et through which such 
lake may become stocked or r eplenished wit h fis b. . Upon these facts, u nder 
Eection 2545, Mr. Letts is the owner of the fish in the lake, and may ta.ke 
them as he sees fit, or permit the same to be done . He needs no authonty 
or permission from any person whomsoever. 
In regard to the lakes owned by private parties, no autbor~ ty i1! needed . 
from the fish and game warden to seine, as the owner of the fish has abso-
lute control thereof. In r egard to public waters, or waters connected with 
the public, the law does not contemplate that t he fi•h and game ward.en 
should give any permission to any perRon whomsoever to take ~sb by sem· 
log. Section 2546 authorizes the warden to take from th A pu blic waters of 
the state any !ish for the purpose of prop&gating or restocking otb.er waters, 
etc. He may do this by means of his employes or agents, but has no 
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authority under the law to give special pri~ileges to any person which are 
not freely granted by law to others. Yours truly, 
MILTON REMLEY. 
A ftornev- Get~eral. 
AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT-L-It is entitled to every-
thjng in the nature of printing, supplies, stationery and 
postage which it requires for the public, as distinguished 
from the expenses of the State fair. 
2.-The act of the legislature creating this depart-
ment is constitutional. · 
3. - It is entitled to the printing and all suppUes neces-
sary for use in the department in performing its public 
duties, the same as other state officers. 
4. - EXECUTIVE CoUNCIL-It is not authorized to purchase 
on competitive bids any printed matter, the printing 
of which the law contemplates shall be done by the 
state printer. The state printer is entitled to do the 
printing, which embraces the laws, journals and 
reports. 
DEs MorNI1:S, IowA, August 4, 1900. 
Han. A. H. Daviso1~, Secretary Ezec1dive Council: 
DEAR SIR-Yours of the 30th ult. duly at hand,- in which you say the 
executive council desires my opinion, 
First.-'' As to what , if any, printing, supplies, stationery and 
postage should be furnished the agricultural department by the 
executive council under the provisions of chapter 58, acts of the 
Twenty-eighth General Assembly." 
Section 13 of said chapter, among other things, provides : '• The said 
office shall be entitled to such supplies, stationery, postage and express as 
may be required, which shall be furnished by the executive council in the 
same manner as other officers are supplied " 
This places the office of the department of agriculture upon exactly the 
same footing as other departments o! state. Section 168 provides: "The 
executive council shall supply the governor * * * with all such articles 
required for the public use and necessary to enable them to perform the 
.duties imposed upon them by law. * * * It shall also furnish the public 
printer with all paper required for the various kinds of public printing in 
such quantities as may be needed for theprompt discharge of his duties." 
The suggestion that the executive council does not furnish printing is, 
in my judgment, without force. The paper upon which printing is done 
is furnished by the executive council, and the language of section 13 above 
quoted, fairly interpreted, places the department of agriculture upon the 
same plane exactly as other officers of the state. 
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Everything, then, which the office of the department of agriculture, as 
distinguished from the expenses of the State fair, requires for the public 
use, and is necessary, should be furnished the department of agriculture. 
Second.-You ask: "Is this department, organized under the pro-
visions of said act, entitled to supplies purc:hased with state funds 
under the constitution?" 
This inquiry is into the constitutionality of the act itself. When the act 
was under the consideration of the general assembly. Senator W. F. Harri-
man requested my op inion as to its constitutionality with reference to the 
two objections which had been urged against it. and after a careful 
examination of the matter, in an opinion given him March 14th, last, I 
expressed the view that the act was not obnoxious to the constitutional 
provisions referred to. 1 have no reason to change the views therein 
expressed. 
Third-" Is this department entitled to printing as are state 
officers under the provisions of sections 117 to 120 of the code?" 
Under section 13, chapter 58, acts of the Twenty -eighth General Assem-
bly, the conclusion is irresistible that the department as such, and in al.I 
matters relating to tho work of the department, except in regard to con-
ducting the State fair , is entitled to the printing and all supplies necessary 
for use in the department in performing its public duties, the same as are 
other state officers. 
Fourth. -"fs the council authorized to purchase on competitive 
bids printing for said department under the provisions of sections 165 
to 168 inclusive of the code~" 
What the council may or may not purchase on competitive bids involves 
the consideration of a number of different sections. First, let me state that 
. there is no express provision requiring matter to be furnished to the state 
printer for printing The duty to do so arises wholly from implication. 
Section 117 of the code, concerning the election and duties of the state 
printer and binder, says : "They shall keep their respective offices at the 
seat of government and sufficiently equipped to enable them to promptly 
print and bind all laws, journals and reports. and do all other printing and 
binding required for state officers, boards or commissioners having their 
offices in the capitol, or by or for the general assembly." The clause, ''and 
do all other p~inting and binding required for state officers," etc , is a gen-
eral term following the specific terms, ''laws. journals and reports ," and 
under the familiar rule of construction, must be considered as referring to 
~he printing of the class described in the specific terms . The duty o~ hav-
mg an office sufficiently equipped to do printing for the state of the class 
which is defined by" laws. journals and reports," imposes an obligation by 
implication upon the officers of st11te to furnish all the printing for state 
officers of that class to the state printer. Section 2 of chapter 82, acts of 
the Twenty-second General Assembly, was in substantially the same 
language as section 117, but contained the proviso: "Nothing in this sec-
tion shall be construed as including letter heads, envelopes or postal cards " 
which is omitted from the code. But the omission of such proviso is n~t 
significant, in view of the well established rule for interpreting statutes 
above referred to. 
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But section 138 contains t be following provision: "The state printer 
shall be paid the following prices for all work done for the . state in an 
acceptable manner : * ·* * for letter heads , envelopes. la bels an~ postal 
cards . including composition and press work, $ l.50 for each 1,000 Impres-
sions or less, and $1 ,25 for each additional thousand. " 
The executive council is not authorized to purchase on competitive bids 
any printed matter the printing of which the law contemplates sh~ll be 
done by the state printer All other supplies of t~i~ nat~re not furmsh?d 
by the state printer must be purchased on competitive b1ds 1f the legis-
lat ure had intended that letter heads, envelopes, labels and postal car~s 
should be included in the supplies which shall be purchased by the councll 
on competitive bids, then there would be no authorit y for pr_o~uring the 
printing of such supplies by the state printer. Htm~e, th'3 proVISIOn fo~ the 
pay of the state printer with reference to such artiCles would be entuely 
nugatory. . . 
It is my opinion that the state printer is entitled to do the prmtmg of 
that class of work which embraces the laws, journals and reports, and none 
other except BIJCh items as are specifically named in paragraph 4 of section 
188. 
As further illustrating the correctness of this conclusion, the state 
printer can well say that the law requir.-s him to keep an office su!fic_iently 
equipped to enable him to do no other kinds of work than the prmt~ng_ of 
the laws, journals and reports, and work of that_ class, an~ th~ pn~tmg 
referred to in paragraph 4. He could not be reqmred to eqmp h~s offic~ to 
do lithographic printing, or any other ~ind than contemplated m sectiOn 
117. 
I It will not do to say that everything w~ich cont~ins pr~nted matter must be printed by the state printer. Such an 1dea, earned to 1ts extreme, would 
requil e all law books, for instance, use_d in this office, to be printed by the 
state printer, or any other books which must _be bought upon the market . 
.Blank books , whether they contain partly prmted p~ges or not, properly 
come under the bead of supplies, and may be furmshed bv blank book 
manufacturers Many blanks used in the different offices, as well as the 
department of agriculture, do not come within the definition of stationery; 
nor do they come within the term of "printiug ", although such blan~s r_nay 
be printed; nor is the printing thereon of the class required to be g1ven to 
the state printer. They may be classified under tb~ general bead of sup· 
plies, and in my JUdgment, all such blanks and record ?~oks may ~nd 
should be procured by the executive council under the prOVISIOns of sectiOn 
167 of the code on competitive bidj! . 
J 'l 0 state the proposition generally, and witho_ut endeavoring_ to name the 
?different kinds of blanks or office supplies which must be pnnted by the 
state printer, it may be said the state printer Is entitled to do that class of 
printing which is illustrated or defined by the terms, ·~laws: journ~ls_ ~nd 
reports " He is also entitled to print the work d~scnbed m subdiv~sJ~n 
4 of section 138. and the ordinary circular letters wh10h do not come w1thm 
the general term of office supplies. But all other supplies, su~h as record 
books, blanks which are in constant use from year to year m an office 
not being of the ~reneral class referred to, mar and should be purchased 
by the executive council by competitive bids. 
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Fi fth .-" If s'aiddepartment is entitled to printing . must it include 
only such necessary stationery as is required for said department as 
a sta te office, or should it also include such printing as is required 
for the State fair, such as tickets, tags for exhibits, forms for appli-
ca tion for entry of exhibits, statements of account with exhibitors, 
records of exhibits and of the fair, account records and all other 
similar State fair printing?" 
The next inquiry is in regard to the same matter, only in a different 
form. 
The last sentence of section 8 of said chapter 58 is in the following 
words: "All expenditures connected with the fair including the per diem 
and expenses of the managers thereof. shall be recorded separately and 
shall be paid from the State fair receipts " 
This divorces entirely all expenses of all kinds connected with the fair 
from the office expenses of the depart ment of agriculture. The printing of 
posters. advertisements, bills, and all printed matter connected with the 
fair, all postage in correspondence with reference to the fair all expressage 
on advertisements or other matters connected with the fair a nd, in fact, 
all expenses of all natures and kinds which have to do with the annual fairs 
<Jannot, under this provision , be paid for as a part of the office expenses of 
the department of agriculture. 
It may be a little inconvenient to observe the provision above quoted, 
but the language seems plain, and even the stationery and postage which 
are procured from the supply department or furnished by the executive 
<Jouncil, shall not be used in connection with the business of making the 
annual exhibits at the State fair. Rut when accustomed to it, there can be 
no serious difficulty in observing the requirements above quoted . 
Yours respectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney-General. 
E xECUTIVE CouNCIL-Resolution passed ordering attorney-gen-
eral to bring suit on bond of clerk of supreme court.-This is 
a reply to said resolution expressing the views of the attorney-
general as to the duties devolving upon him as such officer. 
DES MOINES, IOWA, August 8, 1900. 
To the Executive Council, Des M oines, Iowa: 
GENTLEMEN-I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a copy of 
your resolution in which certain conclusions of fact are stated by you , and 
the attorney-general is ordered not only to bring suit upon t!::.e bond of the 
clerk of the supreme court , but is distinctly ordered ''to include in the suit'' 
certain claims stated in the resolution. 
I am persuaded that the resolution was adopted by your honorable body 
without due consideration , else its form and substance would have been 
entirely different. I regret that the resolution was given to the public press 
some days before any attempt was made to communicate it to me for whom 
it is to be presumed it was intended . Had a different course been adopted, 
a few suggestions might have averted my present embarrassment. 
\ 
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Permit me to recall your resolution by quoting so much thereof as may 
be pertinent. It is stated: ''The executive council have reached this con-
clusion: * * * That for more than twenty years it has been customary 
for the clerk of the supreme court to furnish West Publishing company with 
certifie d copies of opinions of the supreme court at rates fa r below the statu-
tory fees for certi fied copies; that the clerk has employed others to make 
these copies and paid therefor personally. That had the clerk charged for 
such uncerti fied copies ten cents per hundred words as the statute expressly 
provides he shall charge for certified copies, West Publishing company would 
have hired others to make a nd prepare the same, so that in no event would 
the state have derived any revenue therefrom, and it therefore appears that 
the state of Iowa has not suffered any financial loss because of this pro-
cedure . * * * It also appears * * * that for several years it has been 
the custom to furnish carbon copies of opinions to attc.rneys at nominal 
expense; that these copies are prepared without expense to the state, and the 
clerk has claimed title to the price at which they have been furnished. 
* * * It is therefore ordered that the attorney-general bring suit on the 
bond of Chris T. Jones for the statutory fee of ten cents per hundred words 
for all copies of opinions furnished any person by the clerk of the supreme 
court during his term of office, with six per cent interest from the date such 
copies were furnished . 
''It further appears that the clerk has caused lithograph certificates of 
admission to the bar to be prepared at his own expense, and has charged . 
therefor an amount in excess of the statutory fee and accounted to the state 
for only the amount contemplated by sta tute, retaining the excess to reim-
burse himself. * * * It is therefore ordered that the attorney-general in 
his suit include . a claim for these certificates." 
The order made that the attorney-general bring suit upon the matters 
stated in said resolution seems to be imperative and intended to leave him 
no discretion in regard to the matter. · I· beg to remind you that section 208 
gives to the executive council the right to request the attorney-general to 
prosecute or defend an action, but nowhere in the statute is the council 
authorized to order the attorney-general to bring a suit, or to base an action 
upon specific claims which are pointed out to him by the executive council. 
After a request is made by the executive council upon the attorney-
general, the duty and responsibility of determining whether an action can 
-be maintained, and the manner of prosecuting or defending the interests of 
the state, rest wholly upon him. If, in his judgment, no action can be 
maintained, he would not be justified in involving the state in useless and 
fruitlt::ss litigation because of any order or directions made by your honor-
able body. The law imposes certain responsibilities upon the attorney-
general which he cannot escape. He cannot divide that responsibilijy with 
another, or permit another to usurp it. If he brings an action for the s tate, 
he is justly held responsible for that action, notwithstanding the fact that an 
unauthorized order may be made by the executive council for him to bring 
the action . 
I am pleased, however, to receive your order as a request. I only call 
attention thereto for the purpose of emphasizing the fact that under the law 
the responsibility of determining whether an action can be maintained, and 
what shall be set forth as the basis of the action' devolves upon me alone. 
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If the council· thinks an action should be brought, it can properly submit the 
matter to the attorney-general and request him to !:Iring a suit, and there its 
responsibility with the matter ends. ln case useless and expensive litigation 
be undertaken, after the state is defeated in the courts, the order of the 
council gives me no excuse for commencing it. 
The conclusions which the executive council have come to, as stated in 
the resolution, have the effect of findings of fact. U nder section 161 of the 
code, the executive council is authorized and empowered to settle with Mr. 
Jones. The executive council must keep a record of its proceedings. That 
record is a public record. The body, then , which is authorized by law to 
settle with Mr. Jones in effect finds that there have been violations of law. 
It finds, further , as an ultimate conclusion, that the state of Iowa ' ' has . not 
suffered any fi nancial loss because of this procedure ." The fees for fur-
nishing copies to attorneys are substantially in the same category, as West 
Co 's. fees. 
In order for the state to recover on an official bond, the state must prove, 
fi rst, that the officer has been guilty of some breach of official duty; second, 
that the state has suffered financial loss because thereof. No recovery can be 
had without proving both of these points. 
I suppose you have examined the evidence carefully and reached that 
conclusion deliberately. I am not prepared to say that the finding of fact 
which you have made and entered upon your records, you being authorized 
to settle with Mr. Jones, may not be binding upon the state in case action 
were brought; but whether that be true or not, if, after your investigation, 
you believe that the state has not suffered any financial loss, no suit what-
ever should be brought against Mr. Jones . If the evidence before you jus-
tified the conclusion which you reached, then the state would surely lose any 
suit which may be brought, and ought to. 
If, however, the law and the evidence do not justify the conclusion which 
you entered upon your record, then it is certainly impolitic and unwise to 
handicap the attorney-general and probably defeat the action whi<:h you have 
ordered him to bring. I certainly cannot be expected to try to maintain a 
suit for the state which the executive cou'ncil has, by its finding of facts,' 
probably defeated in advance, and I must decline to ap 1= ear to play at cross 
purposes with the executive council. If you really wish a suit to be brought 
for the state, there is no good reason apparent for holding me down with a 
finding of facts which, for all practical purposes, insures the loss of the 
action before it is brought. 
I do not wish to be understood as endorsing tht:: conclusions of fact or of 
law stated in your resolution . You appear to make a distinction between 
fees for ''certified copies" and ''uncertified copies ," whereas the law does 
not, but requires a fee of ten cents a hundred words to be collected by the 
clerk for both certified and uncertified copies . (Code, Sec. 205.) 
The resolution, too, assumes that private parties would have the right to 
enter into competition with the custodian of a public record in furnishing 
copies for private use, when the law requires the custodian to furnish such 
copies and charge therefor for the benefit of the state. I am unwilling, 
without further examination, to assent to such an assumption. 
I have no means of knowing the West Publishipg company would have 
hired others to make and prepare copies of the opinions of the supreme court; 
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nor is it apparent to me how the executive council arrived at the conclusion 
that the state of Iowa has not suffered any financial loss because of this pro-
cedure I am only dealing with the facts as stated in the resolution . If 
your conclusion is conect, then no suit ought to be brought; and if brought, 
would surely be defeated . · 
The same may be said with reference to the last claim you instruct me to 
include in the suit. If Mr . Jones has paid to the state all that the state, 
under the law, is entitled to, then the state has suffered no loss. If be has 
charged those admitted to the bar more than he was legally entitled to do, 
then every person overcharged has a cause of action against him . If be bas 
extorted money from certain citizens, the state has no moral or legal right 
to a,ny part of the money thus illegally extorted. 
A part of the obligation of the oath of office of an attorney and counselor 
of law is ''to counsel or maintain no other action, proceeding or defense 
than those which appear to him to be legal and just, except the defense of a 
person charged with a public offense . '' I have endeavored to observe this 
obligation in the past. I know the people of Iowa, whose servants we are, 
do not wish me to violate it n ow in trying to maintain an illegal and unjust 
claim against Mr. Jones. If Mr. Jones is liable to those whom be has over-
charged, how can the state justly claim the overcharge of him, or why 
should the state sue on an illegal and unjust claim? If the object which the 
council bad in mind is to punish Mr. Jones for extortion, if you think be is 
guilty, it is in the power of the governor to suspend him from office and the 
criminal courts are open for his punishment, but it is unreasonable to ask 
me to bring a civil suit on his bond for claims which are neither legal nor 
ju.st, and I must res?ectfully decline, under the circumstances, to comply 
w1th your orders, wb1cb I am pleased to consider a request. 
Do not infer that I am unwilling to bring a suit against Mr. Jones on his 
bond if a cause of action exists. If your ill-advised resolution be reconsid-
ered, and the matter be submitted to me free from the embarrassment of 
your resolution, I will investigate the facts fully, and if the facts warrant me 
in bringing a suit, it will be brought and be prosecuted to a finish. The 
responsibility of maintaining the action devolving by law upon me, I must, 
of course, determine for myself what shall be included in the action. I have 
reason to believe that there is something due from Mr. Jones to the state. 
I do not understand that he wishes to avoid the payment of anything which 
is legally and justly due from him, but I cannot convince myself that it is 
right to bring an action against him if the conclusions stated in your resolu-
tion are correct. Nor do I think that I should go into court and attempt to 
disprove the truth of findings made by the only officers of the state who are 
empowered to settle with Mr. Jones. " I cannot think that the council 
requesting me to bring a suit, at the same time intentionally adopted a reso-
lution, the effect of which is to make success difficult if not utterly impossible. 
Therefore, I respectfully request that you will reconsider the matter . If, 
upon reconsideration, you are &atisfied that you have all the evidence before 
you, and that the state has not suffered any loss because of Mr. Jones' 
actions, then the controversy should end there, once and for all. But if you 
still think an action should be brought on his bond, let the matter be sub-
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· 11 · I 
mitted to this office unhampered by your resolution, which prachca Y 10sures 
defeat. I£ so submitted to me, it will receive prompt attention. 
Yours respectfully, MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney-General . 
PRISONERS IN PENITENTIARY-It is not necessary for a prisoner to 
be confined in solitary punishment before good time can be 
deducted. DES MOINES, IoWA, August 9, 1900. 
Hon. W. A . Hut~ter, Warden Penitentmry, Anamosa, Iowa: . 
DEAR SIR-Yours of the 8th inst. at hand, in which you call my attentiOn 
to sections 5'682 and 5704 of the code, and ask: 
• 'Is it necessary for a prisoner to be confined in solitary punishment 
before good time can be deducted ?" . . 
Section 5682 does not refer to the forfeiture of good time 10 any respect 
whatsoever. It provides that the number of days which the pris~ner spends 
in solitary confinement for any violation of the rules and regulations of the 
prison shall be excluded from the term of his imprison,!!lent as fixed by the 
court by which be was sentenced. 
To illustrate: If a person were· sentenced to the penitentiary for one year 
and should, by reason of the violation of the rules of the prison, spend ten 
days in solitary confinement, he could not claim his discharge from the pen· 
itentiary until a year and ten days had elapsed. 
Section 5704 however, provides: ' ' ny convict who shall violate any of 
the regulations and laws for the government of the. penitenti~;r shall f~rfeit 
good time earned for the different offenses as there10 stated. ~here IS ~o 
intimation that the punishment of solitary confinement must be 1mposed 10 
order to work a forfeiture of good time, but any violation which justifies a 
punishment of any kind, whether by solitary confinement or ot~er kinds of 
punishment, works a forfeiture according to the schedule of forfeiture _stated 
in said section. Hence, I think your inquiry must be answered 10 the 
negative. . . · 
I do not wish to be understood as saying that every mfrachon of the rules 
and regulations of the prison inadvertently or thoughtlessly n:ade .ipso facto 
works a forfeiture of good time earned, but only that every v1olahon of the 
rules which demands punishment, whether tJ;!at punishment be by solitary 
confinement or otherwise, under said section 5704, works a forfeiture: 
Yours truly, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney-Gn:eral 
' 
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INDEXING OF THE }OURNALS OF THE SE NATE 
Expense therefor. 
AND HousE-
DES MOINES, IOWA, August 21, 1900. 
Hotz. G. L . Dobsott, Secretary of State: 
. D~AR Sm-Yours of today at b and, asking my opinion a s to whether the 
rndexmg of the journals of the Senate and the House of Representatives of 
the 'f~enty-eighth General Assembly should be paid for under the provisions 
of section 14, chapter 149 of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly 
or whether the payment would be controlled by section 140 of the code. ' 
. Section 140 of the code is a s follows: ''The secretary of state shall cause 
mdexes of the journals of the senate and house of representatives to be 
made, the cost thereof not to exceed the sum of $50. • • 
S aid section 14 of chapter 149, appropriates to the secretary of state "the 
: um. of one hundred and twen:y-five dollars as compensation fo r indexing 
~e JOurnals of the Senate and House of Representatives of the Twenty-
eighth General Assembly . " , 
T~ere is .no repeal o~ section 140 . I do not think section 140 is repealed 
by ~aid se~tion 14 of said chapter 149, in the broad sense of the term . Said 
section 14 IS a specia l act apply ing to the indexing of the journals of the 
Senate and Hous~ 0 1 Repreilentatives of the Twenty-eighth General Assem-
bly • whereas section 140 relates to the journals of the senate and house of all 
general assemblies which are not otherwise provided for. Said section 14 
~o far as providing compensation is concerned , takes the indexing of th~ 
JOUrnals of the Senate and House of the Twenty·eigbth General Assembly 
out o~ the operation of the general law as expressed in section 140. It is a 
sp~c r li c appropriation of $125 for the work therein contemplated. It appro-
?nat~s $125 ' .'as compensation." That means full compensation for the 
rndexmg · It .Is not amendatory to said sect.ion 140, and the secretary would 
no.t be a~thorized to expend the sum of $50, a nd also $125 appropriated by 
said section 14 . 
. I ~hink it was c~early . the intent of the leg islature, in making said appro-
pnatwn, .that for mdexmg the journals of the Senate and the House of the 
Twenty-eighth ~eneral Assembly, the secretary was authorized to expend 
the $125 appropnated thereby. The modification thus made in said section 
. 1~0 relates alone to the journals of the Senate and House of the Twenty-
er?hth General Assembly, and said section 140 remains unaffected except 
With reference to the Twenty-eighth General Assembly. 
I have n~ doubt ~hat ~ou are authori~ed to draw from the state treasury 
the sum of $125 for mdexmg the journals of the last general assembly . 
Yours truly, 
MILTON REMLEY I 
A ltorney- General. 
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BALLOT BoxEs.-N o separate ballot box is required for the 
deposit of ballots at an election where a proposed amen d-
ment to the constitution is to be voted fo r by the people. 
DES MOINES, IOWA, August 21 , 1900 . 
Hon. F1'ank F . Merriam, Auditor of State: 
DEAR SIR-Yours of the 21st inst. a t hand, in which you ask whether, 
when the proposed a mendments to the constitution are submitted to a vote 
of the people, it is necessary to use separa te ballot boxes for the depos it of 
the ba llots relating to that question. 
In reply thereto I will say that chapter 35 of th e acts of the T wenty-
eighth Genera l Assembly requires a separate ballot for voting upon the adop-
t ion of a constitutional amendment, or any other measure upon which the 
people are authorized to vote. 
T he statu te does not prescribe that a separate ballot b ox shall be p ro-
vided. Section 1130 of th e code provides that the board of supervisors shall 
provide for each precinct in the county for the purpose of election, one ba llot 
box with lock and key. Township trustees provide a sepa ra te ballot box to 
receive the votes for superv isors of roads, with as many ::lifferent compart-
ments as there are ro11d di stricts in the township . 
Section 1106 of the code , as amended by said chapter 35 of the acts of 
the Twenty-eighth General Assembly provides that ballots for constitutional 
amendments shall be printed upo n yellow paper, but there is no provision of 
law requiring a separate ballot box for the reception of the ballots contain-
ing the vote on a constitutional amendment or other public question . Sec-
tion 1130 , to which I have referred, negatives the idea that more tha n one 
ballot box is needed . There is no reason why the ballot containing the 
regular ticket and the ballot used for voting upon the constitutional amend-
ment or other public measure, cannot be placed in the same box. Each bal-
lot, when the vote is canvassed, must be handled separately, a nd there will 
be no difficulty in readily distinguishing between the ballots . The difference 
in size and color will make them easily distinguishable, and no good reason 
suggests itself to me why separate ballot boxes should be used. The ballots 
will be sent out in the same envelope to the judges of the election, the 
returns will be made in the same envelope, both ballots have to be counted 
by the same judges of the election, a nd the results recorded in the same poll 
books. To require separate ballot boxes would make a useless expense. 
But it is sufficient to say that 'the la w requires but one ballot box to be 
used . Yours respectfully , 
MILTON REMLEY I 
Attorney-General. 
FISH LAw-No person can use more than two lines with one hook 
attached, reg~rdless of whether said lines be attached to a pole 
held in the hand or attached to a floating buoy or jug. 
DES MOINES, IOWA, August 22, 1900 ; 
Geo. J. Stillwell, Esq., Farminglon,1owa: 
DEAR SIR-Your favor of the 16th inst., at hand, in which you ask my 
opinion as to whether what you call jugging for fish is lawful in this state. 
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You state that lines with baited hooks attached are fastened to j ugs and a 
number placed in the river and carried down stream with the current and 
that many fish are caught in th is manner. ' 
Section 2542 of the code prohibits any person from using ''more than two 
lines with one hook on each line in still fishing or otherwise." If any person 
use more than two lines with one hook attached, whether the lines are fas-
tened to a pole, held in the hand, or whether they are fastened to a buoy as 
jug, floating down the stream , he is unquestionably violating said section. 
A t the proper season of the year a person is authorized to fish with two 
lines with one hook upon each line, but to use more than two lines in anv 
m anner whatsoever is a violation of said section. It matters not to what the 
line may be fastened, whether a stationery object along the bank, or whether 
to a floating bouy as a jug; the lines are used in fishing in violation of law. 
Very respectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
A ttor.,ev-General. 
PENITEN TIARY..:......Gene ral support fund of-Such fund cannot be 
diverted from or used for oth er purposes th a n furnishing food , 
clothing, guards, medicines, and such other things as may be 
necessary and proper for the sustenance and safe keeping of 
the convict~. 
DES MOINES, IOWA, August 24, 1900 . 
Board of Corrtrol of State Itutitutions: 
GnNTLRMEN- You rs of the 23rd inst. at hand, in which you ask for my 
opinion as to whether a surp lus of the general support fund of the peniten-
tiary at Ft . Madison may legally be used ; or su fficient thereof for the pur-
chase of a boiler, an d of the necessary pipes and connections and radiators 
for heating a new shop building at said penitentiary, and a lso for putting 
a suitable building or protection over said boiler; or in other word s, whether 
the accu mulations of the support fund now on hand may be used for putting 
up a heating plant , including a building for the boiler , the purchase of a 
boiler, and a ll materia l and labor necessary to make a heating plant for the 
new shop building . 
Section 5718 provides: ''For the general support of the convicts confined 
in the penitentiary there shall be paid out of the state treasury the sum of 
nine dollars monthly for each convict at F t. Madison, or so much thereof a s 
may be necessary." .. 
I know of no statute which authorizes the diversion of the support fund 
to such purpose. I can think of no theory or principle which woul~ justify 
such diversion . The building of a work sh op , or the furnishing of the 
same, or the putting in of a beating p lant for such work shop , is very far 
removed, in my judgment, from the general support of the convicts. The 
legislature usually makes special appropriations for such purposes. I do not 
thin k it was ever contempla ted by the legislature that the support fund 
should be used for purposes d isconnected with furnishing food , clothing, 
guards, medicines, and such things as may be necessary and p roper fo r the 
sustenance and safe keeping of the convicts . If the support fund could be 
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u sed for the purpose indicated in your inquiry, there would be no limit to 
the objects and purposes for which it might be applied. 
Yours very truly , 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney-General. 
GAME LAws-Section 2552 thereof construed . 
DES MOINES, IOWA , Au gust 27, 1900 . 
Hon . George E. Delavan, Fish and Game Warden, Estllerville, Iowa: 
DEAR SIR-Yours of the 24th inst. at hand, if your deputy will examine 
section 2552 carefully, he will see tha t it is made unlawful to kill in any one 
day in the open period more than twenty-five birds of either kinJ named in 
said section. 
This section does not restrain a person from killing more than twenty-five 
ducks during the open period because such ducks are not named in said sec-
tion . Section 2554 prohibits the buying or selling or havin g in possession 
any of the birds or animals named in this chapter during the period when 
thti killing of such b irds is prohibited. This by no m eans is a contrad iction 
of section 2552 . The purpose of the two sections is altogether different. 
Section 2552 is t () afford a cer tain mea ns of protection to the birds named 
therein durin!{ the open period. Section 2554 is to a id in enforcing the law 
against any killing in the closed season. Secti lln 2555 first p rohibits the 
shipping of a ny birds named in the chapter out of the state at any time dur-
ing the open or closed period. Second, it permits a ny person, during the 
period when such b irds may be lawfully killed, to ship to any person within 
the state any of the game birds named, not to exceed a dozen in any one 
day. There it provides certain regu lations for the shipment. 
The second provision in said section above sta ted does operate as a regu-
lation upon the disposition of birds wh_ich may be lawfully killed , and I 
think is in perfect harmony with other sections. Prohibiting the shipment 
of more than a dozen to one person within the state makes it impossib le for 
a person to engage to kill a large number of birds fo r some dealer . It 
takes away the opportunity for engaging in a wholesale killing of the birds 
fo r the purpose of traffic. Yours truly, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
A ttor11ey-General . 
TAXEs-Collection of-Chapter 50 of the ac ts of the Twenty-
eighth General Assembly construed, with relation to section 
1374 of the code. 
DES MOINES, IOWA, August 29 , 1900 . 
Hon. Henry S tone, County Attorney, llfarskalltown, Iowa: 
DEAR SIR-Some days ago Mr. Smith your county treasurer, came with 
a request from you for m y construction of chapter 50 of the acts of the 
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Twenty-eighth General Assembl . 
He p ropounded verbally several yq,uwJtt~ refer~mce to section 1374 of the code. 
d . es JODs With reference t th proce ure 10 the collection of th o ~ manner of h . e amount due as taxe 
eret Jfore Its ted. Without unde t k ' s upon property not 
detail, I will s tate generally what r a mg to answer all the questions in 
of said chapter 50. appears to me to be the fair interpretation 
The difficulty arises because of the . . . 
the fi rs t sentence the reof It i 'd provisions of the first section' except 
. · s evt ent that all except th fi 
sec1jjon 1 was an amendment off d e rst sentence of 
· h ere on the floor of the t Wit ou t due consideration of its effect . sena e or the h ouse 
the act. The ac t in question d . It certamly destroys the harmony of 
tion 1374 of the code; nor does ~tes ~;t o~~rport to ~e an amendment to sec-
the treasurer sha ll d ischarge the d pf p . to prescnbe the m a nner in which 
We may say ' then that section ~317e4s I_mposed upon him by section 1374. 
1 d ' JS n ot amended 0 repea e_ ' unless the provisions of said cha 5 . , r _any part thereof 
There IS nothing in section 1374 that re pt~r 0 a re I~c~nsJstent therewith. 
taxation. That section was eviden tly int q u~re; the _Itstmg of p roperty for 
t he county t reasurer for the benefi t f hen e to gtve a cause of action to 
I o t e county against II concea ed their property or om itt d t r a . persons who 
escaped the payment of th . . e o Is t the same whereby s uch citizens 
etr JUSt. proportion of th bl' b 
supreme court,<i n Worthington v Wh't e pu Ic urdens. The 
c · I man 67 Iowa 190 d · !\. 
ouoty v. Vermillion 70 Iowa 365 h ld b • • an lll .. ppanoose 
such a case; tha t the ~tatu tory 'm th de f t at no recovery could be had in 
was exclusive. The la tter had be oh !do: levying the tax a nd collecting it 
Th · . een e JD former cases 
IS sectw n' then' authorizes the b . . . 
tax duly levied upon a due nngmg of an a ction to recov. r not a 
assessment of property b t b 
to assess when it ought to h b • u eca use of a failure 
h . . ave een assessed H e . not mg 10 section 1 of sairl ch t 50 · nee • we Will Si e that th ap er can be construed 
e method of procedure in said section 1374 . as an fl mendment to 
I am stren g thened in this view because . . . 
treasurer is only in cases wher th . the :Ight of actwn given to the 
listed and assessed If th t e e pro~erty IS subJect to taxation has n ot been 
. · e reasurer hsts the prope t d . 
Ject to the levy and is put upon the ta . . r Y an It becomes sub-
then, under the decisions abo e f xd!Ists With the amount of tax due 
. v re erre to a caus f . ' 
extst, but the treasurer would b r . ' e 0 actwn would not 
ing the tax by a sale of the pro; l~Ite~to the statuto_ry method of collect-
property which ought to have b er y. any oases might arise where the 
d een assessed five yea . an could not be listed or Iev1· d rs ago IS out of existence 
. e upon and the party h 
upon whtch to make it a lien S th' 1. . may ave no real estate d · o e tsttng of the pr t b ur~r an putting it upon the tax list mi h . oper y y the treas-
ObJect had in mind by the enact 't f g _t, In n:any cases, defeat the very 
men o satd sectiOn 1374 
It may b~ asked, then' what the pur ose and .. 
clause of satd section is . 1 1 Bef r . P meanmg of the following 
urer shall give the perso~ in bore tstmg the property discovered' the treas-
. w ose name it is p 0 d or hts agent, ten days notice thereof b . r pose to assess the same, 
the usual place of residence fi . : re~tstered letter addressed to him at 
such proposed listing and a ' xmg t e hme and place where objection to 
t k ssessment may be mad A a . en to the district court from the fi I . e. n appeal may be 
written notice upon him and th _na achon of the treasurer by serving 
1373 of the code. " o erwJse proceeding as provided in section 
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This chuse above quoted m :1y fa irly be construed as extending to per-
sonal property the power to list and assess the same which the treasurer has 
under section 1398 with reference to real estate. Where personal property is 
discovered in the hands of the taxpayer which has been omitted from the 
list, the treasurer may put the same upon the list, thereby subjecting it to 
the taxes of the current year, and in that case, notice must be given to the 
taxpayer in the same manner substantially as chapter 47 of the Twenty-
eighth General Assembly requires the auditor to give in case he makes the 
assessment. The listing by the treasurer, under the provision · above 
quoted, it occurs to me, should only be for the taxes for the current year. 
There is no direct ·reference to or connection with said section 1374, and I see 
no reason why the clause above quoted should be construed as an amend-
ment to section 1374. 
Suppose, for instance, a taxpayer had $S,OOO of· moneys and credits 
which he had held for five years and had omitted to lis t the same, and 
still held the same. The treasurer finds that nothing is assessed to him for 
the current year . I am inclined to the view that he m ay assess the taxpayer 
with $S,OOO of moneys and credits and put it upon the tax list for the com-
ing year, but before doing so, he must give the notice required in the clause 
above quoted, and a t the same time he may demand, without put ting it 
upon the tax list, the amount of money due for the four preceding years 
under the provisions of section 1374 . In case he should bring suit for taxes 
due under section 1.>74, he could not include therein the a mount not yet due 
as taxes for the current year. If, however, he should bring suit for all 
previous years, and then list the moneys and credits for the current year, 
the state and the county would receive their dues and no more. 
I think' it unquestionably true that if the treasurer places upon the tax 
list for the five previous years the amount which should have been listed, 
and gives the notice required in section 1 of said chapter SO, then two things 
would follow : First, he would be required to proceed in the statutory 
method for collecting the tax thus levied anc;l. assessed, and the right to 
maintain an action therefor, under the cases a bove quoted, would he cut 
off . Second, the taxpayer, after receiving such notice, would be estopped 
from denying the correctness of the amount of taxes thus found to be dul:l 
from him, it partaking of the nature of an adjudication, and he could not be 
heard , even if an action could. be brought to ,recover the same , to dispute 
the amount, because it was determined by a proper tr ibunal after due notic" , 
either o t which conclusions would practically a brogate the provisions of 
section 1374, which, to my mind, the act did not intend to do. 
In my opinion , when property is discovered which h as been omitted from 
the tax lists for five years past, it is t ne duty of the treasurer to make demand 
therefor, and to collect the s 1me by action, giving to the defendant therein 
the right to contest before the court the amount of the recovo n •, and as pre-
liminary to bringing such suit, he is not required to give the notice which is 
required in section 1 of chapter SO, but if he places the property upon the 
tax list for the current year, such notice is required to be given. 
In reply to several other questions asked me, 1 will say generally, in pro-
ceeding under sec ~ion 1374, the treasurer must determine the amount which 
he shall demand from the delinquent taxpf!.yer. He must, in the light of all 
the facts of which he has knowledge, determine the amount which shall be 
7 
98 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY-GEMERAL. 
demanded of the taxpayer. The amount to be demanded must be the 
result of his judgment and not the jud~ment of another. His duties are 
somewhat of a quasi judicial nature . He cannot delegate them to any per-
son whomsoever. There is, of course, clerical work that can be done by 
others under his direction, but in determining how much shall be demanded 
of or pa:d by the taxpayer, the taxpayer is entitled to have the deliberate 
judgment of the treasurer himself, and not that of a 'clerk or tax ferret. 
Nor can he authorize other persons to compromise between the county and 
the taxpayer. • 
I do not wish to be understood as saying, however, that when he makes 
a demand, based upon the best information he can obtain, when the tax-
payer comes and convinces him the demand is unreasonable, he cannot 
change the demand and accept less than he thought was due in the first 
place . But whatever is done in regard thereto must be the result of the 
treasurer's judgment, based upon all the obtainable facts. 
I think this covers a ll the points presented to me. 
Yours very truly, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney-(;eneral. 
VOTING MACHINE CoMMISSION-Members of are not entitled to 
receive from the owners of such machines examined their 
expenses in addition to the one hundred and fifty dollars 
allowed them for examining said machines . 
DEs MOINES, IowA, September 10, 1900. 
HotL H. M. Belvel , Des Moines, Iowa: 
DEAR SIR-Your favor of the 8th inst. at hand, in which you ask 
whether the members of the Iowa Voting .Machine Commission are entitled 
to receive from the owners of the m achine examined expenses in addition to 
the one hundred and fif ty dollars allowed them for examining the machines . 
The language of the statute which governs in this case is as follows: ''Each 
Commissioner is entitled to one hundred and fif ty dollars for his compensa-
tion and expense in making such examination and report, to be paid by the 
persons or corporation applying for such examination ." I think this lan-
guage clearly means that the one hundred and fifty dollars which shall be 
paid by the persons or corporation ior such examination shall cover both the 
compensation and the expenses of the commission. 
1 he last sentence of section 4 in chapter 34, limits the amount to be 
received by each commission to $1,500, in any one year , and reasonable 
expenses, but this by no means implies that the owners of the machines 
s hall pay any sum in excess of the statutory amount, viz . , one hundred and 
fifty dollars. I thin k there is no authority to charge the person applying 
for an examination more than one hundred and fifty dollars for each commis-
sioner . • 
This law, however, does not state where such examinations shall be 
made . . The commissioner can require the parties who wish the examination 
REPORT OF THE AT'fORNEY-GENERAL. 99 
to be made to bring their machines to such place as will put the commis-
sioners to as little expense as possible. Yours truly, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney-General. 
PENITENTIARY-Warden of-He has no authority under the law 
to appropriate money placed in his hands for safe keeping 
to the payment of damages done to state property by the 
wilful ar.d malicious acts of a convict. 
DES MoiNES, IowA, September 11, 1900. 
Bon. Wm. A. Hunter, Warden, Penitentiary, Atzamosa,lowa: 
DEAR SIR-Replying to yours of the 7th inat., I will say, I do not think 
a warden bas any authority under the law to appropriate money placed in 
his hands for safe keeping to the payment of damages done to state property 
by the wilful and malicious acts of a convict . 
If the damage is of sufficient importance to justify it, suit might be 
brought against him and the damage proved up and judgment obtainE'd; 
then the money could be garnished and appropriated under order of the 
court; or he might be indicted for malicious mischief, which would probably 
be productive of more good than the other course. 
But I do not think you have any authority to appropriate money to pay 
for damages done by him to state property without his consent thereto. 
Yours truly, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney-General. 
BoARD OF CoNTROL-Money received ' for corn grown upon the 
farm connected with the hospital for the insane at Cherokee, 
should be credited to the Cherokee hospital fund, and be 
expended the same as , other funds appropriated directly by the 
general assembly for said hospital. 
DES MOINES, IowA, September 12,1900. 
The Board of Control of State bzstitutions, Des Moines, Iowa: 
DEAR SIRS-In your letter of the lOth in st. , you state tha t money received 
from crops grown u pon t.be farm connected with the hospital for insane 
at Cherokee has been paid into the state treasury and credited to the support 
fund. You now have a bill for shelling corn and hauling it to the cars at 
that place . The question arises whether the money, the proceeds of produce 
of the farm, should not be credited to the institution generally , and whether 
such bills as this should not be paid theretrom, aql! ask my o pinion whether 
this bill under the circumstances can be properly paid from the construction 
fund, or must it be paid from the amount to the credit of the institution in 
the sup,Jort fund, and if so, under what law will the au d itor be justified in 
drawing hi10 warrant on said support fund for. payment. 
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It is evid~nt as you state, there being no patients at the hospital at Cher-
okee, there IS and· can be no support fund in the sense in which the term is 
applied to other hospitals where patients are supported. If the hospital 
were comp~eted and funds were drawn from the state treasury for the sup· 
port of patients therein, then it is ~vi dent that the produce of the farm or 
garden connected with said hospital should and would properly go to the 
support of the patients therein; and if any were sold, the proceeds thereof 
should properly be credited to the support fund as stated in an opinion given 
you June 2, 1898. 
. In regard to the hospital at Cherokee. which is not yet completed: There 
IS, so. far as is disclosed by the statute, but one fund, a fund appropriated by 
the different acts of the legislature for the erection of a hospital. There is 
then no nec~ssity or appropriateness in attempting to maintain a distinction 
b.etween different funds, such as the support fund, the repair fund, ora con-
tmg~nt fund; or the many 'funds which the legislature has appropriated for 
spt:cific purposes, for so far as is di~closed by the statute there is but one 
fund V:hic.h we may call the Cherokee hospital fund, the object and purpose 
of which IS to erect a nd equip a hospital at Cherokee, Iowa . 
In providing for the erection and equipment of any institution involving 
the outlay of many thousands of dollars, from the nature of the case, there 
must be much left to the wise discretion of those entrusted with the expendi-
ture .of ~he.funds. I.t is impossible for the legislature to anticipate every 
possible mc1dent or circumstance that may arise . There is to be found in 
the statute nothing whatsoever in regard to the proceeds of the produce raised 
upon the farm or the land owned by the state . There is nothing in fact requi~ing th~ board o.f control to rent the land, but no one can qu~stion th~ 
pr?pnety of Its so domg and of selling the produce raised upon the farm. 
It IS equally evident that the expense of raising and marketing the produce 
should .be paid out of the proceeds of the 6ale thereof and the net proceeds 
turned mto the Cherokee hospital fund. If the fund be turned into the state 
tre.asury before the cost of shelling and marketing the corn or produce is 
pa1d, the board of control, in my judgment, should audit and allow the bills 
therefor, in the same manner that bills for the Euperintendent and other 
emp 'ayes are allowed, and certify the case to the auditor, and that a war-
rant be drawn upon the Cherokee hospital fund to pay therefor. 
It may be asked whether the auditor is authorized to issue warrants in 
the aggregate amounting to more than the appropria tion made by the gen-
eral assembly. I think he is authorized to issue a warrant under the board 
of control law, so long as there is money standing to the credit of the fund 
against which it is drawn. Of cours~the aggregate amount taken from the 
state treasury, as distinguished from the treasury of the ·institution, should 
not exceed the amount of the appropriations. Or in a case of this kind, the 
money ~laced in the hands of the treasurer of the Cherokee hospital must 
not be mcluded as a part of the unappropriated money in the hands of the 
state treasurer. To illustrate : suppose the legislature appropriated $360,000 
for the Cherokee 'hospital ; that sum passes to the credit of the Cherokee hos-
pital as fast as it becomes available; suppose $5,000 were received by the 
boar.d of control for corn and products of the farm sold; it passes to the 
credit of the Cherokee hospital fund; then the auditor would be jus;tified, 
under the board of control la'w, to issue warrants against this fund credited 
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to the hospital until it is exhausted. In my opinion, the money received for 
the corn in question should be credited simply to the Cherokee hospital fund 
and be expended the same as other funds appropriated directly by the gen· 
eral assembly. Yours respectfu lly , 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney-Gmeral. 
BoARD OF CoNTROL-The appropriatiop made by chapter 165 of 
acts of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly, can only be used 
to reimburse patients in the Hospital for the Insane at Mt. 
Pleasant whose claims are not secured by the bond of the 
deceased superintendent. 
DES MOINES, IOWA, September 24, 1900 . 
Board of C01ztrol of State Itzstitutions, Des Moitzes, Iowa: 
GENTLEMEN-Yours of the 24th inst. at hand in which you state that 
1 1 Dr. H. A. Gilman, deceased, late superintendent of the Hospita l 
for the Insane, Mt. Pleasant, Iowa, gave no official bond for the time 
prior to July 1, 1898 , but gave such a bond which was in force from 
and af ter that date. He died insolvent abou t October 8 , 1898, indel:ited 
to patients for money received from them both before and after July 
1, 1898 . A portion of the indebtedness incurred for money received 
after July 1, 1898 , W.lS discharged by the sureties on the bond, but 
other indebtedness incun;-ed by Gilman for money received from patients 
both before and after July 1, 1898, remaili!S unpaid. 
"We desire to know whether money appropriated by chapter 165 of 
the acts of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly, may legally be used 
to pay sums received by Gilman from patients after July 1, 1898, and still 
unpaid . " 
It is a fundamental rule of construction ,in the interpretation of statutes. 
that the intent of the legislature shall be ascertamed if possible and force and. 
effect given to such intent. Without entering upon a refined discussion of 
the effect of the preamble and whether its recitals may be used to enlarge or 
restrict the language of an enacting clause , a ll authorities hold that it m ay 
be used to ascertain the intent of the legisl ature. The preamble of chapter 
165 shows that it was the inten t of the legislature to reimburse only such 
patients as had suffered loss by the reason of the late Dr. H. A . Gilman 
giving no bond. Those patients from whom he received money and those 
for whose benefit he received money at the time the law did not require him. 
to give a bond are the patients pointed out by the preamble for whom the 
appropriation made in section 1 of the act was intended . Nothing in the 
entire act discloses the intent to appropriate funds for patients whose claims 
are secured or to relieve the sureties' on the bond executed by the late Dr; 
Gilman on July 1, 1898. 
The amount appropriated was just enough to reimburse those patients 
whose claims are unsecured and it would be unjust and certainly not in 
accordance with the legislative intent to deprive such patients o f any part of 
such fund appropriated for their benefi.t and give it to other patients whose 
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claims are secured, the effect of which is to release the sureties on the bond 
executed July 1, 1898 , from their liability on the bond. 
It is a rule of construction of a statute that the circumstances under which 
it was enacted, the evil to be remedied, or the good to be accomplished, 
shall be taken into consideration. The preamble of this statute shows con-
clusively that it was the intent of the legislature to make good, losses which 
would be otherwise sustained by certain patients depositing their money 
with the superintendent of the hospital at a time when under the law he was 
not required to give bond, and that there is no intention to release the sure-
ties on a bond which was gi\'lln in accordance with law from any liability 
thereof, hence, In my opinion, the appropriation made by said chapter 165 
can only be used to reimburse patients whose· claims are not secured by the 
bond of the late Dr. Gilman. Yours respectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney-General. 
BoARD OF CoNTROL-The support fund for the Institution for 
Feeble-Minded Children at Glenwood cannot be used for the 
purpose of putting a new roof upon one of the new buildings 
of said institution. 
DES MOINES, IOWA, October 5, 1900 . 
Board of Co,trol State Institutions, the Capitol: 
DEAR SIRS-Yours of the 3d inst. at hand. Yon request my opinion as 
to whether it would be proper to pay the expenses of putting a new roof 
upon one of the buildings of the Institution for Feeble-Minded Children at 
Glenwood out of the support fund, mentioning the fact that the appropria-
tion for contingencies and repairs was insuffic!ient to meet such expense, and 
the further fact that all expenses of said institution except clothing and 
transportation are paid by the state and no part, with the exception of the 
above, is paid by the county or other persons. 
Section 2700 of the code as amended by chapter 79 of the acts of the 
Twenty-seventh General Assembly appropriated $12.00 monthly for each 
inmate supported therein by the state. The purpose of this appropriation 
is for the support of the institution. It might be difficult to determine what 
expense might properly be included within the term ' 'the support of the 
institu"tion" if this section stood alone. 
The Twenty-eighth General Asssembly, chapter 150, made appropriation 
for contingent and repair fund $6,000. ~early every general assembly has 
made special appropriation for buildings, changes in the buildings, heat, 
light, the erection of necessary buildings and for contingencies and repairs. 
We cannot suppose the legislature which has made appropriations biennially 
for contingent expenses and repairs intended that such expense should be 
paid out of the support fund. The appropriation of $6,000 for contingencies 
and repairs is, I think, fair!~· to be considered a limitation upon the amount 
that may be expended for that purpose, and negatives any inference that 
the support of an institution includes the repairs which are otherwise pro-
vided for. 
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In m ·udgment, the support fund for the Institution of Feeble-Minded 
Childre: ~t Gienwood cannot be used to put a new roof upon one of the 
buildings of said Institution. Yours truly, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
A ttornev-General . 
GAME LAw-Section 2551 of the code makes it illegal to use any 
artificial ambush built upon the edge of the water. 
DES MoiNES, IowA, October 6, 1900. 
Hon Georf(e E. Delavan' Estherville' Iowa: . . the 
DEAR SIR-Yours of the 4th inst. at band, asking my op1mo~ upon . 
· f section 2551 in regard· to an artificial ambush m shooting 
constructton o d h ther an ambush 
ducks and geese. The question is presente to you w e . 
. th 1 d at the edge of the pond is against the law, and m regard bmlt on e a~ . . Said section among other things provides, 
to this you w1sh my opm10n. . . . f 
, , erson shall kill any of the birds mentioned m th1s sectiOn rom any 
,.~~ti~cial ambush of any kind, or with the aid or use of any sneak boat or 
" "nk box or other device used for concealment in the open water, or ~se 
,, :
1
ny artificial light, battery or any other de.ce otion, ~~~~~i:~~e ;:n~i~:~: 
"whatever with the intent to attract or deceive any o 11 k"ll f the 
' Th 1 • 'no person sha 1 any o 
"in this chapter," etc. e anguage k" d" ·s 
birds mentioned in this chapter from any artificial ambush. o~_an~ ~~at lit 
eneral There is nothing in such language to In lea e . . T:;:nd~d to p;ohibit the killing of such birds from such ambush bmlt out m 
the r:~:wo~!y;he second clause' "or with t~e aid of any s~~ak b~;t.~~i~:t~ 
box or other device used for concealment m open water, wou 1 . 
that the first clause intended to prevent ambush 0::1 the lan~ ~10~e esp:c~a~~~ 
An ambush oti the open water would ordinarily be a snea . oa or smh th 
and the two clauses were intended to cover ,all kinds of ambush w de . e~ 
upon the land or upon the water, including therein sneak boats an sm 
bo~e~~nnot conceive of any possible rule of construction that wou~d_e_xclude 
artificial ambushes built on the land near the water from the ~r0~1b1Uons of 
. ·t. Sat·d section clearly makes it illegal to use any artificial ambush 
thiS sec 10n . 
built upon the edge of the water. Yours truly, 
MILTON REMLEY I 
Attorney-General. 
EscAPED CoNVICT-There is no statute wh_ich makes it a cnme 
to g ive shelter, cloth1ng, and food to an for a person 
escaped convict. 
DEB MoiNES, IowA, October 10, 1900. 
n. 1-V A Hunter Warden Penitenttary, Anamosa, Iowa: o~.EAR. S;R-Your,favor of the 5th inst., enclosing a letter f:om Frank 
Desmond, sheriff of Osceola county, at band . . ' The facts stated m Mr. Des-
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mood's letter do not show that the person named therein in any manner 
assisted or aided a prisoner detained in the penitentiary to escape . I think 
sections 4894 and 4895 are the only sections of the code under which such 
p:o.secution~ could be brought, but unfortunately they relate to as;;isting or 
a1dmg a pnsoner to escape from a peni tentiary or jail. 
Sibley is probably 250 miles from Anamosa . These sections do not make 
it a crime to assist, giving aid, comfort or relief to an escaped prisoner. The 
prisoner in question undoubtedly had escaped , and while be had been 
detained in the Anamosa penitentiary, he was not detained at the time the 
assistance was given him. In fact , the prisoner had already escaped before 
the assistance was given him, as shown by Mr. Desmond's letter . However 
reprehensible the condu-::t of the man referred to was, and however much he 
deserved punishment, yet in the absence of a statute making it a crime, I 
do not think it would be worth while to attempt any prosecu tion. . 
· Your letter, however, presents a very different case. If, while the pris-
oner was in custody at Ana mosa, any person furnished him clothes, or com-
municated to him where other clothes could be found, and planned his 
escape, aiding and assisting him in making the escape by furnishing him 
means of concealment of his character as a prisoner, or any other way while 
he was in the penitentiary, then such person would be guilty under the sec-
tion above referred to. 
You say his prison clothing was found w ithin a quarter of a mile of the 
farm where he was employed. Evidently he put on citizen's garb at that 
place, which must have been furnished him by some one. Possibly it was 
furnished by the man up in Osceola county, either personally or through 
another. If you could connect the man in Osceola county with the acts 
done while the man was in prison, then undoubtedly he could be p rosecuted. 
Or if you could find the one who furnished him clothing while he was in the 
prison, or detained hy the officers of the prison, be could be prosecuted under 
said sections . 
· ·But I know of no statute which makes it a crime for a person to g ive shel-
ter and clothing and food to an escaped convict. 
Yours truly, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
A ttorney-General. 
BoARD oF CoNTROL-PENSION MoNEY OF INMATE AT SoLDJERS 
H oME.-Pensio n checks not endorsed cannot be considered as 
money in the hands of the co~manda nt of said home. 
DES MOINES , Iowa, October 19, I900. 
To the Board of Control of Slate Institutions, Des Moines, Iowa : 
DEAR SIRS- Yours of the 12th in st. at hand, enclosing the Jetter of 
Commandant H orton of the soldiers home at Marshalltown, from which it 
appears that certain members of the home have been twice convicted or 
found guilty of intox ication or other misdemeanors so as to be required, 
under section 2 of chapter 92 of the acts o f t he Twenty-eighth General 
Assembly , ''to deposit t.he money received from the United States govern-
ment as a pension with the commandant immediately on the receipt of h is 
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pension check." It appears a lso that some such members now refuse to 
endorse their pension checks, and have demanded their papers and asked 
for a discharge from the home . Commandant Horton asks this question: 
"May the money be considered to be in my hands where t r. e check is not 
signed, and will it be a violation of the state law to deliver the check to such 
pensioner on his demand, g iving him at the same time his discharge?" This 
is the inquiry upon which you request m y opinion. 
In regard to this I will say that said cha!lter 92 does not contemplate that 
the pension check itself shall be in the bands of the commandant. It assumes 
that the pensioner himself will receive the money upon said check, and 
deposit it with the commandant. So far as appears in the law, the corn-
mandant h as nothing whatsoever to do with the pension check . It is only 
the money which the party deposits with him after receiving the pension 
check with which he has to do. 
I think, under the law . he is not required to r eceive the pension check, 
<>r to hold the same, or to do anything therewith. It is not improper for 
him, if the pensioner brings the check to him, duly endorsed for him, to 
receive it and treat it as money deposited with him . But if the pensioner 
refuses to deposit the money received by him upon tbe check, such money 
cannot be said to go into the hands of the commandant. By so refusing, he 
violates the law and should be promptly discharged, in which case, he would 
be entitled to receive at the end of thirty d ays , the money theretofore depos-
ited to his credit with the commandant. · 
I do not think the commandant, if perchance the pension check goes into 
his hands, would be entitled under the law to retain the check or consider 
it, without an endorsement, as the pay ment to him of so much money. 
Such pensioner, upon being discharged , is entitled to receive any pension 
papers, including the pension certificate, which he may h ave deposited with 
the commandant for safe keeping, but is not entitled to the money which he 
bas deposited until after thirty days. 
1 do not agree with the commanda nt's views, that he might be liable for 
.a violation of the federal statute if he held a pension check after the same 
bad been demanded by the pensioner. It is made a misdemeanor to retain 
the pension certificate ·of a pensioner, and refu;e to surrender the same upon 
his demand. by the act of February 28, 1883; 22 Stat. L., 431; Sup . . to U . 
S. Rev. ~tat., Vol. 1 ,' 39!'1. . . ·. . . 
There 'is a vast difference between a penftion certificate and a pension 
-check, but this inquiry does not enter into the question of the duties of the 
com~andaot, inasmuch as the )aw imposes upon him no duty, whatsoever 
with reference to the pension check. 
Yours truly, 
MI!-TON REMLEY, 
Attorney-General. 
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CoLLATERAL INHERITANCE TAx-Section 3281 of the Code con-
strued and applied to a given statement of facts. 
DES MOINES , IOWA, October 19, 1900. 
M. TV. Herrick, Esq. , County Attorney, Monticello, Iowa: 
Mv DEAR SIR-Treasurer Herriott has shown me your Jettn to him oi 
October 13th, and requests that I write you giving you my views upon the 
point presented. 
Mr. Proctor, o( your city, died testate . By his will he bequeathed to a 
sister of his deceased wife $3,000; the balance of his estate to his two 
daughters . At the time of Mr . Proctor's death, the legatee sister-in-law was 
deceased. so that the portion willed to her goes to her heirs. Her heirs are 
a surviving brother and sister and the children of Mr . Proctor, Mr . Proctor's 
deceased wife being a sister of the legatee. The question arises whether the 
portion of the $3,000, going to the testator's two daughters as heirs of their 
deceased aunt is subject to the collateral inheritance tax . 
The relationship of the heirs to the testator in all cases determines 
whether such bein are collateral heirs or direct heirs . It is the portion of 
the estate passing to collateral heirs that is ~ubject to the collateral inheritance 
tax. The property received by the daughters of the testator not passing to 
collateral heirs is not subject to the tax. This, I think, will be admitted by 
everyone . 
The only consideration which appears to lead to any doubt is that the 
$3,000 passes theoretically to the estate of the testator's deceased sister-in-
Jaw, and from such estate to the daughters of the testator as her heirs. If 
this line be followed, and is the correct view, then the legacy would be 
entitled to two charges of collateral inheritance tax; first from the Proctor 
estate to the estate of the legatee, and the daughters and their uncle and 
aunt who are heirs with them, would be required to pay another tax because 
they are collateral heirs of the deceased legatee 
That doctrine proves either too much or too little. I do not think the 
position is tenable. The $1,000 which passes to the children of the testator 
goes from the estate of their father. They ·are heirs to that portion of their 
father's estate under the provisions of the will. Section 3281 of the Code is 
as follows: ' 'If the devisee died before the testator, his heirs shall inherit 
the property devised to him, unless, from the terms of the will, a contrary 
intent is manifest." '!'he term ''devisee" includes also ''legatee." 
The death, then, of the legatee, under the provisions of this section, has 
the effect to make the heirs of the deceased legatee the legatees under that 
provision of the will the same as if thl)ir names had been written in the will 
respectively. 
In other words, they become the heirs of the property devised, . i. e. , the 
property belonging to the testator and devised by his will. The property 
thus devised is not the property of the deceased legatee, and could not pass 
to the administrator of such deceased legatee's estate. 
The law of the land becomes no less a part of a will than of a contract. 
After the death of the legatee of the $3,000, this section of the statute has 
the effect to read into the will a provision that $1,000 shall be paid to the 
sister of the legatee, another $1,000 to the brother, and another $1,000 to the 
two daughters of the testator. The $1,000 going to the two daughters, 
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passing not to collateral heirs but to direct heirs, in my judgment is not sub-
ject to the collateral inherita.nce tax , but the $2,000 going- to the brother and 
sister of the legatee, I think s hould properly be ch~rged with the tax. 
Yours very truly, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
A ttonzey- General. 
BUILDING AND LOAN AND SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS-Vol-
untary Liquidation of-I. In case the shareholders of such 
associations should decide to go into voluntary liquidation, 
such associations would still be subject to supervision by the 
auditor of state. 
2.-When any shareholder of such associati.Jn sees that h is inter-
ests are being jeopardized through the fraud, speculation, and 
dishonesty of those having the affairs of such association in 
charge, he has the right to apply to a court of equity for the 
appointment of a receiver, notwithstanding the association 
may have resolved to go into liquidation. 
3.-The statements made in paragraphs 1 and 2 will apply like-
wise to a case where such association elect to go into voluntary 
liquidation under a plan approved by the executive council. 
October 31, 1900. 
Hon. Frank F. Merriam, Auditor of Slate, Des Moines, Iowa: 
DEAR Sra-Your favor of the 26th inst. at hand in which you say: 
''Section 7 of chapter 69, Jaws of the Twenty-eighth General 
Assembly, provides a method by which building and loan or savings 
*d loan associations may go into voluntary liquidation . Three ques-
tions regarding this subject have arisen, ,upon which I would be 
pleased to have your opinion. In case the hhareholders should decide 
to go into voluntary liquidation, as provided under section 7: 
First-Would such association be still subject to supervision by 
this department, and could I legally make application for a receiver 
for such an association during the process o£ such liquidation? 
Second-Could a shareholder legally make application for a receiver 
for such an association during the process of such liquidation? 
Tkird-Wou!d the answers you have given to questions 1 and 2 still 
apply in case an association did not accept the plan provided for in 
section 7, but went into voluntary liquidation under a plan of thtir own, 
properly approved by the executive council as provided for in said 
section?" 
The first inquiry that suggests itself is: "What is the status of an asso-
ciation after its shareholders have by a three-fourths vote resolved to go into 
voluntary liquidation upon either the plan outlined in said section 7 or upon 
a plan of their own which has been approved by the executive council? 
Does 1t cease by such act or resolution to be a building and loan or savings 
and loan association? It may and unquestion~bly does, cease taking in new 
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business, but I think it is unquestionably a building and loan association; 
bas not lost its corporate identity or power . Said section 7 or any other 
section of said chapter 69 does not abridge or limit the power given in 
chapter 13, title 9, of the code to the auditor of state. The purpose of the 
law requiring reports to be made by the associations and requiring examina-
tions of the affairs of the association by the auditor, is to protect the share-
holders from improvidence, frauds or the misdeeds of the officers. The 
fact that the association has voted to go into liquidation affords no guaran-
tee against the misman!l.gement, misdeeds, fraud or speculation of the 
officers, and in the nature of the case, there appears to be no reason for a less 
degree of watchfulness on the part of the auditor than if it was a going insti-
tution. If such an association after having resolved. to go into liquidation 
were exempt from any control of the auditor's office or examination, the 
winding up of the affairs of the association might be prolonged year after 
year and the fund s paid in by the shareholders might be diss ipated without 
let or hindrance so far as the auditor is concerned. The same reasoning 
that would prohibit the auditor from interfering would also prohibit a share-
. holder from applying for a receiver. Such a construction of the law would 
leave every shareholder at the mercy of the persons in charge of the winding 
up of the affairs of the company. I do not think this was the intent of the 
legislature. 
Hence, in answer to your first question, my opinion is that such an asso-
ciation is still subject to the supervision of the auditor and he will be justi-
fied in making an application for a receiver for such an association during 
the process of such liquidation whenever said association is not carrying out 
the provisions of the law in good faith or is squandering the property of the 
association which belongs to the shareholders, or pursuing a method of liqui-
dation not contemplated by law. 
Second-In regard to the second inquiry, a shareholder in any corporation 
whenever he sees that his interests are tieing jeopardized through the fraud, 
speculation and dishonesty of th ose having the affairs of the corporation in 
charge, I do not doubt has full right to apply to a court of equity for the 
appointment of a receiver notwithstanding the association may have resolved 
to go into liquidation. 
Third-! think the same rule applies when such association has adopted 
a plan Of liquidation Of itS OWJl Other than that OUtlined in SeCtion 7 I Which 
plan has been approved by the executive council, but in either c.ase, if the 
association is carrying out the plan honestly and in good faith approved by 
the executive council or provided under said section 7, doing the acts therein 
authorized would not be-considereq, a violation of lai.v, and o~ght not and 
could not properly be made a basis of complaint. But if sucli an association 
through its officers is wasting the property' of the association by which the 
rights of any member are jeopardized or a wrong being perpetrated upon 
him, then the right of the state or of any shareholder to apply for the 
appointment of a receiver to wind up the affairs of the company under the 
directions of a court of equity exists the same as that no resolution had been 
passed by the shareholders to go into voluntary liquidation. Said section 7 
while giving power to an association which it did not prior thereto possess, 
to go into voluntary liquidation, does not diminish or limit the power of the 
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auditor to see that the affairs of the association are administered according 
toiaw. Yours respectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY I 
Attorney-General. 
GAME WARDEN-License for non-residents who_ h~n~ w~th_in this 
state--Persons residing on islands in the M1ss1sS1pp1 nver on 
the Iowa side thereof are within the state _of Iowa, ~n_d are 
not required to procure a license, and there IS no prov1_swn of 
Jaw which authorizes the game and fish warden to 1ssue a 
permit to persons to violate the provisions of the law. 
October 31. 1900. 
r1 G 17 D~lavan Fish and Game Warden, Spirit Lake, Iowa: 
.a ott. eo . ..., · y • h d 1 · a D SIR-Your favor of recent date came duly to an , enc osmg letterE~~m Mr. Geo. s. Tracy, of Burlington, in which inquiries were made 
of you, in substance: . f h t r 
• • Whether you have power to waive the requirements o c _ap e 
86 of the acts of the Twenty-eighth General Asse~bly b_y _which a 
t a bona fide resident of the state of Iowa IS proh1b1ted from person no · · h t fi t hunting or killing any game, bird or animal in the state w1t ou rs 
procuring a license,'' etc· . . 
It is claimed that a law requiring a license to be patd w~rk~ a. hardship 
' d t of this state but also residents of llhno1s, masmuch 
not only upon rest en s , . 
as both states claim concurrent jurisdiction over the nver · . 
Without passing upon the question how far the acts of congress admit~ 
· · · d I · t the Union and the statutes of both states rela tmg llhno1s an owa 10 o • . . . . 1 tive to a concurrent jurisdiction over the Miss1ss1pp1 nver may app Y to one 
shooting game birds anywhere upon the Mississ\ppi river, I w1ll sa'! there IS 
· · f law which authorizes the game and fish warden to tssue any 
no provts1on o · · f the 1 w The 
ermit to any person whomsoever, to violate th~ proviSion o a · . 
faw applies to all persons who violate its prov~sLO_ns, and _does ~ot prov1de 
t t indulgences to any w1shmg to viOlate It or grant for any person o gran , 1 tt d immunity from punishment in case of violation. Mr. Tracys e ~r a vances 
the idea that persons living on islands in the Mi sissippi riv~r. wh1ch are near 
the Iowa shore and belong to the state of Iowa . are pr~h1b1te~ by the law 
from shooting game upon the islands on which they live.' Such persons 
being residents of the state are not required to procu_re a lt_cense under the 
· · of said chapter 86 The islands in questiOn be1ng a part of the 
prov1s1ons · 1 d t t n· nk they tate and wholly within the jurisdiction of the state, o ~o I ~ould be held amenable to the Jaws of lllinois for doing :"hat IS lawful_ to be 
done in the state in which they are citizens, and of whtch the locus m quo 
f t The islands in question form no part of the waters of the 
M
o:m_s ~ p~r a.nd Illinois can certainly claim no jurisdiction over tht: lands ISSISS1pp1 1 
belongiu'g to the state of Iowa. Yours respectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY. 
Attorney-General. 
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GA~E LAws--A person who does not own the bed of a Iak . 
!table for seining therein And he may be liable even tho~g~ 
he owns the bed of the lake it the outlet to the I k . h 
th t · · a e ts sue 
b ad. tn ttmes of ordinary high water it is connected with other 
o tes of water and thereby be restocked. 
November 9 1900 Hot~. Ceo. E. Delavan, F£sh and Game Warden, Est-herville, low~: . 
DEAR SrR-Yours of the 7th in st. at hand re uestin . . 
the liability to arrest and prosecute for violatin ~h g my opinion as to 
the state, all persons seining in lake Spitznogglegnea: ~:p:l~ondlfish laws of . 
Th f ' owa. 
e acts stated by you are hardly sufficient for me .. 
conclusion. You say: , 'Th f to form a positive 
, . e armer owns a farm on ·which is lake S . 
noggle. , This would imply that he also owned the Ia . pit_z-
another place that th€. lake covers possibly 250 acres k~i r:~~t apge~rs ~n 
res?rt for business men of Wapello. I know of no lake of an IS t e 
wh1ch was not meandered If the 1 k . d such an extent 
o_wne.d by the farmer alth~ugh he :a~ ~~:v:e,::der::r::~e t~en .it is not 
ripanan owners of meandered lakes own only to high water~:r~ It. I ~h~ 
ca.se, tthhe f~rmer does not own the lake and is amenable to the iaw nl'f hae 
sems ere1n. 
wo;~d ~se;e~;t!;o~f ~:~:h::~h~a~::r hoa:n:othnea;:::,· i~~=~ o~i~:~feht to seine 
which It may be stocked or replenished with fish If !'t h t through 
h ' h · · as no outlet by 
w IC It may be stocked or replenished with fish and h h 
may then fish with seine or in . •. e owns t e lake, h€: 
of the code Th h any manner he IS disposed under section 2545 
. · e c aracter of the inlet or outlet is not stated b 
there IS .a natur~l outlet or inlet which in times of ordinary hi h y you. If 
nects With the rtver so that the lake ma'y be replen ·sh d g water con-
fi h th h f . e or restocked with 
s • en t e armer Is not authorized to seine in said lake Th f t h 
there may be no connection between the lake and the river. in t' e ac f tl at 
water, does not chang~ the rule abov~ s tated . If . the condition ~:=~c~ t:w 
the lake d~pends upon Its connection with the river to be replenished wi~ ~sh,t:ert~mly under the law, the owner of the lake is prohibited from sein-
mg erem · On the other hand, if the far mer owns the 1 · 
connecting outlet. or inlet from the river except in timesa~~ :~~e~:i:: ~sino 
water when the nver may overflow its banks such h ' h gh 
0 1 • Ig water or floods as ccur very s~ dom and are extraordinary, the fa t that an occasional over-
flow of the nver makes the connection with the lake would not · . d 
ment, deprive the lake of its character as private t In my Jn g-
f f . wa ers nor preclude the 
armer rom fishing with a sei ne therein. 1 think it plain that if th f 
does not own the bed of the lake, he is liable to the law in case h: ar~er 
:~e~e.in, .and second, if he does own the bed of the lake and the outlet iss:~nc~ 
a In times of ordtnary high water there is a connection b 
outlet or inlet into the lake by which th• l k b y means of an 
f . " a e may e restocked with fi h 
rom the nver, then he is prohibited from fishing and is amenable. s 
Yours very truly, 
MILTON REMLEY 
A ttorne)-Gen;ral. 
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BoARD OF CoNTROL.-The settlement by the executive council 
with said board should embrace all matters in or for which 
public money is expended under the direction of said board. 
DES MOINES, IOWA, November 13, 1900. 
Hon. A. H . Davison, Secretary Executive Cout~cit . 
DEAR SIR-In yours of the 12th inst., you say that the executive council 
request my opinion "as to whether the board of c'Jntrol is one of the offices 
that should be settled with by the executive council under the provisions of 
section 161 of the code, and if so, should the settlement take in all of the 
financial doings of the said board, or be limited to the office, 0'1' the expenses 
of the office as such." 
Section 161 is as follows: ''The executive. council shall annually, and 
oftener in its discretion, make a full settlement between the state of Iowa 
and the officers of the state, officers and superintendents of the state institu-
tions, and all persons receiving, handling, or expending state funds." 
Section 159 requires the executive council to cause the books, accounts, 
vouchers, expenditures and conduct of each state institution tb be examined 
by a skillful accountant. The settlement referred to in section 161 con-
templates the examination of the accounts as a prerequisite to making a 
settlement. 
The language of section 161 is comprehensive and includes within its 
terms all officers of the state and all persons receiving, handling or expend-
ing state funds . It is a general law and applies to all persons coming within 
the terms. The fact that the board of control was created after this general 
law was enacted does not, in my judgment, exempt it from the examination 
and settlement required by said section 161 of all state officers. The creation • 
of a state office a ter the enactment of a general law governing the conduct 
of state officers, is as much subject to the general law as a public officer 
whose office was created prior to the enactment of the general law. I know 
of no distinction between them, and in my judgment, the board of control 
is embraced within the class of state officers with whom the executive council 
is required to make settlement. 
In regard to the second branch of the inquiry, viz., ''Should the settle-
m ent take in all of the financial doings of the board, or be limited to the 
office, or the expenses of the office as such," I will say chapter 116 of the ac ts 
of the Twenty-seventh General Assembly, creating the board of control, 
places the management of the state institutions under the control of tbe said 
board. Said board becomes the managers of each of the institutions placed 
under its control. The board of control expends public money for the dif-
ferent institutions. The accounts of the different institutions are kept in the 
office of the board of control, and an examination of the financial doings of 
the said board is practically an examination of the books, accounts, vouchers, 
expenditures and conduct of each state institution referred to in section 159 . 
The purpose of the law is evidently to have a chtck upon the public 
officers who are expending the public money. The expenditure for the state 
institutions, by said chapter 118 of the acts of the Twenty-seventh General 
Assembly, is transf~rred from the boards of trustees and superintendents of 
the i stitutions who formerly had control thereof to the board of control. 
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The board of control stands in place of the governing boards of the institu-
tions as they existed at the time the present code was enacted. I do not 
think it was intended by the legislature that a part of the accounts of the 
board of control,-for instance, their office expenses,-should be examined 
and settled by the executive council, and that by far the greater part of the 
expenditures of public money should be released from examination . The 
policy of the law being to secure an examination of the accounts of every 
public officer to the end that mistakes should be corrected and frauds and 
embezzlements detected , it is not, in my judgment, rep€aled and set aside 
by transferring the management of state institutions to the board of control. 
I am of the opi~ion that the settlement by the executive council with the 
board of control 'should embrace all matters in or for which public money is 
expended under the direction of the board. 
Yours respectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney-General. 
BOARD OF CONTROL-The abstract of title submitted for an 
opinion shows a good title in the present holder therecf. 
December 8, 1900 . The Board of· Control of State Instituti01tS, Des Moi1us, Io'U'a: 
DEAR SrRs-I haye examined the abstracts of title which you submitted to me of the following tracts of land : 
First-A part of th ~ south-east quarter of section 13, of township 
78 north, of range 3 east, of the 5th P . M., as follows: Beginning at 
the north-east corner of said south-east quarter of said section 13, 
thence south along the center of a sixty foot road, 18 chains and 34 
links to a stone, thence west along the center of a 40 foot road, 33 
chains 97 links to a stone; thence north, 18 chains and 34 links to a 
stone in the center of a 40 foot road, thence east along the center of 
last named road, 33 chains aod 97 links to the place of beginning, 
containing 62.30 acres, more or less, subject to right of way of C . M. 
& St. P. Railway Co. 
Secotzd-A part of the south-east }( of section 13-78-3 E . of 
the 5th P. M., described as follows, to-wit: Beginning at a stone 
10.79 chains due north from a stone a nd mound at the corner of sec-
tions 13-18-19 and 24; thence ~est 4 chains; thence north 2.50 chains; 
thence west 18 .84 chains; thence south 2 .50 chains; thence west 21.23 
chains ; thence north 10.87 chains ; thence east 44.07 chains; thence 
south 10.87 chains to the place of beginning. Containing 43 10-100 
acres, more or less , except the right of way of the Davenport & St. 
Paul Railway company. 
In regard thereto I will say that while there are minor criticisms that 
might be made, yet there a;Jpears to be no practical objection to the title. 
Anything which might be considered as a defect is of· such ancient date that 
there appears to be no human probability of anythin~r arising thereunder. 
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. . d in accepting the title thus shown as a 
I think you would be JU_stl fied f tin the title or cloud thereon. Some d ftl There is no senous e ec . . 
g oo I e. db the statute of limitatiOn. appa rent ones have been cure y 
Yours very truly, MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney-General. .I 
Where a dentist has been duly DENTISTS DuLY REGISTERElD-1 . force at the time of regis-
. h nder t 1e aw 1n 
registered as sue u I' e ! ·s not necessary to enable 
. tificate or teens 
tratiOn, a ne_w cer h h has failed for one or more him to pract~ce as such w ere e 
years to pay the renewa.l fee. t porary license to practice h h s been g tve n a em . . d 
2.-0ne w o a . so without an examtnatiOn an 
dentistry cann_ot conttnue to ?o d b chapter gr, laws of the 
obtaining a ltcense as requtre y 
Twenty-eighth Generc:l Assembly. 
December 27, 1900. 
Dr. F. A. Lewis, State Board Dental Examiners' Secretary and Treasurer 
Ottumwa, Iowa: d 1 t hand requesting my opinion upon the D.a:AR SIR-Yours came u Y 0 
following points : . he fact that heretofore dentists duly 
First .- you call attention to t the renewal fee of $1 and f .1 d f r one or two years to pay · 
registered have at e 
0 
h f and fines provided under pnor 
'f h ment of sue ees . t 
ask in effect, I t e pay . .fi d . issuing a renewal certificate o • d 
· the board ' 'JUSt! e 10 d fi ?" laws be rna e, ts . h ho has paid such fees a n nes 
and reinstating in the regtster t e ~ne wh e been issued temporary licenses 
Suond.-Whether persons ~o w25~~ :vthe code prohibited to practice 
under the provisions of sectiOn ~ t ' ' and obtaining a license as 
. t t 'thout an examma IOn bl dtlntistry in this s a e WI f th Twenty-eighth General Assem y. 
required by chapter 91 of the _laws o h te t each a correct conclusion it will 
In regard to this point I Wl_ll sa_y t a o ~his subject. The end and pur-
be necessary to review the legislatiOn up?n . d in construing any statute. 
· d st ever be had 10 rum 6 f tb pose to be obtatne mu f of dentistry is chapter 3 o e 
The first law with refer~nce to the pra~;ce The purpose thereof is correctly 
laws of the Nineteenth General_ Assem h yb. tter education of practitioners of 
· 1 ' 'An act to m sure t e e · d d for 
stated in the ttt e, , It will be noticed that said act provt e dentistry in the state of Iowa· 
licenses to be issued: the examination by the board or some mem-First.-To those who upon l'fi d 
ber of the board' were found to ~e .qua I d~pl~ma from the faculty of some Second.-To all persons havmg a 
reputable dental college. . d in the practice of dentistry 
erson who 1s engage 
Thwd .-To every P he taking effect of this act . 
within six months from the date of t f t in fees by which the expenses The act provided for the payment o cer a 
of the board were to be met . 
8 
-
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It will be noticed under the first act that examinations were required only 
of those who after the passage of the act, commenced the practice of 
dentistry and were not graduates of some reputable dental college. The 
fact that one was engaged in the practice of dentistry six months of the date 
of taking effect of the act or was a graduate of some reputable dental col-
lege, was by the law considered evidence of qualification sufficient to entitle 
one to practice . 
The law remained substantially the same until the adoption of title 12, 
chapter 19 of the code of 1897. By section 2599 of the code we find that per-
sons ''who are registered practitioners of dentistry under laws hereto -
fore in force," are excepte I from the law prohfbiting persons to engage in 
the practice of dentistry without a license from the state board of examiners. 
Section 2597 however required ''any one who desires to continue the practice 
of dentistry shall on or before May 15th of each year, pay to the board of 
examiners the sum of $ 1 for which he shall receive a renew11.l of his certifi-
cate, unless his name has been stricken from the register for violation of 
law.'' This compelled all persons who are engaged in the practice of 
dentistry to pay an a nnual fee in order to lawfully continue the business, 
but it will be noticed that the failure t o pay such fee did not have the effect 
of revoking his certificate. The failure to pay such fee incurred a fine of 
$10 for each month durin g which he continued to practice. But the certifi-
cate showing his qualifi ations to practice was not thereby annull.,d. 
The Twenty-eighth General Assembly, chapter 91, repealed chapter 19 of 
title 12 of the code and enacted a substitu te therefor. It provides for the exam-
ination of a ll persons who shall engage in the practice of dentistry and permits 
none to be examined exceptgraduatesof a reputable dental college. Section 10 
makes it unlawful for any person to practice medicine without having complied' 
with the provisions of this act, but section 12 provides ''and nothing herein 
shall be construed to prohibit the practice _of dentis try in this state by any 
practitioner who has been duly registered in accordance with the laws of 
Iowa existing prior to the passage of this act." What does this exception 
mea n? Does it mean that a ny practitioner who at the time of the passage 
of this act held a valid license to practice, or does it mean that any practi-
tioner who h ad shown his qualification t o practice and had been duly 
regis tered in accordance with the law~ of Iowa existing prior to the passage. 
of this act, should be permitted to continue the practice or excepted from the 
requirement laid down in chapter 91 ? 
I have called attention to the fl_J.ct that a failure to pay an annual fee of 
$1 to the secretary of the state dental board did not work a forfeiture of the. 
certificate authorizing the practice Qf dentistry. It subjected the person con-
tinuing the practice of dentistry without the payment of such fee, to a fine or· 
penalty. Under section 2599 of the code, failure to register the ;:ertificate with 
the clerk of the district court of the county for six months worked a forfeiture. 
of the license. The license could be restored upon the payment to the board 
of the sum of $25 but no new examination was required. Where one had 
been for some time duly registered I know of no provision of any statute 
requiring him to again submit to a new examination. The fact that one 
suspended practice for one year say, prior to the taking effect of said 
chapter 91 of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly and did not pay his. 
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annual fee for a renewal of the certificate, would not be evidence of dis-
qualification to practice de ntistry. In my opinion, the language quoted 
above from section 12 of said chapter 91, exempts a ny one who has been duly 
reg istered in accordance with any law in existence prior to the passage of 
said chapter 91, from the provisions requiring an examination and a license, 
and th is is true whether at the time the sai d chapter 91 took effect he was 
lawfully engaged in the practice of medicine or not. In other words, the 
language a bove quoted makes the fact that one has been registered at some 
time, conclusive evidence of his q11alification to practice dentistry irrespective 
of the fact, if it be a fact, that at the time of the taking effect of said 
chapter 91 he m ay not have been engaged in the practice of dentistry or may 
have failed to Pll.¥ the annual fee required by section 2597 of the code. We 
cannot attach penalties to the failure to pay such fee which the statute did 
not . There is noth ing in the said chapter 91 which requires or authorizes the 
board to is;me certificates or licenses to any except those who are required 
under said act to be examined. Said chapter 91 does not apply to any 
persons practicing dentistry who h as been duly regis tered in accordance with 
the laws of Iowa existing prior to the passage of this act. Hence I do not 
think that a new certificate or license is necessary to enable one to practice 
dentistry who has been heretofore registered under the law the n in force, as 
the fact of their having been registered is decla red by the legislature to be 
sufficient evidence of their qualification to entitle them to practice without 
being subject to the penalties provided in said chapter 91. 
::,econd. -In regard to your second question I will say chapter 36 of the 
laws of the Nineteenth General Assembly provide that'' any member of said 
board shall issue a temporary license to any applicant upon the presentation 
by such applicant of evidence of the necessary qualifications to ·pract ice 
dentistry, and such temporary license shall remain in force until the next 
regular meeting of the said board occurring after the date of such temporary 
license and no longer. '' This is substantially the same as section 2598 of the 
code. An examination for a temporary license was not required. Evidence 
of qualification could be submitted to any member of the board . This was 
only a temporary make-shift to enable one ~ho furnished prima facie evi-
dence of his qualification to commence the pract ice until such time as he 
had a n opportunity to take the examination or procure a certificate or 
license in due form from the board as a whole. Such license was not issued 
by the board but by a member . He was not required by section 10 of said 
act to be registered with the county clerk of any county. Only those persons 
who shall be licensed by the said board were required to be registered by 
by the county clerk of any county. And the temporary license issued by 
one member of the board does not mean the same.as duly registered, and I 
am of the opinion that such a one does not come within the exception 
quoted a bove from section 12 of said chapter 91, but in order to practice 
dentistry must take the regular examination provided for in said chapter 91. 
Yours very truly, 
MILTON REMLEY 1 
A ttortzey- Gweral. 
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NOTARY PuBLic-A district judge who has resi~·ned his office is 
in el igible to the office of notary public during the term for 
which he was elected. 
December 31, 1900. 
Hon W. H. Fleming, Private Secretary, Des Moines, Iowa; 
DEAR SIR-Yours informing me of the request of the governor for lilY 
opinion upon the follow ing questions, came duly to hand. The press of 
other matters has delayed my response. You ask: 
Jiirst-"Can a district judge be a notary public? 
Second-' 'Can a district judge who has resigned, be a notary 
public during the time for which he is elected." 
Section 5, article 5 of the constitution contains the following provision: 
~ 'The judge of the district court shall hold his office for a term of four 
years and until his successor shall have been elected and q ualified, and shall 
be ineligible to any other office except that of judge of the supreme court 
during the term for which he is elected. There is no question but that 
notary publi;:: is an office . Section 22 of article 3 of the constitution so 
recognizes it. But without such recognition it is clearly settled by authori-
ties that a notary public is a public officer. 16 Am. Eng. Enc. of Law, 
page 733. 
In reply, then, to your first inquiry, I will say that I do not think a person 
can hold the office of a district judge and a notary public at the same time . 
In regard to the second inquiry, whether he is ineligible for the office of 
notary public during the time for which he was elected, I will say that, tech-
nically speaking, he is ineligible. It is very evident to my mind that the 
case does not come within the spirit of the constitution, although within the 
letter. From the nature of the case, the appointment of notary public being 
made by the governor, could not be secured by reason of any favors shown 
by a judge in the discharge of his duties on the bench. The purpose of the 
constitutional prohibition is to prevent one holding the office of district judge 
being subjected to the temptation of showing partiality to this person or that 
person, or this faction or that faction, fer the purpose of gaining support for 
the appointment or election to some other office. It is to remove the dis-
trict judge from any suspicion of using the office of judge for the purpose 
of making friends, which would help him to another position. The appoint-
ment to the office of notary public could not be influenced by anything done 
by the judge upon the bench. Hence, I say it is not within the spirit of the 
constitution. 
But the constitution makes no exaeption, as is found in section 22 of 
article 3 of the constitution. It is difficult to anticipate wbat the supreme 
court would ultimately determine in regard to it, but I am of the opinion 
that the court would be forced to hold that a judge who has resigned is 
ineligible to the office of notary public during the term for which he was 
elected. If there were any doubt about it whatsoever, in view of the serious 
consequences that might follow by having the acts of a notary public 
declared of no effect, it is far better to take no risk whatever, but follow the 
letter of the constitution. Yours respectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney-General. 
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INSURANCE CoMPANIEs-Foreig n companies must substantially 
comply with chapter 65, laws of the Twenty-eighth General 
Assembly, before they ca n be permitted to do a stipulated 
premium business in this state. 
December 31, 1900 . 
Hon. Frank F. Merriam, Auditor of State, Des Moines, Iowa; 
DEAR SIR-I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your request for 
m y opinion ' 'as to the standing of insurance organizations which have 
formerly been admitted to do business in this state under the provisions of 
chapter 7, which, until amended by the last general assembly, governed 
stipulated premium and assessment life insurance companies and associa-
tions. Nearly all the associations or companies from other states which are 
authorized under chapter 7 to do business in this state are doing what is 
ordinarily termed 'stipulated premium' business, and I desire to advise 
these companies what change will be required of them in order to comply 
with the new stipulated premium law in this state, and whether or not a 
company organized under the laws of some other state as an assessment 
company and doing a stipulated premium bu lness can be authorized to do 
business in this state as an assessment company, or must they comply with 
chapter 65 of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly; and if they 
must comply with chapter 65, laws o f the Twenty-eighth General Assembly, 
should this department require them to have their policies valued and li3ted 
as a liability?" 
In regar'd to this, I will say that chapter 65 of the acts of the Twenty· 
eighth General Assembly in effect eliminates from chapter 7, title 9 of the 
code, all provisions relating to stipulated premium companies. Said chapter 
65 is an amendment to chapter 7, title 9 of the code. Section 5 defines what 
is a stipulated premium company, and provides ' ' that the business of life 
insurance upon a stipulated premium plan shall be subject to the provisions of 
this act." This defioition of a stipulated premium company is the test or 
standard by which a foreign insurance co~pany is to be measured. The 
purpose of the act is to divorce those insurance companies which require a 
fixed payment or stipulated premiums to be paid, from those associations 
which conduct the business upon the assessment plan. It is very evident to 
my mind that an Iowa compaoy or associatipn cannot lawfully do a stipu-
lated premium business, and at the same time an assessment business. For 
a stipulated premium company which is required to have a reserve sufficient 
to enable it to comply with the contract it makes with the policy holder to 
continue an as,essment business which might, and in all human probability 
will ,jeopardize the funds which have been accumulated to pay the stipulated 
premium policies at their maturity, would defeat the end and purpose of 
this act. Section 16 prescribes a penalty for any company attempting or 
claiming to transact business under this act, or using the term stipulated 
premium in its policies, contracts, advertisements or literature, without 
having complied with the provisions hereof. Hence, it is unlawful for any 
company, doing an assessment business, to write stipulated premium policies 
without having complied with the provisions of said chapter 65, and if said 
company does not comply with the provisions of said chapter 65, then it is 
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prohibi ted from carrying on the business 'of assessment insura nce. This is 
unquestionably true with reference to companies organized under the laws 
of this state. 
The question still remains , whether the provisions of said chapter 65 
applies to fo reign companies? Section 14 of said chapter 65 provides the 
terms or conditions under which any corporation or ~ssociation organized 
under the laws of any state for the purpose of insuring lives of persons on a 
stipulated premium plan, may be permitted to do business in th is state 
under the p rovisions of this act. It cannot be supposed or contended for 
one moment, that the legislature ever intended that any company organized 
under the laws of another state, shoul d be permitted to do business of a 
kind , or with less securities for the policies , than is required or demanded of 
companies organized under the laws of this state. Unless , then, the plan of 
b usiness of a foreign insurance compa ny is substantially the same as that 
referred to in said chapter 65 , and the securities and reserve are accumulated 
a s contemplated in said chapter 65, so a s to make such company equally a ble 
to fulfill its contracts of insurance as a company organized under the laws of 
this state, I am clearly of the opinion such foreign company should not be 
permitted to do a s tipulated p remium business in this state . 
Section 8 of said chapter 65 provides as follows: ' 'All policies issued 
under the provisions of this act shall be valued as provided in section 1774 of 
the code, and the net value thereof shall be deposited with the auditor of 
state as therein provided.'' ln order to determine the responsible and 
fin a.ncia l standing of a ny foreign company doing business in the state, it 
will be the duty of the auditor to have all policies issued by the said com-
pany valued as required by section 1774 of the code, and if su ch company 
does not show it has assets sufficient to meet the requirement of said section, 
then I am of the opinion that such company should not be permitted to con-
tinue business in this state. While the statute does not contemplate that the 
securities of a foreign insurance company shall be deposited wi th the 
auditor of this state, yet it does contemplate that the solvency of such com-
pany shall be tested by the same rules as are applied to a company or asso-
ciation organized under the laws of this state . 
Yours respectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney-General . 
APPROPRIATION FOR STATE UNIVERSITY-The taking effect of the 
code of 1897 did not annul the appropriation mad e for the uni-
versity by chapter 76 of the l~ws of the Seventeenth General 
Assembly, and chapter II 5 of the laws of the Twentieth Gen-
eral A ssembly. Section 2643 of the code supersedes the 
form er sta tutes, and the university cannot now claim the ben-
efit of such former appropriation. 
DES MOINES, IOWA , December 31, 1900. 
Hon. Frank F . Merriam, Attditor of State: 
DEAR SIR-Your req uest for my opinion upon the following questions 
was duly received . You call my attention to chapter 76 of the laws of the 
• 
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Seventeenth Genera l Assembly, and chap ter 115 of the laws of the Twen-
tieth General Assembly, making appropriations for the support of the state 
university , and state that under chapter 76 , the fi rst payment was made 
J uly 1878, and the last Au gust 7, 897, and under chapter 115 of the laws 
o f the Twentieth General Assembly you say that the fi rst payment of $8 ,000 
was in July , 1884, and last August 7, 1897. The points upon which you 
request my opin ion are these : 
ftirst _-Was there at said date, October 1, 1897 , any of said appro-
pria ti on available, and is there at this time? 
Second. -Did the taking effect of section 2643 of the new code 
appropriating for the support of the university, annul the a p propria-
tions referred to by said chapter 76 of the Seventeenth General Assem-
bly, and chapter 115 of the laws Gf the Twentieth General Assembly ? 
The answer to the firs t question depends upon the conclusion reached in 
regard to the second . 
It will be noticed that chapter 76 of the Seventeenth General Assembly 
appropria ted $20,000 annually to be paid in installments of $5,000 each, the 
first insta llment of $5.000 to be paid on the first day of July , 1878, and the 
same quarterly thereafter . While this is an appropriation of the sum of 
$20, 000 a nnually , the manner of the payment thereof makes it in effect an 
appropria tion of $5,000 quarterly for each q uarter on the first day of July 
1878, a nd each successive quarter beginning the fi rst day of October, Jan-
uary and April of each year so long as the law shall remain in force . 
It will be further noticed that chapter 115 of the laws of the Twentieth 
Genera l Assembly makes an appropriation of $8,000 which appropriation 
becomes availa ble and hence due upon the taking effect of the act. The act 
was published a nd took effect April 4 ,1884. It thereby becomes evident that 
there was d ue from the state t reasury on the first of every April si nce 1884 
up to to the time the code of 1897 took effect, the sum of $8, 000 . These 
appropriations are for a fi xed a nd definite sum. They are not for a sum 
named ' 'or so much thereof as m ay be necessary , ' ' but they are absolute 
appropriations for the university in a definite and fixed sum, and so long as 
the law remains in force a nd effect, the appropriations become due at the 
times above specified. 
The real question then is whether said acts have been repealed by the 
code, and if so, the effect of such repeal upon the unpaid appropriations, 
if any . 
Section 49 of the code contains this provision: '• All public and general. 
statutes a dopted prior to the present session of the general assembly, 
except acts appropriating money when the same has not been fully paid out , 
and all public and special acts the subjects w hereof are herein revised or 
which are repugnant thereto, are repealed, subject to the limitations and 
exceptions hereinafter referred to . ' ' 
This act being for the appropriation of money, any sum which could 
have been drawn prior to the adoption of the code would not be affected by 
reason of the exception above referred to, viz, ''acts appropriating .money 
when the same has not been fully paid out." There is no express provision 
repealing said acts , and the exception above referred to was evidently 
intended to authorize the payment of all money which had been appropriated 
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when the same had not been fully paid out. I do not think the taking effect 
of the code annulled the appropriations referred to in said chapter in the 
sense in which such language is ordinarily understood. 
While there is no repeal in express language, yet it is evident to my mind 
that section 2643 o f the code supercedes the former statutes, a nd I do not 
think the university could claim the benefit of section 2643 and the continued 
quarterly appropria tion under chapter 76 of the acts of the Seventeenth 
General Assembly and an annua l appropr iation under chapter 115 of the 
Twentieth General assembly, but from and after the taking effect of the 
code such acts are merged unto section 2643, and thereafter such acts, cease 
to be operative. They are, I thin k , without question, revised by the adop-
tion of the code, and payments which would otherwise have become due 
under said acts by their terms on or after the first of October, 1897, must 
afterwards be drawn under the authori ty of said section 2643. But this does 
not, in my judgment, cut off the right of the university to receive all that 
was payable before October 1, 1897. Such unpaid portion of the a ppropria-
tions comes clearly within the exception referred to in said section 49 of the 
code. 
Now, applying these views to the case in hand: If payments were made 
for each quarter under the appropriation made in chapter 76 of the laws of 
the Seventeenth General Assembly, between the first day of July, 1878, and 
the first day of October, 1897, then I do not think any further payments 
should be made thereon. Under section 2643 of the code an annual appro-
priation of $65,500 is made. That, presumably , is the amount the legisla-
ture intended the university should draw between the first day of October, 
1897, and the first day of October, 1898, and I cannot think that the legis-
lature intended that $5,000 more should be drawn for the· quarter com-
mencing October 1, 1897, and ending December 31, 1897. If, however, no 
sum had been drawn for the quarter beginning July 1, 1897, and ending 
September 30, 1897 , I am of the opinion that $5,000 would be due to the 
university for such quarter. It follows that the appropriation under chapter 
115 of the Twentieth General Assembly being payable, all on the fourth day 
of April, 1897, such appropriation , if not fully paid out, would be available, 
and requisition for that amount would be honored. 
I regard section 2643 of the code as providing a new basis for appro-
priations for the support of the university, and it takes the place and stands 
in lieu of all previous acts making appropriation for the support of the uni-
_versity from and after October 1, 1887. But this does not cut off any sum 
which under the previous acts was properly payable before the first day of 
October. Any part, then, of the $8,000 which was due on the fourth day of 
April, 1897, which has not yet been paid, should, in my judgment, be paid, 
and if any quarterly appropriation under chapter 76 of the Seventeenth Gen-
eral Assembly, which became due prior to October 1, 1897, has not been 
paid in full, I am fully satisfied you are authorized to draw a warrant there-
for, but not for any sum which became due and payable on or after October 
1, 1897. Yours respectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney-General. 
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BoARD OF CONTROL-The board has authority to require a cer-
tificate to be furnished to the chief executive officer of the 
state institutions, except the penitentiaries, that the person 
who is to be received therein has not for seventeen days next 
preceding been exposed to smallpox, diptheria or scarlet fever. 
DES MOINES, IOWA, January 2, 1901. 
Board of Control of State Institutions: 
GENTLEMEN-Your favor of the 31st ult. at hand, in which you submit 
to me the following resolution : 
''Resolved, That whenever any person shall be sent to any ins titu-
tion under the control of this board, except to either of the peniten-
tiaries, from a locality where smallpox, diptheria or s:arlet fever is 
prevalent, at the time of the reception of the said person in the 
institution there shall be furnished to the chief executive officer so 
receiving said person a certifica te that said person has not for seven-
teen days next preceding the time of sending, or commitment, been 
exposed to any of such diseases. And if in such cases no certificate is 
furnished, said chief executive officer shall refuse to receive said per-
son into his institution. In any case , when said chief executive officer 
shall have good reason to believe that a person committed, or sent, to 
his institution has been thus exposed, it shall be his duty to require the 
certificate above mentioned before admitting him or her into th{dnstitu-
tion. The certificate above mention~d shall be made and signed by 
the board of health of the locality where such contagious disease 
exists and in insane cases certified to by the commissioners of insanity 
of the county." 
You desire my opinion as to whether or not the board of control has 
authority under the law to adopt such a rule as that contemplated in the 
resolution. 
In regard thereto permit me to say that section 8 of chapter 118 of the 
laws of the Twenty-seventh General Assembly , contains tbe following: 
''The board of control shall have full power to manage, control and govern, 
subject only to the limitations contained in this act, tbe Soldiers ' Home, " 
etc . 
Section 46 of said chapter contains this provision: ' 'The board of con-
trol is authorized to make its own rules for the proper execution of its 
powers, and may require the performance of aditional duties by the officers 
of the several institutions so as to fully enforce the requirements, intents and 
purposes of this enactment." 
It will be observed that the powers of the board of control to manage, 
control and govern the state institutions committed to its care are plenary, 
subject only to the limitations contained in said chapter 118. The trust 
imposed upon the board consists in more than looking after the safety, or 
feeding and clothing the inmates of the state institutions . It goes without 
saying that it is its duty, and one of the greatest importance, tolookafterthe 
health and physical well being of the persons whom such institutions are 
intended to benefit. The health and life of the inmates of the insane hos-
pitals, for instance, is of more importan~e than their actual confinement. 
122 ' REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY- GENERAL. 
No management of such institutions could be considered good or capable 
which would ignore every reasonable precaution UP.cessary for their health 
and to prevent the spreadin g of contagious diseases in such institutions. 
The legislature has given to the board full power in the matter, with full 
authority to make such rules and resolutions as shall best carry out the 
powers bestowed, and unless such powers are limited by said chapter 118, 
there can be no reasonable question that such a resolution is authorized. I 
find nothing whatsoever in said chapter 118 which limits the power of the 
board so as to preclude such a resolution being adopted. 
It may be thought, however, by some, that the management, control 
and government of such institutions does not relate to determining who shall 
be admi tted to such institutions, and it may be thought that the provisions 
of section 2266 of the code, relating to the admission to the insane hospita ls , 
shall in a ll cases control. It is provided in said section 2266: ''The s heriff 
shall execute the warrant and sha ll deliver a duplicate with a physician's 
certificate and finding to the superintendent, who shall over his official 
signature acknowledge such delivery on the original warrant, which the 
sheriff shall return to the clerk of the commissioners ." This implies a duty 
on the part of the superintendent to receive the person thus delivered to 
him, and to treat such p erson in the insane hospita l. 
With reference to other institutions, similar provisions are found which, 
by inference, impose a like d u ty upon the m a naging officers of the d ifferent 
institutions. If we were to concede that the board of control act does not 
modify the duties impose d by fair inference upon the executive officers of 
such institutions, yet such language, being in general terms, has, from the 
necessities of the case, its limitations . 
The supreme court of the United Sta tes has said: ''All laws should 
receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in their 
application as not to lead to injustice, oppression or absurd consequences . 
It will always, therefore, be presumed th'at the legislature intended excep-
tions to its language which would avoid results of thi<> character." 
If, then, the law by fair inference imposed the duty in general terms 
upon the superintendent of the insane hospital to receive and admit thereto 
all persons who were brought with a proper warrant from the commissioners 
of insanity, it must be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions 
when to so receive them would work injustice, oppression, or would be 
absurd. No greater injustice could be done to those wards of the state than 
to admit one inoculated with a contagious disease, or one actually having 
such disease . The hospitals for the insane being intended as a place for the 
treatment of those who may be ben~fited thereby, it could not be contem-
plated that the legislature intended one hopelessly insane should bt: received. 
If the hospital were crowded to its utmost capacity, it certainly would not 
be contemplated that the legislature intended to receive another one when 
the hospital had no facilities for caring for such a one. 
This illustrates that there may be exceptions to general language, and 
from the necessities of the case there must ever be . I would have no hesi-
tation in saying that the legislature never contemplated, even before the 
board of control act was passed, that the superintendent of an insane hos-
pital should receive one into the hospital whose presence would be a menace 
to the life and health of those already confined therein. But the board of 
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control act gives to the board of control much more extended powers than 
were ever given to the superintendents and executive officers o f the differ-
ent state institutions prior thereto. The full power to manage, control and 
govern an i n~titution cannot be said to exist if, against the judgment of the 
managing board, a discordant and unruly or a dangerous element may force 
an en tra nce therein. If the board has n o power to close the doors of state 
institutions against a dangerou s element which is a ~en ace to the safety of 
the inmates of the state institutions, then its p ower to control is limited and 
is not a full power ; It is limited then, by some provisions other than those 
contained in said chapter 118, but said section 8 gives it lull power except as 
the same may be limited by the provisions of said chapter 118. 
Another consideration: It is the beneficent purpose of the state, in pro-
viding state institutions, to restore to health, physically, mentally and 
morally , those unfortunates who become the wards of the state. Every pro-
vision of law with reference to such institution, is made to accomplish this 
end. The state, in confining its unfortunate wards within walls for their 
own good would be guilty of a crime against civilization if, while thus con-
fined, it subj ected them to innoculation from smallpox or other contagious 
diseases by bringing a person thus affected or inoculated into contact with 
them. Whatever lapse of legislation may be thought to exist with reference 
to such institutions, it is evident that the people of the state, throu g h its 
legislature, never intended to .commit such a crime, and if there were any-
thing in the statute which seemed to impose upon the board the duty of 
receiving one affected say with smallpox as an inmate of a state institution, 
it must be conclusively presumed that the legislature intended such exemp-
tion in the general language as would not compel the perpetration of such a 
wrong, which is repuls ive alike to common sense and the better sentiments of 
our natures . 
I am clearly of the opinion that the board of control has full power to 
adopt and enforce the resolution above referred to. 
Yours respectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney-General. 
INSURANCE CoMPANIEs-Chapter 21 of tbe Acts of the Twenty-
sixth General Assembly applies to every organization that was 
doing insurance business which claimed tne right so to do 
under section 21, chapter 65, Acts of the Twenty-first General 
Assembly. 
January 2, 1901. 
Hon. Prank F. 1J£erriam, Auditor of State, Des Moines, Iowa : 
DEAR SIR-You submitted to me the followmg statement and inquiry: 
"Section 1798 of the code makes some exemptions as to insurance 
organizations being required to comply with the provisions of chapter 
7, title 9 of the code. Under this exemption it has been held by my 
predecessor in this office that such organizations as the Locomotive 
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Firemen, the Locomotive Engineers, and the Order of Railway Con-
ducters, and some others which confine their membership wholly to 
one religious denomination, were exempt entirely from complying 
with any state law. I desire your opinion as to whether such organi-
zations which have a lodge system, ritualistic form of work, and a 
representative form of government, and pay death and other benefits, 
should or should not be required to comply with the provisions of 
chapter 9, title IX of the code if they desire to operate in this state." 
With reference to the ruling of your predecessor as stated by you, I will 
say that it was undoubtedly m ade before the enactment of chapter 21 of the 
acts of the Twenty-sixth General Assembly and prior to that time such ruling 
was undoubtedly correct. The enactment, however, of said chapter 21 put 
entirely a different phase upon the question. Said chapter 21 was undoubt-
edly for the purpose of placing under control of the state in the manner pro-
vided in the said act, all associations which had grown up under the excep-
tion made by section 21 of chapter 65 of the acts of the Twenty-first General 
Assembly. 
Chapter 21 of the acts of the Twenty-sixth General Assembly now appears 
a s chapter 9, title IX of the code, and section 21 of chapter 65 of the Twenty-
first General Assembly now appears as section 1798 of the code . There is 
no inconsistency between said section 1798 and chapter 9 of t itle IX. I do not 
think there is room for a doubt that such beneficiary associations as are 
described in section 1822 of the code must comply with every provision made 
in said chapter 9, title IX of the code. 
It will be noticed that said section 1798 does not provide that such associ-
ations shall not be amenable to any law, but it says: ''Nothing in this 
chapter shall be construed to apply to any association organized solely for 
benevolent purposes and composed wholly of persons of any one occupation, 
guild, profession, or religious denomination, but any such society may by 
complying with the provisions hereof, become entitled to all the privileges 
thereof, in which event it shall be amenable to the provision s of this chap-
ter so far as they are applicable . " It only excepts such associations from 
the provisions of said chapter 7 of title IX of the code, and does not except 
them from the provisions of chapter 9 of title IX. 
It would be to my mind, an absurd conclusion, that because certain 
insurance companies are excepted from the provisions of one chapter, that 
they become thereby excepted from the provisions of another chapter, which 
expressly includes them within its terms. I am of the opinion tha t such 
organizations ''which have a lodge system, ritualistic form of work and a 
representative form of government, and pay death or other benefits, should 
be required to comply with the provisions of chapter 9, title IX of the code, if 
they desire to operate in this state." 
In regard to whether or not there may be an association which comes 
within the terms of said section 1798, which may not be subject to the pro-
visions of said chapter 9, title IX of the code, I do not now express any views, 
although it was originally contemplated, I think without doubt, that said 
chapter 21 of the acts of the Twenty-sixth General Assembly should apply to 
every organization that was doing insurance business, which claimed the 
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right so to do under said section 21 of chapter 65 of the acts of the Twenty-
first General ·Assem bly . 
Yours respectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY , 
A ttornt:y- Gem:ral. 
BoARD OF CoNTROL-It has no authority in law to furnish cut 
stone free, from the Anamosa penitentiary, for the public 
library at A namosa. 
January 4, 1901. 
Board of C.ontrol of State Institutions, Des Moines, Iowa : 
DEAR SIRS-Your inquiry with reference to whether the board of control 
had authority under the law to furn ish cut stone free, from the Anamosa 
penitentiary for the library at Anamosa, I fi nd has not been formally 
answered, although my views were stated to you personally. 
I find no authority of law whatsoever, for complyi ng with the request of 
the Daug hters of the American Revolution to furnish stone or the labor of 
convicts for such purpose. In the absence of any authority given by statute, 
it is evident that the board may not comply with the request. 
Yours respectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY, 
Attorney-General. 
BoARD OF CoNTROL-( 1) Said board is not authorized to receive 
a resident of the state wh(!) is less than five years of age or 
more than twenty-one years of age as a pupil in the school for 
the deaf at Council Bluffs. ( 2) A person properly received 
as a pupil in said institution, under the age of twenty-one 
years, may be retained in said school after he has attained 
that age, for the purpose of con1pleting the prescribed course 
of study, or to pursue special studies. 
January 4, 1901. 
Board of Control of State Institutions, Des Moines, iowa; 
DEAR SIRs-Yours duly at hand in which you desire my opinion upon 
the following questions: 
First.-"Whether any person who is less than five or more than 
twenty-one years of age, can be received as a pupil into the school for 
the deaf at Council Bluffs?" 
Second.-' 'Whether a person properly received as a pupil may be 
retained in the school after he has attained the age of twenty-one 
years, for the purpose of completing the prescribed course of study, or 
to pursue specialstuuies?" 
The only provision of the statute which throws any light upon these ques· 
tions is contained in section 2724 of the code. ''Every resident of the state, 
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of school age and suitable capacity, who is deaf and dumb, or so deaf as to 
be unable to acquire an education in the common schools, shall be entitled 
to receive an educa tion in the institution at the expense of the state, and 
non-residents similarly situated may be entitled to an education therein, upon 
the payment of forty dollars quarterly, in advance. 11 Section 2723 provides 
that the trustees of the inst itution ''shall appoint a superintendent, employ 
teachers and servants to do any other ac t or thing necessary and proper to 
be done to carry into effect the objects of the institution. 11 All the powers 
of the board of trustees has been transferred to the board of control. The 
object of the institution is to give an education to the unfortunate who are 
deprived of hearing or speech, and I do not think the la w should be con-
strued so as to defeat the beneficent objects of the institution or limit them 
more than the language of the statute demands . The language quo red from 
section 2724 gives to every resident of the state of school age a nd suitable 
capacity , the right to receive an education in the institution at the ex pense 
of the state. That right attaches to a resident of school age. The right is 
to receive an education at the expense of the state . One a few months 
under twenty-one years of age cannot in that few months receive an educa-
tion at the expense of the state, but the statute says he is entitled to receive 
it. It does not say that he is enti tled to receive an education a t the expense 
of the state provided he can complete his education by the time he is twenty-
one years of age . Taking into consideration the object of the institution and 
the provis ion of section 2724, I am of the opinion that the board of control 
would not be authorized to receive a resident of the state who is Jess than 
five years of age nor more than t wenty-one years of age , as a pup il in the 
institution . It must be presumed that in the judgment of the legislature one 
who was over twenty-one years of age could not be benefi ted in said institu-
tion to an extent commensurate with th<' cost of such educa tion . While this 
may be a mistaken view, and the statute might be with great propriety 
enlarged so as to receive persons over twenty-one yea rs of age, yet we must 
take the law as it is written . 
In reply to the second inquiry , I will say the right to receive an education 
having attached to one between the ages of five and twenty-one years, be 
may be received in the institution, and at such institution is entitled to receive 
the education contemplated in said section, notwithstanding the fact that it 
may require years beyond the time that he attains his majority. 
Yours respectfully, 
• 
MILTON REMLEY I 
Attorney-General. 
BoARD OF CoNTROL-The law of the state governs the question 
as to wh en minors cease to be such in relation to a parent pen-
sioner residing at the soldiers' home. 
January 4, 1901. 
Board of Control of State bzstitutions, Des Moines, Iowa : 
DEAR SIRS-Your favor came duly to hand requesting my ''construction 
of our law in connection with the United States pension law, as to when a 
child ceases to be a minor.' ' This is asked with reference to chapter 92 of 
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the laws of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly relating to the disposition of 
the pension money of members of the Iowa Soldiers' Home. 
I presume the doubt bas arisen because of the fact that the United States 
government allows a pension for minosr under sixteen years of age. Section 
3 of said cha pter 92 is as follows: ''All members of the home who are 
pensioners and have a wife or minor children, shall be required to deposit 
with the commandant at once upon receipt of his pension check, one half of 
his pension money, which shall be sent at once to said wife or minor chil-
dren, unless the said wife is proven to be a woman of immora l character.'' 
This being the law of the state of Iowa, we cannot go to the statute of some 
other government to ascertain the meaning of the terms employed. That 
would not be permissible. The Jaw of this state defines what is a minor, 
and to the law of this state alone we must look for its definition . All 
unmarried females under the age of eighteen are minors. All males under 
the age of twenty-one are also minors, and in applying said section 3, ref-
erence must be had to the Ia w of this state alone . 
But even if a different ru le prevailed, there is nothing in the Unites States 
statu te which defin~ s a minor to be other and different from the law of this 
state. The fact tha t the United States government a llows a pension for 
minors under sixteen years of age, does not change the meaning of the term 
minor as it is used in the statute of the United States . The enforcement of 
the provisions of section 3 in some cases may work a serious hardship , as in 
the case under which the inquiry a rose. There may be cases continually 
a rising where it is practica lly impossible to pay one half of the pension to the 
minor child of the member of the home . The law requires no impossible 
thing to be done. The spirit of the law is that dependent minors sha ll be 
entitled to receive one half of the pension of the members of the home. 
Where a minor is not deoendent and has cut loose from a ll connection with 
his father and his reside~ce is unknown, I do not think tha t the spirit of the 
statute would require one half of the pension money of a member of the home 
should be retained for an indefinite time for the purpose of carrying out the 
exact letter of the statute. But what should be done in each particular case 
must be determined by the wise discretion of the commandant and the board. 
Yours respectfully, 
MILTON REMLEY I 
Attorney-Ge1zeral. 
BoARD OF SuPERVISORs-It has no power to demand the keys of 
the recorder's office and take possession thereof by force. 
DEAR SIR-I beg to acknowledge the receipt of the esteemed favor signed 
'by yourself and Mr. Barr, chairman of your board of supervisors, asking 
m y opinion as to what ought to be done in the conflict between the newly 
elected officers and those whose terms of office would have expired on the 
seventh day of January, 1901, except for the Titus amendment. 
In reply, I will say that the board of supervisors has no power to demand 
the keys of the reC'order's office and take possession thereof by force . The 
only way to test the right of the newly elected officers is by an action of 
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qtto warrat1to in the court. The officers elected at the last general election 
should make a demand for the possession of the office after they have filed 
their bonds and qualified, and then the natural course would be an action 
of qtto warranto to oust the incumbent. In as much, however, as such an 
action has been tried between two county attorneys in Washington county, 
and will be submitted to the supreme court at as early a day as possible for 
its decision thereon, as a test case, I would suggest that the necessity of 
bringing other actions in different counties can probably be avoided by wait-
ing for the decision in the Washington county case. A decision in the Wash-
ington county case is expected to be handed down by the supreme court upon 
the second or third day of its session, and the delay to the new officers in 
taking possession of th,eir offices, in case the court holds they are entitled to 
do so, will be slight. The old officers holding over and refusing to surrender 
their respective offices, are in my opinion officers de facto between the time 
of the expiration of their terms of office and the time when the newly elected 
officers assume their duties, and the business transacted by them is valid, 
and I do not see how loss or litigation can arise therefrom . 
Yours very truly, 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
Attorney-General. 
7o Mr. A. P. Olsen, County Attorney, Leon, Iowa: 
January 9, 1901. 
ScHOOL FUND--Judgment rendered in favor of-While the law 
provides no method for the compromise of judgments rendered 
in favor of the school fund of the state, yet there are circum-
stances under which compromises of this kind are very desir-
able and may be made. 
DEAR SrR-Your favor of the 14th inst. has been received. There is no 
method, so far as I know, provided by law for the compromise of judgments 
rendered in favor of the school fund of the state, but sometimes compromises 
of this kind are very desirable, and should be made, even though there is no 
direct provision of law therefor. 
I would suggest this course of action: Have the auditor, treasurer, 
clerk, and the board of supervisors agree upon what they consider a fair 
compromise. Have the money paid to the auditor, and a resolution adopted 
by the board of supervisors directing ~im to cancel the judgment, and under 
such r.esolution he can satisfy the record in the clerk's office. 
The money upon the judgment goes to the temporary school fund of your 
county, and it is a matter which should be adjusted by the officers of that 
county, and the mode of procedure which I suggested recommends itself to 
my mind, as being the best. Very truly yours, 
To Mr. George A. Jeffers, L1 Mars, Iowa: 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
Attorney-General. 
January 13, 1901. 
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WARRANTS FOR PER DIEM AND MILEAGE FOR Ex OFFICIO MEM-
BERS OF THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF STATE UNIVERSITY-The 
auditor of state is authorized and empowered to draw warrants 
·for their · per rliem and mileage the same as for other regents 
not drawing salaries from the state for the performance of the 
duties of another office. 
DEAR SrR-Your favor of the 15th inst. is received, in which you say: 
"Your opinion is requested on the following, are the above named 
officers, when acting in the capacity of regents or trustees, entitled to 
the compensation referred to in sections 2617 and 2618, and is the 
auditor of state authorized and empowered to draw warrants for their 
per diem and mileage, the same as for other regents and trustees not 
drawing salaries from the state of Jowa, as provided in section 1289 of 
the code?" (The officers referred te being the governor and superin-
tendent of public instruction, both of whom are ex officio officers and 
members of the board of regents of the state university.) 
Upon determining the question, I have made an examination of the 
history of the legislation in regard to the salary of the governor and super-
intendent of public instruction, as now fixed by law, and the compensation 
provided for regents of the state university, and submit the following opinion : 
The Thirteenth General Assembly increased the governor ' s salary from 
$2,000 to $3,000 per annum. The act by which such increase was made 
went into effect on the fifteenth day of April, 1870 . From that time to the 
present the salary of the governor has remained the same. 
The governor and superintendent of public instruction were made mem-
bers of the board of regents of the state university by the same legislature. 
The act by which they were made members of the board of regents provided: 
''The regents shall receive no compensation except for mileage in traveling 
to and from the meetings of the b Jard; which shall be at the same rate, and 
computed in the same manner, as the mileage allowed to members of the 
general assembly," etc. 
This provision was embodied in the code Of 1873, and remained the law 
until 1888, at which time the Twenty-second General Assembly increased the 
compensation of the trustees of state institutions and regents of the state 
university by providing, ''that the trustees of state institutions, members of 
visiting committees of the hospitals for the insane, and regents of the state 
university, shall receive as their compensation four dollars ($4. 00) per day 
for each and every day actually employed in the discharge of their duties, 
and the actual and necessary expense incurred while so engaged; but in no 
case shall the amount allowed for expenses exceed live cents per mile by the 
nearest traveled route necessarily traveled in such business." 
Chapter 77 of the laws of the Twenty-second General Assembly, with 
some changes, was embodied in the code as section 2617 thereof. 
The Sixteenth General Assembly repealed the act of the Thirteenth Gen-
eral Assembly whereby the governor and superintendent of public instruction 
were made members of the board of regents of the state university, and 
enacted chapter 147 of the laws of the Sixteenth General Assembly in lieu 
thereof. This chapter, with some slight changes, was embodied in the code 
as section 2635, which is the present law in relation thereto. 
9 
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From this outline of the history of this legislation, it will be seen that the 
provisions of the legislature increasing the compensation of the members of 
the board of regents of the Iowa State University were made long after the 
governor's salary was increased to three thousand dollars ($3, 000. 00) a year. 
The governor and superintendent of pubJh.: instruction are both by law 
made members of the board, and all provisions of the statute, including 
that by which the compensation of the members of the board of regents is 
fixed, applies to them, as it does to every other member of such board. 
The duties of the two offices held tythem are separate and distinct, and dif-
ferent and distinct duties are required in each. It is a rule of law that is 
well settled that the statutory recognition, whether direct or indirect, of the 
right to hold separate offices, implies that the officer may have the salary or 
compensation attached to each. 
Collins v . United States, 15 Court of Claims, 22. 
United States v . Satmders, !20 U. S. 126 . 
In re Conrad, 15 Fed. Rep., 641. 
La11dram v. United States, 16 Court of Claims, 74. 
Hartson v . U11ited States, 21 Court of Claims, 451. 
State v . Harrison, 116 Ind., 300. 
State v. Walker, 97 Missouri, 162. 
Philadelphia v. 11'/artin, 125 Penn. State, 583. 
Cromean v. Nightingilt, 1 Nevada, 323. 
Preston v. U11ited States, 37 Fed. Rep., 417. 
Irwi11 v. United States, 37 Fed. Rep. , 4 70. 
The legislature of our state, having provided that the governor and 
superintendent of public instruction shall be ex officio members of the board 
of regents of the state university, and perform the duties of such office, and 
having provided that all of the members of such board shall receive as com-
pensation for their services four dollars (.$4.00) per day and expenses, such 
provision gives them the right tb have paid to them the same compensation 
as is paid to the other members of such board, and under the rule of law 
above cited, they are entitled to take and receive the compensation paid. 
The auditor of state is, therefore, in my opinion, authorized and 
empowered to draw warrants for their per diem and mileage, the same as for 
other regents of the university not drawing salaries from the state for the 
performance of the duties of another office. 
January 15, 1901. 
Ron. Fr-ank F. Merriam, Auditor of"State. 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
Attorney- General. 
TRUSTEES OF IowA AGRICULTURAL CoLLEGE-Endowment fund-
Loans made on account of-Loans may be made by the board 
of trustees, under seotion 2667, without being submitted to and 
approved by the executive council before being consummated .. 
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DEAR SIR-I am in receipt of your favor of the 15th inst., in which you 
say: 
''I am directed by the executive council of Iowa to request your 
opinion, in writing, as to whether loans made on account of the endow-
ment funds of the Iowa Agricultural College, under the provisions of 
code, section 2667, should be submitted to and approved by the 
executive council, as are investments made under section 2666." 
Sections 2665, 2666 and 2667 of the code all refer to the endowment fund 
of the State College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts and provide for the 
safe keeping and safe investment of such fund. 
Section 2665 provides that the principal of such endowment fund must be 
paid to , and held by the treasurer of state, except when it is drawn out by 
the board of trustees for investment. 
Section 2666 provides that the board of trustees shall manage and invest 
the endowment fund, which may be done in the bonds of the United States 
or this state, or in some other safe bonds yielding not less ·than five per cent 
interest on the par value thereof. Then follows the provision, ''But the 
proposed investment shall be submitted to, and approved by the executive 
council, before being consummated.'' 
This provision was clearly intended by the legislature to apply to the 
investment of the endowment fUiads in bonds of the United States or of this 
state, or in some other safe b onds yielding not Jess than five per cent inter-
est. That is to say, under the provisions of section 2666, the trustees are not 
allowed to invest the funds in the bonds named therein, without such pro-
posed investment being first submitted to, and approved by the executive 
council. 
Section 2667 provides that it (the board of trustees of the State College of 
Agriculture and Mechanic Arts) may Joan the state funds; that is, the endow-
ment fund of the college, upon approved real estate security, subject to the 
following regulations: Then follow the regulations adopted by the legisla-
ture for the control of the board of trustees in loaning such funds upon 
real estate security. Power is conferred by this section upon the board to 
loan the endowment fund of the college, updn the conditiuns, provisions and 
regulations expressed therein. 
As the legislature did not see fit to provide that the loan of such funds 
upon approved real estate security should be submitted to, and approved by 
the executive council before the loan was consummated, the provision con-
tained in section 2666, which was clearly intended by the legislature to relate 
to the investment in bonds only, cannot be extended to loans made upon real 
estate security, under the power conferred by section 2667. 
Under this construction of the statute, I am clearly of the opinion that 
loans made by the board of trustees, .under section 2667, do not have to be 
submitted to, and approved by the executive council before being consum-
mated , as do loans made under the provisions of section 2666. 
Respectfully submitted, 
January 16,, 1901. 
CHAS. M. MULLAN, 
Attorney-Ge11eral. 
7 o A. H. Davidson, Secretary Executive Council. 
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ScHOOL TowNSHlPS-Independent districts-Consolidation of-
Under such consolidation the township or district whose 
boundaries are so extended becomes by operation of law the 
school township or district, having entire control for school 
purposes_over the territory with in the boundaries as extended. 
DEAR SIR-I am in receipt of your favor of the the 14th inst. , in which 
you say: . . 
• 'Your official opinion is requested on the followmg questton : 
. • • Chapter 89 of the acts of the Twenty-seventh General Assemb.ly 
provides that 'the boundaries of a school township or .independent ~~~· 
trict may in the same m anner be extended to the !me between CIVIl 
townships , even though by such change o:ae of the districts shall be 
included within and consolidated with the other as a s ingle district.' 
• 'By this provision, is authority given the board of directors of an 
independent district to abandon its school organizat ion by uniting its 
territory with that of the school township? If so, does the school 
town ship have the same authority?" 
The language of sect ion 1 of chapter 89 of the acts of the Twenty· seventh 
General Asssembly does not very clearly express the meaning and intent of 
the leg islature , but the construction which must be put upon this language 
is, that a school township or an independent district may, by the concurrence 
of the boards of directors of each, extend the boundaries of either so as to 
embrace and include the school township or independ,mt district whose 
boundaries are not extended. That is to say, an independent district located 
in a school township may, by the concurrence of the board of the independ-
ent district and the b oard of the school township, so extend the boundaries 
of the independent distri.::t that it will take in and include the school town-
ship; or the school township may, in like ';Da nner, with th~ concurren~e of 
the two boards, extend its boundaries so as to take in and include the mde-
pendent district. . 
Whenever the boundaries of either the school township or independent 
district are thus extended, the district whose boundaries are not extended is 
by operation of law consolidated with the district whose boundar~es are 
extended, and ceases to exist as a school district or a school township , and 
the township or district whose boundaries are so extended becomes by opera-
l ion of law the school township or district having entire control for school 
purposes over the territory within the boundaries as extended. 
The object of the legislature in enacting chapter 89 of the laws of the 
Twenty-seventh General Assembly, wai:j. to permit the consolidation of school 
townships and independent districts for the p urpose of enlarging the same, 
and to enable them to carry out the plan of central schoolhouses , to which 
the pupils are brought and returned home at the expense of the district. And 
such construction should, in my opinion, be given to the language of that 
chapter as will enable s uch plan to be put in successful operation. 
CHAS. W . MULLAN, 
A ttontey-Genera!. 
January17,1901. 
To Hon. R. C. Barrett, Sztperintendent Public Instruction. 
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R uRAL INDEPENDENT DISTRICT-How formed-The phrase "inde-
pendent districts, " as used in section 2799, is a ge neric term, 
and includes and is applicable to all independent school dis-
tricts in the state, whether known as independent districts or 
rural indep endent districts. Rural independent di stricts may 
unite, consolidate , and form a single rural independent district 
under the pro vis ions in the above section. 
DEAR SIR-I am in r.eceipt of your favor of the 14th inst., in which you 
say: 
''Your official opinion is requested on the following question : 
''Section 2799 provides that independent districts located contigu· 
ous to each other may unite and form one and a single independent 
district. May rural districts located in the same manner unite and 
form a single rural independent district?" 
The meaning of ! ection 2799 is not very clear, and a short statement as to 
the history of its adoption by th\l legislature will m a terially aid in ascertain-
ing its true meaning and intent. 
Section 1716 of the code "of 1873, which was compiled from chapter 172 of 
the laws of the Ninth General Assembly, and chapter 33 of the laws of the 
Eleventh General Assembly, made two classes of school corporations-the 
' 'district township'' and the ' 'independent district . '' 
These continued to be the only class of school corporations until section 
2744 of the code was enacted. 
Chapter 9 of title XII of the code of 1873 a uthorized the erection and crea-
tion of independent districts in cities and towns and contiguous territory, of 
school townships, a od of subdistricts in district townships. All were gov-
erned by the law applicable to independent distr icts , and practically stood 
upon the same footing. 
Sections 1800, 1814, 181 5 and 1819 , code of 1873, section 1819 being as 
' follows : 
''Districts organized under the provisions of the preceding four sections 
shall be governed and treated in every respect as provided by the law 
creating independent districts." 
Section 1811 of the code of 1873 provides , ' 'independent districts located 
contiguous to each other may unite and form one and the same independent 
district, in the sam e manner,'' etc. 
Then follow the provisions as to the mode of uniting independent districts. 
This law clearly applied to all independent districts, whether cities, towns, 
townships or su bdistricts , which ha d been erected into independent districts 
un der the provision of law. 
Under the provisions of chapter 9, independent districts, whether incllld-
ing cities , towns, or rural territory , could consolidate and form one inde-
pendent district. 
Section 1811 of the code of 1873 was re- enacted as section 2799 of the 
present code, with but slight changes in its language . The words' ' or if 
there be not ten, then a m ajor ity of such voters" was interpola ted in the 
fourth a nd fifth lines of the section , as re·enacted ; and the words "including 
cities and town&" was added to the sectiofi . 
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These additions to section 1811 indicate that it was the intention of the 
legislature to make section 2799 apply to all independent school districts. 
Any independent district which comprised a city or town which had more 
than ten legal voters residing within its territory, and if section 2799 had 
been by the legislature intended to apply only to urban independent distric ts , 
then the words which were interpolated in the section, viz: ''or if there be 
not ten,, then a majority of such voters," would be without force; and the 
words ''including cities and towns," which were added to section 1811, 
clearly indicate that the provisions of section 2799 were intended to apply to 
rural districts, as well as to independent districts in cities and towns. 
In my opi nion the phrase ''independent districts," as used in section 
2799, is a generic term, and includes and is applicable to all independent 
school districts in the state, whether known as independent districts or rural 
independent districts. 
This being true, rural independent districts may uni te, consolidate and 
form a single rural independent district, by the method provided in section 
2799 of the code. Respectfully submitted, 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
A ttor1uy-General. 
January 19, 1901. 
To the Hon. R . C. Barrett, Superintendent Pttblic Instruction. 
MULCT SALOONs-Statement of general consent for-Witness to 
signature-( 1) Signatures to the petition, which are not wit-
nessed by some one other than the signer thereof, should not 
be counted. (2) Withdrawal of signature-When names have 
been withdrawn from the petition by a wrirten statement filed 
with the county auditor, such names cannot afterwards be 
restored to said petition by a subsequent written statement of 
such persons. 
DEAR SIR-Your favor of the 18th inst., asking my opinion, 
First.-' ' Can a person who signs a statement of general consent for 
mulct saloons, un der chapter 6, title 12 of the c6de, witness the sign-
ing of his own name thereto?" 
Seco1ld.-' 'Where signers to a petition of consent have withdrawn 
their names therefrom by a wdhen statement filed with the board of 
supervisors, can they afterwards withdraw such written statement and 
have their names counted upon the petition?'' 
I am very clear upon the first proposition, that a person signing a petition 
of general consent for mulct saloons , under chapter 6, title 12 of the code, 
cannot sign his own name as a witness to his signature. 
The purpose and object of section 2452 of the code was to p revent the 
forgery of names upon petitions of consent, or names being attached thereto 
by fraud, and absolutely require that every signature upon such peti tion 
should be personally witnessed by some reputable person who was present at 
the time of, and saw the name signed to the petition. 
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It would certainly be contrary to all rules of law relating to the witness-
ing ?f signatures to written instruments, to say that anyone signing a writ-
ten mstrument might be a witness to his own signature, where such a wit-
ness is required by law. 
:Under this view of the law of the case, the signatures to the petition, 
wh1ch are not witnessed by soma other than the signer thereof, should not be 
cpunted, under the provisions of section 2452. 
The second question is not so easy of solution . So far as I know there 
has been no adjudication of the question, and the true interpretation of the 
statute can only be arrived at upon the general principles governing statu-
tory construction, 
lt is of course true, that anyone signing a petition of consent for mulct 
sal?ons bas the absolute right to withdraw his name from such petition: by a 
wn_tten_ statement of consent filed with the auditor of the county, before 
actiOn IS taken upon such petition . 
When such a statement is filed, the petition, and every subsequent action 
thereon by the board, is as thou~?h the name of the person who bas with-
drawn his consent by such statement, was never signed to the petition. By 
such statement his name is, in effect, expunged and stricken from the 
petition . 
While it is true, as is said in Green v. Smith, 82 N. W. Rep., 448, that 
the board has only to deal with the petition as it comes to it, and that any 
person that has signed such p etition can withdraw his name therefrom before 
action by the board, I am of the opinion that under section 2452 which pro-
vi~es that "no ?arne shall be counted that was not signed wit hi~ thirty days 
pnor to the filing of said statement of consent" limits the time in which 
names can be signed to a statement of general cons.ent between the time of 
the filing thereof with the auditor and thirty days prior thereto; that is, that 
no name can be counted upon such statement of general consent which was 
not signed thereto within thirty days prior to the time such statement was 
filed with the auditor. 
If a statement filed with the auditor withdrawing names from a oetition 
of consent has the effect of striking such na~es from the petition,· then a 
subsequ~~t statement by which such names were sought to be replaced upon 
such petition, and the consent of the persons signing such subsequent state-
ment thereby given for the sale of intoxicating liquors, under the provisions 
of wh~t is known as the mulct law, such action would be, in effect, the 
attachmg of new names to the petition of consent after it had been filed with 
the auditor . 
Th~ provision of section 2452 above quoted, in my opinion, prohibits the 
attachmg of any na mes to a petitio n of consent after the same is fi led with 
the auditor . 
. Every signature attached to the statement of consent is required to be 
Witnessed by some repu table person, and this provision of law would not be 
complied with by the attaching or reattaching of names to such statement of 
~onsent by a subsequent written statement filed with the county auditor ask 
1ng that the names of the signers thereof be coun ted upon such petition of 
consent, after they had been previo usly withdrawn therefrom. Such action 
would, in effect, be the attaching of signatures to the statement of consent 
1n another and different manner than that provided by law. 
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In view of these facts, my conclusion is, that when names h ave been 
withdrawn from a petition of consent by a written statement filed with the 
county auditor before action by the board of supervisors, that such' names 
cannot be af1erwards restored to the petition and counted by the board 
under any subsequent written statement of the p ersons whose names have 
been withdrawn; and that the petition must go to the board of supervisors, 
and they must act thereon as though such names had never been attached 
to the petition of consent. Respectfully submitted, 
January21, 1901. 
CHAS. W. MULLAN , 
Attorney- General. 
To the Hmt. N.J. Lee, County Attonuy, Estherville, Iowa. 
CITIES AN D TowNs-Election of officers thereof-Plan of change 
to be pursued by towns changing from such to cities of the 
second class. 
DEAR SIR -I beg to a cknowledge the receipt of your favor of the 21st 
inst., asking my opinion in regard to the course to be ptlrsued by towns, 
which under the census of 1900 are eligible to become cities of the second 
class, in organizing into cities and E:'lecting the officers thereof. 
I desire to preface my opinion hereafter given you with this sta tement: 
The attorney-general is not by law made the lega l adviser of the mayor and 
officers of cities and towns ; neither is the executive council of the state of 
Iowa. The mayor and officers of a town eligible to become a city of the 
second class should submit these questions to its solicitor instead of to the 
attorney general, through your office. Inasmuch, however, as you have 
requested my opinion, it is respectfully submitted. 
The notice given by the executive council to such towns as are, by the 
census of 1900 eligible to become cities of the second class, having been 
given in accordance with the provisions of section 639 of the code, the town 
council, upon receipt thereof, should meet and enact an ordinance whereby 
the town is declared a city of the second class, and providing the frame-
work of its government. 
This ordi1:1,ance should provide for t he election of the officers of the ci ty, 
their duties, compensation, and provide for the perfecting of the organiza-
tion of the town into a city of the ~cond clas>. All of the assets of the 
town and property belonging to it, by operation of law then becomes the 
property of the city. Wards should be created a nd their boundaries defined. 
Notice should then be given by the mayor and recorder, that at the regu-
lar municipal election to be held on the last Monday in March the officers of 
the city will be elected, and such notice should state where the polling places 
of such election will be located. 
The election should be conducted in the manner provided by law for 
genera l elect ions, and every qualified elector who is a resident of the city or 
town at the time of the election and has been a resident of the precinct ten 
days prior thereto, is entitled to vote at such election. 
-
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There should be elected at such elee tion, and biennially thereafter, a 
mayor, solicitor, treasurer, and assessor, who will hold their respective 
offices for the term of two years, and until their successors a re elected and 
qualified. Two councilmen should a lso be elected from each ward , who 
shall determine by lot the length of their respective terms of office, and one 
shall hold office for one year and the other for two years after such elect ion. 
Thereafter, one councilman shall be elected from each ward, who shall serve 
two years. 
All of the old officers of the town go out of office upon the new organiza-
tion being perfected, and the new officers take their places and the control 
of the government of the city under the new organization . 
Sections 639 to 648 point out specifically the method to be followed in 
making the change from a town to a city of the second class , and if careful 
attention is given to the provisions of these sections, no mistake will be 
made . Respectfully submitted, 
January 23, 1901. 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
Attorney-General . 
To Hon . A. H. Davidsm:, Secretary Executive Council. 
ScHOOL DIRECTORs-Discretion of-It IS a well settled rule of 
l=iw that where a discretion is vested in a board or person, there 
is no power to compel the exercise of such discretion. If the 
board refuses to make an order for the withholding of money 
by the treasurer for the purchase of books for library purposes, 
it is doubtful whether there is any authority to compel the 
board to act in the premises. 
DEAR SIR-In my letter to Anna White, your county superintendent, I 
think I said to her that if a reques.t came to me through you, as county attor-
ney , the law req ui red me to g ive an opinion. 
Such statement in my letter, however, was through inadvertence, as the 
law does not make it my duty to render opinion s upon questions r eferred to 
me by county attorneys, and it is a rule of this office that the attorney-gen-
eral will not give an opinion where he is not required by law to do so. 
However, as I wrote your county supe rintendent that I would give an opinion 
if the request came through you, as county attorney, I will, in this instance, 
waive the rule and answer the questions asked by you in your let te r . 
Section 1 of chapter 110 of the acts of the Twenty-eighth General Assem-
bly is not very clear or concise in its language. 
It provides that the treasurer of each ~chool township, and each rural 
independent district in the state , shall withhold a nnually from the money 
received from the appo in tment of the several school districts , not less than 
five, nor more than fifteen cents, as may be ordered by tlze board, for each 
person of school age residing in each school corporation , etc. , etc . , for the 
purchase of books, as provided therein. And when ordered by the board of 
directors, the provisions of section 1 shal.) apply to any independent district. 
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This section, by its provisions, vests in the board of directors of the school 
township or school district, the r ight, in its discretion, to fix the amount of 
money which shall be withheld annually by the treasurer , for library pur· 
poses, within the limit named in the section. 
The money in the hands of the treasu rer of the school townshi]J or school 
distr ict, can only be paid ou t upon the order of the b oard of directors, and 
he has no authority to withhold any part of the money in his hands, or to 
pay it out for any purpose whatever, except on the order of the board. 
If the board refuses to make the order upon the treasurer to w ithhold 
money, and the president and secretary refuses to s ign an order for its pay-
ment for library purposes, I doubt if there is any power to compel it to do 
so, as it appears by the language of the act, tha t it was the intention of the 
legislature to vest in the board the discretion to have the money withheld and 
used for library purposes as in its jurlgment is deemed advisable. 
That is, the board, in its discretion, may order not less than five or more 
than fifteen cents for each person residing in the school district or school 
township, to be withheld by the treasurer from the money received from the 
apportionment, for library purposes, and paid out for that purpose on its 
order . 
It is a well settled rule of law, that where a d iscretion is vested in any 
board or person, there is no power to compel the exercise of such discretion. 
This being true, if the board refuses to make the order for the withholding 
of the money by the treasurer, or its payment by the treasurer for the pur-
chase of books for library purposes, I doubt if there is any authority which 
can compel the board to act in the premises . 
Respectfully submitted, 
January 23, 1901. 
CHA.S. W. MULLAN, 
Attorm:y·General. 
To Hon . Arthur G . Jordan, County Attorney, Fairfield, Iowa . 
BANKs-Savings-Articles of incorporation-Th e articles of a 
certain bank having been submitted for approval, are exam-
ined and ~pproved. 
DEAR SIR-I have examined the articles of incorporation of the Citizen's 
Savings Bank of L ester, I owa, a nd have given particular a ttention to the 
prov isions of article 3 thereof . 
It is a general rule in the organization of corporations for pecuniary profit, 
that its charter or articles of incorp~ration may provide that it can com-
mence the transaction of its b usiness when a portio n of its authorized capital 
stock has been subscribed and paid in . 
The sta tute of Iowa providing fo r the organization of savings banks does 
not make any change in this general rule a s to the organization of corpora -
tions for pecuniary profit. 
Section 1842 provides that the articles must name the amount of the 
capital. 
Section 1843 provides that the paid up capital of any savings bank shall 
not be less than ten thousand dollars ($10 ,000) in c it ies , towns or villages 
having a population of ten thousand or less . 
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Section 1853 provides ' 'the capital stock of savings banks shall be divided 
into shares of one hundred dollars ($100) each, issued or acquired only upon 
full pay ment of the sums represented b y them .'' 
Section 1856 provides that the capital stock of savings banks may be 
increased by an affi rma tive vote of two-thirds of the shares thereof at the 
stockholders' meeti ng, called as provided in the section. 
Under these provisions of the statute relating to the organiz~tion an~ 
conduct of savin gs banks, I see no objection to making the authonzed capt· 
tal stock of the savings bank twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), and 
permitting it to commence to transact business when twelve thousand dollars 
($12,000) of that stock has been subscribed and fully paid. . 
I think such a p rovision is in h armony with the s tatute , and that a rticle 3 
of the a rticles of incorporation submitted, is not objectionable upon that 
ground. Respectfully submitted, 
CHAS. W. MULL AN, 
A Uorney- General. 
January 26, 1901. 
To Hon. Frank F. Merriam, Auditor of State. 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE-Use of funds-Its board has no 
power or authority in law to expend any part of its fund for 
the purpose of maintaining an exhibit of Iowa products at the 
Pan-American Exposition, to be held at Buffalo, N.Y. 
DEAR SIR-Upon a careful examination of chapter 58 of the laws of the 
Twenty-eighth General Assembly, by which the department of agr iculture 
was organized, and which confers the powers a nd prescribed the duties of 
its officers , I find no authority for the board to u se any Pl!-rt of the funds in 
its treasury for the p urpose of making an exhi~ition of agricultura l products 
of the state at the Pan-American Exposition to be held at Buffalo, N.Y. 
Section 6 of the act confers upon the board the general supervision of the 
several branches, bureaus and officers embraced in the department of agri-
culture, and imposes upon the board the duty of looking after and pron:-oting 
the interest of agriculture, agricultural education, animal a nd other mdus-
tries throughout tb.e state; of investigating all subjects relating to improved 
methods, appliances, machinery , and the diversification of crops and 
products, also the investigation of the prevalence of c?~tagio~s diseases 
among domestic animals , of destructive insects and fun gt m gram, ~rasses 
a nd other plants; of the adulteration of foods , e tc . , and of reportmg the 
results of such investiga tions wi th recommendations a s to remedial measures 
for the prevention of damage resulting therefrom : 
These powers and d uties are broad and general in their nature, and should 
be liberally eons trued. It cannot, however, be said that an exhibition of 
agricultural products of the s tate a t the Pan-American Exposition falls wit~in 
a ny of the powers conferred upon the board, giving the statute the mostltb· 
eral construction of which its language is susceptible. 
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The use of the funds of the agricultural department for the pu rpose sug-
gested, would open the door for their use for many purposes not named in 
the statute. 
It might be thought advisable for the board to appoint a commission to 
visit Europe or South America , for the purpose of investigating !he latest 
approved agricultural methods in either of those countries, or to make an 
exhibition of agricultural products in a foreign country, and to appropriate 
the money of the department for the payment of the expenses connected with 
such investigation or exhibit. 
And it could be claimed with equal reason that such commission or exhi-
bition in a foreign country, would be in the interest of Iowa agriculture. 
I am clear that the powers of the board to expend the funds of the depart-
ment do not permit the expenditure fo·r either of the purposes named , as 
uch expenditure would be wholly outside of, and beyond those contemplated 
by the legislature when the department was created, and the powers of the 
board defined. 
I am therefore of the opinion that the board of the department of ag ri-
culture, however much it might be desirable, has no power ur authority in 
law for the expenditure of any part of its funds for the purpose of maintain-
ing an exhibit of Iowa products at the Pan-American Exposition to be held 
at Buffalo, N. Y. Respectfully submitted, 
January 29, HOI. 
To Hon. S. B . Packard, Marsltalltown, Iowa. 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
Attorney-Ge11eral. 
BoARD OF ScHOOL DIRECTORS-( 1.) Under section 2801 of the 
code, the school board of a township is authorized to reduce 
the number of school districts within the township. (2) It 
may provide that there shall be no subdistricts, and that the 
school s of the corporation shall be governed by a board of 
three directors chosen from the township at large. 
DEAR SrR-Your favor of January 14th is received, in which you request 
my opinion upori the following questions, viz: 
''Does the board have authority to reduce the number of subd is-
tricts?" 
• 
''May it provide that there shall be no subdistricts, and that the 
schools of the corporation shall be governed by a board of three 
directors chosen froln: the township at large? " 
Section 2801 of the code provides: 
"The board of any school township may, by a vote of a maj ority of all 
the members thereof, at the regular meeting in September, or at any special 
meeting called th ~ reafter for that purpose, divide the school township in to 
sub-districts, such as justice, equity and the interests of the people require, 
and may make such alterations of the b oundaries of sub-districts heretofore 
formed as may be deemed necessary." 
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Then fo llow provisions in relation to the boundaries of such districts and 
of subsequent a lterations thereof being leg bly and distinctly designated 
upon the plat, etc. 
This section gives to the board full power to establish sub-districts within 
the township, to alter or change their boundaries, as shall be deemed to the 
best interest of the people, and to discontinue any dist rict or districts within 
the township, in the discreti<>n of the board. 
The section is a re-enactment, in all of its material parts, of section 1796 
of the code of 1873, which was construed by the supreme court in Morgan 
v. Wilfley eta!., 70 Iowa, 338. 
Judge Beck, in delivering the opinion in that case, said: 
' 'While the redistricting and the organization of a new district are to be 
regarded as valid, having been approved by the county superintendent, it 
cannot be held that the district board may not, in the exercise of its discre-
tion, change the sub-districts and dispense with the new sub-districts in a 
lawful manner, if in the exercise of its lawful discretion the board finds it to 
the best interest of all the parts of the district. The new district is not to be 
regarded as a permanent thing, which the board, or any subsequent board 
cannot change, for sufficient ca use. 'rhe power to redistrict and change sub-
districts, as conferred upon the board by t he statute, and a ction in that 
direction, if sufficient cause, cannot be regaded as unauthorized ." 
It follows as a logical seq uence , that if authority is given the board of 
directors by section 2801 to discontinue any sub-district within the school 
township, it may, if the best interest of the people demand such action, dis-
continue all , and restore the territory to a school township. 
If this is done by the board, then the provisions of the statute for the 
government of school townships will at once become applicable to the 
changed conditions, and the territory within its boundaries will be governed 
by the provisions of statute relating to the government of school townships, 
as though the same had not been previously sub-divided. 
Section 2752 of the cqde provides: 
"When a school township is not divided ipto sub-districts, a board of 
three directors shall be elected a t large, on the second Monday in March, by 
all the voters of the school township.'' 
After the sub-districts have been discontinued, the township is , of course, 
no longer d ivided into sub-districts, and necessarily falls within the provis-
ions of section 2752, and its affairs should be controlled by a b oard of three 
directors , as therein provided. 
Under this construction of section 2801, I am of the opinion that the school 
board of a school township has the authority to reduce the number of school 
districts within the township. 
Second.-That it may provide that there shall be no sub-districts, and 
that the schools of the corporation shall be governed by a board of three 
directors, chosen from the township at large . 
Respectfully submitted, 
January 31, 1901. 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
Attorney-General. 
To Hon. R. C. Barrett, Superintendent Pttblic Imtmction. 
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BoARD OF SuPERVISORs-Power of to contract with private hos-
pital for the care of in sane-A contract by said board with a 
private hospital for the care of the insane who are county 
charges, for a period of ten years, is against public policy and 
absolutely void . 
DEAR. SIR-I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of the 26th 
inst. , in which you ask an opinion as to the right of a board of supervisors 
to make a contract with a private hospital for the care of the insane which 
are a county charge, for a term of ten years. 
Upon this question I submit the following opinion: 
The question is one of some difficulty, and perhaps its true solution can 
only be reached by determini ng the principles upon which the power of 
boards of supervisors of counties are based. 
A county organization is created almost exclusively with a view of the 
policy of the state at large, for purposes of political organization and civil 
administration, in matters of finance, education, of provision for the power 
of military organiza tion, of the means of travel and transport, and especially 
for the general administration of justice . 
With scarcely an exception, all the powers and functions of a county organ-
ization a re for the direct and exclusive reference to the general policy of the 
state, and are in fac t but a branch of the general administration of that 
policy. 
They possess such powers as have been conferred by the constitution and 
legislative department of the state. Such powers are of a public nature, and 
should be exercised in such manner as will best promote the interest and 
advance the welfare of the people. 
The right to exercise the power so conferred by the state is lodged a lmost 
wholly in the board of supervisors, and under the statute, the duty is 
imposed upon them to make proper provision for the care, custody and sup-
port of the poor and insane of the county, who are public charges. 
In making such provision, however, they must act within the scope of 
the authority conferred by the state, and if they attempt to go beyond that 
and enter into any contract which is contrary to public policy, such contract 
is invalid, and cannot be enforced. 
Section 410 of the code provides for the election of the members of the 
board of supervisors, and that their term of office shall be three years . 
Section 415 of the code provides: 
''The board of supervisors at its first meeting in each year, shall organize, 
by choosing one of its members as chairman, who shall preside at all its 
meetings during the year.'' ., 
The membership of the board, and its organization, would therefore be 
changed many times during the existence of such a contract, and the ques-
tion presented is: Can a board of supervisors make a contract which shall 
take away from the newly elected members, and the board as annually organ-
ized, the control over affairs which has been vested in it by the state as 
part of the governmental p owers . 
In Milliken v. County of Edgar, 142 Ill . , 528, it is said: 
''At the t ime the contract was attempted to be made, the members of 
the board of supervisors were elected annually. Each member held his 
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office for the term of year and no longer. The board was clothed with 
authority to levy taxes to r aise funds to support paupers, or this power 
was acquired to be exercised annually. In view of these provisions of the 
statute, it would be unreasonable construction of the statute relied upon to 
hold that the legislature intended to clothe the board with authority to enter 
into a contract with the keeper of the poorhouse to run for the term of three 
years.'' 
In Board of Commissioners v. Taylor , 123 Ind. , 148, it is said : 
''We note, as a matter of law, * * * that the membership of the 
board will be changed as many &.s three times from the date of the employ-
ment to the expiration of the term of service , unless some of its members are 
re-elected, and in that case the term of office will be different. 
''Unless some of the members are re-elected there must be an entire change 
in the membership of the board between the date of the employment and the 
expiration of the time covered by the contract. 
' 'This contract deprives the board, as re-organized from year to year, of 
the right to employ its attorneys for the next following year." 
In Sheldon v. Board of Commissioners, 48 Kan., 356, it is said: 
''If the board of county commissi6ners of a county could tie the bands of 
a subsequent board in designating the official newspaper, and in contracting 
for county printing, it might tie the hands of subsequent boards for several 
years. At least for what would be a reasonable time; and it would be diffi-
cplt to determine what, under all of the circumstances of the case, would be 
a reasonable time . It follows logically that a board of commissioners of a 
county must be limited to one year, or until the body if dissolved, or else its 
power is unlimited in this respect. " 
The opinion announced in Sheldon v. Commissioners, was reaffirmed in 
Commissioners v . Smith, 50 Kan., 350. The same principle of law is 
laid down in State v. Layton, 28 New Jersey Law, 244. 
The same principle is recognized in State v . Planter, 43 Iowa, 140, and 
Adams, justice, in delivering the opinion in that case, <>aid: 
' 'A,s the statute provides that the steward may be removed at the pleasure 
of the board, the defendant was of course reU:ovable, unless the board had 
deprived themselves of that power by the said contract which they had made 
with him; but we are of the opinion that a board of supervisors cannot c~n­
tract with a favorite appointee for such a time and salary as they may see 
fit, so as to deprive subsequent boards, or e en themselves, of all control 
over the matter." 
The taxes necessary to be levied in a county for the support of the poor 
and insane, are required by statute to be levied annually, and the board of 
supervisors must make such levy upon the estimated cost of the care of the 
poor and insane for the ensuing year, and it certainly would be against pub-
lic policy to permit a board of supervisors to make a contract for the support 
of its insane and poor which would leave nothing to its successors except the 
levy of the tax to raise the money necessary to carry out such contract. 
The board of supervisors as it is annually organized, must, in my 
opinion, be absolutely free to exercise the governmental powers which 
have been conferred upon it by the state; and such freedom cannot be 
abridged by any contract, the effect of which is to take from the newly-
elected and newly-organized board the right to exercise such powers. 
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In Burkhead v. Independent District of Independence, 107 Iowa, 29, it 
was held tha t the board of directors of an independent school district did not 
have the power to enter into a contract for the employment of a superintend-
ent of schools for a term of five years, although such contract is not 
expre~sly limited by statute. This decision is in harmony with those of 
Illinois, In:liana and Ohio, and is founded upon reason a nd sound princi-
ples of law. 
Under the principles of law enunciated in the cases referred to, I am 
clearly of the opinion that a contract by a board of supervisors with a private 
hospital for the care of the insane who are county charges for a period of 
ten years, is, for the reasons stated, against public policy, and absolutely 
void. Respectfully submitted, 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
A ttonzey -Gene1'al. 
February 1, 1901. 
To Hon. W. H . Killpack, Council Bltdfs, Iowa. 
refund rart of fe e charged 
incorporation-Under the 
state cannot refund a part 
SECRETARY OF STATE-Power of to 
for filing amended articles of 
facts herein s tated the secretary of 
o f such filing fee already paid. 
DEAR SIR-I beg to acknowledge receipt of your favor of the 1st inst., 
asking my opinion as to whether you can refund to the Working Men's 
Building and Loan Association of Missouri Valley, Iowa, any part of the fee 
of $314 paid by it for the filing of its amended articles of incorporation, 
on the 24th day of Augu·st , 1900? 
Section 1891 of the code req uires building and loan associations to become 
incorporated under the general incorporation laws of the state. 
Section 1618 provides that such corporations may endure for a term not 
exceeding tw<!nty years, and the amendment thereto-chapter 56 of the laws 
of the Twenty·eighth General A~sembly-provides that upo n the renewal of 
such corporation, and the filing with the secretary of state of its articles of 
incorporation by which the renewal is made, it shall pay a fee of twenty-five 
dollars, and an additiona l fee of one dollar for all shares of stock in excess 
of ten thousand dollars, the entire fee in no event to exceed two thousand 
dollars. 
And upon the filing of its amended articles of incorporation, as provided 
therein, the secretary of state shall is.ue a proper certificate for the renewal 
of the corporation. 
The act of the Working Men's Building and Loan Association, in filing in 
the office of the secretary of state its articles of incorporation, which were 
approved by the executive council July 9, 1900, was in effect a renewal of the 
corporation, which extended the time of its existence twenty years from 
July 9 , 1900. 
By so doing it became liable to pay the fees required to be paid the sec-
r~tary of state, under chapter 56 of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General 
Assembly, and having complied with this requirement of law by the pay-
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ment of the fees provided for in said chapter, it is, in my opinion, not enti-
tled to have repaid to it any portion of such fee. 
From July 9, 1900, to the present time, it has been transacting its busi-
ness under its amended articles of incorporation, which renew the time of 
its existence, and it cannot now, in my judgment, by any amendment 
which it may make in reducing the time which such corporation shall 
endure under its articles of incorporation, alter or change its liability to pay 
the fees which were required when its articles were approved July 9, 1900. 
I am therefore of the opinion that no portion of the fee paid by the 
Working Men's Building and Loan Association of Missouri Valley, Iowa, 
can, under the circumstances, be repaid or refunded to it. 
Respectfully submitted, 
February 2, 1901. 
CHAS. W . MULLAN, 
Attorney-General. 
To Hon. W. B. Martin, Secretary of State. 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE-:Printing and binding of Iowa 
Year Book. 
The provision of section 2 of chapter 58 of the laws of 
the Twenty-eighth General Assembly is inoperative and such 
book mu5t be printed in the regular and usual way by the state 
and paid for out of the state's funds, the same as other reports 
and docume'nts required by law to be printed. 
DEAR SIR-I have given your request, that I make an examination of 
the statute, and determine how and where the year book of the agricul-
tural department shall be printed, and from what fund the cost of such 
printing shall be paid, careful consideration, an'd have arrived at the follow -
ing conclusion : 
Section 11 of chapter 58 of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General 
Assembly, by which the department of agriculture is created, provides: 
' ' The Iowa Year Book of Agriculture shall be printed and bound 
in cloth, in such number as the executive council may direct, to be 
distributed as follows: One copy to each state officer and member 
of the general assembly; ten copies to the state library; and ten 
copies to the libraries of the state university and state college of agri-
culture and mechanic arts ; one copy to each library in the state open 
to the general public ; one copy to the president and secretary of each 
county and district agricultural society ; ~one copy to the board of 
supervisors of each county in which there is no agricultural society, 
and the balance as may be directed by the board of agriculture." 
This provision of section 11 directs the printing and distribution of the 
agricultural year book, and if there is no particular or specific method pro-
vided by the statute as to the manner in which the same should be printed, 
or the fund from which the cost of such P.rinting should be paid, it would 
10 
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b~:: the duty of the state printer , under the provisions of chapter 5 of the 
code, to print such book as one of the reports of a state department, and he 
would be paid therefor at the same rate, and in the same manner as he is 
paid for other books of like character which he is required by law to print. 
Following the provision of section 11 above quoted, is this provision : 
1 1 The executive council shall receive competitive bids for the print-
ing and binding;of the year book, and let the contract to the lowest 
responsible bidder; such eidding, however, shall be confined to con-
cerns in Iowa, and to persons or corporations paying the union scale 
of wages." 
This provision is entirely separate from the first p art of the section 
quoted, and relates to the duty to be performed by the executive council in 
reference to the manner in which the year book shall be printed, and in no 
way modifies the provisions which require that the book shall be printed and 
distributed as p rovided in such section. 
Section 10 of the same chapter, in prescribing the duties of the secreta ry 
of the board provides : 
1 1 He shall compile and superintend the printing of the annual 
report of the state department of agriculture, which shall be entitled the 
Iowa Yea r Book of Agriculture, and shall include the annual report 
of the dairy commissioner, the state dairy association , and the Iowa 
ag ricultural experiment station, the annual report of the s tate veteri-
narian, the Iowa weather and crop service report, the Iowa improved 
stock breeders' association, or such part thereof as the executive 
committee may direct, and such other reports and statistics as the 
board may direct, which shall be published by the state.'' 
This provision in express terms provides what shall be included within 
the yea r book as compiled by the secr~tary, and that it shall be published 
by the ~ate. 
It is clearly, therefore, the duty of the secretary of the agricultural 
department to prepare a nd compile a year book, and of the department 
to have the same published by the state, as provided in section 10. 
By the provisions of section 11 above quoted, the legislature attempted 
to provide a method by which the contract for the printing and binding of 
the year book should be let to the lowest bidder, and if such provision has 
become effective, it undoubtedly takes the printing and binding of the book 
out of the hands of the state printer and binder , unless the contract should 
be awarded to them upon competitive bids. If, on the other hand, such 
provision is for any reason inopet'ative, then the book must be printed and 
bound by the state, the same as are the reports of other departments-that 
is, by the state printer and binder. 
Before the provision of section 11, for the letting of the contract to the 
lowest responsible bidder could become operative, it was necessary that the 
iegislature should provide, by appropriation or otherwise, a fund out of 
which the cost of the printing and binding under such contract could be 
paid . It would be idle to say that the executive council should receive com-
petitive bids for the printing and binding of a year book, open such bids 
and award the contract to the lowest responsible bidd~r, when no funds 
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==~~ %~~:i~~~re~~d:~~ legislature to carry out the contract, or pay for the 
It is therefore in my opin · b 1 
should provide the means b hl.onh a sho u tely necessary that the legislature 
Y w 1c sue contract can be carri d t b h execut~ve council before the provision of section 11 above quotede ou b y t e 
operative. can ecome 
No provision was made by the Twent ei h h G 
the cost of the . f d . . Y· g t eneral Assembly to pay 
pnn mg an bmdmg of the agricultural e b k 
fund was designated out of which the cost thereof could by ar .doo 'and no 
I am therefore of the opinion that the provision of ~ pa l · . . 
to receiving competitive bids for the printing and bin;.ect!O~ 1~, m relation ?Y the executive council is inoperative, and that such ~ngko t e year .book 
m the reg ular and usual way by the state and 'd foo must be pnnted 
funds the sa!lle as other reports and d ' pal 0~ out of the state 
printed. R ocuments required by law to>be 
espectfully submitted, 
February 4, 1901. 
. C H AS. W. MULLAN 
Attorney-Gene~al. 
To Hon. G. H. Van Houten, .Secretary D epartment of A g riculture. 
INSURANCE COMPANIES-LIFE-(!) Such companies desirin to take an~ carry ~asualty risks must first adopt amendments ~o their 
articles of Incorporation, unless their articles at the time ive 
them the power to accept and carry such risks. g 
(2) Such companies desiring to write such risks should . t . orgamze 
a s~para e casualty or accident department, and all of the 
business of s~ch department should be transacted direct] in 
accordance With chapter 4 title I X of th d y 
• , e co e. 
1st,D:n~~o~:~-: ~:~:u:~~:~:~e~!~ t~ees:~~ei~uof your f,avor of F~bruary 
position of the auditor's department upon l'f . dley & Coffin, askmg the 
a~d carrying casualty risks , under chapter 16~ ~~s~:=~~:~o:;pt~nieTs taking 
e1ghth General Assembly. e wenty-
The questions asked by Messrs Dudle & C ffi audit~r·~ department of the state rather ~an tooth: ~:~:ti~n:h:f ~~~cy of the 
It Is important that a correct polic of act' b . 
department which shall be adhered t: h f~on . e ado~ted by the auditor's 
questions that will arise in regard t l ' fere~ er m passing upon the various 
. o 1 e msurance comp · t k ' 
carrymg casualty risks; in view of this I will . . anJes a mg and 
appears to me to be the policy which' should ~Jve ~n a general way .what 
depa~tment and the attorney-general. e a opted by the auditor's 
. Ftrst .-All life insurance companies desirin to tak 
nsks, as specified in subdivision 5 of ·section 1~09 of t~ and ~arry casualty 
;=:~ ~m;:~:.e:~~e:~ :~::; a:~:~~~:s 0~~ ~~~~rfho:~tit~: pc~:t~~nt;' t:e~t :i~~ 
carry such risks. wer o accept ·and 
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Second.-Every life insurance company which sees fit to avail itself of 
he provisions of chapter 61 of the acts of the Twenty-eighth General 
Assembly, should organize a separate c~sualty or accident department, and 
all the business of such department should be transacted strictly in con-
tormity with chapter 4 of title IX of the code. 
This chapter provides that the articles of incorporation of all companies 
which seek to take and carry casualty and accident risks, must be submitted 
to the auditor and attorney·general for approval, before they are permitted 
to transact business within the state . . 
When any life insurance company desires to bring itself within the pro-
visions of chapter 61 of the acts of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly, 
and to clothe itself with the power of taking and carrying casualty and 
accident risks, it must submit to the auditor and the attorney-general its 
articles of incorporation for their approval, as such articles constitute the 
charter under which it is authorized to transact business of any character. 
It follows , therefore, that before it is authorized to transact the business of 
taking and carrying casualty risks its entire articles of incorporation, under 
which it is authorized to do business, must be submitted to and approved by 
the auditor and attorney-genera l. 
The provisions in regard to electing a first board of directors, and other 
provisions which apply to new companies organized for the purpose of tak-
ing and carrying casualty risks, would not apply to a life insurance company 
organized at the time chapter 61 of the acts of the Twenty-eighth General 
Assembly became a law, and therefore such provision would not have to be 
followed by a life insurance company availing itself of the provisions of such 
chapter. 
As before suggested, the casualty insurance should be strictly a separate 
department of a life insurance company, and the funds of such separate 
department should be handled and invested strictly in accordance with the 
provisions of chapter 4, and the provisions of chapters 6 and 8 of title IX of 
the code would not be a pplicable to the funds of such department. Its life 
funds would be invested in compliance with the provisions of chapter "' 
and 8. 
The provisions of chapter 4-that companies doing business thereunder 
shall charge as a liability a reserve equal to forty per cent. of the amount 
received as premiums or unexpired risks, which amount of reserve shall be 
considered unearned premiums-would be applicable to the casualty depart-
ment alone, and the provisions of chapter 6, which provides for a reserve 
upon life policies computed acco,ding to the American table of mortality, 
etc., would be applicable to the life department alone, and neither should be 
confused with the other. 
The provisions of chapter 4 would apply to the accident department 
alone, and the provisions of chapter 6 above referred to would apply to the 
life department alone. 
I think the provisions of chapter 4, which does not permit compani~s 
organized thereunder to incur any risk to an a mount in excess of ten per 
cent. of the paid up capital of the company unless such excess is reinsured, 
is applicable to the casualty department as organized under the provisions 
of chapter 61, and such percentage should be computed upon the paid up 
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chapitalf of the life insurance company seeking to avail itself of the provisions 
ereo . . 
~nder this view, a life insurance company seeking to transact accident busme~s, would be limited in taking casualty risks to ten per cent. of ·t ·d 
u_p ca?ttal, but this provision would in no way affect its right to t~~:~~e 
nsks m excess thereof, as now provided by law. 
h The fact. that a life insurance company avails itself of the provisions of 
~ apter 61 • In no way changes its obligation to deposit its securities as a life 
msur~nce compa_n?' with the auditor of state, but it will not be required to 
deposit ~he secunttes _ta~en by it_s accident department. That is, it will still 
~e required to depostt Its secunties with the auditor of state, so far as its 
life dep~rtment IS c_on~erned precisely as it is now requiied to do, and will 
be permitted to retam 1ts securities, so far as the accident department is con-
cherned, the same as other accident insurance companies organized under 
c apter 4. 
llT~e provisi~ns of chapter 4, in regard to forfeiture, suspension and can-
ce atwn of pohc~ for nonpayment of • premiums, and notice in writing to be 
served upon the msured by registered letter or otherwise and the customary 
short rates ~o c~ncel ~~licie~, etc. , cannot be held to appjy to the life depart-
ment, . a nd 1ts 1:£~ policies Will not be subject to such provisions. Its casualty 
or ~cctdent_ policies only will be _governed by these provisions of chapter 4. 
Thts, I believe, answer$ all the mquires made by Messrs. Dudley & c ffi 
a nd sta tes my_ vi~ws of the law, and the policy which 1 think shou~d ~~ 
adopted as to hfe msurance companies taking accident and casualty risks 
under chapter 61 of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly . ' 
Respectfully submitted, 
CaAs. W. MuLLAN, 
February 5, 1901. Attorney-General. 
To Holt. Fra1zk F. Merriam, Auditor of State. 
ST~TE LIBRARY-State Historical D epartment-Consolida-
tion of-( I) _The de bts contracted by the state historical 
department pn?r ~o Janua_ry I, Igoi, should be paid out of the 
annual 2ppropnatwn cred1ted to that department for the year 
· rgoo, except such as hereafter referred to. 
If, after paying such debts, any portion of such appropriation 
remains unexpended on January I, 1901, the auditor should 
charge the same off. 
(2) The appropriation of $4,000 made by the Twenty-eighth 
General Assembly, was not discontinued by the · · f h provisions o 
c apter I 14 thereof, or upon the consolidation of the two 
boards .. I~, therefore, remains as a separate and additional 
approp~Iatwn made to the historical department for its support 
and maintenance. 
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DEAR SIR-In reference to your inquiry as to the effect of the consolida-
tion of the state library and state historical department, under chapter 114 
of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly, upon the different 
appropriations made by the legislature for the support of these depart-
ments, I submit the following opinion: 
Section 1 of chapter 114 of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General Assem-
bly provides : 
• • That the board of trustees of the Iowa state library, and the 
board of trustees of the Iowa historical depa rtment, be, and the same 
are hereby empowered and directed to consolidate the miscellaneous 
portion of the Iowa state library (exclusive of the law section) or so 
much thereof as shall be regarded by said board as advisable, with 
the historical department; the aforesaid consolidation to take effect 
on the first day of January, 1901, or at any such la ter date as said 
trustees may direct; and that on and after January 1, l 901, the 
board of trustees of the Iowa state library and the board of trustees 
of the Iowa state historical department shall cease to exist as such and 
the aforesaid boards shall by this act become the boanl of trustees of the 
state library and historical department of Iowa, and the newly consti-
tuted board shall thereafter be charged with all the duties and respon-
sibilities imposed upon the boards aforementioned, and possess all the 
powers thereof. " 
This section provides for two distinct consolidations: 
First . -The consolidation of the miscellaneous portions of the Iowa 
state library, or 50 much thereof as may be regarded by the board as advis-
able, with the historical department. 
This is the consolidation of the material and tangible property of the 
library and historical department, and the board is authorized to make such 
consolidation on the first day of J anuar:y, 1901, or at such time thereafter as 
it may direct . 
Second.-Tbe consolidation of the board of trustees of the Iowa state 
library and the board of trustees of the Iowa state historical departm ent. 
On the 1st day of January, 1901, by operation of law, under the provi-
sions of section 1, of chapter 114, of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General 
Assembly, the board of trustees of the Iowa state library and the board of 
trustees of the state historical department were consolidated and ceased to 
exist as independent boards . 
The consolidated board is thereafter known as the board of trustees of the 
state library and historical department, and it at once became charged with 
the management and control of the .state library and historical department 
of Iowa, and was invested with all the powers theretofore exercised by the 
board of trustees of the Iowa state library and the board of trustees of the 
Iowa historical department. 
Upon such consolidation, the Iowa state historical department, as a sep-
arate and independent department, ceased to exist, and the control and 
management of its business and affairs was vested in the newly constituted 
board. 
Section 2879 of the codt;: provides for an annual appropriation for the 
support of the historical department of six thousand dollars. This section 
remained in force until the provisions of chapter 114, of the laws of the 
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Twenty-eighth General Assembly, became operative; and the appropriation · 
of six thousand dollars for the year 1900 for the support of the historical 
depa rtment is a fund out of which all of the expenses of that department 
should be paid until the boards of the two departments were consolidated 
under chapter 114 . 
That this was the intention of the legislature when chapter 114 was 
enacted, is made clear by the language of section 5 of that chapter, which 
provides: 
''There shall be annually appropriated from any money in the 
state treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of ten thousand 
dollars for the use of the state library and historical department and 
museum, and the sum of twenty-five hundred dollars for the separate 
use of the law department, the money to be expended under the 
direction of the board of trustees of the state library and historical 
department; and the existing appropriations of five thousand dollars 
for the state library and six thousand dollars for the historical depart-
ment shall be discontinued upon the consolidation aforesaid." 
That is, the appropriations made to the state library and to the historical 
department, under sections 2667 and 2897 of the code, were to continue and 
remain as the funds out of which the ~xpenses, and support of the two 
departments should be paid until the 1s t day of January, 1901, when the 
new appropriation made by section 5, of chapter 114, became available 
upon the consolidation of the two departments. 
Under this view of the law, I am clearly of the opinion that all of the 
debts contracted by the state historical department prior to January 1, 1901, 
should be paid out of the annual appropriation of six thousand dollars 
credited to that department for the year 1900, except such as should be 
~barged to the four thousand dollar appropriation hereafter referred to; and, 
tf after paying all of the debts incurred by that department before January 
1, 1901, any portion of the s ix thousand dollars so credited remains unex-
pended, such unexpended balance should be by the auditor recovered into 
the treasury of the state; and that all bills a11d indebtedness of either the 
Iowa state library or the historical department of Iowa, contracted after 
January 1, 1901, must be paid from the appropriations made by section 5, 
of chapter 114, of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly, except 
such as should be paid from the appropriation of four thousand dollars made 
by the Twenty-eighth General Assembly, wllich stands upon an entirely 
different footing than the annual appropriation made bv section 2879 of the 
00~. -
Chapter 114 was approved on the 12th day of March, 1900, and went into 
effect upon publication, on the 13th day of March of that year. 
Chapter 155 of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly provides 
for an appropriation of four thousanct dollars ''in addition to the sum now 
provi~ed. by law !~r t~e support of the historical department for the purpose 
of prmtlng and bmdmg, for the purchase of books and periodicals and for 
additional assistance and incidental expenses.'' This chapter became a 
law on the 4th day of July, 1900, after chapter 114 became operative as a 
law of the state. 
The appropriation carried by section 5 of chapter 114 was an appropria-
tion made by the Twenty-eighth General ssembly before chapter 155 went 
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into effect, and the appropriation carried by chapter 155 of the laws of the 
Twenty-eighth General Assembly was in addition to such former appropria-
tion. 
Section 5 of chapter 114 provides: 
• • And the existing appropriations of five thousand dollars for the 
state library and six thousand dollars for the historical department 
shall be discontinued upon consolidation thereof." 
No other appropriation to the state library or the historical department is 
referred to or discontinued by the provisions of chapter 114. 
It is therefore clear that the appropriation of four thousand dollars made 
by the Twenty-eighth General Assembly, and w hich became operative after 
chapter 114 became a law, was not discontinued by the provisions of chap-
ter 114, or upon the consolidation of the two boards. It therefore remains 
as a separate and additional appropriation made by the legislature of Iowa 
to the historical department for its support and maintenance, and should be 
credited to that department upon the books of the auditor, and paid out 
upon bills and vouchers properly approved and certified upon such fund. 
This I believe covers a ll of the questions referred to me by both the 
auditor and the board of trustees of the state library and historical depart-
ment of Iowa. Respectfully submitted, 
February 8, 1901. 
C HAS . W. MuLLAN, 
Attorney-General. 
To Hon. Frank F. Merriam, Attditor of State, atzd the Board of 
Trustees of the Iowa State Library and Historical Department. 
GAME LAw-Power of Game Warden Under-He has no power 
or authority to grant permiss ion to anyone to trap quail and 
prairie chicken for the purpose of propagc.tion. 
DEAR SrR-I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your esteemed favor of 
the 11th inst"., in which you ask my opinion as to whether it would be unlaw-
ful to trap quail and prairie chicken for the purpose of propagation or not. 
Section 2552 of the code is as broad as language can make it, and specifi-
cally provides: 
• 'No person shall at any time, or at any place within the state, 
trap, shoot or kill for traffic any pinnated grouse or prairie chicken, 
woodcock, quail, rough grouse •or pheasant, * * or catch or 
take, or attempt to catch or take with any trap, snare or net, any of 
the birds or animals named in the preceding section * * '' 
This provision clearly prohibits the trapping, catching or attempting to 
take or catch within any trap, snare or net, by any one or at any time or 
place, any pinnated grouse or quail. The prohibition is absolute, and 
applies to all purposes alike. 
Under this section it is unlawful to trap quail or prairie chicken for any 
purpose whatever, and I know of no authority vested in the fish and game 
warden of the state by which the provisions of the statutes can be sus-
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pended, and that which is made unlawful by law be permitted under any 
permi>sion given by the warden. 
I am therefore compelled to hold that it is unlawful for any one to trap or 
attempt to trap or catch · any quail or prairie chicken for the purposes of 
propagation. Such an exception might be a wise provision of the law, but 
the legislature has not made it, and I must construe the law as it exists upon 
the statute book. 
This being my view, I think you have no power or authority to grant 
permission to any one to trap either of the birds named · for propagating pur-
poses. Respectfully submitted, 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
A ltorney-General. 
February 12, 1901. 
To Hon. Geo. E . Delavan, Jiish and Game Warden, Estherville, I owa. 
OIL INSPECTOR-Duties of State Board of Health-Section 
2505 is mandatory and no deviation from its strict require-
ments can be permitted on the part of the inspector. 
Any illuminating oil inspected by him which fails to meet the 
test required by the statute must be branded by him "rejected 
for illuminating purposes ." 
Any attempt on the part of the state board of health to have such 
products branded differently than is required by the statute, 
is without force and must be disregarded by the state oil 
inspectors. 
DEAR SIR-I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of the 9th 
inst., requesting my opinion as to the construction of section 2505 of the 
code as amended by section 2, of chapter 83 or the laws of the Twenty-
eighth General Assembly, relating to the branding of oils by the inspector 
of petroleum products. In reply thereto, I submit the following opinion: 
Sectio n 2505 provides: • 'He (the inspector) shall reject all oils for 
illuminating purposes which will .emit a combustible vapor a t the 
temperature of one hundred and five deg rees standard Fahrenheit 
thermometer, closed test, not less than one-half pint of oil to be used 
in the flash test. If upon test and examination the oil shall meet the 
requirements, he shall brand over his official signature and date on 
barrel or package holding the same, • Approved flash test ..... ... . 
degrees, inserting in the brand the number. Should it fail to meet 
the requirements, it shall be branded under his official signature and 
date 'Rejected for illuminating purposes.' " 
This provision of the statute Is clearly mandatory, and no deviation from 
its strict requirements can be permitted on the part of the inspector . 
Any illuminating oil inspected by him which fails to meet the test 
required by the statute must be branded by him • • Rejected for illuminating 
purposes.'' 
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Chapter 83 of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly simply 
amends section 2508 of the code by striking out thereof the words ''the 
Welsbach hydro-carbon incandescent lamp,' ' and inserting in lieu thereof 
the words ''such lamps which, having been submitted to the state board of 
health and having been examined and tested by said board shall be found 
safe for the use of the public,'' and then prescribing the duties of the state 
board of health as to making a full and careful examination of the mechan-
ism of lamps submitted for their inspection. 
T oe effect of this amendment is to substitute in section 2508 of the code 
lamps which have been examined by the state board of health and found to 
be safe for the use of the public in the burning of the lighter products of 
petroleum, for the Welsbach hydro-carbon incandescentJamp, in which such 
products were permitted to be used only, prior to the amendment. 
Chapter 83 of the 1aws of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly in no way 
changes the duties of the inspector of petroleum products, as prescribed by 
the code. He must inspect the same, and brand them as is thereby 
required, without reference to the uses which may be made of them under 
the provisions of chapter 83, a fter they, are inspected and branded. 
Chapter 83 simply permits the use of the lighter products of petroleum 
which have been branded by the inspector ''Rejected for illuminating 
purposes" to be used in lamps which have been examined and approved by 
the state board of he.alth as safe to be used in burning such products for 
illuminating purposes, and the state board of health has no power or 
authority, by resolution or otherwise, to change the brand which by law the 
inspector is required to put upon such lighter products of petroleum . And 
any attempt upon the part of the state board of health to h ave such products 
branded differently than is required by the statute, is without force, and 
must necessarily be disregarded by the state oil inspectors. 
Respectfully submitted, 
February 12, 1901 . 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
Attorney-General . 
To J. F. Kennedy, M. D., Secretary State Board of Health. 
IsuRANCE CoMPANIEs-How Limited-Sections 1709 and 1710, 
construed with chapter 6o, laws of the Twenty-eighth General 
Assembly, limits the business of such companies, organized 
under chapter 4, title IX, of the c~de, to one of seven kinds or 
classes specified in the seven subdivisions of section 1709. 
DEAR SrR-I have your favor of the 7th inst., asking for a construction 
of sections 1709 and 1710, of the code, as amended by chapter 60, of the 
laws of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly, and in reply thereto submit 
the following opinion: 
It was evidently the intent of the legislature in enacting chapter 60, of the 
laws of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly, to add another subdivision 
to section 1709, of the code, and to permit companies organized under chap-
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ter 4, of title IX, of the code, to insure against loss or damage resulting 
from burglary, robbery, or attempts thereat, and against loss of moneys 
and securities in tlfe course of transportation . 
The subdivision of section 1709, so added, makes seven classes or kinds 
of insurance for which companies may be organized and operated, under 
chapter 4. 
Section 1710, of the code, provides that no company organized under 
chapter 4, or authorized to do business in the state, shall issue policies of 
insuranc<l for more than one of the six purposes mentioned in section 1709. 
This provision of 1710 was modified by chapter 61, of the laws of the Twen-
ty-eighth General Assembly, but such modification is not involved in the 
present inquiry. 
It was clearly the intent of the legislature in enacting section 1710, to 
limit every insurance company organized under chapter 4, of title IX, and 
every insurance company of like character authorized to do business in the 
state of Iowa, to one of the classes of insurance na med in the subdivision 
of section 1709. Tha t is to say, a company authorized to insure against 
loss or injury to the person or property, or both, growing out of the explo-
sion or rupture of steam boilers, must confine its business strictly to that 
class of insurance, as is provided in subdivision 6, of said section . 
And so with every other insurance company organized for the purpose of 
issuing policies under either of the other subdivisions of said section . 
The adding of chapter 60, of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General 
Assembly, as the seventh subdivision of section 1709, does not, in my opin· 
ion, alter, change, or enlarge the rights or powers of insurance companies 
organized under chapter 4, to issue policies for more than one of the pur-
poses named in section 1709. 
If a company is organized for the purpose of insuring against loss or 
damage by burglary, robbery, etc., it must, in my judgment, confine 
itself strictly to that class of insurance, and is not authorized to issue poli-
cies for any other of the purposes named in the sabdivision of section 1709. 
If a company is organized to insure houses, buildings, etc. , against loss 
or damage by fire or other casualty, it must, in my judgment, confine its 
business strictly to that class of insurance, and it cannot issue policies for 
any of the other purposes mentioned in section 1709, as amended. 
The key to the construction and interpretation of all statutes is the gen-
eral irtent of the legislature . Such general intent should be kept in view 
in determining the scope and meaning of every part of the statute sought to 
be interpreted. This is necessary to ascertain the purpose of the act, and 
·to make the parts harmonious, and thus, if possible, give a sensible and 
intelligible effect to each, in furtherance of the general design of the legisla-
ture. 
With this rule of construction, which is elementary, I am clear that sec-
tion 1709 and section 1710, taken in connection with chapter 60, of the laws 
of tbe Twenty-eighth General Assembly, limits the business of all insurance 
companies organized under chapter 4, of title IX, of the code, and all com-
panies authorized to do business in the state, to one of the seven kinds or 
classes of insurance specified in the seven subdivisions of section 1709. And 
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that such companies cannot be permitted, under the provisions of law, to 
transact more than one kind or class of Insurance. 
Respectfully submitted, 
February 12, 1901. 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
Attorney-General. 
To Hon. Frank F . Merriam, Auditor of State. 
ATTORNEY's FEEs-Such fees do not . constitute any part of the 
court costs, and cannot be deducted from an estate of a 
decedent under any of the provisions of section I, chapter 
51, of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly. 
DEAR SIR-I am in receipt of your favor of the 11th inst. , in which you 
ask my opinion "as to whether attorney's fees constitute a part of the court 
costs or can be construed as proper deduction under the provisions of sec-
tion 1, chapter 51 of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly." 
In reply thereto, I submit the following opinion: 
Section 1467 of the code provides for a tax of five per cent upon the estate 
of a decedent above the sum of one thousand dollars, after deducting all 
debts, which go to collateral heirs. 
In Magee v. State, 74 Northwestern Rep., 695, the supreme court held 
that the debts referred to in section 1467 were the debts owing by the 
decedent at the time of his death. 
By section 1, of chapter 51, of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General 
Assembly, the term ''debt'' as used in section' 1467 of the code, was extended 
so as to include local or state taxes due from the estate prior to the death of 
the decedent, a reasonable sum for funeral expenses, court costs, including 
the cost of appraisment mane for the purpose of assessing the collateral in-
heritance tax, the statutory fees of executors, administrators or trustees, and 
by its terms expressly prohibits the deduction of any other sum of money 
from the estate of the decedent. 
. .'\.ttorney's fees paid or agreed to be paid by the executor, administrator 
or heirs of a decedent does not fall within any of the classes of debts or 
demands specified in section 1 of chapter 51. Such charges are not a part 
of the court costs, and cannot be taken
6 
into consideration and deducted 
from an estate as such. 
The legislature has clearly and specifically named the demands and debts 
which may be deducted from the estate of a decedent and has not included 
attorney's fees therein. 
Under the familiar rule of statutory construction "the expression of one 
excludes all others" it must be held that it was the intention of the legislature 
to exclude attorney's fees from the demands which could be deducted from 
an estate. 
I am therefore clearly of the opinion that attorney's fees do not constitute 
any part of the court costs, and that they cannot be deducted from an estate 
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of a decedent, under any of the provisions of st:ction 1 of chapter 51 of the 
laws of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly. 
February 13, 1901. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
Attorney-General. 
7o Hon. G. S. Gilberson, Treasurer of State. 
ScHOOL LANDs-School Funds-Rate of Interest to be Charged-
It is the duty of the auditor of state to charge five per cent 
interest upon the amount of all sales and resales of school and 
escheated lands reported to him by the county auditors for 
the previous year; and under chapter I I3 of the laws of the 
Twenty-eighth General Assembly to charge four and one-
half per cent to each county upon the amount of the perma-
nent school fund under its control. 
DEAR SIR-I am in receipt of your favor of February 11th, in which my 
official opinion is requested upon the following questions: 
First.-You say ''Will it be my duty to charge the different coun-
ties of the state on sales or resales of school land and also on escheated 
estates interest at the rate of five per cent, and the balance of the 
school fund at the rate of four and one-half per cent?" 
Secoozd.-You say' 'Will it be my du ty from the time chapter 113, 
acts of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly became a law to charge 
the different ' ounties of the state interest on this school fund for all 
sales, resales and esc heated estates, at the, rate of five per cent, or 
what length o.f time will it require for a sale, resale or escheated 
estate to become a part of the permanent school fund, and interest be 
computed at the rate of four and one half per cent?" 
Section 2855 of the code, before it was amended by chapter 113 of the 
law£ of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly, provided: 
' 'County auditor's shall on the first day of January report to the 
state auditor the amount of all sales and resales on the sixteenth sec-
tion five thousand acres grant and escheated estates made the year 
previous, who shall charge the same to the counties, with interest upon 
the same from the date of such sales or resales, at the rate of five per 
cent per annum. He shall also on the first day of January, charge 
up to each county having permanent school fund under its control, 
interest on the whole amount in said county, at the rate of five per 
cent, payable semi-annually, on the first day of January and July of 
the year following, and include it in the semi ·annual apportionment of 
the interest collected for the year, which shall be taken as the whole 
sum due from each county. Any surplus collectt:d over the five per 
cent ·charged, shall be paid into the county treasury." 
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This provision of the statute makes it the duty of the county auditors to 
report to the state auditor on the first day of January of each year the 
amount of all sales a nd resales of school lands and escheated estates made 
d uring the preceding year . 
It also makes it the duty of the state auditor to charge to the county from 
which the report is received the tota l amount of all such sales and resales, 
with interest thereon from date of such sales or resales , at the rate of five per 
cent per annum, 
This provision of section 2855 stands alone, and imposes upon the county 
auditors and sta te auditor duties which are independent of the other duties 
prescribed in the ~ection . It stands as a manda tory provision of the statute, 
and one that must be ~trictly complied with and followed, unless it has been 
repealed or modified by subsequent legisla tive action. 
The provision of section 2855 immediately following, makes it the duty 
of the state auditor on the fi rst day of January of each year, to charge to 
each county having permanent school fund under its control , interest on the 
whole amount of such fund , at the rate of five per cent per annum. 
By this provision an entirely separate a nd distinct duty is imp osed upon 
the auditor of state . He is required thereby to charge to every county in the 
state five per cent interest upon the total amount of school fun d under the 
control of such county . That such provision was intended by the legislature 
to be a sep ara te and distinct duty imposed upon the auditor of state, is 
manifest by the language of the sta tute, which provides: 
''He (the state auditor) shall also, on the first day of January. 
charge up to each county having permanent school fund under its con-
trol, interest on the whole amount in said county at the rate of five 
per cent." 
Under the provisions of section 2855 , the legislature has i~posed upon the 
auditor of state two separate and distinct duties : 
First : To charge the county with the full amount of all sales and 
re-sales of school and escheated lands made therein during the year previ-
ous , with five per cent interest thereon from the date of such sales . 
Second. To charge to each county in the state having permanent school 
fund under its control, interest on the whole amount of such fund a t the 
rate of five per cent per annum, such interest to become due and paya ble 
semi-annually, on the first day of January and July of the year following. 
By the provisions of section 2 of chapter 113 of the laws of the Twenty-
eighth General Assembly, the rate of interest to be charged by the state 
auditor to the counties upon the permanoot school fund, under the provision 
of se;::tion 2855 above quoted, was changed from five to four and one half 
per cent ; and the question arises whether the amendment made to section 
2855 by section 2 of chapter 113 of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General 
Assembly changing the rate of interest to be charged by the auditor of state 
upon the permanent school fund, also changes the rate of interest to be 
charged by h im upon the amount of all sales and re-sales of school and 
escheated lands. 
As I have shown, the provisions of this section impose entirely separate 
and distinct duties upon the state auditor, and while it may be well said that 
the charging of a different rate of interest upon the permanent school fund 
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than is charged upon the amount of the sales and re-sales of school and 
escheated lands is inharmonious, can it be said that because the legislature 
has seen fit to change the rate of interest in the one case, the rate of interest, 
by implication, is also changed in the other? 
It is a well settled rule of Jaw in the construction of statutes that the pre-
sumption is that the legislature does not intend to change or modify the law 
beyond what it explicitly declares either in express terms or by unmistakable 
implication : 
M cGinnis v. State , 49 American Decisions , 697 . 
Cadwallader v. Harris, 76 Ill., 372. 
Bertles v. Nu1zan, 44 American Rep. , 361. 
Keack v . Baltimore, etc. , R. Co., 17 Maryland, 32. 
It is not to be supposed that the legisla ture will overturn the established 
law without expressing a clear intention so to do . 
United States v. Fiskf!r, 2 Cran~h , 358. 
Horton v. lltfobile School Com'r., 43 Ala., 604. 
Harwood v. Lowell, 4 Cushing, 318. 
While it is true that legislative enactments are not to be defeated on 
account of mistakes, errors or omissions, provided the intention of the leg-
islature can be collected from the whole statute, it is equally true, where 
the language presents no ambiguity, courts will not attempt to qualify its 
plain language from what can be ingeniously argued was the intent of the 
legislature . 
Doe v. Considine, 6 Wallace, 458 . 
·It is certainly the duty of the auditor of state, under section 2855 to 
charge to the respective counties the amounts of all sales and resales' of 
schools and escheated lands reported to him by the county auditor for the 
year previous , with five per cent interest thereon from the date of such 
sales or resales, unless it can be fairly said from the contex t of the statute 
that the word ' 'five" in line 13 of that section was changed to, and must be 
read as four and one-half , because the word ' ' five" in line 15, and the 
same word in line 19 is changed to four and one-half by section 2 of chapter 
113 of the laws of the Twenty-eighth general assembly . 
The only grounds upon which such a construction could possibly be had 
are that there is an apparent and manifest error or clerical mistake or omis-
s:Min in the amendatory statute, which the courts have power to correct or 
supply, or, second, there is such an inconsistency and repugnancy between 
the amendatory statute and that which preceded it that the two cannot pos-
sibly stand or be construed together. In such case the prior statute must 
yield to the extent of the conflict. 
In the amendment under consideration there is no apparent mistake, 
error or omission, which can possibly be ascertained from the context, and 
second , there is no such inconsistency, repugnancy or conflict between the 
two provisions of section 2855, a& amended by the laws of the Twenty-eighth 
General Assembly , that such provisions cannot stand and be construed 
together. 
It was competent and proper for the legislature to say that four and one-
half per cent should be charged by the state auditor to the counties upon the 
permanent school fund, and at the same time 'leave the statute in full force 
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and effect which provides that counties shall be charged with five per cent 
upon all sales and resales of school and escheated lands. There is no real 
conflict or repugnancy between the two statutes. 
It may be said that the acts of the law making power, in creating such a 
distinction are inconsistent, but it is not such an inconsistency as will repeal 
or change the former statute by impl ;cation. 
I am therefore of the opinion that it is the duty of the auditor of state, 
under the statute as amended, to charge five per cent interest upon the 
amount of all sales and resales of school and escheated lands reported to 
him by the county auditors for the previous year; and under chapter 113 of 
the laws of the Twenty· eighth General Assembly, to charge four and one-half 
per cent to each county upon the amount of the permanent school fund 
under its control. 
Another question here arises, which has not been directly referred to in 
the request for my opinion, but which will certainly arise under the con-
struction I have given this statute, viz: 
Whether the surplus collected over four and one-half per cent upon the 
amount of the sales of school and escheated lands, shall be paid into the 
county treasury? 
Section 2855 as amended reads: 
''Any surplus collected over the four a,nd one-half per cent char~ed 
shall be paid into the county treasury." 
This provision clearly relates to the interest charged upon the perma-
nent school fund , and not to that charged upon the sales and resales of 
school and escheated lands. The amount to be paid into the treasury of the 
county is the surplus collected above the four and one-half per cent provided 
by the statute. The four and one-half per cent thus referred to is only 
chargeable upon the permanent school fund, and the provision of the stat-
ute that the surplus collected above that amount shall be paid into the county 
treasury , must necessarily refer to the four "and one-half per cent required 
to be charged upon the permanent school fund, and not to the amounts 
upon which the auditor is directed to charge five per cent. 
Second-When the county auditors make their report to the auditor of 
state, on the first day of January each year, of all sales and resales of 
school and eschea ted lands the auditor must compute interest at the rate 
of five per cent per annum on each sale from its date to the first day of 
January, and charge the entire amount to the county in which such sale has 
been made; when the interest as thus computed, and with the principal is 
charged to the county, the amount at once becomes a part of the permanent 
school fund of the state, and interest m~st thereafter be charged upon such 
amount, as a part of the permanent school fund of the state, at the rate of 
four and one-half per cent per annum, under the provisions of section 2855, 
as amended by the laws of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly. 
Respectfully submitted, 
February 14, 1901. 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
Attorney-General. 
To the Hon. Frank F. Merriam, Auditor of State. 
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ScHOOL DISTRICTs-Rural Independent Districts and Independ-
ent Districts-How Formed Into a Sing-le School Corporation-
Such districts, containing a city, town or village of a civil town-
ship, may be formed into a single school corporation in the 
manner provided by section 2799. 
DEAR SIR-We are in receipt of your favor of the 14th ult., in which you 
say ''your official opinion is requested on the following question:" 
''By what process, if any, may the several rural independent dis-
tricts and an independent district containing a city, town or village, 
of a civil township, be formed into a single school corporation?" 
In a former opinion to you, under date of January 19, 1901, it was 
said, after giving a brief history of the law, "in my opinion the phrase 
'independent districts ' as used in section 2799, is a generic term, and includes 
and is applicable to all independent r;chool districts in the state, whetht.r 
known as independent districts or rural independent districts. This being 
true, rural independent districts may unite, consolidate and form a single 
rural independent district, by the method provided in section 2799 of the 
code." 
From the a bove holding we conclude that there is no difference or dis-
tinction between what are denominated ''independent districts" and ''rural 
independent districts.'' 
Section 2799 provides that independent districts located contiguous to 
·each other may u nite and form a single independent district. 
Section 2800 provides tha t a township which has been divided into rural 
independent districts may be erected into a school township, 
From the ruling in the above opinion, that the term ''independent dis-
trict" is generic, and includes rural independent districts, we are of the 
·opinion that rural independent distric ts , and independent districts containing 
.a city , town or village, of a civil township, may be formed into a single 
school corporation, 
Respect fully submitted , 
February 16, 1901. 
CHAS. A. VAN VLECK, 
Assistant A ttvrttey- Getzeral. 
To Hon. R. C. Barrett, Superintendent Pttbtic Instruction . 
INSURANCE CoMPANIEs-Mutual-Section 1689 of the code is 
mandatory. Every mutual company must embody .the word 
"mutual" in its title, which must appear upon the first page of 
every policy or renewal receipt. Any attempt at evasion by 
printing in small type or letters or by an attempt to obscure 
the word "mutual" is a violation of law, and makes the com-
pany liable to have its certificate revoked . 
DEAR SIR-Your avor of the 13th inst. has been received, in which you 
.ask my construction of the provision of section 1689 of the code which re-
quires the word '' mutual " to be embodied ·n the title of all insurance 
11 
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companies organized under chapter 4 of title IX of the code doing business 
upon the mutual plan, and such word to appear upo_n the first page of 
every policy a nd renewal receipt issued by such compantes . 
Section 1689 of the code provides : 
' ' Every insurance company organized as provided in this chapter, 
shall, if it be a mutual company, embody the word '' mutual" in its 
title, which must appear upon the first page of every policy and 
renewal receipt. " 
This provision of the statute is clearly mandatory. Section 1747 requires 
every insurance company organized and doing business under chapter 4 of 
title IX, to conform to all the provisions of chapter 4 . 
Section 1748 prescribes the punis!::.ment to which the officers of any com-
pany doing, or attempting to do business under the provisions of c~apter 4, 
become liable for a failure upon their part to comply with the requtrements 
of chapter 4 ; 'and section 1715 authorizes the auditor to wit~hold his ~er­
mission or certificate of authority from every company orgamzed or domg 
business under chapter 4, which neglects or fails to comply with the provis-
ions of that chapter. 
Under the mandatory provision of section 1689, every mutual company 
organized under chapter 4, must embody the word ''mutual" in its title. 
And its title, with the word ''mutual" embodied therein, mus t appear 
upon the first p age of every policy and renewal receipt. 
Any deviation by an insurance company so organized, from this express 
provision of the statute, makes the officers of such company li~bl~ to the 
punishment prescribed in section 1748 of the code, and the permission and 
aut):10rity of such company to transact business within the sta te should be 
withheld by the auditor. 
The printing of the word '' mutual'' upon the first page of the policy or 
renewal receipt of such company, enclosed in parentheses, or printed else-
where than in the title of the company, is a failure on the part of the insur-
ance company so doing to comply with the provisions of section 1689. 
It was clearly the intent of the legislature that every insurance company 
organized upon the mutual'plan, under chapter_4 title IX, should declare in 
its title that it is a mutual company, and that its title, so declaratory of the 
character of the compaoy, should be printed, lithographed or engraved-as 
the case may be-upon the first page of each policy and renewal receipt, in 
such manner that from an ordinary reading of the title, it would be readily 
seen that it is a mutual company. 
Any attempt on the part of an insurance company organized upon the 
mutual plan' under chapter 4 title cr of the code; to prevent the word 
''mutual" from being read, as a part of the title, by the use of small type 
or letters, or by printing, engraving or lithographing the word "mutual" 
at a place upon the first page of its policies or renewal receipts where it 
would not be readily seen in an ordinary reading of the title of the company, 
is an evasion of the express provisions of section 1689, and a violation of 
law. 
While your department may not be able to designate the manner, style 
or type in which the title of an insurance company shall be lithograph~d, 
engraved or printed, it has the power, in my opinion, to require such title 
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to so appear upon the first page of every policy and renewal receipt, that an 
ordinary reading of the title of such company will disclose that it is a 
mutual insurance company. 
Wherever there is an attempt to evade the plain provisions of section 
1689, by not embodying the word "mutual" in the title of the company, 
as required by law, or by having it printed in parentheses, or i'n small type 
or letters, or at an obscure place upon the page, so that it would not be 
likelY. to be seen or read, upon an ordinary reading of the title of the com-
pany, it is, in my opinion, your duty to at once require such company to 
fully comply with the pr.Jvisions of section 1689; and upon a failure to do so 
upon the part of the company , its authority to transact business within the 
state should be revoked. 
Respectfully submitted, 
February 18, 1901. 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
Attorney-General. 
To Han . Frank F. M erriam, Azeditor of State . 
INSURANCE CoMPANIEs- It is advisable that all companies seek-
ing to avail themselves of the provisions of subdivision 7, 
section 1709 of the code, should prepare amended and sub-
stituted articles of incorporation upon which the auditor and 
attorney-general can act. 
DEAR SIR-Herewith I return to you the articles of incorporation of the 
National Life & Trust Company, of Des Moines, Iowa, and the amend-
ments thereto, with this suggestion: 
I find the proposed amendment to conform to the laws of the United 
States, the constitution and laws of Iowa, and to be in regular and proper 
form. 
As it becomes, however, the duty of the auditor of state and attorney-
general to pass upon the articles of incorporation under which an insurance 
company seeks to do business as specified in the seventh subdivision of sec-
tion 1709 of the code, I believe the articles of incorporation of such company 
should be submitted in their entirety to the auditor and the attorney-general 
for their approval. I therefore think it advisabl · that all companies seek-
ing to avail themselves of the provisions of subdivision seven, should prepare 
amended and substituted articles of incorporation, which can be submitted 
to these offices as complete articles nf organization, upon which the auditor 
and attorney-general can act . 
Respectfully submitted, 
February 18, 1901. 
CHAS . W. MULLAN, 
Attorney-General. 
To Han. Frank F. Merriam, Auditor of State. 
GAME LAws-It is unlawful to ship either quail or grouse from 
any point within to any point without the state, or from one 
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point to another within the state, except as is specifically pro-
vided in section 2555 and 2557 of the code. A common 
carrier transporting any such birds at any other season of the 
year than when th ey may be lawfully killed wo~ld be liable to 
the punishment provided in the last section. 
DEAR SIR-Your favor of the 14th inst. , enclosing letter of H . W. 
Kerr, publisher of the Naturalist and f!ancier's Review, is at hand . 
You ask my opinion upon the question of shipping live quail or grouse 
for breeding or propagatiag purposes either within or without the state, 
during the period of the year when the killing of such birds is prohibited by 
law. 
Section 2555 of the code provides: 
"But it shall be lawful for any person to ship to any person 
within this state any game birds, not to exceed one dozen in any 
one day, during the period when the killing of such birds is not 
prohibited, but he shall firs t make an affidavit before some person 
authorized to administer oaths, that said birds have not been unlaw-
fully killed, bought, sold or had in possession, are not being shipped 
for sale or profit, giving the came and post office address o t the person 
to whom shipped, and the number of b irds to be so shipped." 
The section then provides that a copy of an affidavit of such facts shal • be 
furnished the common carrier who receives the birds for transportation, and 
. such affidavit shall operate as a release of such carrier for any liability in 
the shipment of such birds . 
Section 2557 provide!'\: 
• 'If any railway or express company, or other common carrier, or 
any of their agents or servants, receive a ny of th fish, birds or 
animals mentioned or referred to in this chapter, for transportation or 
other purpose, during the period herein limited and prohibited, or at 
any other time except in the manner provided in this chapter, he or it 
. shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars 
* * *." 
Under the provisions•of these two sections of the code, it is unlawful to 
ship either quail or grouse from any point within to any point without the 
state, or from one point to another within the state , except as is specifically 
provided in these two sections; and any common carrier transporting any of 
such birds at any other season of the year than when they may be lawfully 
killed, would be liable to the punishment provided by section 2557. 
I regret being compelled to put this construction upon the present game 
and fish law, but no provision has bee'b. made by the legislature for the 
s hipping or transportation of birds for propagating or breeding purposes; 
and as t.he law now stands upon the statute books, the shipping or transport-
ing, for any purpose other than that mentioned in section 2555, and at any 
other time, or manner than is therein provided, is unlawful, and a common 
carrier so doing would be liable under section 2557. 
Respectfully su.bmitted, 
CHAS . W. MULLAN, 
Attorney-General. 
February 18, 1901. 
To Hon. Geo. E. Delavan , Estherville, Iowa. 
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BoARD OF CONTR OL-Authority of to Receive Prisoners From a 
Sister State for Safe Keeping in the Penitentiaries-The power 
to manage, control, .and govern the penitentiaries is vested in 
the board of control, and it is held to be no abuse of such dis-
cretion for them to receive into the penitentiaries of this state 
prisoners from the state of Nebraska, under the circum stances 
mentioned herein . 
DEAR SIR-We are in receip.t of your favor of the 2d inst. in which 
you say: 
''Application has been made to this board by the governor of 
Nebraska throu gh the governor of Iowa to know if we will receive 
into the penitentiaries of this state some of the p risoners of that state 
owing to the burning of their penitentiary. We desire to know fro~ 
you if we have the legal right and authority so to do in case we find 
we can properly and conveniently do so." 
Upon a careful examination of the laws of this state, we find no statute 
directly or indirectly authorizing the reception of prisoners from another 
state into the penitentia ries of this state . Neither do we find any statute 
directly or indirectly forbidding the same. 
Section 5676 of the code provides: ' 'Convicts sentenced for a life or 
less .term. at. hard labor ~hall be received by the warden into the peni-
tentiary designated by the executive council, and those so sentenced by 
a ny co urt of the United States may be so received," etc. 
As we understand the above language it defines the duty of the warden 
~f the pen.itentiary to receive such prisoners as are designated by the execu-
tive council, whether within the district where such penitentiary is located 
or.outside of the district named by said council if so ordered ; and a lso such 
pnsoners so se ntenced by any court of the United States if so recommended 
by said council. It is not our understanding thai t he a bove section limits 
or forbids the reception of prisoners from another state not sentenced by a 
fe~eral court, if in the opinion of the executive council, the reception of such 
p n soners would be proper and wise. 
Section 8 of chapter 11 8 , acts of the Twenty- seventh General Assembly, 
provides: .., 
. ' 'The board of control shall have full power to manage, control, and 
govern, subject only to the limitations contained in this act, * * * 
the state penitentiaries. " 
Section 9 provides : ''The powers possessed by the governor and 
executive council, with reference to the management and control of 
the state penitentiaries, shall, on July 1, 1898; cease to exist in the 
governor and executive council, and shall become vested in the board 
of control; and the said board is, on July 1, 1898, and without further 
process of law, authorized and directed to assume and exercise all the 
powers heretofore vested in or exercised by the several boards of 
trustees, the governor or the executive council, with reference to the 
several in~titutions of the state herein named." 
All the powers then of the several boards of trustees or managers of the 
several state institutions except so far as they may be repealed or modified 
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by the act creating the board of control become vested in the board of con-
trol. With but few exceptions, the power given to the several managing 
boards of the state institutions were general powers; the manner of exercis-
ing such powers was left to their sound discretion. They were subject only 
to a very few limitations. The board of control, then, succeeding to these 
powers has a broader a nd more general authority than is to be found in the 
act creating the board of control. In some particular~, the act creating the 
board of control points out the manner ·in which these powers shall be exer-
cised. but in the absence of some specific direction, the board is vested with 
all the powers which have heretofore been exercised by the various trustees 
and m anagers of the institutions . Having then been endowed with all of 
the powers and duties to manage, control, and govern said penitentiaries, 
which theretofore existed in the governor, executive council, and managing 
boards of s~id institutions, the board of control became vested with a ll 
sound di scretionary powers relative to the management, control and govern-
ment of said institutions with few , if a ny limitations. 
It is further provided by said act creating the board of control that said 
powers were ''subject only to the limitations contained in this act. Nowhere 
in this act do we find the sound discretionary power of the board of control 
limited as to what prisoners may be received in said penitentiaries . Whether 
the exigencies of this particular case require this board of control to receive 
some of the prisoners from the state of Nebraska is a question which addresses 
itself to the discretion and judgment of this board. It is in the nature of a 
judicial, or discretionary, and not of a ministerial act. The power of the 
board of control to authorize the reception of prisoners into the penitentiaries 
of this state not being limited by sta tute, we think it is clearly within their 
sound d iscretion as to whether they will receive p risoners from another state. 
In Martin v. M l1tl, 18 Wheaton 31, it is said by Mr. Ju~tice Story th::tt 
'·'Whenever the statute gives a discretionary power to any person to be 
exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of 
construction th a t the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of 
the existence of these facts .'' 
Having thus found that the power to manage, control and govern the 
penitentiaries of this state vested in the board of control is discretionary, 
and that such discretion is not limited as to what prisoners shall be received 
into said penitentiaries, we therefore conclude, and it is our op inion, that 
the board of control has legal right and authority to receive prisoners from 
the state of Nebraska into the penitentiaries of this state. 
March 4, 1901 . 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHAS. A. VA M VLECK, 
As sistattt Attorney-General. 
To Hon. L. G . Kitme, Chairman, Board of Control. 
AssESSMENT OF MoNEYS AND CREDITs-Promissory notes taken 
for rent, and not yet due, are obligations for rent not yet due, 
within the meaning of subdivision three of section 1304 of 
the code, and being such obligations, are exempt from taxation. 
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If such notes have been sold or deposited by the original payee 
and are in the hands of a third party at the time of th e 
assessment, they fall within the provisions of section 1304, 
and should be assessed to the holder thereof as moneys and 
credits. 
DEAR SIR-I beg to a cknowledge the receipt of your esteemed favor of 
March 15th, in which you say: 
''Will you please give me your official opinion, in writing, as to 
whether promissory notes taken for rent should be lis ted b~· the holder 
thereof and assessed as moneys and credits, prior to the maturity 
thereof . '' 
Complying with your request I submit the following opinion: 
Section 1309 of the code is as follows : 
' 'The term credit as used in this chapter, includes every claim or 
demand due or to become due for money, labor, or other valuabl e 
thing, and every annuity or sum of money receivable at stated periods• 
and all money or property of any kind secured by deed, title bond, 
mortgage or otherwise ; but pensions of the United States, or any of 
them, or salaries or payments expected for services to be rendered are 
not included in the above term." 
This section is broad enough in its language to include promissory notes 
given for rent which aro not yet due, and if we were confined to the pro-
visions of this section alone, such notes would undoubtedly fall within the 
definition of moneys and credits which are to be listed and assessed. 
Subdivision 3 of section 1304, which specifies the classes of property 
which are not to be taxed, provides that obligations for rent not yet due, in 
the hands of the original payees, shall be exempt from taxation. Promissory 
notes taken for rent, and not yet due, are clearly obligations for rent not yet 
due, within the meaning of the provisions of subdivision 3 of section 1304 of 
the code; and being such obligations, are exempt •from taxation, a.nd should 
not be listed by the holder thereof, if he is the original payee, or assessed to 
him as moneys and credits. 
If, bow~ver, such notes have been sold or disposed of by the original 
payee, a nd are in the hands of a third party at the time of the assessment, 
they then fa ll within the provisions of section 130 above quoted, and should 
be assessed to the holder thereof as moneys and credits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
A ltornev- General . 
March 16 , 1901. 
To Hon . Franle 'F. Merriam, Auditor of State. 
ATTORNEY's FEE FOR FINES CoLLECTED, AND ScHoOL FuND 
MORTGAGES FORECLOSED-Under the facts stated In the 
opinion, the county attorney is not entitled to commission or 
fees upon a penalty collected by him in .a civil proceeding. 
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DEAR SIR-I am in receipt of your favor of Ma rch 5th, enclosing a Jetter 
from N . Willett, of Decorah, Iowa, in which he asks whether he is entitled 
to any commission , or any fee fo r services- rendered in recovering $50 .00 
penalty against T . A. Jaynes for viola tion of sections 1800 and 1801 of the 
code . 
In reply will say that section 308 of the code provides: 
''In addition to the salary above provided, he (the county a ttorney) 
shall receive the fee as now allowed to attorneys for su its upon written 
instruments where judgment is obtained , for a ll fines collected, and 
school fund m ortgages fore closed * * *. '' 
I think the word ' 'fine" as used here must be taken in its legal sense, 
which in or dinary lang uage means a sum of money, the payment of which 
is imposed by a court according to law , as a punishment for a crime or 
misdemea nor, or, as has been aptly defined by the supreme court of Texas , 
a pecuniary punishment imposed by the judgment of the court upon a per-
son convicted of a crime. 
State v . Stein, 14 Texas , 396. 
While a penalty is a sum of money the payment of which the law exacts 
by way of punishm ent for doing some act which is prohibited , or omitting 
to do some act which is required, it does not necessarily involve a conviction 
for a cr ime. 
The leg islature has only seen fi t to give to a county attorney fees for fines 
collected, and has not included penalties within its p rovisions. 
The sum for which judg ment has been entered against Mr. Jaynes is 
s trictly a penalty imposed by sections 1800 and 1801 of the code for a failure 
on the part of a n agent of a n insurance company to conform to the p ro-
visions of chapter 8 . Such penalty is a forfeiture imposed by law for such 
fa ilure, a nd must be collected by a civil suit, and does not involve criminal-
ity under the statute. 
I am therefore of the opinion that Mr . Willett is not entitled to commis-
sion or fees npon the penalty so collected by him in civil proceedings against 
Mr. Jaynes . Respectfully submitted, 
CHAS. W. M ULLAN , 
A I torney -General. 
March 16, 1901. 
To Hon . Frattk F. Merriam, Attditor of State. 
ScHoOL F OR INDIGENT CHILDREN AND THE SoLDIE R's ORPH AN's 
HoME-Appropriation Unexpended .-The unexpended bal-
ances referred to in the opinion ·were charged off the books of 
the auditor of state on the first day of Os;tober, 1898 . They, 
therefore, came within the provisions of section one, of chapter 
three, of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly and 
are available for the support of the institutions for which the 
appropriations were made. 
DEAR SIR--I am in receipt of your favor of the 21st inst., in which you 
ask whether the unexpended . appropriations made to the school for indigent 
children and the soldiers' orphans' home, for the year 1898, and which 
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were charged off the auditor's books October 1 , 1898, a1 e now available and 
ca n be used by the board of control for the support of these institutions . 
I also note wha t you say as to the op inion of Attorney-Genera l Remley, 
given June 2, 1898 , in which he says: 
• 'The permanent appropriation per capita for the inmates of an 
institution is intended for its general support fund . It is an annual 
appropriation. It is a limitation on the amount that may be used 
year a fter yea r . If 1 ss is needed to meet the wants of the institution, 
less should be drawn.'' 
Under the law as it was at the time the opinion of Mr. Remley was 
given, it was undoubtedly the duty of the auditor and treasurer of s ta te to 
charge off any unexpended balance at the end of the fiscal year . The 
money appropriated by the legislature was for the yearly support of such 
institutions, and if a Jess amount than the whole appropiation was required 
to meet the needs of an institution it was the du ty of the auditor and 
treasurer of state to m ake such entries up on their books as would return the 
unexpended balance to the unappropriated fund s in the treasury. 
The Twenty-eighth Genera l Assembly , however, made a very m a terial 
change in the law. Section 1 of chapter 3 is a s follows : 
''Tha t section 123 of the code be and is amended by adding thereto 
the following : The maximum amount named as a ppropria tions made 
for the support of inma tes or for pay of officers or teachers or for any 
other purpose whatever connected with the operating of any sta te insti-
tution under the control of the board of control of sta te institutions 
shall be available until u sed for the purpose for whic h said appropri-
at ion was made, and no part of the sa me shall be, by the auditor of 
sta te or treasurer of state, charged off a s an unexpended balance 
unless said officers shall be notified in writing by said board tha t sa id 
balance so unexpended will not be needed, and any sums cha rged off 
as unexpended bala nce by the audi tor or treasurer of state, since chap-
ter one hundred and eighteen (118) acts of the Twenty- seventh General 
Ass11mbly took effect, shall still be available 'and subject to the prov is-
ions of this section. '' 
Under this section, any unexpended balance of an appropriation made 
to a state institution' , remains availa ble for the support of such institution, 
until such time as the auditor or treasurer of s t!\Se shall be notified by the 
board of control that such unexpended balance will not be needed for the 
support of the institution, and the unexpended ba lance cannot be charged 
off until such notice is received . 
The section also provides that any sums charged off as unexpended bal-
ances by the auditor or treasurer of state since chapter 118 of the acts of the 
Twenty-seventh General Assembly took effect, shall still be available, and 
subject to the provisions of this section. 
Chapter 118 of the acts of the Twenty- seventh General Assembly took 
effect on the first day of April, 1898, by publication in the Iowa State Regis-
ter and Des Moines Leader. By an examination of the books of the auditor 
of state, I find that the unexpended balances referred to in your communi-
ca tion were charged off the books on the first day of October, 1898. They 
therefore come within the provisions of section one of chapter three of the 
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laws of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly, and are now available for the 
support of the institutions for which the appropriations were m ade . 
These amounts should therefore be credited by the auditor and treasurer 
to the funds of the institutions for which the appropriations were made , and 
the auditor is authorized by law to draw his warrant againsttbe same, upon 
proper vouchers of the board of control, showing that such sums are to be 
used by the board for the general support of the institutions for which the 
app ropriations were mad e . 
Respectfully submitted, 
March 22, 1901. 
CHAS. \¥. MULLAN, 
A ttorney- General . 
To Hon. Frank F . Merriam, Auditor of State. 
PENITENTIARIEs-Duty of Warden to Punish Prisoner-Under 
the facts stated in the opinion, it is the duty of the warden of 
the penitentiary to punish the prisoner by confining him at 
hard labor in the penitentiary, although the court may have 
omitted the words," at hard labor," in the sentence and in 
the mittimus under which the pri soner was delivered. 
DEAR SIR-I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of the 27th 
inst., enclosing letter from W . A . Hunter, warden of the penitentiary a t 
Anamosa, the mittimus issued in the case of the State of Iowa v. P. E. 
Pierce, and his affidavi t in reference to his wishes in regard to his sentence, 
and letter. of the clerk of the district court of Plymouth county, Iowa, sub-
m itting to m e the question as to whether the warden of the penitentiary at 
Anamosa can lega lly require Mr. Pierce to perform bard labor, under the 
sentence of the district court. 
Section 5675 of the code provides: 
' 'All punishment in a penitentiary by imp risonment must be by 
confinement to ba rd labor , and not by solitary imprisonment; * 
This provision of the statute regulating the character of punishment t0 
which prisoners in a penitentiary shall be subjected, applies .to all prisoners 
sentenced to a penitentiary by the judgment of a district court, except where 
otherwise provided by the statute. 
If a person is sentenced to a term in a penitentiary by the judgment of 
the district court, and the sentence and 6mittimus do not particula r ly specify 
the character of punishment which be is to receive, be must, in m y opinion, 
be punished by confinement at bard labor , as provided by section 5675. 
It is not absolutely necessary that the judgment, sentence, or mittimus 
rendered or issued by the district court should particularly specify that the 
person sentenced shall be confined to bard labor in the penitentiary, as the 
law itself specifically provides that all punishment in a penitentiary by 
imprisonment must be by confinement to bard labor, and the judgment, 
sentence, and mittimus of the court must all be construed with reference to 
such provision. 
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This view finds support in the case of the State v . Cole, 63 Iowa, 702, 
where the jury found by their verdict that the defendant was guilty of mur-
der, and that be should be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary at 
bard la bor for life. The court, in entering its judgment upon the verdict, 
a nd in sentencing the prisoner, omitted the words, "at hard labor . " 
The court, upon appeal , however, held that the judgment and sentence of 
the court should be construed to mean that the defendant was sentenced to 
the penitentiacy at bard labor for life , under the provisions of the statute . 
In the particular case in which I am asked to construe the sente.:.ce and 
mittimus of the district court, I am of the opinion that it is the duty of the 
warden of the Anamosa p eniten tiary to pu nish the defendant, Pierce, by 
confining him at hard labor in the penitentiary, under the provisions of sec -
tion 5675, although the court may bave:omitted the words,'' at bard labor," 
in the sentence and in the mittimus under which Pierce was delivered. 
Respectfully subm itted, 
March 28 , 1901. 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
Attorney-General. 
To Hon. L. G. Ki1me, C!tairma11 Board of Control. 
FEE TO BE PAID FOR FILlNG AMENDMENT TO ARTICLES OF INcOR-
PORATION-Although a corporation may have paid a fee of 
$2,000 upon the filin g of original articl es of incorporation, if 
it subsequently files an amendment to such original articles of 
incorporation, increasing its capital stock, it must pay the 
secretary of state a fee of $r.oo for each $ 1,000 of such 
increase, not exceeding the sum of $2,000. 
DEAR SIR-I am in receipt of your favor of the 6th inst., in which you 
ask for a construction of the provisions of section 1610 of the code, relating 
to the amount of the fee required to be paid by corporations for pecuniary 
profit, u pon filing amendments to their articles of incorporation increasing 
their capital stock, and in response thereto, I submit the following opinion: 
Section 1610 of the code, as amended by chapter 40 of the laws of the 
Twenty-seventh General Assembly, provides: 
''Such corporation shall pay to the secretary of state, before a cer-
tificate of incorporation is issued, a fee of twenty-five dollars, and for 
all authorized stock in excess of ten thousand dollars an additional fee 
of one dollar per thousand. Should any corporation thereafter 
increase its capital stock, it shall pay to the secretary of state one 
dollar for each one thousand dollars of such increase, but in no event 
shall a fee in excess of two thousand dollars be charged under this 
provision of this section. The recording fee sha ll be paid in all cases 
* * *." 
As shown by the facts submitted in your letter, the Union Pacific Railroad 
company filed its original articles of incorporation on the twenty-second day of 
January, 1898, in which the capital stock of the company was fixed at one 
hundred and thirty-six million dollars, At that• time it paid to the secretary 
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of state three hundred and fifty dollars, which was the maximum fee fixed 
by the statute then in force. 
On the first day of February, 1899, the company filed a n amendment to 
its articles of incorporation, increasing its capital stock to one hu~dred sixty-
three million four hundred sixty thousand one hundred dollars, and paid to 
the secretary of state a fee of sixteen hundred fifty dollars and fifty cents. 
On November fourteenth, 1899, a second amendment was filed, increasing 
the capital stock of the company to one hundred ninety-six million one hundred 
seventy-eight thousand seven hundred dollars, for the filing of which no fee 
was charged by the secretary of sta te. 
The company now presents to the secretary of state a third amendment 
to its articles of incorporation, which increases its capital stock to two 
hundred ninety-six million one l;JUndred seventv-eight thousand seven 
hundred dollars, and the question to be determined is whether the secretary 
of state is required by law to charge a filing fee, under section 1610 , 
for the filing of such amendment. 
As I am informed, it is the contention of the corporation that having paid 
a fee ofthreehundredand fifty dollars on the twenty-second day of J a nuary , 1898, 
for the filing of its original articles of incorporation, and a further fee of 
sixteen hundred and fifty dollars on the first day of February, 1899, fo r the 
filing of its first amendment thereto, thu!. making a total aggregate amount 
of fees paid by the corporation of two thousand dollars, the secretary of 
state is not authorized to charge, or require to be paid, any further fee for 
the filing of any other amendment to its articles of incorporation by which 
its capital stock is increased. 
That is, it is claimed that the corpora tion has paid the maximum fee 
fixed by the statute, and that it is now entitled to file any number of amend-
ments to its articles of incorporation, and to increase its capital stock 
indefinitely, without paying a further fee to- the state. 
Whether such contention is true must be determined from the interpre-
tation given section 1610 of the code, a s amended by the acts of the Twenty-
seventh General Assembly. 
The construction of this statute depends largely upon the meaning of the 
clause-' 'but in no event shall a fee in excess of two thousand dollars be 
charged under the provisions of this section.'' 
Was it the intent of the legislature that this clause should be construed to 
cover the aggregate amount of fees paid at different times by a corporation 
for the fi ling of its original articles of incorporation and subsequent amend-
ments thereto increasing its capital sto~k, or 'did the legislature intend to 
limit the amount of the fee which the secretary of state is entitled to charge 
for a single tra nsaction in the filing of the articles of incorporation or subse-
quent amendments thereto increasing the capital stock of the corporation? 
If the former interpretation is given to this clause, then the contention of 
the corporation is right . If, however, it was the intention of the legislature 
to limit the amount of the fee to be charged by the secretary of state for the 
filing of the original articles of incorporation to $2,000.00, and to limit the 
cl!arge for the filing of any subsequeat amendment thereto increasing the 
capital stock of the corporation to $2,000.00, and not to limit the aggregate 
fees which the secretary of state is authorized to charge for separate and 
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distinct transactions, then the contention of the corporation cannot be sus-
tained . 
The statute provides that the corporation must pay to the secretary of 
state a fee of $25 .00, and $1.00 per thousand for all authorized stock in excess 
of $10,000.00, upon the filing of its original articles of incorporation . The 
maximum amount of such fee is, however, limited by the clause above 
quoted, to $2,000.00, and the secretary of state is entitled to charge a fee of 
$2,000.00 for the filing of the original articles of incorporation, if the author-
ized capital stock in excess of $10,000 .00 is sufficient to bring the fee to that 
amount. The filing of the original articles of incorporation, and the fee 
paid therefor, constitutes one transaction. 
The statute further provides, ' 'should any corporation thereafter increase 
its capital stock, it shall pay a fee to the secretary of state of $1.00 for each 
$1,000.00 of such increase, but in no event shall a fee in excess of $2,000.00 
be charged under the provisions of this section ." 
It will be observed that wherever the fee to be paid is referred to in the 
section, it is stated in the singular and not in the plural number, in terms 
which do not include aggregate fees. Thus, in the first clause quoted, it is 
provided that a fee of $25.00, and for all a uthorized stock in excess of 
$10,000.00, an additional fee of $1.00 per thousand shall be paid ; and in the 
last clause above quoted, it is provided, ''should any corporation thereafter 
increase its capital stock, it shall pay a fee to the secretary of state of $1.00 for 
each $1,000.00 of such increase, but in no event shall a fee in excess of 
$2, 000 . 00 be charged . " 
When a corporation fi les its original articles of incorporat ion , it must pay 
a fee therefor, and if it subsequently files an amendment increasing its 
capital stoc k, it mu st pay another fee for the filing of such amendment; each 
is· a separate and independent transaction, fo r which a separate fee is 
authorized and required by statute, and in my opinion the clause of limita-
tion applies to each of the fees th us to be charged by the secretary of state, 
separately, and not to the aggregate amount, which may be paid as fees 
for such separate transactions. 
Under this view, I a m compelled to hold that although a corporation may 
have paid a fee of $2,000 .00 upon the filing of original articles of incorpora-
tion, if it subsequently files an amendment to such original articles of incor-
poration increasing its capital stock, it must pay to the secretary of state a 
fee of $1.00 for each $1,000 .00 of such increase, not exceeding the sum of 
$2,000.00. 
I am therefore of the opinion, in the case su bmitted, that the Union 
Pacific Railroad company must pay to the secretary of state the maximum 
fee of $2,000.00 upon the filing of the amendment to its articles of incorpora-
tion whereby its capital stock is increased $100,000,000.00 as provided in 
section 1610 of the code. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHAS. W. MULLAN , 
A ttortzey-General. 
Apri113, 1901. 
To Hon. W. B . Martin, Secretary of State. 
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STATE NoRMAL ScHOOL-Authority of Board of Trustees to Use 
Mon.ey Derived from Certain Tuition Fees for the Purpose of 
Equipping New Buildings Erected.-The contingent fund pro-
vided for in section 2676 _of the code cannot be used to equip 
the new building or to enlarge the present heating plant in 
order toobtain sufficient capacity to heat the same. 
DEAR SrR-Your letter of the 6th inst., requesting an official opinion on 
the following question, has been referred to me for answer: 
You sta te that ''section 2676 of the code authorizes the board of 
trustees of the state normal school to ' charge a fee for contingent 
expenses not to exceed one dollar monthly, and a tuition fee of not 
more than six dollars a term, if necessary, for the proper support of 
the institution.' 
' ' May fees derived from the above sources be used to equip 
the new b uilding now being erected by act of the Twenty-eighth Gen-
eral Assembly, chapter 152, and to enlarge the present heating plant, 
in order to obtain sufficient capacity to heat the same?" 
Chapter 152 of the above act, in making an appropriation for an addi-
tional building at the state normal school, provides that ' 'there be and is 
hereby appropriated out of any money in the state treasury not otherwise 
appropriated, to be exp~nded in the erection and equipment of an additional 
building, the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, or so much thereof as 
may be necessary . " 
In making this appropriation, it must have been clearly the intention of 
the legislature that the sum so appropriated should cover the entire expense 
of erecting and equipping said building, as it designates said amount for 
such specific purpose. 
From the reading of the above act, we are led to the conclusion that no 
other moneys except such as are therein appropriated can be used in equip-
ping said building, certainly not any ot the money derived from fees and 
tuition provided for in section 2676 . 
That section of the statute makes such fees and tuition a part of the con-
tingent fund, to be used solely for contingent expenses. To equip a new 
building is not contingent -expenses .. 
Ordinary repairs should be paid out of the contingent fund, but when 
such repairs assume the magnitude of a rebuilding, or of an expensive addi-
\ion, they should be charged to the schoolhouse or building fund. 
It has been held that the seating of l} new schoolhouse could not be paid 
out of the contingent fund, but should be paid out of the schoolhouse fund. 
In Williams et at. v. Pienny et al., 25 Iowa, 438, it was held that the law 
does not authorize the use of the contingent fund for the erection or com-
pletion of schoolhouses, but when the house needs re-seating or other repairs, 
the cost may be defrayed either from the contingent fund, or from any unap-
propriated schoolhouse fund in the treasury, 
The equipping of a new building is not in the nature of repairs, but is a 
completion of the new building. 
For the~e reasons, expenses for equipment could not be charged to, or 
paid out of the contingent fund. 
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Neither do we think the enlargement of the present heating plant, in order 
to obtain sufficient capacity to heat this new building, can be paid out of the 
contingent fund provided for in section 2676 of the code. 
The enlargement of the present heating plant is made necessary by the 
fact that the new building has been erected. This expense is clearly inci-
den-t to the erection and equipment of the new building, and is not in the 
nature of repairs. 
We are unable to see any distinction between the placing of an entirely 
new heating pla nt and the enlarging and extending of the present plant so 
as to meet the same req uirements . Both would be incident to the equip.ping 
of the new building, and not in the nature of rep a irs. 
F or the reasons above given, we are clearly of the opinion tha t the con-
tingent fund provided for in section 2676 of the code cannot be used to equip 
the new building or to enlarge the present heating plant in order to obtain 
s ufficient capacity to heat the same. 
Respectfully submitted, 
May 6, 1901. 
CHAS. A. VAN VLECK, 
Assistant Attorney-General. 
To Hon. R. C. Barrett, Superintendent Public Iustruction. 
ScHOOi..s-lnstruction to be Given in Vocal Music by Special Teach-
ers-When instruction is given as stated in the opinion, there 
is a compliance with the law, and regular teachers under such 
circumstances would be clearly exempt from p~ssing an exam-
ination in the elements of vocal music. 
DEAR SrR-Yourfavorof the 6thinst., asking an official opinion o~ the 
following question has been referred to me for answer: 
' 'Section 1 of chapter 109, the acts of the Twenty-eighth Gen-
eral Assembly, provides that where instruction is not given in vocal 
music by special teachers, all teachers shall be required to satisfy the 
county superintendent of their ability to teach the subject. 
''Under present conditions, a large number of cities and towns now 
employ supervisors, or special teachers. These experts in some places 
visit the different rooms under their supervision semi-weekly, in others 
bi-weekly, and in still others only once in three weeks. 
''Where instruction is given as above, is there a compliance 
with the law, and may regular teachers be excused from examina-
tion?" 
From a careful reading of the section above referred to, we are led to the 
conclusion that where a special teacher is provided to instruct in the elt:ments 
of vocal music, this clearly exempts those teachers in general charge of such 
schools from satisfying the county superintendent of their ability to teach 
the elements of vocal music in a proptr manner. 
The question of the number of times such special teacher may instruct in 
such schools in the elements of vocal music, is one to be determined by the 
board of directors, and clearly can have no bearing upon the question of the 
examination of the other teachers, who instruct 'n other branches. The fact 
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that a special teacher is provided for the purpose of teaching the elements 
of vocal music, we believe clearly exempts such other teachers from furnish-
ing proof of ability to teach that branch. 
We are therefore of the opinion that when instruction is given, as stated 
in your inquiry, there is a compliance with the law, and that regular teach-
ers under such circumstances would bt. clearly exempt from such examina-
tion. Respectfully submitted, 
May 7, 1901. 
CHAS. A. VAN VLECK, 
Assistant Attorney-Genenal. 
To Hon. R. C. Barrett, Sttperintmdent of Public Instruction. 
BuREAU OF L A.tl OR STATISTICs-Whether it is advisable to send 
out blanks, provided for in section 2474 of the code, more than 
once during the biennial period is a matter of discretion with 
the commissioner. 
DEAR SIR-I am in receipt of your favor of the 31st ultimo, in which 
you ask my opinion as to the construction of section 2474 of the code. 
This section must be taken in connection with section 2470 , in determin-
ing the duties of the commissioner of labor statistics in colle.:ting information 
with reference to the industries of the state. 
Without going into a lengthy discussion of the questions involved, I will 
say that the statute does not provide when, or how frequently it is the duty 
of the commissioner to obtain information as to the labor statistics of the 
s tate , except that he must obtain such information in time to embody it in 
his biennial report to the governor. 
The intent of the statute is that the commissioner shall collect, assort 
and systematize a ll of the information whish he is able in relation to the 
commercial, social, eaucational and sanitary condition of the laboring classes 
of the state during his term of office, and in time to embody such informa-
tion in his biennial report. 
Whether it is desirable to send out the blank provided for in section 2474 
of the code more than once during the biennial period , is a matter which 
he must determine in his sound discretion and judgment, as there is no 
statutory requirement in relation thereto. 
Respectfully submitted, 
June 1 , 1901. 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
Attorney-General. 
To Hon. C. F . Wennerstrum, Commissioner Bureau Labor Statistics. 
CoLLATERAL INHERITANCE TAx-From an examination of the will 
of Francis G. Boyd, it is held that the fourth paragraph 
thereof makes a bequest to charity and is therefor not liable 
to the payment of a collateral inheritance tax. 
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DEAR SIR-I have given the fourth paragraph of the will of Francis G. 
Boyd, of Clinton, careful consideration, and made an examination of the 
authorities bearing upon the question involved, for the purpose of deter-
mining whether the bequest contained in that paragraph is one for a char-
itable purpose, and exempt from the payment of the collateral inheritance 
tax, under the provisions of section 1467 of the code. 
The weight of authority is: That where a bequest is made for a purpose 
which benefits the general public, it falls within the definition of charity. 
In the case In re Vaughan, 33 Chancery Division, 187, North, J., deliv-
ering the opinion of the English court of chancery, holds that a bequest to 
keep a churchyard in repair is a charitable bequest. 
This case has been cited and approved in numerous American decisions. 
In Wolford v. Crystal Lake Association, 54 Minn., 440, the supreme 
court of Minnesota recognizes the principle as being sound, and substan-
tially holds the same doctrine. 
The only case I have been able to find which can be said to tend to the 
establishment of a different principle, is a Massachusetts case in which a 
cemetery association was held liable tor a tort, on the ground that it was not 
a charitable organization. 
The question involved here, however, was not in the Massachusetts case, 
as it may well be true that a cemetery association is not a charitable organi-
zation, and yet, a bequest made to such association, for the benefit of the 
public, be a charitable bequest, which can be held and administered by the 
association. 
In the case under consideration, it is probably true that the Oakland 
Cemetery association is not, strictly speaking, a charitable organization. 
It may, however, take and hold a gift or bequest to charity, and if the exe-
cution thereof falls within the powers of such organization, it may carry 
into effect such gift or bequest. 
The bequest under consideration is for the purpose of beautifying the 
grounds of Oakland cemetery. The public will be benefited by its expendi-
ture, as directediinlthe will, as it is a recognized auty of all communities to 
improve and beautify their cemeteries . The execution of the bequest, and 
its expenditure as directed in the will, come within the powers of the asso-
ciation. 
I am therefore of the opinion that the judgment of the district court, 
holding the bequest is to charity, and not liable to pay the collateral inheri-
tance tax, is correct, and that the interest of the state will not be subserved 
by an appeal to the supreme court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
June 10, 1901. 
CHAS . W. MULLAN, 
Attorney-General. 
To Hon. G. S. Gilbertson, Treasurer of State, 
~OARD OF DENTAL ExAMINER~-~xP.en~es of-;-All costs, outlay 
and charges which are necessarily incidental to the perform-
12. 
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ance by the board of the duties imposed upon them, und{ r 
chapter gr, acts of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly, are 
included in the term "expenses". 
DEAR SIR-In answer to your personal request for a n opinion from this 
office as to w hat may reasonably and necessarily be included in the cl ause 
' 'with the actual expenses incurred by him in the discharge of such d utits, " 
appearing in section 7, chapter 91, acts of the T wenty-eigh th General Assem-
bly, relating to the board of dental examiners and the practice of dt ntistry, 
we have to say: 
We are of the opinion that a ll costs, outlay and charges which are nt ces-
sarily incidental to the performance by the board of the duties imposed upon 
them under this chapter a re included in the term ''expem;es." 
Webster defines the worq. ''expenses" to mean ''cost, outlay, charges, 
etc." As to wha t is necessary and reasonable ·cost, outlay a nd charges in 
the performance of your duties, we are of the opinio n that the r -Lilroad fare, 
hotel bills, cost or outlay for books and stationery, actu ally expended in 
going to and from your place of meeti ng and the carrying out of the duties 
imposed upon you by this chapter, are included therein. 
You further inquire, ''Is it the duty of the secretary and treasurer of the 
board to take the records, financial and otherwise, to and from the different 
p laces of meeting?" 
Section 4 of the above chapter requires that a book of reg istrati n shall 
be kept by the secretary in hi~ office , which shall be open to inspEction 
of the public. In no other part of said chapter do we find anything said as 
to where other books of the board sha ll be kept. lt is the rule and custom 
of all boards of this character, to keep the books used in the performance of 
their duty at the office of the secretary, and we can see no reason why any 
different rule should apply to this board. The secretary 's office is the proper 
place for keeping the records of the board, and we think it would not be 
wise for such board to carry the records about with them from place to place 
where they hold their meetings. 
You also ask ''Is the board expected to correct the examination papers 
at the time and place of examination, or at home?" 
We think this is clearly a matter of discretion with the board, as to 
whether they examine and mark the papers at the p!ace of exam ina ion, or 
n ot until they have returned home . The above chapter is silent a! to this, 
and it is our opinion tha t it is a matter left entirely within the discretion of 
the board. 
Again, you ask ' 'When i~ the biennial report of the treasurer to be 
made? '' .o 
Subdivision 5 of section 122 of the code provides tha t the biennial report 
of the board of dental examiners shall be laid before the governor on or 
before November 15th, in odd numbered years. 
Respectfully submitted, 
June21, 1901. 
CHAS . A. VAN VLECK, 
Assistant Attorney-General. 
To Dr. F. A. Lewis, Secrellsry and Treasurer State Board of Dental 
Examiners. 
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ATTOR NEY's FEEs-Such fees should be paid by the state, as well 
as court costs, where such costs and· fees are incurred in a 
prosecution for the vio lation of section 4897, as provided by 
chapter 128, acts of the Twenty-e ighth General Assembly. 
DEAR SIR-I have examined the certificate of the clerk of the district 
court of Jones county as to the fees and costs taxed in the case of the State 
of Iowa v. 7/wmas f{itlg , who was indicted for escaping from the penitentiary, 
and the affidavits of the county attorney and a ttorney for defendant attached 
thereto, and am of the opinion tha t the bill should be paid in full . 
Chapter 128 of the acts of the Twenty-eighth Genera l Assembly provides 
that all costs and fees incurred in prosecutions for violation of secrion 4897 
of the code, shall be paid out of the state treasury from the general fund, 
where the prosecution fails, or where such fees and costs cannot be made 
from the person liable to pay the same. 
In the case of the State v. King , the certificate of the clerk shows that 
it is impossible to collect any part of the costs from the defendant. They 
are therefore certified by the clerk of the dis:rict court to the auditor, under 
the provisions of chapter 128. 
1 think the phrase-' a ll c,. sts aud fees incurred in prosecu tion, etc . " in 
section 1 of said cllapter includes at t :rney's fees fixed by the court to be paid 
to the attorney appointed to defend in the case. 
The provisions of section 2 , which provides that the clerk of the district 
court shall certify to the state auditor the a mount o f fees or costs incurred 
in each case , etc., indicates that the purpose of the legislatu re was to include 
attorney 's fees as a part of the cost of the prosecution of such cases. The 
purpose of the sta tute is to relieve the cou nties in which the state penitenti-
aries are located from the burden of paying the costs of the prosecution of 
this character, and to put such burden upon the state a t large. 
Persons confin ed in the state penitentiaries are wards of the state, and the 
' state , and not the county in which the peniten ~iary is located should bear 
the expense incurred in caring for the penons so confined, or in prosecuting 
them for escaping or attempting to escape from the prison in which they are 
confined. 
No reason can be assigned why the county in which one of the peniten-
tiaries of the state is located should pay either the court costs or the 
attorney's fees , in an action against a defendant for escaping or attempting 
io escape from prison . Both a re necessary expenses incurred in prosecuting 
such action. The legislature, by chapter 128 of the acts of the Twenty-
eighth General Assembly, has undertaken to relieve such county from the 
paoment of such expenses, and such construction should be given to the 
language of the act, if it can be done, as will carry out the intent of the 
legislature. 
I am therefore of the opinion that attorney's fees should be pidd by the 
state, as well as what are strictly known as court costs. 
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In accordance w· h the provisions of chapter 12 ~, therefore, you should 
dra w your warrant on the treasurer for the a mount of the cla im . 
R espectfully spbmitted , 
C HAS . W . MULLAN. 
Attorney-Genu a!. 
June 22, 1901. 
To Hvn. Frank F. M erriam, A uditor of State. 
SuRVEY AND RE-SURVEY O F PuBL 1 c L ANDS-( I) Th e lands 
described in the opinion, for which patents are asked, are not 
of the class claimed by the state under its right of sovereignty 
in lakes and lake beds within its te rritory, and a re -survey 
th ereof, or patents issued therefor, do not conflic t with the 
position maintained by the state as to its own ership of lakes 
and lake beds, which were correctly meandered by the orig inal 
government survey. 
(21 It is held that the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul railway is 
e ntitled to lands described in paragraph two of the opinion, 
which are included within the railway grant, from the general 
government, and were erroneously included from the original 
government survey. 
(3 ) Clay county is entitled, under the Swamp Land Grant from 
the government, to certain lands dellcribed in paragraph three 
of the opinion, which are excluded in such re-survey. 
No patent has yet been issued to th~ state by the government 
for any of these lands. 
SIR-I beg to report that I have made a careful examination of the evi. 
dence offered as to the origina l and re-survey of lands by the government in 
townships n inety-six (96 ) and ninety-seven (97), ranges thirty-four (34) an d 
thirty-five (35), west of the fifth principal m e ridian, for a re -survey of which 
an application was made to the commissioner of the land office , and a 
re-survey thereof made under the direction of the commissioner in the 
months of May and June, 1900, and have found the following facts, wi th 
my conclusions thereon, to wit: 
First .-! find that a mistake was mjde in the meander lines of the 
origina l survey of said lands . These lines do not follow the shores of any 
body of water, and a considerable amount of dry tillable lands were excluded 
from the orig inal survey by reason of such m istake . The lands thus 
excluded are not lakes or Jake beds, a nd were erroneously included with 
Trumbull and Lo .t Island lakes , and bounded by the mea nder lines of such 
survey. No reason exists why such mistake in the original survey should not 
be corrected, and patents to said lands be issued from the state to the 
parties entitled ·thereto. The lands for which patents are asked are not of 
the class claimed b y the state under its right of sovereignty in lakes and Jake 
beds within its territory, and a re-survey thereof , or patents issued therefor 
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do not con flict with the position m aintained by the state as to t he ownership 
o f lakes a nd la ke beds, which were correc tly meandered by the original 
governmen t su rvey . · 
~·ecotzd . -l fi nd t_hat the ChicQ.go , Milwaukee & St. Pau l Railway is 
entt tled to the followmg lands , which are included with in the railway g ra nt 
fr~~ the general government, and were erroneou5ly excl uded f rom the 
ong ma l govern men t survey. 
Lots nu mbered six (6), seven (7), eight (8), nin e (9) and ten ( lO) , the 
southeast quarter of th e nor theast quarter , the sou thwe~t quarter of the 
sou the st quarter, anri the east half of the southeast quarter of section nin e-
teen t 1 9~; lots numbered nine (9) , ten (10; and eleven (11 ) , in secti on 
twenty:nme (29), a ll in township n nety-seven (97), r a nge thi rty -fou r west 
o f the hfth pnnctpal merid ian. 
L ots five 15) , six (6), seven (7) and nine (9) , in sect ion one (1); lots 
five (5) and Sl~ (6) m section (ll}j lots four (4) and fi\•e (5) in section thir-
t~en (13) ~ ~ll m township ninety-six (96), range (35) , west uf the fifth rin-
cipal mend tan. p 
Lots five (5) in iiect ion twenty-three (23); lots five (5) six (6) a nd seven in 
sectwn twent~-se~en (27); lot< seven (7) and (8), in section thirty-five (35} , 
all_ m_ townsh~p Dinety·seven (97), range thirty-five (35), west of the fil th 
pn nCiiJal mendian . 
A patent has been issued by the goveromen t to the state fo r the I d · 
to h · · (9 ) an s m wns tp mnety-seven 7 . range t hirty-four (34) a foresaid, and 0 0 reason 
eJ<.Jsts why the state ~hould not ar once issue its patent to the railwa com -
pany fo r these lands . y 
. N J paten t h~s a> yet be~n i sued by the goverament to the state for lands 
m townships ntnety-six !96) and {97) , ran ge thirty -five (35), and the patent 
from the state to the ra ilway company should no t issue until such lands a re 
patented to the state uy t he government. 
Tni•-d. -I find that Clay county iS ent it led , under t h ~ Swamp Land Grant 
from the government to the fo llowing decrib d hinds, which a re included in 
such re-survey, namely: 
1 
Lot~ eight (81, ten { 10) a n •l eleven i ll ), in sect ion one (1), the east one- ha lf 
( Yz ) of the southeast one fouth ()4 ) and lots seven (7) and eigh t (8) of sec-
tiOn eleven (11 ); lo t~ five (5) and ~ix (6) of section twelve (J2); lots fou r (4) 
an_d five (5J of sectiOn f•Jurteen (14) . a ll in township ninety-six (96), ran o-e 
t hirty-five r35), west of the fifth principal m eridian. ~ 
~ot el~ven (11) in ~ection t wenty-five {25); lots fou r (4), five (5) and six 
(_6! m s~ctwn t_wen ty:slx (26); lot five (5 ) in section thi rty-four (34!, and lot 
SI~ (6~ ID sect1on thirty · five (35), . a ll_ in township ninety-seven (97;, ra nge 
th irty five (35 ), west of the fi fth pnnctpal meridian. 
No patent has as yet been issued to the state by the government fo r any 
of t~ese lands, a nd the patent from the state to Clay county should not issue 
until the state receives its patent from t he government. 
Repectfully subm itted, 
July, 3, 1901. 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
Attorney-Gweral. 
T o the Honorable Leslie M. Shaw, Gover?tor of I owa. 
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CLAIM oF THE STATE oF IowA UPON THE UNITED STATES FOR 
INTEREST UPON BoNDS IssuED IN 186o-(1) It is held that the 
state, at the time of the payment of the interest npon its war 
bonds and for at least six years after the last payment of such 
intere~t made, had a valid claim against the United States for 
the interest so paid upon its war bonds, which could have been 
enforced against the government. 
(2 ) It is doubtful whether such claim is n ) W barred by the statute 
of limitations . . 
(3) No authority is lodged in the governor, executive counctl: or 
other body to employ and compensate counsel for prosecutmg 
a claim of this character against the United States. 
SIR-Replying to your favor of the 22d ult . , in which you ask my 
opinion upon the following questions: . 
First .-' • Has the s tate of Iowa any claim upon the Umted States 
for interest paid by the state upon bonds issued in 186~, a nd pat~. Ill 
1881, such bonds being issued in aid of the governmen_t m prosecu~mg 
the war against the insurgent forces in arms agmost the Umted 
States?" 
Second.-' 'If the state has such claim, is there any authority 
lodged by law in the governor or executive council or any othe.r body 
to employ and provide for compensating counsel for prosecutmg the 
claim?" 
I respectfully submit the following opinion : 
First. -Nearly all of the northern states raised large amounts of money, 
either by bonds or taxation or both, in 1861 and_ 18~2 , for :he purpose of 
aiding the federal government in enlisting and equtppmg soldiers for the war 
of the rebellion. This was done pursuant to an act of congress of July 27, 
1861 which provided that the secretary of the treasury was directed out of 
the ~oney in the treasury, not otherwise appropriated, to pay to the gov-
ernor of any state, or his duly authorized agents , the cost~ •. charges _and 
expenses pr<>perly incurred by such states for enrollin~, s~bsistmg, clothmg, 
supplyi lg, arm ing, equipping, p~ying a~d transpor:mg Its •roops employed 
in aiding to supp ress the insurrectiOn agamst the Umted S tates. . 
By a joint resolution of congress, ~pproved March 8, 1862, It was 
declared that this act of congress should b~ construed to apply to expenses 
incurred as well after a'i b~fore the date of the approval of the act. 
The state of Iowa expended in equipping, clothing, arming and subsist-
ing its troops, enlisted in aid of the general government, ~omething over one 
million of dollars, for which interest bearing bonds w~re tss~ed by the state, 
as there was nQ available money in the treasury wtth whtch to pay such 
expenditure. 
A large portion of this sum has since been repaid by the general govern-
ment to the state, but the interest upon what are known as the war bonds 
has never been allowed or paid. 
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An almost identical condition obtains in many other states of the Union. 
A claim of like character was transmitted by the secretary of the treasury 
to the court of claims on the third day of January, 1889, by the state of 
New York against the general government, for interest upon money used by 
that state in arming , equipping, clothing and subsisting its soldiers. 
This claim of the state of New York was allowed by the court of claims, 
and an appeal was taken from the decision of that court to the supreme 
court of the United States, the case being reported in the 160 United States 
Report at page 598. 
Without going into detail as to all of the questions ra ·sed and p1.ssed up on 
by the court in that case, it is sufficient to say that the claim of the state of 
New York was upheld by the United States supreme court in every point 
and its claim for interest paid upon money borrowed by the state to pay for 
the expense of equipping, arming, clothing, and subsisting its soldiers, 
enlisted in defense of the general government, was held to be a valid claim 
against the United States. 
In passing upon the question , Judge Harlan S'lid: 
"We cannot doubt that the in ·erest paid by the state on its bonds, 
issued to raise money for the purposes expressed by congress, consti-
tutes a part of the cost, charges, and expense properly incurred by it 
for those objects . Such interest when paid became a principal sum 
as between the state and the United States,-that is, became a part 
of the aggregate sum p roperly paid by the state for the United States. 
The principal and interest so paid constitutes a debt from the United 
States to the state. It is as if the United States had itself borrowed 
the money through the agency of the state ." 
I can see no reason why the principles enunciated by Judge Harlan, upon 
which the New York case was decided, do not apply with equal force to the 
clai n of the state of Iowa for the interest paid by it upon bonds issued to 
raise money to arm, equip, a nd subsist s1ldiers furnished the general gov-
ernment, to aid in suppressing the rebellion. The decision in the New York 
case is, in my judgment, conclusive as to the valid ity of the claim of the 
state of Iowa for such interest. 
I am. therefore, o t the opinion that the state, at the time of the payment 
of the interest upon its war bonds, and for at least six years after the last 
payment of such interest was made, h ad a valid !a im against the United 
States for the interest so paid upon its war bonds, which could have been 
enforced against the government. 
Second.-The serious question arising as to th~-: enforc ng of snch claim 
against the United States at the present time is whether the claim of the 
state is now barred by the statute of limitations . The la"'< t of the war bonds, 
and interest thereon, was paid by the state in 1881 . Prior to 1894 the state 
had filed its claim against the government for its costs and expenses in 
enlisti~g, arming, and equipping its soldiers, for the sum of $1,095,303.09. 
By the report of the committee on war claims. submitted to congress 
February 28, 1895, $1,062,453.84 of the claim was allowed, and afterward 
paid by the United States to the state of Iowa, leaving an unpaid balance 
of the claim then made by the state against the government of $32,849.25. 
No claim appears to have bet:n made against the government for the 
interest paid upon the war bonds, and the que~tion of the validity of such 
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claim bas, therefore, never been pa~sed upon by any of the departments or 
courts or the United States. 
Section 1069, of the Revised Statute~ of the United States, provides: 
''Every claim against the United States cognizable by the court of 
claims, shall be forever barred, unles:> the petition, setting forth a 
statement thereof, is filed in the C'ourt, or transmitted to it by the sec-
retary of the senate , or clerk of the house of representat ives, as pro-
vided by law, within six years after the first claim acC'rues." 
This statute was held in the case of the United States against New York 
supra, n r. t to affect clai ms which bad b~en filled with an ex~cutive depart-
ment of the state, although such claims did not reach the court ot claims 
within six y. ars after the same accrued. 
Prior to the decision in the New York case, the accounting officers of the 
treasury department were disall0wing and refusing to pay all claims for 
interest paid by the s tates for money borrowed u pon bonds, or otherwi<e, for 
the purpose of arming and equipping their sold ie r~. and· prior to that time it 
was not believed by the state of Iowa, or other northern states, that any 
valid cL!im aga ins t the goueroment ex is ted to r the repayment of ouch 
interest. 
It is ·a well settled rule of la w that laches is an equitable defe nse, con-
trolled by equitable consi derations, and varies with the peC'uliar circum-
stances of each case. Unless It is shown that owing to the neglect of the 
complainant, some right or advantage has been lost to the defendant, a lapse 
of time is of very little consequence . The rule is stated s:rongly and ter: ely 
in Dagger v. Van Dyke, 37 New Jer3ey Equity , 130 , as follows: 
"It is only when the complainant has slept over his wrvng' so long 
that great and serious wrong will be done to the delendant, that laches 
will constitute a complete de ense. Here the parties a:-e in a lmost 
exactly the same posit ion n ow that tb~y were at the time the wrong, 
for which redress is sought, was done , and relief may be g iven to the 
complainant without doing any harm whatever to the defendant." 
This principle was recognized in the case of U1tited States v. New Yurk, 
sztpra. 
Since t he decision of that case, many other states bavr; filed the tr claims 
against the general govern ment, and are now prosecuting the same with 
vigor, in the belief that the Uni ted S •ates courts will finally hold . that the 
statute of limitations, above quoted, does not apply to this cl ass of claims. 
Tnis is notably true of Pennsylvania, which has a very large claim now 
pending, wh ich stands exactly in the t~osition of the claim of the state of 
Iowa. 
So much depend s upon the view ta keu by the courts as to '-'"hether a com-
plainant should be barred from prosecuting his claim by reason of laches , 
tha t , in my judgment, the facts in this case warrant the prosecution of the 
claim of th• state against the government, for the interest paid upon its war 
bonds. I do not feel justified 1n taking the re 'lponsibility under the circum-
stances of saying tha t the United States courts will hold that the claim of the 
state is barred by the statute of limitations, because of the laches of the 
state in prosecuting the same, and for that reason no effort should be made 
to collect such claim . 
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Tliird.-As to the question whether any authority is lodged by law in the 
governor, executive council or other body, to employ and provide compen-
sation for counsel for prosecuti Lg the claim, I am Cilf the opinion that no 
authority is lodged in the governor, executive council or other body to 
employ and compensate counsel for prosecuting a claim of th is character 
aga,nst the United States. 
The claim against the government sh ou ld be prepared and filed by the 
executive department of the state. It then becomes the duty of the attorney.-
general to appear in beh a lf of the ~ ta te to prosecute such claim, a nd if it is 
thought dc~irable to employ additional counsel to assis t him in its prosecu-
tion, a provision for such assistant cou nsel , and their compensation, must 
be made by the legislature, as no power is lodged elsewhere under which a 
contract can be ~ntered into for the employment or payment of such addi-
tional counsel. Respectfully submit ted, 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
A tlo>11t:y-Get11!1'al. 
July 9 , 190 1. . 
TtJ the l-Ion . L eslie M. Shaw, Gover11or of Iowa. 
FEES FOR FrL ING ART ICLES OF I NCO RPORATION-The corpora-
tion me nti o ned in th e opi nion does no t fall within the exemp-
tion provided for in section 1637, and it mus t fi le with th e 
secretary of s tate a certified copy of it s articlts uf incorpora-
tion, pq t he s tatuto ry lee , a nd receive a permtt, before it is 
entitled to carry on it-; bus in ess within th e state. 
SIR-In respo nse to your request for my opinion as to whether the 
American Grain Purifie r Constructing com pany should pay the fees provided 
in section 1637 of the code, tor fili ng a certified copy of its artic le.; of incor-
poration with the secretary o f state, and te.eivi ng from the secretary a per-
mit to tran sact business in the s tate of Iowa , 1 submit the fo llowing opinion: 
All corporations s~eking to do b •ls tness w ithi n the state of low~, by filing 
certified copies of their a r ticles o f incorp ora t io n with the sec retary of state, 
and receivinR" from him a permit to tra nsac t business within the:; s ta te, must 
pay statutory fees, exce pt such corporations as a re specifica lly exe mpted 
from the payme nt thereo f by the provisions of sec iion 1637 of the code. 
Does th e cc rporation referred tO co me with in the exception named in 
section 1637? 
T ue lan g uage of the section is a~ follow~ : 
''Any corpor<tion for p .:cuniary p ro fit, other than for c-arrying o n 
mercantiie or man ufac turing business, organized under the Jaws of 
~ other state, or of a n y ter rito ry "f the Uni,c.. cl S t .. tes , o r uf auy 
foreign country, which has transacted busi nes -; in the s tate of Iowa 
si nce the first day of September, 1836, or de-; ire:; hereaftn to transact 
business in this s tate, and wh ich has not a permi t to do su ch bus iness. 
shall file with the secretary of state a certi ti ed copy of its art ic les of 
incorporation, duly attested, accompanied by resolution of its board of 
directors or stockholders , authorizing the filing thereof, and also 
authorizing service of pr:>cess to be m.ade upon any of its officers, or 
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agents in this state, t::ngaged in the transaction of its business and 
requesting the issuance to such corporation of a permit to tra~sact 
busin~ss in this state; said application to contain a stipulation that such 
perm~t ~h~ll be subject to the provisions of this chapter. Before such 
permit IS Issued the said corporation shall pay to the secretary of state 
the same fee required for the organization of corporations in thi~ state 
and if .th~ capital of such corporation is increas;d it shall pay the sam~ 
fee as IS 10 such event requirtd of corporations organized un der the 
law of this state. * * *. •• 
T~e excepti~n provided for in the statute i> intended to apply only to cor-
poratiOns carrymg on a mercantile or manufacturing business outside of the 
state, which desire to ship into the state, a nd sell their goods or manufac-
tured. p~oducts; the purpose of the exception is to permit such corporation 
to. ship mto .the state and sell their goods or manufactured products wi bout 
fi lm g a certifi~d. copy of their articles of incorporation with the secretary of 
state, or obtammg a permit to transact that class of business within the 
state. . 
When, however, any corporation , organized under the la ws of another state 
or ?fa territo.ry of the ~nited States, or of a fo reign country, except corpo~ 
ratiOns organized exclusiVely for the purpose of carrying on a mercantile or 
man~facturing business, d · si res to enter the state, and transact its business 
therem, such corporatio n must file a certified copy of its articles of incorpo-
ration with the secretary of state, pay the statutory fee therefor and receive 
a permit from the 'ecretary, before engaging in the transaction of its busi-
ness within the state. 
I think it is a~so true th~t the exception provided for in the statute applies 
only to ~orporauons orgamzed ior the purpose of carrying on an exclusive 
mercantile or manufacturing business, and if the corpora tion is organized 
for the purpose of carrying on or cond ·Jcting a ny other class of business 
although the same ~ay be c~mnected with mercantile or ·manufacturing busi~ 
ne~s, su~h corporation does not fall within the exemption of the statute; and 
If It desires to transact its busineEs within the s· ate it mu st file a certified 
copy of its articles of incorporation with the secretary of state, pay the stat -
utory fee and receive from him a permit to transa\:t business within the state 
In saying this, ho~ever, I do not intend to be uaderstood as holding tha~ 
such a corporat1on m1ght not ship its goods or manufactured products into 
the .state, and sell them here, without filing with the secretaty of state a 
certified copy of its articles of incorporation, and receiving from him a per-
mit so to do . 
Th~ Arueric.an Grain Purifier Constructing company is not a corporation 
org~n1zed outsi~e of the state of Iowa for the purpose of carrying on an ex-
~lus!Ve mercant1 e or manufacturing busi ness , which simply desires to ship 
Its goods o~ m~nu.factured products into the state for the purpose of selling 
them therem; It 1~ a corporation which des res to enter the state for the 
purpose of transacting its ordinary busine~s. 
The purpose and business of the corporation is set forth in the second 
article of its articles ol incorporation as follows: 
''The purpose for which this corporation is formed is to manufac-
ture a~d sell a patent grain purifier and dryer; to acquire, own , sell 
and dispose of patents pertaining thereto, or any right therein; to 
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acquire, manufacture, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the right to 
construct all our patent purifiers and dryers; to purify grain, and to 
do and perform all acts necessary in the business of purifying grain, 
or manufacturing grain purifiers and dryers, and selling or acquiring 
patents pertaining to purifiers and dryers, or to sell or otherwise dis-
pose of the manufactured product of this company, or of any right, 
in whole or in part, in and to the p atents now owned by this com-
pany .' ' 
Under this provision of its articles of incorporation the compapy has the 
right to manu facture and sell its patent grain purifier and dryer. It also, 
however, takes to itself the right to acquire, own, sell and d ispose of patents 
pertaining to such grain purifier and dryer, or any right therein; also t? 
sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the ri ght to construct or use patent pun-
tiers and dryers; to acquire and sell patents pertaining to purifiers and dry-
ers, or any right. in whole or in part, to the patents owned by the company· 
That is to ~ay, coupled witn its right to manufacture and sell patent grain 
purifiers and dryers, the corporation is organized for the purpose o.f selli~g 
to any other person or persons the right to manufacture and sell Its gram 
purifi rs and dryers. within any clesignated territory of the state of Iowa, 
and to sell to any person or persons any or all of i•s patents pertaining to 
purifiers and dryers, or any right, in whole or ill part, to the patents owned 
by the company. 
It is , therefore, clear that the corporation does not fa ll within the exemp-
tion provided for i-1 section I637, above quoted, and that it must file with the 
secretary of state a certified copy of its articles of incorporation, pay the 
statutory fee provided therefor and receive a permit from the secretary of 
state to transact its bnsiness within the state, before it is entitled to carry on 
its business therem . 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHAS. W . MULLAN, 
Attorney- (;meral . 
July 12 , 1901. 
To Han. W. B . Martin, Secretary of State . 
D AIRY CoMMISSIONER. -So far as section 2523 of the code refers 
to the testing of milk by operators of creameries, cheese or 
condensed milk factories, the word" milk" includ es" cream." 
SIR-I beg to acknowledge receipt of your reqnest of this date, in which 
you ask my opinion: 
First.-'' Does the word 'milk' therein contained (section 25,23 oi 
the code) include the word 'cream'?" 
In m y opinion, so far as the section refers to the testing of milk by 
operators of cr, ameries, cheese or condensed milk factories, the word ''milk'' 
includes cream. Wherever a test is made either of milk or cream, it must 
be in the manner provided in section 2523 of the co::le. 
In answering your second and third inqniries, which I do not deem nec-
essary to quote in full, I will say that under section 2523 operators of cream-
eries, cheese or condensed milk factories, whenever a test of the quality of 
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milk or cream is made, are required to use such ;~pp liances and tllsts as shall 
be clear oil, free from any foreign substance, and produce correct measure-
ments of butter fat. 
The kind or character of the appliance used for this purpo<e i< within 
the discretion of the dairy commissioner, t he statute requiring that every 
such appliance so used for te5ting milk or cre :J.m, must be certified by him 
as an approved appliance for making such measurements, before the same 
can be used by o perators. 
The statute practically leaves the character of the implement used in mak-
ing such tests, a nd th<J manner in whi ch such tests shall be made within the 
control of the dairy commissioner, and any appliance which gfves a correct 
measurement, which has been approved and certified by him, can be law-
fully used in making such tests. 
Respectfully submitted, 
July 15, 1901. 
CHAS. W. MuLLAN, 
Attorney-Ge11eraL . 
To the Hon . B . P . Norton, Dairy Commissionrr. 
CoLLATE RAL INHERITANCE TAx-Int e res t Thereon-It is held 
that the interes t which accrues upon the estate, after the death 
of the testator or intesta te, a nd before the distribution, is not 
liable to pay th e collateral inheritance tax. 
SIR-In response to your inquiry as to whether interest accumulations, 
upon property liable to p ay :1 collateral inheritance tax, which accrues af ter 
the death of the testator or intestate, and before the property is distributed, 
is liable to pay collateral inheritance tax, I, submit the follow .ng opinion: 
Our statu le, providing for the collection of a collateral inheritance Tax , 
is modeled after 1he statutes of New York and Pennsylvania , and in deter-
mining the interpretation which our courts will give the statute, we naturally 
turn to see what construction has been placed upon simi lar sta tu tes in those 
states . 
The question submitted arose early in Pennsylvania, aad in 111ilLer's 
Estate, reported in Pennsylvania Cou::; ty Court Reports, at page 522, it was 
held that accumulations of interest, after the death of the decedent, and 
before the distribution to the heirs, was not liable to pay the collateral 
inheritance tax . 
The court in that case said: 
''Collateral inheritance tax is imposed only upon the estate owned 
, by the decedent at the time of his death, and not upon interes t or 
income subsequently arising." 
This doctrine was subsequently adhered to by the supreme court of 
Pennsylvania, in fViltiamson's EJtate, 153 Pa. St. Report, page 508 , in 
which it is stated: 
''The orphans' court was also in error in holding that our decision 
In re Williamson's Estate, 143 Pa., 150, subjects the income for the 
first year to the collateral inheritance tax. This tax fastens upon so 
much of the estate as passes to collaterals as it ~;tands at the death of 
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the testator. lt comes out of the corpus of the gift, upon its descent 
or transmission upon the death of the former owner to the ·beneficiary. 
Income accruing su bsequently comes not from the testator, but from 
the property held by, or for the use of the legatee or other beneficiary, 
and is not to be distinguished from income derived by the mme 
persons from any other source.'' 
In Matter of Wilt of Vassar, reported in the 127 New York, at page 1, 
the court of appeals of New York squarely holds that interest accruing af~er 
the death of the testator, and before distribution, is not chargeable wtth 
collateral inheritance tax ThA court in passing u on the question ~ays: 
• 'The better and more reasonable construction of the statute is that 
the property of which the person died seised or possessed_is subject to 
the tax; that the increase or interest thereafter obtamed by the 
executors is property of which the testator \las not seised or possessed 
at the time of his death; that the property should be appraised, and 
the tax assessed as soon after death as practicable, and that the tax 
should then become immediP.tel y due and payable; the provision for 
charging interest thereon in case it is not paid is in lieu of any increase 
or inter~;st that may be derived from the estate by the executors . " 
Substantially the same provision found in the New York statu~e, re~ating 
to the charging of interest for the non· payment of the collateral ~nhentance 
tax, if not paid within the time fixed by the statute, was enacted tn our own 
statute on the subject, in the•e words: 
'• All taxes imposed by this chapter shall be payable to the treasurer 
of state, and those which are made payable by executors, adminis-
trators or trustees, shall be paid within fifteen months from the death 
.of the testator or intestate, or within fifteen months from assuming of 
the trust by the trustee, unless a longer period is fixed by the court. 
All taxes not paid within the time prescribed by this act shall draw 
interest at the rate of eight per centum per annum until paid." 
By th .s provision the legislature has imposed a penalt~ of e~ght per cen.t 
per annum upon all property liable to pay the collateral mhentance tax, tf 
the same is not paid within fifteen months . One of the purpose~ of such 
provision is to compel the payment of such penalty in lieu of any increase .or 
interest that may be derived from the estate by the executor or admm-
istrator. 
Under the holding of these cases, decided upon &•statute almost identical 
to ours both in New York and Pennsylvania, lam very clear that the inter-
est whi~h accrues upon the estate after the death of the tes tator or intestate, 
and before the distribution, is not liable to pay the collateral inheritance tax , 
and our courts will so hold when they are called upon to pass upon the 
question. 
Under section 5 of chapter 51 of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General 
Assembly the entire estate, subject in whole or in part to the payment of ~be 
collateral inheritance tax, should be appraised for the purpose of computmg 
such tax by the collateral inheritance tax appraisers . From the value so 
fixed by ~he appraisers, the debts of the decedent, as defined in section 1 of 
· this chapter, should be deducted, and the computation of the collateral 
inheritance tax made upon the amount of the value of the estate, after such 
debts are deducted; without adding accumb.late.d interest,. 
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The case of Hooper v. Shaw, 176 Mass., has sometimes been cited as 
holding a doctrine contrary to that herein expressed, but a careful reading 
of that case will disclose that the question whether interest accruing upon 
property in the hands of an executor or administrator, after the death of the 
testator or intestate, and before distribution, was liable to pay collateral 
inheritance tax, was not involved ln the decision of that case, the issue 
determined by the court being as to whether the United States legacy tax 
should be deducted as a debt before computing the state collateral inheri-
tance tax, aod while the court ha ' used language which possibly might be 
construed as adhering to a different doctrine, I cannot regard the case as 
authority against the rule laid down by the New York and Pennsylvania 
courts. 
Another rule of construction which obtains as to statutes of this character, 
and which leads me to the conclusion arrived at, is that taxes imposed by 
the collateral inheritance acts are special and not general. 
In Matte,.. of McPket'"SOn, 104 New York, 306. 
And it is the rule that special tax laws are to be construed strictly against 
the government, and favorable to the taxpayer ; that a citizen cannot be 
subject to special burdens; without clear warrant of law . 
Dos Passes on Collateral Inheritance Taxes , 41 
Matter of Emton, 113 New York, 174. 
This, I believe, covers the question submitted to me for n:iy opinion. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHAS. W. MuLLAN, 
A ttorney-Gmet·al . 
Jul y 20, 1901, 
To H o1z. G. S. Gilbe1·tson, Treasurer of State. 
Bu REAU OF LABOR STATISTICs-No "use should be made of names 
of individuals, firm s, or corporations supplying information 
obtained unde r the authority vested in the commissioner by 
section 2472. 
SIR-You ask our · opinion as to whether the information obtained 
through inspection pr vided for in section 2472 of the code, is such informa-
tion as i' deemed confidential, and the publication o f the names of individ-
uals, firms, or corporations is prohibited by section 2475 of the code. 
Our answer to this inquiry must be in the negative.. In order to answer 
this question intelligently, it is neces9B.ry that we consider the entire chapter 
8, relative to the creation and duties of the commissioner of labor statistics. 
S ction 2470 defines the duties of the commissioner, and specifies the kind 
and class of information which it is his duty to collect, assort, systematize, 
and present in his report to the governor. 
Section 2474 provides that such information shall be furnished upon 
request of the commissioner. 
Section 2471 vests the commissioner with power to secure such infor-
mation, when not otherwise furnished, by the issuance of subprenas, 
administering oaths, and taking testimony of witnesses . . 
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Section 2472 also furnishes another means of obtaining such information, 
where the commissioner is unable to procure the same under section 2474 or 
2471. 
Neither of the last above mentioned sections provides for any other class 
of information to be obtained by the commissioner than that specified in 
section 2470. This last mentioned section enumerates and specifies all of 
the information which the commissioner is required to collect, assort, sys-
tematize, and pre~ent in his report. 
Sections 2471, 2472, and 2474 only provide the means, or vests the com-
missioner with certain powers, by which he may obtain such information. 
Section 2475 clearly prohibits the use of the names of individuals, firms, 
or corpo rations, in supplying information called for by sections 2470 and 
2471. 
It cer:ainly could not have been the intent of the legislature to permit 
the use of confidential information obtained by the means provided in sec-
tion 2472, and prohibi t its use when obtained either under section 2474 or 
2471. 
Tb ~ real purpose and intention of the leg islature in prohibiting the use of 
information is because the same is in its nature deemed confidentia l. Such 
information is as much confidential information when obtain"ed under the 
power ves ted in the commissioner by section 2472, as it would be if obtained 
by either of the other methods. 
We, therefore, are clearly of the opinion that no u se should be made of 
names of individuals, firms, or corporations , supplyin_g- the information 
obtained under the authority vested in the commissioner by section 2472. 
July 22, 1901. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHAS. A. VAN VLECK, 
Assistant Attornev-General. 
To H on. C. F. Wennerstrz1m, Commissioner Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics. 
IOWA STATE CoLLEGE-Expenses of Trustees-The board of 
trustees of such college cann ot use any portion of the appro-
priation made by chapter 152 of the act&of the Twenty-eighth 
General Assembly for the expenses to be incurred on a pro-
posed trip to inspect college buildings in the East. 
SIR-You ask our opinion as to whether the board of trustees of the Iowa 
State college can make an appropriation for the expenses incurred on a 
proposed trip to inspect college buildings in the East, for the purpose of 
enabling them better to prepare plans for a new building to be asked for 
at the next session of the legislature. 
The appropriation to the Iowa State college by section 1, chapter 152, 
acts of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly, was made for certain specific 
purposes, viz: 
"For repairs, general impr-:>vements, current expenses, and addi-
tional support." 
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'l'o hold that expenses incurred in the manner spec ·fied in your inquiry 
could be paid out of the above appropriation, would be giving an interpreta-
tion to the specified purposes therein mentioned which the rules of interpreta-
tion do not justify . 
Such expenses not com in,_ wi thin the above mentioned specific purposes, 
we are clearly of the opinion that they cannot legally be paid out of said 
apJ)ropriation. Respectfully submitted, 
August 17, 1901. 
CHAS. A . VAN VLECK, 
Assistant Attomey-General. 
To J . B . Hungerfo d, Chairman Board of Trustees , Iowa State College. 
INSUt<Al\CE PoLICIEs-The clause contained tn lines 31 to 40 
inclusive in the printed portion of what is known as Iowa 
Standard Policy. should be eliminated from all fire insurance 
polic •es within the state of Iowa. 
SIR-I h ave examined what is known as the Iowa Standard Policy, with 
re ference to the clause co ntained in the printed portion of the policy 
embraced in lines 31 to 40 inclusive, which provides that in case the policy 
holder obtains other additional insurance, which is permitted by the policy, 
and such insurance ~hall not be valid and collectible, the ob taining of such 
insurance shall be held to be an election on the part of the insured to cancel 
the policy, and the ~arne shall stand canceled from the time such invalid 
insurance is obtained, and the insured shall be entitled to receive upon return 
of the policy to the company, the unearned premium from the date of sur-
render . 
I can put no other construction upon this provision than that which its 
language imports. That is, that the inSurance company and the policy 
holder agree that if such invalid insurance is obtained by the policy holder, 
the previous policy held by him under his contract of insurance shall at once 
be canceled, and he loses all right to recover thereunder. 
The clause is certainly a rarnarkable one, and one which in my judgment 
should be eliminated from all fire policies within the state of Iowa. I can 
see no particular be.nefits whkh will accrue to the insurance company by the 
retention of the clause, and clearly see many hardships which may be sus· 
tained by the p olicy holders if the clause is permitted to remain. 
Respectfully submitted, 
August 22, 1901. 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
Attorney-General. 
To Hon. Frank F. Merriam, Auditor of State. 
-IowA STATE CoLLEGE-Use of Funds Ap'propriated for Support 
of Experiment Station·.-The experiment stati'on is a depart-
ment and part of sc;tid colleg.e. The _board of trustees may 
legally use such portio~ of the inon~y appropria~ep by section 
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one of chapter I 52 of tpe laws of the Twenty· eighth General 
Assembly as is, in their judgment, required to meet the cur-
rent expenses and support of such department. 
It is also held that the trustees may also use the annual appro-
priation granted by section 2674 of the code for the purpose 
of paying the current expense of the experiment station. 
SIR-Your favor of July 23d, asking for my opinion and construction of 
section one of chapter 152 of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General Assem-
bly, and also of the legality of using funds appropriated by section 2674 of 
the code, which request is as follows,-
'' Resolved that we, the board of trustees of the Iowa State College of 
Agriculture and Mechanic Arts, hereby request the Attorney-General 
of Iowa to render a decision as to the legality of using funds appropri-
ated by section one of chapter 152 of the laws of the Twenty-eighth 
General Assembly for the support and current expenses of the experi-
ment station, and also the legality of using funds appropriated by sec-
tion 267! of the code of Iowa in the same manner, " -
carne to hand some time ago, and I have delayed answering the same for 
two reasons: 
First.-The letter was received during my absence from my office in Des 
Moines, and it was necessary that I have access to the records of that office 
tefore giving an opinion upon the questions involved: · 
Second.-! find that my predecessor, Mr. Remley . for whose legal opin-
ion I have a high regard, rendered an opinion which is somewhat in conflict 
wi~ the conclusions I have reached . 
After a careful consideration of the matter in all its various phases, I 
submit the following opinion in response to the resolution of the board of 
trustees of the Iowa State College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts: 
The solution of the questions called for by the resolution turns and depends 
entirely upon a single proposition, i e .: 
Is the Agricultural Experiment Station at Arhes a part of, or a depart-
ment of, the Iowa State College of A g riculture and Mechanic Arts? 
An affirmative or negative answer to this question determines the solution 
of all the questions involved in the resolution. It is therefore important to 
examine the history of the agricultural experiment station, for the purpose 
·Of ascertaining whether it was established as a department of the college, or 
as a separate institution. 
July 2, 1862, an act of congress was passed granting to the several states 
and territories an amount of public la nd to be apportioned to each, equal to 
thirty th ousand acres for each senator and representative in cong ress, to 
which the states were respectively entitled. The land so granted to be sold 
by the states, and the m oney rec ~ ived therefor to be invested in stocks and 
l?onds of the United States, or other safe securities, yielding not less than 
five per centum upon the par value thereof, which money so invested shall 
constitute a perpetual endowment fund, the interest of which may be used 
to ,;upport and maintain a college, where the leading object shall be to 
teach such branches of learning as relate to agriculture and mechanic arts, in 
such m anner as the legislatures of the s tates may respectively prescribe. 
13 
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Subdivision three of section five of the , act of congress referred to, 
provides: 
''Any state which may take and claim the benefit of the provisions 
of this act, shall provide within five years at least not less than one 
college, as described in the fourth section of this act, or the g rant to 
such state shall cease, and the state shall be bound to pay to the 
UnitP.d States the amount received for any lands previously sold . " 
Other provisions relating to the manner of locating the script issued for 
such lands, and the annual report to be made by the governors of the several 
states to congress, etc . , are incorporated in the act. 
The state of Iowa, as early as 1858, by an act of the Seventh General 
Assembly, had established a state agricultural college and model farm, to be 
connected with the entire agricultural interests of the state, and when the 
act of congress referred to became a law, Iowa was one of the first states to 
accept its benefits. 
This acceptance was enacted at the extra session of the Ninth General 
Assembly, approved on the twenty-fifth day of September, 1862, and is 
embodied in the code of 1873, in the followiiJg language: 
' 'Section 1604. The lands, rights, powers and privileges granted to 
and conferred upon the state of Iowa by the a ct of congress entitled 
'An act donating public lands to the several states and territories 
which may provide colleges for the benefit of agriculture and the 
mechanic arts,' approved July 2, 1862, are hereby accepted by the 
state of Iowa, upon the terms, conditions and restrictions contained in 
said act, and there hereby is established an agricultural college and 
model farm, to be connected with the entire agricultural and 
mechanical interests of the state; the said college and farm to be under 
the control and management of a board of five trustees, no two of 
whom shall be elected from the same congressional district." 
Under this section, all of the benefits derived from the act of congress 
were made a part of the agricultural college and model farm of the state of 
Iowa, and placed under the control and management of its board of trustees. 
On the second day of March, 1887, an act of congress was passed which 
is supplemental to the act of July 2, 1862. Section 1 of the act of 1887 
provides: 
' 'That in order to aid in acquiring and diffusing among the people 
of the United States useful and practical information on subjects con-
nected with agriculture, and to promote scientific investigation and 
experiment respecting the prin~iples and application of agricultural 
science, there shall be established, under direction of the college or 
colleges or agricultural department of colleges in each state or terri-
tory established, or which may hereafter be established, in accordance 
with the provisions of an act approved July second, eighteen hundred 
and sixty-two, entitled 'An act donating public lands to the several 
states and territories which may provide colleges for the benefit of 
agriculture and the mechanic arts,' or any of the supplements to said 
act, a department to be known an<i designated as an 'Agricultural 
Experiment Station.' " 
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Under the provisions of this section, each state or territory which accepted 
the benefits of the act of July 2, 1862, and established an agricultural college 
in conformity with the provisions thereof, was required to establish as a 
department of such college, and under its direction and control, an "Agri-
cultural Experiment Station . " 
Section 9 of the act of May 2, 1887, provides that the grants of money 
authorized by the act may be subject to the legislative assent of the several 
states and territories to the purposes of said grants. 
It is clear from the language of this act, that congress intended the exper- · 
iment stations established under the provisions of the act should be a part 
of the agricultural colleges established by the states a od territories which 
accepted the benefits of the act of 1862, and not separate and independent 
institutions . 
· The assent of the state to the provisions of the act of 1887, was given by 
the Twenty-second General Assembly by chapter 180, which became a law 
on the third day of March, 1888, and by the same act an experiment station 
was established by the legislature of Iowa as a department of the Iowa 
Agricultural College, such act being as follows : 
''WHEREAS,-The congress of the United States, by an act 
approved March 2, 1887, and entitled 'An act to establish agricultural 
experiment stations in connection with the colleges established in the 
several states under the provisions of an act approved July 2, 1862, 
and of the acts supplementary thereto,' did provide in section 9 
thereof 'that the grants of money authorized by this act are made sub-
ject to the legislative assent of the several states and territories to the 
purposes of said grants' ; therefore, 
Be it Enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Iowa: 
Section 1. That such legislative assent be and is hereby given to 
the purposes of the grants authorized by the said act of March 2, 1887, 
and that in accordance with the requirements thereof, the state agrees 
to devote the moneys thus received to the establishment and support 
of an agricultural experiment station as a department of the Iowa 
agricultural college, as provided in said act: of congress." 
This assent of the legislature to the grant of congress is embodied in sec-
tion 2645 of the present code, which is as follows: 
''Section 2645. Grant accepted. Legislative assent is given to the 
purposes of the various congressional grants to the state for the endow-
ment and support of a college of agriculture and mechanic arts, and 
an agricultural experiment station as a department thereof, upon the 
terms, conditions and restrictions contained in all acts of congress 
relating thereto, and the state assumes the duties, obligations and 
responsibilities thereby imposed. 
All moneys appropriated by the state because of the obligations 
thus assumed, and all funds arising from said congressional grants, 
shall be invested or expended in accordance with the provisions of such 
grant, for the use and support of said college located at Ames." 
'l'hus taking the entire history of the legislation relating to the establish-
ment of the experiment station of the Iowa College ot Agriculture and 
Mechanic Arts, we find that from the time that it is first mentioned in an act 
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<>f congress to the time of the enactment of the present code, every legisla-
tive body has undertaken to make it a part of the college and a department 
thereof. It is no where trea ted or referred to as a separate and independent 
institution; and when the state of Iowa accepted the benefits of the provisions 
<>f the acts of congress referred to, it by such assent agreed and bound itself 
t o establish and maintain an Agricultural Experiment Station as a part of the 
State Agricultural College, under the control and management of its board 
·of trustees. 
'!'he control of the experiment station is by cong ress and the state legisla-
ture given to the tru stees of the college. They have full power to manage 
.and control the property of the college and fa rm, whether real or personal. 
The fact that there is an annual appropriation of congress to aid in pay· 
ing the necessary expenses of conducting investigations and experiments, 
.and for printing and distributing the results of the work, does not tend to 
make the experiment station an independent institution, or give it existence 
:separate and apart from the college. 
It is a matter of common knowledge that in colleges throughout the 
-country many of the departments have separate endowment funds and re-
s ources , the income of which can only be med to pay the expenses of the 
-particular department to which the endowment belongs; bu t no one has ever 
thought that the possession of such endowment made the depar :ment an 
i nstitution separate and apart from the college to which it belongs. 
I can see no reason why the Agricultural Experiment Station is not as 
much a part of the State College of Ag riculture and Mechanic Arts, as is the 
medical department a part of the State University at Iowa City. 
I a m therefore clearly of the opinion that the Agricultural Experiment 
Station is a part and a department of the Iowa State College of Agriculture 
and Mechanic Arts, and that the annual appropria tion granted by section 
2674 of the code can be used by the board of.. trustees of the college as their 
judgment shall direct for the purpose of paying current expenses of the 
experiment station, as a department of that college , precisely as it can be 
used to pay the expenses of any other department. 
The conclusion which I have arr ived at, and the construction which I 
bave placed upon section 2674 of the code , applies with equal force to sec-
tion 1 of chapter 152 of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly. 
This section provides: 
' 'There is hereby appropriated to the · Iowa State College of 
A g riculture and Mechanic Arts, out. of any money in the state treasury 
not otherwise appropriated, for repairs, general improvements, current 
expenses and additional support: the sum of twenty-five thousand 
dollars annually hereafter; said sum to be paid in quarterly install-
ments on the order of the trustees, the first installment to be paid July 
1 , 1900 ." 
The Experiment Station, being, as we have seen, a department and part 
of the Iowa State College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts, the board of 
tru~tees may legally use such portion of the money appropriated by section 
1 of chapter 152 of the laws ::>f the Twenty-eighth General Assembly as is in 
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their judgment required to meet the current expenses and support of such 
department. Respectfully submitted; 
CHAS. W. MuLLAN, 
Attorney -General. 
August 24, 1901. 
7 0 E. w. Stanton, Secretary of the Board of 1 rustees of the Iowa 
State College of Agriwlture atLd Mechanic Arts. 
GAME LAws-Pinnated grouse, quail and other game birds pro-
tected by law may be, under the present statute, lawfully sold 
during the period when it is lawful to kill such birds within the 
state. 
SIR-I a m in receipt of your favor of the 31st ult . , asking for a construction 
of sections 2552, 2554 and 2555 of the code, relating to the killing and selling 
of certain game birds. 
There is a slight incongrui ty in these sections, and it appears to me that 
the leg islature had the thought to prohibit the sale of game birds withi~ the 
state at the time the Jaw was enacted, but the interpretation of the law ttself 
will not bear this ' ut . 
Section 2552 of the code prohibits and makes it a crime for any person to 
trap, shoot or kill prairie chicken, woodcock, q a ail or rough &rouse for 
traffic . . 
• Section 2554 makes it a n offense for any person, company or corporation 
to buy or sell or have in possession any such birds or ~nimals during the 
period when the killing thereof is prohibited, except during the first five days 
of such prohibited period. . 
Section 2555 provides that no person, company or corporatiOn shall at any 
time ship, take or carry out of the state any of fhe birds or animals named, 
but it shall b < lawful to ship to any person wi1hin the state any of the game 
birds named, not to exceed one dozen in any one day, during the period 
when the killing of such birds is not prohi bi ted , providing an affidavit, made 
before some person authorized to administer oaths , that the birds have not 
been unlawfully killed, bought, sold or had in possession, and are not 
shipped for sale or profit, is made and attached to the bir~s so ~hipped . 
Neither of thes@ sections in terms , or in language whtch wtll bear such 
construction, prohibits the sale of such game birds within the state during 
the open period. . 
I am therefore of the opinion that pinnated g rouse, quat!, and other 
game birds protected by Jaw, may be under the present statute lawfully sold, 
during the period when it is lawful to kill such birds within the state of Iowa. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHAS . W. MULLAN, 
A tlorney- General. 
September 6, 1901. 
To Hon . George A. Lincoln, Fisk and Game Warden, Cedar Rapids, 
Iowa. 
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LABELS, TRADE MARKS AND FoRMS OF ADVERTISEMENT- Each is 
separate and independent of the other, and in order that the 
person applying to have the three which he has adopted regis-
tered, and he be secured in the exclusive benefits thereof under 
section 5049 of the code, he must reg ister each separately and 
receive separate certificates thuefor. 
SIR-In compliance with your request, I have examined section 5049 of 
the code, with reference to the dut ies of the secreta ry of state a s to issuing 
certi fi cates of registration of labels , trade marks and forms of advertisement 
as provided in such section , and after a careful reading thereof, I am of th~ 
opinion that a separate certificate must be issued by the secretary for each of 
the purposes desired. The· provi~ions of the section are as follows: 
''Every person or a ssociation, or union of work ingmen, or others , 
that has adopted, or shall adopt for their protection any label, trade 
mark, or form of advertisement, may file the same for record in the 
office of the secretary of state, by leaving two copies, counterparts or 
facsimiles thereof, with the secretary of state. Said secretary shall 
thereupon deliver to such person, association or union so filing the 
same, a duly attested certificate of the record of the same, for which 
he shall receive a fee of one dollar.'' 
The section provides for the filing of a label, a trade mark, and a form 
of advertisement. A label is not necessarily a tra:le mark or a form of 
advertisement, nor is a trade mark a label or form of advertisement nor 
is a form of advertisement necessarily a label or trade mark . ' 
Any one desiring to place a particular label or brand upon the goods 
which he sells, must apply to have such label registered. If he desires to 
adopt any particular trade mark, he must have such trade mark registered, 
and if he desires to adopt any particular forfn of advertisement, and to be 
protected in the exclusive use thereof, he must register such form of adver-
tisement. 
I think the three are separate and independent of each other, and in 
order that the person applying to h3.ve the label, trade mark or form of 
advertisement which he has adopted registered, and he be secured in the 
exclusive benefits thereof under the statute, he must register each separately 
and receive S!lparate certificates therefor from the secretary of state. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHAS. W . MULLAN, 
A ltorney- General. 
September 11, 1901. • 
To Hon . W. B. Martin, Secretary of State. 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE-Use of Funds Appropriated-
Under section 21 of chapter 58 of the laws of the Twenty-
eighth General Assembly, making an annual appropriation of 
$1,000 for insurance and improvements to buildings on the 
state fair grounds, if it is admitted desirable to use the whole 
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sum thus appropriated for insurance, it is within the power of 
the department to do so. 
Sm-In compliance with your request for a construction of section 21 of 
chapter 58 of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly as to the 
right of the Department of Agriculture to draw and use the funds thereby 
appropriated, I submit the following opinion: 
Section 21 prov ides for an annual appropriation of one thousand dollars 
for insurance and improvements to build in gs on the state fair grounds, the 
auditor to draw the warrant therefor upon the order of the department of 
agriculture , sig ned by the president and secretary thereof, in such sums and 
a t such times as the department may deem necessary . 
Thi~ provision gives to the depa rtment the discretion and r ight to use the 
one thousand dollars appropria ted for e ither of the purposes designated, as 
shall be deemed advisa ble by them. 
If a better rate of insurance can be obtained and the department of agri-
culture be thereby benefited financially by taking the insurance for a long 
term and using the sum so appropr iated to pay for such insurance, it is 
within the power of the department of agriculture to so use the money. 
The legislature has simply made the appropriation for insurance and 
improvements, and left it wholly to the discretion of the departme~t as to 
the use of the same for either of the purposes for which it is appi'opnated. 
If it is deemed advisable to use the whole sum thus appropriated for 
insurance, it is, in my judgment, within the power of the department to do 
iO ana the auditor should issue his warrant for the payment of such sum, 
up
1
on the order of the agricultural department sigaed by the president and 
secretary thereof. Respectfully submitted, 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
Attorney-General. 
September 25, 1901. 
To Hon. Frank F. Merriam, Auditor of State . 
BALLOT-N arne of City Officer on at General Election-The name 
of a city officer should not go on the ballot at the general 
November election, and a vacancy in a municipal office cannot 
be legally filled at such ele ction: 
SIR-I am in receipt of your favor of the 20th inst., asking my construc-
tion of section 1278 of the code, upon the question as to whether, under its 
provisions, the name of a city officer should be placed upon the ballot at a 
general election. 
I have hesitated somewhat about expressing an opinion as to the proper 
construct ion of this section, for two reasons: 
First.-- I am not required by law to render such an opinion, unless the 
matter is referred to me by one of the departments of the state. 
Second.-This section is so out of harmony with other provisions of the 
statute, that it is extremely difficult to determine what the intent of the 
legislature was, when it was enacted. 
. As the request comes from a brother lawyer, however, in his capacity as 
city solicitor, I will answer the inquiry to the best of my ability. 
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The term ''General Election" has always been understood to mean the 
election at which officers of the general government, either federal or state 
-as distinguished from local officers-are elected . 
This definition of the term appears to have been adopted by the legisla-
ture in sections 1057 and 1089 of the code, and were it not for the fact that 
the provisions of section 1278, if construed to mean that city officers shall be 
elected at general elections are repugnant to other provisions of the code, 
which must be given full force and effect, I should hold that the term 
' general election,'' as used in that section, means the general November 
election at which federal, state and county officers are elected. 
Under the constitution, every elector at a general election must have 
been a resident of the state six months and of the county sixty days, to 
entitle him to cast his vote, and if he possesses such qualifications as to 
residence, and is a citizen of the United States, he is entitled to have his 
name placed upon the registry list, and to vote at any general election. 
Section 642, which provides for municipal elections, requires that in 
addition to the six months' residence in the s~ate and sixty days in the 
county, he must have been, at the time of such election, a resident of the 
precinct in which he offers to vote ten days prior to such election; and in 
cities where registration is required, his name cannot be placed upon the 
registry list, nor will he be entitled to vote at a municipal election, unless he 
possesses such qualifications as to residence in the voting precinct. 
If the name of a city officer is placed upon the ballot of a general elec-
tion, at which electors having the general qualification as to residence in the 
state and county are permitted to vote, it would render the provision of sec-
tion 642, as to the ten days' residence in the voting precinct, nugatory, as 
each elector voting at such general election would have the right to cast his 
ballot and have it counted for all of the offices named thereon, and no dis-
tinction could be made between persons entitled to vote at the municipal 
election under section 642, and those who are entitled to vote at a general 
election, under the provisions of the constitution. 
The effect would be that ballots would be cast for the city office by per· 
sons not legally entitled to vote at a municipal election, and the result of the 
election might be very different from what it would be were the legal 
electors at a municipal election only permitted to vote . 
Section 1272 provides that vacancies in all city elective offices, when there 
are sixty days of an tl nexpired term, shall be filled by a special election, to 
be c:alled by the council as soon after the vacancy occurs as is practicable . 
This section clearly contemplates that 
6
all vacancies in elective city offices 
shall be filled by a municipal election, at which only electors possessing the 
qualification required by section 642, shall be permitted to vote. 
I do not believe that it was the intention of the legislature, by the provi-
sions of section 1278, to permit city officers to be elected by electors not 
having such qualification. The provisions of sections 642 and 1272, in my 
opinion, control the construction which must be given to the provisions of 
1278, and I think the term, "general election," as used in that section, 
when applied to the election of city officers, must be held to be the general 
city election held on the last Monday in March, instead of the general elec-
tion for federal, state, and county officers, held in November. 
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Taking this view of the statute, I am of the opinion that the name of a 
city officer should not go on the ballot at the general November election, 
and that a vacancy in a municipal office cannot be legally filled at such 
election . Respectfully su bm tted, 
September 26, 1901. 
To F. A. Harrima1t, Hampton, Iowa . 
CHAS . W . MULLAN, 
Attorney-General. 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF STATE LIBRARY-Right to Sign Requi-
sition for funds-The governor is ex o.tficio president of the 
board. The power to draw money upon requisition made is 
necessarily lodged in the board. In the absence of the presi-
dent, the board may authorize its president p1·o tem to sign 
the requisitions made upon the auditor, and when this is dune, 
such requisition should be honored by the auditor as though 
signed by the president himself. 
DEAR SIR-I am in receipt of your communication of the 15th io5tant, 
asking my opinion as to whether the auditor can recognize the signature of 
any other person than the governor to requisitions made by the board of 
trustees of the library, for the funds appropriated by the general assembly 
for the support of the library and historical department. 
There appears to be no direct provision by statute as to the manner in 
which requisitions shall be made upon the auditor for the money so appro-
priated, and as no specific method is pointed out by statute as to how such 
requisition shall be made, and the money drawn for the use of the library 
and historical department, the details o t the meth'Od of making such requi-
sitions is left to the discretion of the board. 
Ordinarily such requisitions should perhaps be signed by the president of 
the board. If, however, the president for any reason is absent, or unable 
to act at times when it is necessary for the board to meet to transact its busi-
ness, the president pro tem, who should be eleeted by the board, may 
legally perform the duties of the president, and sign such requisitions upon 
the auditor for the money appropriated by the general assembly as shall be 
authorized by the board itself. 
In other words, the power to draw money upon requisitions made is nec-
essarily lodged in the board. The board may authorize its president protem 
to sign the requisitions made upon the auditor, and when this is done, such 
requisitions should be honored by the auditor, as though signed by the 
president himself. 
Respectfully submitted, 
October 17, 1901. 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
Attorney-General. 
To Hon. Frank F. Merriam, Auditor of State. 
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INSURANCE CoMPANIEs-Mutual Life-Such companies, organized 
under chapter 65 of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General 
Assembly may, if they so provide in their articles of incorpo-
ration, insure against the casualties named in subdivision 5 of 
chapter 1709 of the code. 
SIR-Chapter 61 of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General .1\ssembly pro-
vides: 
'' That se::tion 1710 of the code be amended by inserting after the 
word 'company' in the sixth line, the following provision: Provided , 
however, that any life insurance company organized on the stock or 
mutual plan, and authorized by its charter or articles of incorporation 
so to do, may, on complying with the provisions of this chapter, in 
addition to such life insurance, insure against all of the casualties 
specified in subdivision 5 of section 1709 of the code." 
Chapter 65 of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly authorizes 
the organization of both stock and mutual insurance companies upon the 
stipulated premium plan, for the purpose of issuing policies of insurance on 
the lives of individuals. 
U nder the chapter quoted, a mutual life insurance company organized 
under chapter 65, would have the right , if its articles of incorporation so 
provided, to insure against the casualties specified in subdivision 5 of sec-
tion 1709, it being the express intent of the legislature that all life insurance 
companies doing business within the state, either upon the stock or mutual 
plan, shall have the right to provide in their articles of incorporation for 
such insurance . 
It is a rule of construction of statutes,. that where there are apparently 
conflicting provisions, they must be construed if possible, to give t.orce to 
each of the provisions of the statute. 
In view of the acts of the legislature embodied in chapter 61 of the laws 
of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly, which authorizes mutual companies 
to insure against personal injuries and general accidents, I think the clause 
contained in section 1710, which is as follows : ' 'or expose itself to loss on 
any one risk or hazard to an amount exceeding ten per cent of its paid up 
capital, unless the excess shall be reinsured in some other good and reliable 
company," must be held to apply to companies organized on the stock plan, 
and that it was the intention of the legislature, in enacting chapter 61 of the 
laws of the Twenty-eighth General A~sembly, to permit mutual insurance 
companies to insure against the casualties named in subdivision 5 of section 
1709, although such companies had no paid up capital stock. 
Companies organized under chapter 65 of the laws of the Twenty· eighth 
General Assembly may be, a's we have seen, mutual life insurance companies, 
and as such, would come within the provisions of chapter 61. 
I am therefore of the opinion that mutual comp<!nies, organized under 
chapter 65 of the laws of the Twenty-eighth General Assembly, may, if 
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they so provide in their articles of incorporation, insure against the cas-
ualties named in subdivision 5 of chapter 1709 of the code. 
Respectfully submitted, 
October 29, 1901. 
CHAS . W. MuLLAN, 
Attorney-C e~teral. 
To Hon . Frank F. Merriam, Auditor of State . 
CoLLATERAL INHER ITANCE T Ax-It 1s held that real es tate 
si tuated within the jurisdiction of Iowa, although the same 
has been by provi sio ns in the will of a testator directed to be 
sold, and the proceeds distributed, is liabl e to pay the col-
lateral inheritance tax imposed by our statute. 
SIR-Upon the li&.bility of lands in the state of Iowa, owned by William 
Huber at the time of his decease, to pay a collateral inheritance tax, I 
submit the following opinion: 
William Huber, a resident of the state of Pennsylvania, died in March, 
1901. 
At the time of his death he was the owner of land in the state of Iowa, 
which, under the provisions of his will is to be sold by his executor and the 
proceeds thereof distributed among collateral heirs named in the will. 
It is claimed by the ext> cutor that such provision in the will is an equita-
ble conversion of the real estate situated in Iowa into personalty, and that 
the domicile of the deceased draws to the state of Pennsylvania jurisdiction 
over all his personalty, wherever situate, and that, by fiction of law, the 
real estate in Iowa being converted into personalty by the terms of the will, 
is within the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania and not liable to the collateral 
inheritance tax imposed by the statutes of this state. 
In support of this proposition I have received from Mr. William ·s. 
Hosmer, attorney for the executor, a very able brief and argument, setting 
forth very clearly the claims of the executor and the holding of the Pennsyl-
vania courts upon the question s involved. 
The position t1ken by the executor, through his counsel, is undoubtedly 
the law of Pennsylvania . 
The courts of that state have carried the principle contended for to a 
complete logical conclusion. 
In Miller v. Commonwealth, 111 Pa. St., 321, it is held that where a 
testator provided in his will that land in another state should be sold by the 
executor and the proceeds thereof distributed among collateral heirs of the 
testator, such provision was an equitable conversi.m of the real estate into 
personalty, and the domicile of the testator being in Pennsylvania drew to 
the jurisdiction of that state all pe rsonalty of which the testator died seised; 
the proceeds of the land being part of his personal estate in Pennsylvania, 
was liable to pay the collateral inheritance tax imposed by that state. 
This principle was subsequently reaffirmed in later cases, and the court 
has applied the doctrine with equal force to land in the state of Pennsylvania 
as to lands in other states. 
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Coleman's Estate, 15~ Pa. St., 231. 
I cannot, however, agree with the rule of law announced by these 
decisions, or the reasoning which leads to the conclusion reached . 
Our statute provides: 
''All property within the jurisdiction of this state, and any interest 
therein, whether belonging to the inhabitants of this state or not, and 
whether tangible or intangible, which shall pass by will c r by the 
statutes of inheritance of this or any other state, or by deed, grant, 
sale or gift made or intended to take effect in possession or in enjoy-
ment after the death of the grantor or donor, to any person in trust or 
otherwise, other than to or for the use of the father, mother, hus-
band, wife, lineal descendant, adopted child, the lineal descendant of 
an adopted child of a decedent, or to or for charitable, educational or 
religious societies or institutions within this state, shall be subject to a 
tax of five per centum of its value, above the sum of one thousand 
dollars, afterthepaymentof all debts, for the use of the sta te;* * *" 
The real estate owned by Huber at the time of his decease is within the 
jurisdiction of the state of Iowa . 
The proposition that real estate t annot be taxed or charged except in the 
jurisdiction where it is situate applies equally to succession taxes as to other 
forms of taxation. This principle has been enunciated in a large number of 
cases. 
The rule that real estate, and everything pertaining to its devolution, 
transmission and tenure, is governed and controlled by the law of its situs, 
is a vital principle of the inter-state law of this country, and one which 
probably more than any other, has maintained the equilibrium and avoided 
the clashing of the taxin g powers of the several states. 
'l'o charge the succession of foreign real estate with the payment of col-
lateral inheritance taxes is inconsistent with the spiri t of such taxation. 
Land situated abroad and devised by a domestic will to persons living 
within the state, does not devolve by force of the will, nor of the domestic 
law, but by permission of the state where the land is situated and under the 
provisions of the laws of that state . 
The doctrine that real estate may be converted into personalty, by a pro-
vision of the will of the testator that the same shall be sold and the proceeds 
distributed upon his death, is a n equitable fiction of the law, which can 
have no place in a system of taxation. 
The conversion thus effected by a court of equity is designed to prevent 
injury, or to better carry out and furtper the intentions of the testator; but 
a fiction in equity will not bring within the jurisdiction of the st'!te, for the 
purpose of taxation, lands which cannot otherwise be taxed under the laws 
of that state, nor can it take out of or remove from the jurisdiction of a 
state lands situated therein. The land remains as realty within the state 
where it is situate, subject to the laws of inheritance of that state, and sub-
ject to the laws providing for a succession tax thereon. 
This question was ably considered in Swift's EJtate, 137 N. Y., in which 
Gray, J., said: 
''The question of the right of a state to tax is one of fact, and 
cannot turn upon theories or fictions, whic~, however serviceable to 
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adjust the rights of parties, were never intended to furnish a basis of 
constitutional power." 
I am clearly of the opinion that the supreme court of this state will not 
adopt the reasoning or conclusion of the Penn, ylvania courts upon this ques-
tion, and will hold that real estate situate within the jusisdiction of Iowa, 
although the same has been, by a provision in the will of a testator, directed 
to be sold and the proceeds ai~tributed, is liable to pay the collateral inheri-
tance tax imposed by our statute. 
Respectfully submitted, 
November 1, 1901. 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
Attorney- General. 
To Hon. G. S. Gilbertson, Treasurer of State. 
TRUSTEES OF IowA STATE NoRMAL ScHoOL-Per diem charges-
Mileage for traveling outside of state-A member of the 
board of trustees acting as a member of the building committee 
of such institution, is not entitled to draw from the state 
treasury pe1· diem while traveling beyond the state, nor is he 
entitled to have pay for mileage computed under provision of 
section 2618. 
The opinion of Attorney-General Remley under date of June Ig, 
1899, to the auditor of sta te, is concurred in. 
SrR-In compliance with your request of September 17th, in which you 
.ask the following questions-
First-Whether as a member of the building committee, a trustee of the 
Iowa State Normal School is entitled to charge per diem for services rendered 
·outside of the state 
Second-Whether such trustee is entitled to mileage for travel outside of 
the state. 
7hird-Whether he is entitled to per diem and mileage as a member of 
the building committee to any other point in the state other than that where · 
the institution is located- ' 
I submit the following opinion: 
Section 2617 provides that regents and trustees .shall be allowed four 
·dollars for each day actually and necessarily engaged in the performance of 
official duties, not exceeding thirty days in any one year. 
This provision restricts the per diem compensation which may be allowed 
and paid to trustees of the Iowa State Normal School, to the time they are 
actu >lly and necessarily engaged in the performance of official duties. 
In an <>pinion given by my predecessor, Mr. Remley, as to whether mem-
bers of the board of regents of the Iowa State Univers 1ty should receive com-
pensation and mileage for trips made outside of the state of Iowa, he used 
\this language: 
''The language of section 5 :04 is that they should 'receive as com-
pensation four dollars per day for each and every day actually 
employed in the discharge of their duties ,. and the actual and necessary 
206 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 
expenses incurred while so engaged.' The term, 'thtir duties,' evi-
dently refers to their duties as regents. It may be said generally that 
in the duties of the board of regents to govern the university and man-
age and control its affairs, the regents act as a unit, as a board. It 
may be, and probably is proper for the board of regents to send some 
one to inspect articles to be purchased or needed by the institution, or 
to obtain information as to the best methods of making needed repairs, 
and it is not improper to send a memoer of the board to obtain the 
information needed. But I do not like to say that a person thus sent 
was discharging his duty as a regent. Some person other than a 
regent could be employed to make any inspection or examination and 
obtain information needed by the board. He obtains information and 
data which the board of regents may act upon when they are called 
upon to discharge their duties as regents. Such trips, I believe, are 
always undertaken for the purpose of obtaining information to enable 
the regents to act intelligently upon any matter before them . While 
it is undoubtedly incumbent upon one holding the office of regent to 
obtain information and knowledge necessary to enable him to dis-
charge the duties of regent intelligently, yet obtaining such informa-
tion and knowledge is not discharging the duties of regent. 
''There is, to my mind, clearly a distinction to be made between 
the duties of a regent and the duties of one appointed, who may be a 
member of the board or not, to go elsewhere and obtain information 
upon which the regents may act. 
• 'Section 5104 of McClain's code provides fer the compensation and 
expenses of the regents while actually engaged in the discharge of their 
duties, but does not provide for the payment of agents or employes 
appointed by the board of regents." 
In an opinion given by Mr. Remley, June 19, 1899, to the auditor of state, 
he further says: · 
'' 'The limitation of thirty days shall not apply to building commit· 
tees, which shall not consist of more than three members, but such 
committee shall not charge for or receive compensation for more than 
sixty days in any one year' is a legislative recognition of a custom which 
has long prevailed wit.h all appointing committees to discharge certain 
duties which can be more appropriately done by a committee than by 
a full board.'' 
The reasoning given in this opinion of Mr. Remley applies with equal 
force to the trustees of the Iowa State Normal school, and I concur in the 
conclusion reached; with a slight excet>tion. 
Whenever a building committee is appointed by a board, it acts for and 
in behalf of the board, and whenever meetings of such committee are 
called, and are necessary for the transaction of the official business of the 
board, the members of such committee are entitled to their per diem and 
mileage. 
I am of the opinion that it is not necessary that such meeting~ shall be 
called or held at the place where the institution is located, but may be called 
·and held at any convenient and suitable place within the state, and the 
members attending such meeting would be entitled to per diem and mileage, 
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computed by the nearest traveled route from the home of the member to the 
place where the meeting is held. 
Where, however, a member of the board or a member of the building 
committee is selected as an agent of the board or of the committee to travel 
beyond the state for the purpose of obtaining information which may be 
laid before the board or the committee, to enable it to act intelligently 
upon the questions coming before it, the work thus Clone by such mem-
ber cannot be said to be the official act of such trustee or regent. He is 
simply acting as the agent of the board or of the committee in obtaining 
information for it, to enable the board or committee to act officially in rela-
tion thereto. 
In such case, I am of the opinion that the person so traveling beyond the 
state is not entitled to draw from the state treasury a compensation of 
four dollars per day, or to have his mileage computed by the auditor and 
paid to hlm under the provisions of section 2618. 
In so holding, I do not wish to be understood that such person is not 
entitled to compensation and expenses under the circumstances suggested, 
but only as saying that the auditor has no A-uthority, under the provisions 
of the statute, to draw a warrant for his per diem and mileage. 
It is within the power of the board of trustees to pay to the person who is 
thus employed by them a reasonable compensation and expenses for the ser-
vices performed at their request, opt of the funds of the institution under 
their control. Respectfully submitted, 
November 16, 1901. 
CHAS. W. MULLAN, 
Attorney-General. 
To Hon. Frank F. Merriam, Auditor of State. 
BoARD OF CoNTROL-Authority to Employ Assistant Architect-
Under section 23 of chapter I 18 of the laws of the Twenty-
seventh General Assembly, the board of control has no power 
to employ a consulting architect or additional skilled assist-
ance for the purpose of informing themselves as to the adop-
tion of the plans of a public building, until the legislature has 
authorized the erection of such building and made an appro-
priation therefor. 
SIR-I am in receipt of your favor of the 6th instant, asking my opinion 
as to the construction of section 23 of chapter 118 of the laws of the Twenty-sev-
enth General Assembly, relating to the employment of an assistant archi-
tect, and as to whether such assistant architect can, under the provisions of 
that section, be employed in anticipation of an appropriation by the legis-
lature for the construction' of a public building. 
The portion of the section applicable to the question at issue, is as 
follows: 
' ' In case!! of sufficient magnitute, the board may secure the advice 
of a consulting architect, or secure additional skilled assistance before 
the adoption of the plans of the state architect, but the expense 
thereof shall not exceed fifteen hundred ~ollars in any one year.'' 
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It appears to me clear that th<: intent of the legislature was, where an 
appropriation is made for the erection of an important public building, of 
such magnitude as, in the judgment of the board of control, the advice of a 
consulting architect or skilled assistant is desirable before the adoption Of 
the plan of the state architect, for the purposE: of obtaining the knowledge 
and information necessary to determine as to whether the plan of the state 
architect should be. adopted, the board has the right to secure the advice of 
a consulting architect, or the services of an additional skilled assistant for 
such purpose. 
I think, however, that the provisions of the section do not go to the 
length of authorizing the board of control to secure the advice of a consult-
ing architect or additional skilled assistance, in anticipation of an appro_ 
priatlon by the legislature for the erection of a public building. 
Prior to the making of such an appropriation, the whole matter is within 
the authority of the legislature. and not the board of control. If the legis-
lature requires any information imparted to it through the medium of a con-
sulting architect or otherwise, to enable it to act intelligently in making an 
appropriation for a public building, it ha> full power to obtain such informa-
tion in any manner it may deem best. 
Authority is not given to the board of control by section 23 to incur the 
expense 01 obtaining such information in behalf of the legislature . 
Under this construction of section 23, I am of the opinion that it is not 
within the power of the board c f control to employ a consulting architect or 
additional skilled assistance, for the purpose of informing themselves as to 
the adoption of the plans of a public building, until the legislature has 
authorized the erection of such building, and made an appropriation therefor. 
December 12, 1901. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHAS. W . MULLAN, 
Attorney-Gmeral. 
To Hon. L. G. Kinne, Chairma1l Board of Co1ltrol. 
GASOUNE LABELS TO BE UsED ON PAcKAGEs, BARRELS AND CAsKs 
CoNTAINING GASOLINE-The law makes it the duty of dealers 
in gasoline to label and mark the packages, barrels and casks 
sold by them, and they must be at the expense of procuring 
the labels necessary for that purpose , as there is no authority 
of law for the furnishing of such labels, or for paying therefor 
by the state. .. 
SIR-I am in receipt of your favor of the 12th inst., requesting my op in-
ion as to the construction of sections 2505, 2506, 2507 and 2508 of the code, 
with reference to the duty of the state to purchase and furnish free of 
expense to retail dealers gasoline labels to be used by them in labeling pack-
ages, barrels, or casks containing gasoline sold to their customers. 
Section 2505 provides: 
' 'Each inspector shall be furnished at reasonable expense to the 
state, the necessary instruments and apparatus for testing, and shall 
promptly make inspection, and test and brand all illuminating oils 
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kept for sale, and for such purpose may enter upon the premises of 
any person * * * 
''If, upon test and examination, the oil shall meet the require-
ments, he shall brand over his official signature and date on the barrel 
or package holding the same, 'Approved, flash test, ...... ... .. .. .. . 
degrees,' inserting in the blank the number. 
''Should it fail to meet the requirements, it shall be branded 
under his official signature and date, 'Rejected for illuminating pur-
poses.' ~ ' 
. The~ follow certain provisions regulating the manner of making the 
mspect10n, by whom the inspector shall be paid, and what disposition shall 
be made of the money received by h •m. 
Following, and in the same section, is this provision. 
''No gasoline shall be sold, given away, or delivered to any person 
in this state until the package, cask. barrel, or vessel containing the 
same has been plainly marked gasoline." 
This is a regulation by the legislature of the sale of gasoline by wholesale 
and retail dealers, as being a commodity which it is necessary to regulate 
the sale of for public safety. 
Thi.s regulation is a restriction upon its sale precisely as is the regulation 
made 1n regard to the sale of many other commodities within the state. 
Many articles kept are sold by pharmacists, and required by the statute to 
be plainly marked as to their character, and the fact that the same are 
poisonous, and no one has ever thought that it was the duty of the state to 
furnish the labels for so marking such commodities. 
I find no provision of law in chapter 11, title 12, or elsewhere, which can 
be construed as requiring the state to furnish labels to be put upon gasoline 
packages, casks or barrels sold by retail dealers . 
The law makes it the duty of such dealers to label and mark the pack-
ages, casks and barrels sold by them, and I am clearly of the opinion that 
they must be at the expense of procuring the labels necessary for that pur-
pose, and that there is no authority of law for the furnishing of such labels 
or for paying therefor by the state. ' 
Respectfully submitted, 
December 14, 1901. 
<.'HAS. W. MULLAN, 
A tlonzey-General . 
To Hon. W. B. Martin, Secretary of State. 
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